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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant can be considered a Government entity for the purpose of the limitation period. 2. Whether the appellant can be considered an individual and if the import was for personal use, thereby extending the limitation period. 3. Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 18 of the Customs Act, and if the limitation period starts from the date of the Assistant Collector's letter. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Whether the appellant can be considered a Government entity for the purpose of the limitation period. The appellant contended that being a corporation with 100% shares held by the Government, it should be considered a Government entity, thereby extending the limitation period to one year under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. The appellant relied on the Supreme Court decision in AIR 1975 S.C. 1331 (Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram) to support this argument. However, the Tribunal found this decision inapplicable as it dealt with whether certain statutory bodies were authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Tribunal clarified that while such entities might be authorities under Article 12, they are not considered Government entities. Therefore, the appellant, being a statutory body owned by the State Government, cannot be considered a Government entity for the purpose of the Customs Act. Consequently, the extended limitation period of one year is not applicable. Issue 2: Whether the appellant can be considered an individual and if the import was for personal use, thereby extending the limitation period. The appellant argued that it should be considered an individual under Section 27(a) of the Customs Act, claiming that the goods were imported for personal use, thus extending the limitation period to one year. The Tribunal rejected this argument, stating that personal use implies use by the appellant personally and not for commercial activities. Since the goods were used for testing machines manufactured by the appellant, which were intended for sale, they were not for personal use. Additionally, the Tribunal noted that the term "individual" in Section 27 is distinct from "person," which includes corporations. Therefore, the appellant, being a corporation, cannot be considered an individual under Section 27(a), and the extended limitation period does not apply. Issue 3: Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Section 18 of the Customs Act, and if the limitation period starts from the date of the Assistant Collector's letter. The appellant contended that the assessment was provisional, invoking Section 18 of the Customs Act, and argued that the limitation period should start from the date of the Assistant Collector's letter informing them of the excess duty paid. The Tribunal dismissed this argument, stating that the limitation period starts from the date of payment of duty, not from the date of the Assistant Collector's intimation. The Tribunal referenced a decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal (1989 (40) E.L.T. 353 (SB)) and the Supreme Court decision in Miles India Limited v. Assistant Collector of Customs (1987 (30) E.L.T. 641 S.C.), reinforcing that the statutory period of limitation must be adhered to. Therefore, the claim for a refund was barred by limitation, and the appeal was dismissed. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed on all grounds. The appellant was not considered a Government entity, nor an individual for the purposes of Section 27(a) of the Customs Act. The limitation period for claiming a refund starts from the date of payment of duty, not from the date of the Assistant Collector's intimation. The Tribunal upheld the orders of the lower authorities, confirming that the refund claim was barred by limitation.
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