2019 (8) TMI 1917 - SC - Indian Laws

Civil Suit for recovery of damages - territorial jurisdiction of the court to try this suit - suit barred by time limittaion or not - non-joinder of necessary parties - suit land was notified as forming part of the Wildlife Sanctuary or not - Plaintiff is entitled to damages or not - entitlement to interest - privity of contract between the parties to claim compensation - time limitation. Claim for damages by the Appellant-whether sustainable? - HELD THAT - It could at once be noticed that a few changes were brought about by the amending enactment i.e., Act No. 44 of 1991, having the effect of slightly altering the process of declaration of sanctuary. Prior to the said amendment, the notification Under Section 18(1) of the Act of 1972 was of the declaration of an area to be a sanctuary whereas, after the amendment, such notification Under Section 18(1) would be of declaration by the State Government of its intention to constitute an area as a sanctuary. However, the remaining part of the scheme of the provisions regarding the powers of the Collector to determine the rights; the bar over accrual of rights after issuance of notification Under Section 18; issuance of proclamation by the Collector; inquiry by the Collector; and the Collector's powers for the purpose of inquiry remained essentially the same. The operation and effect of Section 20 of the Act of 1972 - HELD THAT - The entire substratum of the case of the Appellant is knocked to the ground once it is found that the Appellant had acquired no right under the said second lease dated 20.03.1978 and least any right against the State. Noteworthy it is that in all the previous litigations, initially seeking exclusion of land in question from the sanctuary; then seeking compensation for its inclusion; and then questioning its exclusion, the Mutt had been an active participant. In fact, the last petition seeking to question the exclusion was filed jointly by the Mutt and the Appellant. However, the Mutt has not joined the claim for damages in this suit - Appellant had no right whatsoever to claim damages with reference to the alleged cause of action based on the order of exclusion dated 19.11.1993 for the reason that the alleged second lease was of no effect and the Appellant had acquired no right thereunder - suit filed by the Appellant is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. Even if the Appellant had any right, there was no infringement - HELD THAT - The Division Bench has rightly observed in the impugned judgment that there is nothing on record to establish that the original owner and the Plaintiff were prevented from going inside the forest and collecting the usufructs. In a comprehension of the facts on record and the law applicable, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff-Appellant was prevented from exercising its lawful rights in any unlawful manner by the State. Hence, there appears no basis for the Appellant to maintain an action for damages. The Appellant had no case for claiming damages against the Respondent-State. Hence, it does not appear necessary to deal with various decisions cited by learned Counsel for the Appellant as regards violation of right to property and the claim for damages on that count. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly answered both the material questions i.e., as to whether the Appellant had any right in the subject land; and if there was any such right, as to whether the same had been infringed, against the Appellant in a proper manner and in accordance with law. No case for granting any decree for damages is made out. Time Limitation - HELD THAT - In the present case, except the fact that the earlier writ petition in challenge to the exclusion order dated 19.11.1993 was civil proceeding and the Plaintiff might have been prosecuting with due diligence, none of the other requirements of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are satisfied. The basic requirement, that the matter in issue in the earlier and the later proceeding ought to be the same; and both the proceedings, earlier and later, ought to relate to the same cause of action and for the same relief, is totally missing. Rather, the matter in issue in the earlier proceeding could well be contradistinguished from the matter in issue in the present suit. In the said earlier proceeding, the Plaintiff-Appellant joined the Mutt to assert that the Respondent-State was not entitled to exclude the land in question from sanctuary; and that the State ought to take the land and ought to pay compensation as proposed by some of its officers. On the other hand, the claim in the present suit is founded on the ground that the Plaintiff has suffered loss due to the proceedings under the Act of 1972 and then, due to exclusion of the subject land from acquisition. The Plaintiff-Appellant consciously chose not to claim damages in the wake of the order dated 19.11.1993 and, instead, joined the Mutt to seek the relief that the said order dated 19.11.1993 be quashed and the land be not excluded from sanctuary. Having failed in such an attempt, the Appellant could not have maintained the claim for damages, by filing a suit in the year 1998 - Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the present suit; and, for being otherwise barred by limitation, the suit is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. The suit filed by the Plaintiff-Appellant was barred by limitation and even otherwise, the Plaintiff-Appellant had no case on merits to claim damages from the Respondent-State. The Division Bench of the High Court has rightly allowed the appeal filed by the State and has rightly dismissed the baseless suit filed by the Appellant - Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the court.
2. Limitation period for filing the suit.
3. Non-joinder of necessary parties.
4. Notification of the suit land as part of the Wildlife Sanctuary.
5. Entitlement of the Plaintiff to damages and the quantum thereof.
6. Entitlement of the Plaintiff to interest.
7. Privity of contract between the parties for claiming compensation.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Court:
The trial court determined that it had the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned Single Judge rejected the Defendant's objection regarding jurisdiction, deciding the issue in favor of the Plaintiff.

2. Limitation Period for Filing the Suit:
The learned Single Judge held that the suit was filed within time, disagreeing with the Defendant's contention that it was barred by limitation. However, the Division Bench of the High Court expressed doubts about the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the exclusion of time spent in prosecuting a previous proceeding. The Division Bench did not decide on this issue due to the dismissal of the suit on merits but noted that the writ petition filed earlier was for a different relief and dismissed on merit, not for want of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the suit barred by limitation, as the cause of action arose on 19.11.1993, and the suit was filed much later on 08.06.1998.

3. Non-joinder of Necessary Parties:
The learned Single Judge found that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, deciding the issue in favor of the Plaintiff.

4. Notification of the Suit Land as Part of the Wildlife Sanctuary:
The Plaintiff-Appellant claimed that the land was included in the notification for the sanctuary, which was not denied by the Defendant. The learned Single Judge found that the land was indeed notified as part of the sanctuary, which was a key aspect of the Plaintiff's claim for damages.

5. Entitlement of the Plaintiff to Damages and the Quantum Thereof:
The learned Single Judge awarded damages to the Plaintiff, holding them entitled to a sum of Rs. 51.82 lakhs towards damages and Rs. 35.06 lakhs as interest. However, the Division Bench reversed this decision, finding that the Plaintiff had not acquired any right under the second lease due to the notification under Section 18 of the Act. The Division Bench held that there was no statutory embargo preventing the Plaintiff from exercising its rights and that the Plaintiff was not prevented from entering the land or collecting usufructs. The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench's view, finding no unlawful act by the State that would entitle the Plaintiff to damages.

6. Entitlement of the Plaintiff to Interest:
The learned Single Judge awarded interest to the Plaintiff, but the Division Bench set aside this finding, rejecting the Plaintiff's claim for interest. The Supreme Court agreed with the Division Bench's decision.

7. Privity of Contract Between the Parties for Claiming Compensation:
The learned Single Judge found privity of contract between the parties, but the Division Bench disagreed, noting that there was no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the State. The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench's finding, emphasizing the lack of any contractual relationship that would justify a claim for damages against the State.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the Division Bench's decision to dismiss the suit. The Court found that the suit was barred by limitation and that the Plaintiff had no substantive claim for damages against the State. The Plaintiff's lack of any legally enforceable right under the second lease and the absence of any unlawful act by the State were pivotal in the dismissal of the claim.