2024 (5) TMI 480 - HC - Customs

Validity of a Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs CBIC Instruction dated 09 July 2022 - impugned Instruction invalid or ultra vires Section 151A of the Act - Warehousing of imported capital goods used in the generation of solar power - Cancellation of license of warehousing as granted in terms of the MOOWR Regulations - Whether solar power generation could be said to be an operation or activity permissible u/s 65 of the Act - Principle of purposive interpretation - HELD THAT - The impugned Instruction, as would be manifest from a plain reading thereof, appears to place the licensing authorities under a clear mandate to proceed on the basis that generation of electricity as a subject per se falls outside the ambit of the MOOWR Regulations. The Instruction proceeds further to hold that all licenses granted as well as applications which may be made thereafter would be guided by the view expressed by the Board. This clearly appears thus to travel far beyond the advisory and clarificatory function which stands placed in the Board by virtue of Section 151A of the Act. We find ourselves unable to uphold the validity of the impugned Instruction bearing in mind the well settled precepts of administrative law and which abhor abdication of an independent decision making power as well as a quasi-judicial authority being compelled to act under the dictates of a superior authority. Undisputedly, the power to consider whether a license is liable to be cancelled under Section 58B of the Act would place the licensing authority under the obligation to examine whether a licensee had either acted in violation of the Act or contravened a statutory provision or command. In light of the impugned Instruction, the petitioners now face the inevitable specter of the license being cancelled consequent to the peremptory directions as contained in the communication of the Board. Since the directive of the Board binds the licensing authorities, the exercise of calling upon the petitioners to show cause is essentially rendered otiose and a mere formality. This, more so when the Board has already come to the definitive conclusion that solar power generation is an activity which would fall outside the ambit of Section 65 of the Act as well as the MOOWR Regulations. The Instruction thus clearly amounts to a dictate binding the licensing authority to cancel all subsisting licenses and thus falling foul of the principles noticed. The SCN is clear evidence of the licensing authority having understood the Instruction as requiring it to cancel the existing license. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SECTIONS 61 AND 65 - We are of the considered opinion that the mere fact that input-output ratio norms may not apply in the case of generation of electricity would not be determinative of the controversy which stands raised. This, since those norms are prescribed to take care of contingencies where a part of the imported goods get consumed in the process of manufacture. They would similarly also not be attracted in the case of manufacture of textiles or automotive parts as discussed hereinabove. The inapplicability of those factors in the case of generation of electricity, thus is neither an oddity nor can it be said to be a legislative oversight. In our considered opinion, Section 65 clearly stops short of making an exception or excluding a certain category of manufacturing activities from its ambit. It also fails to exclude from its application the manufacture of intangible goods in explicit terms. Section 61 clearly envisages both capital and non-capital goods being imported and housed in a warehouse for the purposes of manufacturing activity being undertaken in terms of permissions granted under Section 65 of the Act. The statute enables capital goods being housed in the warehouse till such time as they may be cleared for home consumption. While Section 61, prior to the 2016 amendments envisaged the maximum retention period to be five years, post amendment, that stipulation came to be substituted with the Legislature permitting the retention of those goods without any maximum time frame operating. The clear and unambiguous scheme which thus emerges from a reading of Sections 61 and 65 is of the importer being enabled to bring into the country capital goods which may be utilized in connection with manufacture or other operations in a licensed warehouse and the resultant goods alone being subjected to tax. MOOWR REGULATIONS AND THE CONTEMPORANEOUS MATERIAL - T he principal argument of the respondents was that the MOOWR Regulations were never intended to extend to a situation where imported capital goods do not get subsumed in the final product which may emerge out of a licensed warehouse and that Section 65 was meant to apply only to manufacturing operations being undertaken on the imported capital goods itself. We have in the preceding parts of this decision already found that neither Section 61 nor Section 65 would warrant such a meaning being ascribed to those statutory provisions. This, in light of the plain text of the provisions neither impliedly nor in explicit terms excluding any particular category of manufacture or basing the extent of the applicability of those provisions dependent upon the nature of the resultant goods which may be obtained at the end of a manufacturing process. From observation it is clearly establishes that the MOOWR Scheme was concerned with both imported goods which may be used in the course of manufacture or as inputs for further processing. This clearly demolishes the contention of the respondents that the expression in relation to necessitates the capital goods themselves being worked upon. As evident, the respondents clearly held out that both raw materials and capital goods could be imported and that in both contingencies, the import duty would stand deferred. The duty element and the time when the same would get attracted was explained to be when finished goods are cleared for the domestic market, and in which case, import duty would stand attracted on the imported raw materials used in production of the finished goods. It was further clarified that import duty on capital goods would be payable only when they are cleared to the domestic market. This too is indicative of the underlying imperatives of input-output ratio declarations being made and those being principally concerned with imported raw materials. The Invest India portal also spoke of the unlimited period of warehousing which would be applicable in the case of capital as well as non-capital goods and non-capital goods being described to include raw materials, components, etc. It is thus manifest that the contemporaneous material and literature gave no indication of an avowed intent of the MOOWR Regulations being inapplicable to a manufacturing process which may have continued without any prescription of a maximum period for which capital goods could have been warehoused. The promotional material, the FAQs, as well as the 01 October 2019 Circular issued by the Board also did not speak of an exclusion of any particular genre of manufacturing activity or the nature of the resultant goods which may be produced with the aid of capital goods housed in a licensed warehouse. We come to the firm conclusion that neither Section 61 nor Section 65 can be justifiably construed as incorporating an inherent or implied exclusion of solar power generation. The material that was placed for our consideration cannot possibly be interpreted as indicative of an intent of a particular type of self-consuming capital goods alone being intended for import. Neither the statutory provisions nor the contemporaneous material embodies an underlying policy intent for capital goods themselves being worked upon in the warehouse and constituting a part of the resultant goods. In fact, and to the contrary as we have found, the primary objective of the scheme was to give a fillip to domestic manufacturing albeit with the aid of imported capital goods. On an overall conspectus of the above, we find ourselves unable to accede to the submissions addressed by the learned ASG. DISTORTION OF THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD - The learned ASG had vehemently contended that the activity of solar power generation has led to the creation of inequalities between domestic manufacturers and those like the petitioner who have claimed undue benefit of the MOOWR Regulations. It was in the aforesaid context that the respondents had sought to urge that we must interpret Section 65 in a manner which would subserve the larger policy objectives and the impetus sought to be accorded to domestic generation of solar power. While we have no reason to doubt the salutary purpose and objective underlying the framing of those measures, as a Court, we cannot be unmindful of our primary function being confined to interpret the statutory provisions in accordance with well-defined precepts of interpretation. The construction of a statute cannot be guided or influenced by the subsequent experience of the executive or of discerned inequitable results. As we have found hereinabove, the statutory scheme underlying the MOOWR Regulations cannot be construed as seeking to exclude solar power generation in terms of permissions granted u/s 65. The contemporaneous literature also fails to lend credence to the submission of the respondents. In fact, it clearly tends to be indicative of a contrary position and the absence of an intent to exclude any particular activity of manufacture. It is this which leads us to doubt whether even the principles of purposive interpretation could be justifiably deployed. APPLICABILITY OF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES - The principle of purposive interpretation is one which Courts resort to in order to overcome anomalies and to avoid resultant absurdities. GP Singh, in his seminal work on Principles of Statutory Interpretation succinctly explained the rule of purposive construction as being liable to be resorted to in order to avoid absurdity, repugnancy, or inconsistency. However, and as the learned author explained in the said treatise, the aforesaid principle is liable to be adopted in situations where the language of the statute itself is capable of bearing more than one construction or a plain grammatical construction leads to an apparent contradiction of the underlying object of the statute. The language in which Sections 61 and 65 are couched does not give rise to any ambiguities. This is also not a case where a plain grammatical construction leads to an apparent contradiction or a position of irreconcilability between two provisions present in the same enactment. Our conclusions are based on a harmonious construction of Sections 61 and 65 along with the contemporaneous material which accompanied the promulgation of the MOOWR scheme. While we have dilated on the aspect of purposive interpretation, one cannot possibly lose sight of the fact that the arguments addressed by the respondents with respect to the illegality of the activities undertaken by the petitioners were not based on an asserted statutory anomaly, absurdity or irreconcilability, principles which are often spoken of in the context of statutory interpretation. The learned ASG also did not argue that the statutory provisions suffered from ambiguity. The entire plank of the argument against solar power generation being permissible u/s 65 was based on the inequitable impact that such activity was likely to have on domestic industry and local generators. That, however, and as was observed by us in the preceding parts of this decision, is an aspect pertaining to policy and which cannot constitute a legitimate basis for the Court to reconstruct a statutory provision. The respondents essentially bid us to introduce a condition of ineligibility in the garb of statutory interpretation. It would be wholly incorrect for us to recreate or reassemble Section 65 so as to exclude a particular category of activity based upon the experience of its working or its perceived negative impact on domestic industry. While and hypothetically, it may be open for the respondents to adopt appropriate remedial measures if they be of the opinion that solar power generation by virtue of permissions granted u/s 65 is negatively impacting local generators or distorts the level playing field , this Court would clearly not be justified in deploying principles of purposive interpretation to correct that projected and asserted anomaly. FINAL DETERMINATION - Accordingly, we allow the present writ petitions. The impugned Instruction of the Board dated 09 July 2022 insofar as it mandates review of existing licences and taking of follow-up action is hereby quashed. For reasons aforenoted, we also quash the SCNs dated 13 July 2022. As noted above, we allow W.P.(C) and quash the impugned order dated 19 July 2022 for reasons aforenoted. W.P.(C) shall stand disposed of.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC) Instruction dated 09 July 2022.
2. Interpretation of Sections 61 and 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.
3. Applicability of Manufacture and Other Operations in Warehouse (No.2) Regulations, 2019 (MOOWR Regulations) to solar power generation.
4. Impact of the impugned Instruction on existing licenses and future permissions.
5. Ancillary issues including the demand for a provisional bond for the release of goods.

Summary:

1. Validity of the Impugned Instruction:
The impugned Instruction dated 09 July 2022 issued by the CBIC under Section 151A of the Customs Act, 1962, was challenged for directing a review of existing licenses and prohibiting future permissions for solar power projects under the MOOWR Regulations. The Court held that the Instruction impinges on the discretion of the licensing authorities, compelling them to act in a particular manner, thus violating the Proviso to Section 151A. The Instruction was found to be ultra vires as it interfered with the quasi-judicial functions of the customs officers. Consequently, the Instruction was quashed.

2. Interpretation of Sections 61 and 65 of the Customs Act, 1962:
Sections 61 and 65 of the Customs Act, 1962, were interpreted to determine their applicability to solar power generation. The Court observed that Section 61 allows capital goods to remain in a warehouse until clearance, without any time limitation post the 2016 amendments. Section 65 permits manufacturing or other operations in relation to warehoused goods, without explicitly excluding any category of goods or manufacturing activity. The Court concluded that the statutory scheme does not exclude solar power generation from its ambit.

3. Applicability of MOOWR Regulations to Solar Power Generation:
The Court examined the MOOWR Regulations and contemporaneous materials, including FAQs and promotional literature, which indicated that the scheme was intended to facilitate manufacturing in India using imported capital goods. The Regulations did not exclude solar power generation or any specific manufacturing activity. The Court held that the MOOWR Regulations apply to solar power generation, and the imported capital goods used in such projects could be warehoused without time limitation.

4. Impact on Existing Licenses and Future Permissions:
The impugned Instruction's directive to review existing licenses and prohibit future permissions was found to be beyond the scope of Section 151A and ultra vires. The Court quashed the Show Cause Notices (SCNs) issued based on the Instruction and invalidated the cancellation of licenses that had been carried out under its mandate.

5. Ancillary Issues:
The demand for a provisional bond for the release of goods was addressed in a previous order dated 04 August 2023, which directed the parties to proceed in accordance with that order. The Court reiterated that the cancellation of licenses based on the impugned Instruction was invalid and quashed the relevant orders.

Final Determination:
The writ petitions were allowed, and the impugned Instruction dated 09 July 2022 was quashed. The SCNs issued based on the Instruction were also quashed. The Court left it open for the respondents to proceed in accordance with law regarding any future actions.