2004 (8) TMI 197 - AT - Customs

Summary

Issues:
- Validity of impugned order-in-appeal affirming order-in-original regarding supervision charges for a 100% EOU unit.

Analysis:
The appeal questioned the validity of the impugned order-in-appeal that affirmed the order-in-original regarding supervision charges for a 100% EOU unit. The issue revolved around the liability of the appellants to pay supervision charges in accordance with Bond B-17. The adjudicating authority confirmed these charges under Section 142 of the Customs Act, along with a penalty under Section 117 of the Customs Act.

The appellant's counsel argued that the Commissioner (Appeals) wrongly stated that the order confirming the charges was not appealable. Additionally, the counsel contended that there was a lack of evidence to prove that any Customs/Excise officer was permanently stationed at the warehouse for supervision. The appellants claimed that they paid charges whenever an officer visited, as evidenced by TR-6 Challans submitted. The counsel urged that the impugned order should be set aside.

On the contrary, the ld. SDR supported the correctness of the impugned order. After hearing both sides and examining the record, it was noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in stating that no appeal could be filed against the order-in-original. The appellants were entitled to appeal the order under Section 142 of the Customs Act within 60 days before the Commissioner (Appeals). The Commissioner (Appeals) had also considered the merits of the case but failed to establish the appellants' liability for the disputed charges.

The conditions of Bond B-17 required the appellants to provide amenities to stationed officers for supervision and pay their charges. However, there was no evidence to prove the presence of any officer at the warehouse for supervision. The show cause notice lacked details regarding the officer's presence or the period of stationing. Consequently, the obligations under the bond could not be enforced against the appellants for payment of supervision charges. Thus, the appellants could not be held liable based solely on the conditions of Bond B-17.

In conclusion, the impugned order was set aside, and the appeal of the appellants was allowed with any consequential relief permissible under the law.