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1991 (12) TMI 4
Balancing Allowance, Business Expenditure, Capital Or Revenue Expenditure, Income Tax Act, Income Tax Proceedings, Salary To Employee, Special Deduction, Surtax Assessment
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1991 (12) TMI 3
Issues: The issues involved in this case are: 1. Interpretation of exemption under section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 2. Liberal construction of the term 'purchase' in relation to the Transfer of Property Act.
Interpretation of Exemption under Section 54(1): Late Dr. Laxmichand Nagda sold his self-occupied dwelling house and entered into an agreement to purchase a flat in Bombay. The Income-tax Officer initially denied exemption under section 54, stating that the registered sale deed for the flat was not executed within one year of the house sale. However, the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal, granting the exemption. The Tribunal upheld this decision, emphasizing the actual use of the flat for dwelling within a reasonable time frame.
Liberal Construction of the Term 'Purchase': The Revenue contended that a registered sale deed and title transfer were prerequisites for considering a transaction as a 'purchase' under section 54. However, the court disagreed, citing various judicial precedents. The court highlighted that the word 'purchase' should be interpreted liberally, not just in a literal sense but in a broader context. Referring to past cases, the court emphasized that the word 'purchase' should be understood in a wider sense, focusing on the actual acquisition and use of the property rather than just legal technicalities.
Conclusion: The court dismissed the application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, stating that no question of law arose from the Tribunal's decision. The court upheld the Tribunal's ruling, emphasizing that the exemption under section 54 was correctly granted based on the actual acquisition and use of the property for dwelling purposes. The court clarified that the legal title transfer within a specific timeframe was not a mandatory condition for availing the exemption. The court also distinguished a previous Supreme Court decision, stating that its interpretation did not apply to the current case. Ultimately, the court dismissed the application and discharged the rule, with no order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 2
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... f the Income-tax Act in view of the admitted fact that premises were not residential units ? The property known as Wani Market, is registered as a commercial complex in the municipal council and is used as shops. The benefit under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 23 of the Income-tax Act was claimed by the assessee on the basis that it was a residential unit. The Income-tax Officer did not grant that benefit. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the appeal of the assessee. The Tribunal confirmed the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the basis of a circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes dated March 19, 1971, and the case of Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat, AIR 1976 SC 2463. In view of the language employed in section 23 and the relevant proviso, the above questions of law do arise out of the order of the Tribunal and, hence, this application is allowed and rule made absolute. No order as to costs.
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1991 (12) TMI 1
Additional amount payable for the import of machinery on account of devaluation of rupees - development Rebate - includibility of additional amount paid in actual cost for purpose of rebate - though development rebate was intended to promote development of industries, this could not be allowed at the cost of the foreign exchange resources of the country which are also depleted when there is an increase in liability due to devaluation of the currency
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1991 (11) TMI 276
... ... ... ... ..... ng this appellant as juvenile under Section 3 of the Act and exercising powers of Juvenile Court Under Section 7(3) of the Act, while maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, IPC I direct the appellant to be released on probation of good conduct on executing a bond to the satisfaction of the trial court that he will keep peace and be of good behaviour for a period of three years. He is further directed in the circumstances of the case to pay a sum of Rs. 5000/- as One, which shall be paid as compensation of the widow of deceased Chandradip Singh, though this amount is not an adequate compensation to her for the loss she has suffered. 44. As regards the other appellants, the conviction and sentence imposed upon them by the trial court are found to be well made out and so they are affirmed and their appeal is dismissed. The appeal of appellant Rajendra Singh is also dismissed with the modification in sentence as mentioned above. S.K. Singh, J. 45. I agree.
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1991 (11) TMI 274
... ... ... ... ..... the respondents perform their duties in execution of the works, repairs and maintenance thereof in connection with the generation, transmission and distribution of the electrical energy by the Corporation licensee. The Corporation is the Principal employer. The respondents' immediate employers execute the work etc. under the supervision of the Corporation as its agents. Their employees, in law, work under the supervision of the principal employer, corporation. They are covered under Section 2(9)(iii) of the Act entitling to the sickness benefits, etc. envisaged therein and the respondents are liable to make their contribution to the Employees' Insurance Fund. 48. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The writ appeal Nos. 16 & 436/ 86 and matter No. 1650 of 1985 dated April 4, 1988 in the Calcutta High Court stand dismissed confirming the order of the learned single Judge dated December 11, 1986, but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 273
... ... ... ... ..... as 18th December 1991 for trial. The petitioner also received a letter dated 5-10-1991 from his Advocate informing him that as the Advocates were on strike he had not appeared in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate and therefore the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had issued a fresh non-bailable warrant against the petitioner and had adjourned the case to 18th December 1991. The petitioner says that he had already booked a ticket for 14th December 1991 and he would leave Bombay on 14th December 1991 by Paschim Express by 11 a.m. and that he would go to Delhi and then he would get the non-bailable warrant cancelled, and he undertakes to remain present in the Tis Hajari Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Smt. Sangita Dhingare on 18th December 1991 to face the trial. 3. The present application is clearly misconceived . No such anticipatory bail can be granted after a Magistrate has issued a warrant. The application is dismissed. 4. Application dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 272
... ... ... ... ..... r the offence. 5. In Ess Bee Food Specialities and Ors. v. Kapur Brothers and Ors. 1991 PAP 203, relying on these authorities, this Bench held that to make person liable, it has to be shown that he was incharge or responsible to the company for the conduct of the affairs of the company or liable to the company. 6. In the impugned complaint, as well as in the evidence produced before the summoning, there is no allegations that Smt. Amrit Rani was incharge of the affairs of the firm or liable to the firm for its affairs as such, there was no material before the learned Magistrate to summon her under Section 138-B of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The impugned summoning order is hereby quashed. 7. This order will, however, not stand in the way of the learned Magistrate of the resummon Smt. Amrit Rani under the provisions of Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure If evidence comes on the record about her being incharge of the affairs of the firm or being liable for its business.
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1991 (11) TMI 271
... ... ... ... ..... into and considering the evidence, as law did not require it, as held in the case of Madula (Supra). But if the Court below had done so, even then the judgment cannot be set aside. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the Court below had wrongly thrown the entire burden of proof of nonpayment of rent on the defendant. The submission is not correct. It had considered the case on merits and by examining the evidence, found that plaintiff proved that the defendant was in arrears of rent for more than six months and that it failed to comply with the order passed under Section 13(4) of the Act. In that view of the matter, decree of ejectment had to be passed. 13. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The appellant is given six months time from today to vacate the shop and hand over the possession of the same to the plaintiff-respondent with the condition that the appellant would regularly pay the rent to the plaintiff-respondent at the agreed rate.
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1991 (11) TMI 270
... ... ... ... ..... ound that his wife has to remain at Chandigarh. No doubt the guidelines require the two spouses to be posted at one place as far as practicable, but that does not enable any spouse to claim such a posting as of right if the departmental authorities do not consider it feasible. The only thing required is that the departmental authorities should consider this aspect along with the exigencies of administration and enable the two spouses to live together at one station if it is possible without any detriment to the administrative needs and the claim of other employees. 6. The High Court was in error in overlooking all the relevant aspects as well as the absence of any legal right in the respondent to claim the relief which the High Court has granted as a matter of course. The High Court's order must, therefore, be set aside. 7. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the respondent's writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 269
... ... ... ... ..... n of the executive directions and order of this Court dated February 7, 1991 and is, therefore, not a fit case in which contempt proceedings need to proceed any further. We, accordingly, drop the contempt proceedings and discharge the rule issued against the respondents. 11. Since the Court has found entitlement of the untrained teachers in all the categories to appointment provided they are otherwise qualified and trained teachers are not available, we direct the respondents to properly comply with the orders of this Court dated February 7, 1991 and select and appoint untrained teachers who are otherwise qualified for appointment in all categories without putting the condition of training or age bar against them where trained teachers are not available. The State must conclude the process of fresh selection in the light of the observations made in this order expeditiously and, in any case, not later than three months from today. 12. The petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 268
Issues Involved: 1. Applicability of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Interpretation of Section 30(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. 3. Substantive rights conferred by Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
Summary:
1. Applicability of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894: The primary issue was whether the benefits of Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, could be granted to landowners when the Collector's award was made before April 30, 1982. The Supreme Court held that Section 23(1-A) deals with substantive rights and is applicable to cases where the Collector or the Trial Court had yet to make its award after the coming into force of the said sub-section on September 30, 1984. The Court clarified that the term "award" in Section 23(1-A) refers to the award made by the Collector or the Reference Court, not to decrees made by appellate courts.
2. Interpretation of Section 30(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984: The Court interpreted Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984, which states that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) shall apply to every proceeding for the acquisition of land where the Collector had not made his award by April 30, 1982. The Court concluded that the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) is payable even if the court had made its award before September 24, 1984, provided the Collector had not made his award by April 30, 1982. This interpretation limits the benefits strictly to cases where the Collector and the Court made their awards between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984.
3. Substantive Rights Conferred by Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act: The Court emphasized that Section 23(1-A) and Section 23(2) confer substantive rights, which generally have prospective application unless explicitly stated otherwise by the legislature. The Court rejected the narrow interpretation given in Union of India v. Fillip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, which limited the applicability of Section 23(1-A) to cases where the Collector made his award after April 30, 1982. The Court held that the benefits under Section 23(1-A) should be awarded in all cases pending before the Reference Court on September 1, 1984.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in Union of India v. Zora Singh, affirming the High Court's decision to grant the benefits of Section 23(1-A) to the claimants. The Court also dismissed other similar appeals filed by the Union of India, while directing that appeals filed by the claimants be placed before appropriate Benches for disposal in light of this decision.
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1991 (11) TMI 267
... ... ... ... ..... on given to the three candidates in pursuance of the High Court orders. We do not know whether the petitioner's case is true. All the same, we think it appropriate to make the following direction the college authorities shall create three more seats in the said course and admit the first three available students in the waiting list against those seats. The Chandigarh Administration shall pass the necessary orders in this behalf. Action in terms of this direction shall be taken forthwith by the Chandigarh Administration and the college authorities. Before we part with this case we wish to make an observation. In matters of this nature where the High court directs students to be admitted in Educational Institutions. it would be advisable if the High Court stays the operation of its order for a period of about 3 to 4 weeks, if a request therefor is made by the Educational Institution or the State, as the case may be. SLPs disposed of accordingly. R.P. Petitions Disposed of.
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1991 (11) TMI 266
... ... ... ... ..... dy received a sum of ₹ 16,75,000 from BCCL the balance sum of ₹ 1,47,990 should be assessed to tax for this assessment year as according to us, the same has accrued to the assessee though not received. The assessee thus gets a relief of ₹ 17,60,797 (Rs.9,08,787 - ₹ 1,47,990). 10. It is represented by the assessee's counsel that till to-day the assessee has not received the sum of ₹ 1,47,990 from CIL though more than seven years have passed and, therefore, it will not be justified to subject it to tax on ₹ 1,47,990 also. We, therefore, direct the ITO that if the assessee is unable to receive or recover the said amount of ₹ 1,47,990 from either BCCL or CIL and satisfies the ITO to this effect, the ITO should allow the assessee to write off or set off the said sum of ₹ 1,47,990 against its profits in subsequent assessment years in accordance with law. 11. to 13. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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1991 (11) TMI 265
Issues Involved: 1. Establishment of an All India Judicial Service. 2. Uniformity in judicial cadres. 3. Enhanced uniform age of retirement. 4. Uniform pay scales. 5. Provision of residential accommodation. 6. Transport facilities for judicial officers. 7. Adequate perks and allowances. 8. Provision for in-service training.
Summary:
I. Establishment of an All India Judicial Service: The plea for setting up an All India Judicial Service was not seriously pressed. The Law Commission in its 14th Report recommended the establishment of such a service to improve the personnel of the subordinate judiciary. The Supreme Court noted the merit in the recommendation and commended the Union of India to examine and implement the feasibility of this recommendation expeditiously.
II. Uniformity in Judicial Cadres: The Law Commission suggested uniform designations for judicial officers. The Supreme Court directed that the State Judicial Service should be classified as District or Additional District Judge, Civil Judge (senior division), and Civil Judge (junior division) on the civil side, and on the criminal side, as Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate, and Magistrates. The Ministry of Law and Justice of the Union Government was tasked with monitoring this uniformity by March 31, 1993.
III. Enhanced Uniform Age of Retirement: The Supreme Court directed that the age of retirement for judicial officers should be 60 years, considering the higher entry age and the nature of judicial work. Appropriate alterations in the Rules were to be made by December 31, 1992.
IV. Uniform Pay Scales: The Supreme Court acknowledged the disparity in pay scales across different States and Union Territories and directed that the pay structure of judicial officers be reviewed by the respective Pay Commissions or Committees when set up.
V. Adequate Perks and Allowances: The Supreme Court directed the provision of a residential office allowance of Rs. 250 per month for Civil Judges (junior and senior divisions) and Rs. 300 for higher category officers. It also mandated the provision of a small library for every judicial officer by June 30, 1992, and a sumptuary allowance of Rs. 300 per month for District Judges and Rs. 200 for Chief Judicial Magistrates, effective from April 1, 1992.
VI. Provision of Residential Accommodation: The Supreme Court mandated that official residences be provided for every judicial officer to avoid undue obligations and ensure mental peace. Until government accommodation is available, the State should provide requisitioned accommodation, with the balance rent met by the State Exchequer. This directive was to be fully implemented by December 31, 1992.
VII. Transport Facilities: The Supreme Court directed that every District Judge should be provided with a car by March 31, 1992, and Chief Judicial Magistrates by September 30, 1992. In stations with more than four judicial officers, a common transport vehicle should be provided by March 31, 1993. Judicial officers in smaller outlying courts should be provided loans for purchasing two-wheeler automobiles, with a monthly allowance of Rs. 200 for petrol.
VIII. Provision for In-Service Training: The Supreme Court emphasized the need for in-service training and directed the establishment of an in-service institute at the Central and State or Union Territory level within one year.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court provided comprehensive directions to improve the conditions of service for judicial officers, emphasizing the need for uniformity, appropriate retirement age, pay scales, residential accommodation, transport facilities, and in-service training, thereby ensuring the efficient functioning of the judiciary.
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1991 (11) TMI 264
... ... ... ... ..... itioners were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, it is only then, that they can be vicariously prosecuted along with the company. The Proviso to S.278-B(1) of the Act will come into operation only after the initial onus cast on the prosecution under the main Section gets discharged. The criminal proceedings in that case were quashed. 12. The decision referred to above, do apply to the facts of this case and in this view, the prosecution has failed to prove that the 4th accused/petitioner is a person responsible for payment of tax deducted to the Government and is also a person in charge of and responsible for paying the said amount. Therefore the charge as against the petitioner under Ss.276-B and 278-B of the Income tax Act are not maintainable. The prosecution, therefore, being an abuse of process of law, is liable to be quashed. The findings of the lower court are set aside and this criminal revision case is allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 263
... ... ... ... ..... till it will not come in the way of making interlocutory order in the Probate suit such as appointment of a receiver or Administrator. The Bombay High Court in the case reported in AIR 1922 Bom 276, has held that even if the order of stay is passed still the Court can pass interlocutory order such as appointment of receiver or attachment before Judgment. 17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, and the suit is pending before the Bombay High Court and that the Probate proceedings in this Court is still at the interlocutory stage and in both suits the trial has not yet commenced, and the matter in issue is not directly and substantially the same between the same parties and that the reliefs claimed in the Probate proceedings and the proceedings in the suit are not the same, I am of the firm view, that this is not a fit case to grant stay much less to grant any interim order of stay of this Probate Proceedings. 18. Consequently, the application is rejected.
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1991 (11) TMI 262
Issues involved: Appeal against judgment of Madras High Court regarding sale of property under Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act, 1894.
Issue 1 - Publication of Date and Place of Sale: The appellant contended that the sale was invalid due to the absence of the place of sale in the publication, as mandated by Sec. 36. The High Court held that the omission did not render the sale invalid, interpreting that Form 7A did not prescribe the place of sale. However, the Supreme Court emphasized that the publication of the date and place of sale is crucial for inviting bidders and ensuring fairness in public auctions. The Court ruled that the omission of the place of sale rendered the sale not just irregular but also invalid, as specified under Sec. 36.
Issue 2 - Deposit of Sale Amount: Another contention was the non-compliance with the requirement to remit the balance of the sale amount within 30 days from the auction date, as mandated by Sec. 36. The appellant argued that the confirmation of the sale without this compliance was illegal. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that failure to deposit the balance amount within the stipulated time rendered the 15% deposit liable to forfeiture. The Court held that the sale was vitiated by this error of law and upheld the decision of the Appellate Authority to set aside the sale confirmation, overturning the judgments of the High Court.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, dismissed the writ petition, and restored the order of the Appellate Authority. The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout the legal proceedings.
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1991 (11) TMI 261
... ... ... ... ..... bservations made in these decisions which could be and are applicable in deciding the present case. They are a’ contingent, provisional or notional liability is not an allowable deduction under the Income-tax Act and it is allowable only when it has been ascertained and became capable of being enforced against the assessee. 22. To conclude, this year being not the year of production or manufacture, nor the year in which an enforceable legal demand was raised, the assessee would not be entitled to any deduction in computing its business income. We, therefore, hold that the CIT(Appeals) was justified in enhancing the, assessment by withdrawing these two liabilities allowed by the ITO in pursuance of the directions issued by the IAC in 144B proceedings. We, accordingly, uphold the add backs of ₹ 19,59,972 and ₹ 12,32,881 made by-the CIT(Appeals). His order on enhancement is accordingly confirmed. 23. This para is not reproduced here as it involves minor issue.
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1991 (11) TMI 260
... ... ... ... ..... t's inherent powers under the Code and powers otherwise under Article 142 of the Constitution, to further the cause of complete justice, confining it to the facts of this case, and to be fair to the auction purchasers, direct the appellant to burden himself in paying to the auction purchasers, interest on their blocked sum of ₹ 1,05,000, the purchase money, lying in Court since 1963, which we quantify as equivalent to the sum deposited. We thus allow this appeal on the condition that the appellant shall deposit in the executing Court a sum of ₹ 1,05,000, within a period of two months from this date and direct that this sum together with the sum of ₹ 1,05,000, lying in deposit as auction money be paid over by the executing Court to the auction purchasers, singularly or collectively, at the convenience of the auction purchasers. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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