2015 (5) TMI 1264 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay in filing appeal u/s 5 of the Limitation Act - whether an appeal under S. 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act 2008 (NIA Act) can be validly filed before the High Court after the expiry of the period of ninety days from the date of judgment sentence or order appealed from? - HELD THAT - The N.I.A. Act is an Act to constitute an investigation agency at the national level to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty security and integrity of India security of State friendly relations with foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties agreements conventions and resolutions of the United Nations its agencies and other international organizations and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The superintendence of the N.I.A. shall vest in the Central Government as provided in S. 4 of the N.I.A. Act. S. 6 provides for investigation of scheduled offences. S. 7 provides that the N.I.A. may request the State Government to associate itself with the investigation. S. 9 mandates that the State Government shall extend all assistance and co-operation to the Agency for investigation of the scheduled offences. The period of limitation provided under sub-section (5) of S. 21 is thirty days. The first proviso to sub-section (5) empowers the High Court to entertain an appeal after the expiry of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. The second proviso provides that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days. The first proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 21 itself deals with condonation of delay in filing appeal and the delay up to sixty days (ninety days from the date of order) can be condoned by the High Court. By making a restriction that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days the application of S. 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded. The High Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing the appeal. But that power is restricted under the first proviso to sub-section (5) of S. 21. A further restriction in the second proviso is a clear indication that the High Court cannot exercise the power under S. 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. To that extent it amounts to an express exclusion of S. 5 of the Limitation Act as contemplated under S. 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Conclusion - The appeal filed after ninety days was dismissed as not maintainable. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED

The core legal questions considered in this judgment are:

• Whether an appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA Act) can be validly filed before the High Court after the expiry of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence, or order appealed from.
• Whether the High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Validity of Filing an Appeal After Ninety Days

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:

Section 21 of the NIA Act outlines the procedure for appeals, stipulating that appeals must be filed within thirty days, with a provision allowing the High Court to entertain appeals after this period if there is sufficient cause. However, the second proviso explicitly states that no appeal shall be entertained after ninety days. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act allows for the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act unless expressly excluded by a special or local law.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:

The court interpreted the second proviso to Section 21(5) of the NIA Act as an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which generally allows for the condonation of delays. The court emphasized that the legislative intent was clear in restricting the High Court's power to entertain appeals beyond ninety days.

Key Evidence and Findings:

The appellant filed the appeal after 164 days, well beyond the ninety-day limit. The court found that the NIA Act's provisions were clear in their restriction, and no additional evidence or arguments could alter this statutory limitation.

Application of Law to Facts:

The court applied the statutory framework of the NIA Act and the Limitation Act to the facts, concluding that the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period and thus could not be entertained.

Treatment of Competing Arguments:

The appellant argued for the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, citing the absence of express exclusion in the NIA Act. The court, however, found that the language of the NIA Act constituted an express exclusion of Section 5, as demonstrated by precedents from the Supreme Court.

Conclusions:

The court concluded that the appeal filed after ninety days was not maintainable, as the NIA Act expressly excluded the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delays beyond ninety days.

Issue 2: Power of the High Court to Condon Delay Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act

Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents:

The court referred to various precedents, including the Supreme Court's rulings in Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker and Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., which discussed the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the context of special laws.

Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:

The court reasoned that the NIA Act's second proviso to Section 21(5) constituted an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thereby preventing the High Court from condoning delays beyond ninety days.

Key Evidence and Findings:

The court found that the legislative intent of the NIA Act was to provide a strict timeline for appeals, reflecting the urgency and importance of cases under this Act.

Application of Law to Facts:

The application of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was considered, but the court held that the express exclusion in the NIA Act overrode the general provisions of the Limitation Act.

Treatment of Competing Arguments:

The appellant's argument for the applicability of Section 5 was dismissed based on the clear legislative intent and express exclusion in the NIA Act, as supported by relevant case law.

Conclusions:

The court concluded that it lacked the jurisdiction to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act due to the express exclusion in the NIA Act.

3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS

Preserve Verbatim Quotes of Crucial Legal Reasoning:

• "The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is expressly excluded by the second proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the NIA Act."
• "The legislative intent is clear that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of ninety days."

Core Principles Established:

• The NIA Act provides a strict limitation period for appeals, with an express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delays beyond ninety days.
• The High Court does not have the power to entertain appeals filed after ninety days under the NIA Act.

Final Determinations on Each Issue:

• The appeal filed after ninety days was dismissed as not maintainable.
• The application for condonation of delay was dismissed, affirming the express exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the NIA Act.