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Showing 241 to 260 of 3459 Records
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1991 (11) TMI 259
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... ... ..... e that such provisional admission should not be granted. We dismiss this special leave petition and sustain the order not on merits but for the reason indicated. The interlocutory application in the civil appeal need not be further dealt with in view of what we have said above. We had issued notice to the Principals of the seven medical colleges. They have appeared and have given a written undertaking to the Court by way of affidavit that there was some misunderstanding in regard to the requirement of a selection test for post-graduate admission. There were two year and three-year courses running simultaneously for some period and some confusion was there as to whether the two year course students were covered by the direction of this Court. Though we are of the view that there was hardly any scope for being misled, we are prepared to give the benefit of doubt to the Principals. The contempt proceedings are withdrawn but the undertaking are kept on record. Appeals dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 258
Issues involved: The legal question in this case is whether an application for renewal of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, became extinct after the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or if the right to seek renewal survived despite the repeal of the 1939 Act.
Judgment Summary:
The appellant, a permit holder for a stage carrier route, applied for renewal before the expiry date under the 1939 Act. The application was published, but before renewal, the 1988 Act came into force. The Regional Transport Authority granted renewal to the appellant, rejecting the respondent's application. The respondent challenged this, arguing that the application ceased to exist after the repeal of the 1939 Act.
The Court analyzed Section 217 of the 1988 Act, which repeals the 1939 Act but saves permits issued under the repealed Act. The Court referred to the General Clauses Act, emphasizing that rights acquired under a repealed Act are protected unless there is a clear intention to the contrary in the repealing Act.
The Court held that the preference for permit renewal under the 1939 Act was a civil right enforceable in law. The appellant's right to have his renewal application processed under the old Act was saved by the saving provision of the 1988 Act. The Court cited previous judgments supporting the view that the legal process for renewal itself constituted a right.
The Court found no express provision in the new Act barring renewal of permits applied for under the old Act. The absence of a preferential provision in the new Act did not negate the right to renewal initiated under the old Act. The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order, and directed each party to bear their own costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 257
Issues Involved: Interpretation of Recruitment Rules for promotion of Assistant Engineers in the Public Works Department, Pondicherry regarding eligibility criteria for Diploma-holder Junior Engineers who obtain a Degree during service.
Summary:
The dispute in the case revolved around whether Diploma-holder Junior Engineers who obtain a Degree during service are eligible for promotion as Assistant Engineers based on three years of service, including the period before obtaining the Degree. The Diploma-holders argued for inclusion of the earlier period, while Degree-holders maintained that the three years of service should be post obtaining the Degree. The Central Administrative Tribunal ruled in favor of the Diploma-holders, directing their consideration for promotion alongside other Degree-holding Junior Engineers. The Degree-holders appealed against this decision.
The Supreme Court analyzed the past practice in the Department, where Diploma-holders who obtained a Degree during service had their three years of service as Degree-holders counted from the date of obtaining the Degree, excluding the earlier period as Diploma-holders. The Court considered the Recruitment Rules and observed that the three years of service required for Degree-holders for promotion must be as Degree-holders, commencing from the date of obtaining the Degree. The Court found the past practice consistent and the construction of the rules by the Degree-holders as reasonable. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Tribunal's order and directing the Department to consider promotions in line with this decision.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the Tribunal's decision and upholding the practice of counting three years of service for Degree-holders from the date of obtaining the Degree, not including the earlier period as Diploma-holders. The Department was instructed to proceed with promotions accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 256
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... ... ..... ied upon a decision in Kurjibhai Dhanjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 1985 (1) Scale 964. In our view, the said decision cannot be availed of because the facts therein are entirely different. In that case, the show cause notice and the reply to the said notice sent by the detenu himself, which according to the Court were vital documents, have not been placed before the detaining authority. For the reason stated above, the second contention has to be repelled. 11. The third contention that there is unexplained delay in passing the impugned order has no force in the present case. Even according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the detenu came to India only by the end of October, 1990 that is after passing of the impugned detention order and till then the detenu was in abroad. 12. For all the aforementioned reasons, we see no substance in any of the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel and consequently dismiss this writ petition as devoid of any merit.
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1991 (11) TMI 255
Issues involved:
The judgment involves the quashing of the appointment of a professor at the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences (NIMHANS) by the Karnataka High Court, based on the Selection Committee's proceedings and the subsequent appointment of Dr. Gauri Devi.
Details of the Judgment:
Issue 1: Quashing of Appointment
The Karnataka High Court quashed the appointment of Dr. Gauri Devi as the professor of Neurology at NIMHANS, citing lack of fair consideration by the Selection Committee and absence of reasons for the selection decision.
Issue 2: Lack of Reasons for Selection
The High Court questioned the absence of reasons for preferring Dr. Gauri Devi over other candidates, emphasizing that the Selection Committee's decision lacked a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusion drawn.
Legal Analysis:
The Supreme Court clarified that the Selection Committee's function is administrative, not judicial, and not bound to provide reasons for its decisions unless mandated by law. The Court distinguished the requirement of recording reasons from the principle of procedural fairness, stating that administrative decisions need not be supported by reasons unless legally required.
Fair Consideration by Selection Committee:
The Supreme Court found that the Selection Committee's decision to place Dr. Kalyana Raman second in the panel of names indicated fair consideration, despite the Committee's later assertion that he did not meet the minimum eligibility requirements. The Court upheld the expertise and impartiality of the Selection Committee members, cautioning against undue interference in their decisions.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, overturning the High Court's judgment and reinstating Dr. Gauri Devi's appointment as the professor of Neurology at NIMHANS, without imposing any costs in the case.
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1991 (11) TMI 254
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991.
2. Whether the Tribunal's interim order constitutes a report and decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, and if it requires publication to be effective.
3. Competence of the Water Disputes Tribunal to grant interim relief.
Summary:
Issue 1: Constitutional Validity of the Ordinance
The Supreme Court held that the Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991, is unconstitutional. The Ordinance directly nullifies the interim order of the Tribunal dated June 25, 1991, which impinges upon the judicial power of the State and is ultra vires the Constitution. The Ordinance also has an extra-territorial operation affecting the flow of waters into Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry, thus exceeding Karnataka's legislative competence under Article 245(1) of the Constitution. The Ordinance is against the rule of law, as it allows Karnataka to act unilaterally and defy judicial decisions, potentially leading to lawlessness and anarchy.
Issue 2: Tribunal's Interim Order as Report and Decision
The Tribunal's order dated June 25, 1991, constitutes a report and decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. The order directs Karnataka to release water to ensure 205 TMC of water is available in Tamil Nadu's Mettur reservoir and regulates the release of water from month to month. This order is not merely declaratory but is meant to be implemented, making it a report and decision that must be published by the Central Government under Section 6 of the Act to be effective and binding on the parties.
Issue 3: Competence to Grant Interim Relief
The Tribunal is competent to grant interim relief when a reference for such relief is made by the Central Government. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court's decision on April 26, 1991, which directed the Tribunal to consider Tamil Nadu's request for interim relief on merits. The question of whether the Tribunal can grant interim relief when no reference is made by the Central Government does not arise in this context and is therefore not answered.
Conclusion:
1. The Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991, is ultra vires the Constitution.
2. The Tribunal's interim order of June 25, 1991, is a report and decision under Section 5(2) and must be published under Section 6 of the Act.
3. The Tribunal can grant interim relief if the Central Government refers the matter for such relief. The question of granting interim relief without such a reference is not addressed.
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1991 (11) TMI 253
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... ... ..... hich he did not otherwise possess nor could it take away the rights of the members of the joint Hindu family by accepting the properties in suit to be the personal properties of respondent No. 1. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that as has been held above, the properties in suit had been earmarked by respondent No. 1 as his personal properties which he was competent to do as a sovereign and the Government by accepting or approving the list of properties submitted by him as his personal properties in pursuance of the covenant did not purport on its own to create any right in favour of respondent No. 1 in such properties. The Government could have disputed the list submitted by respondent No. 1 but it chose not to do so and the assertion of respondent No. 1 that the properties in suit were his personal properties was accepted; 66. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the Civil Appeals fail and are dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 252
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... ... ..... ion of tax in respect of goods carried in the vehicle in question. For that purpose, he has to serve a notice in form VI-B on the owner of the goods or any person on his behalf, giving him an opportunity to rectify the defect or omission if any, or an option to pay such amount indicated by him. Question of exercising the option to pay the amount indicated by the officer in-charge of the check-post arises only where a notice in form VI-B is issued, on the officer being satisfied about existence of situations enumerated in rule 94(4)(a) of the Rules. Since there is controversy on the question as to whether payment was voluntary or it was illegally collected, the officer in-charge of check-post shall not, without being satisfied about existence of situations enumerated in rule 94(4)(a) and/or issuance of notice in form VI-B collect tax from the petitioner. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 251
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... ... ..... any inquiry. The finding of the Tribunal is perverse as no inquiry was made from the suppliers of the saries, etc., in respect of these purchases of the assessee. Penalty cannot be levied simply on the supposition or presumption and it is the burden of the assessing authority to prove the offence. The assessee may take an incorrect legal plea, but to prove it so is the burden of the assessing authority after making due inquiry and bringing the evidence on record in this regard. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the documentary evidence which was produced before the assessing authority without making any inquiry. Consequently, the revision is allowed, the orders of the Sales Tax Tribunal and the lower authorities are set aside and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority for making the inquiry de novo in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 250
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... ... ..... or other amount can be said to be due from the dealer. In such circumstances, by invoking the powers vested in the appellant under section 25 of the Act, the issue of exhibit P2 notice was unauthorised and illegal. That apart, it is conceded that the petitioner in the original petition has filed O.P. No. 4321 of 1989 and C.M.P. No. 12443 of 1989 and this Court has stayed the recovery proceedings against the assessee, the petitioner in the original petition. The order of stay, so granted by this Court, was in force on the day when exhibit P2 was issued by the appellant. The issue of exhibit P2 notice, when admittedly there was an order of stay from this Court regarding proceedings initiated against the assessee, to say the least, is improper. The learned single Judge was justified in quashing exhibit P2, in the manner he did, and in directing the appellant to pay the costs. We see no reason to interfere in this writ appeal. The writ appeal is dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 249
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... ... ..... re and simple excavation does not amount to manufacture and the benefit of the notification dated March 23, 1963 cannot be availed of. 2.. If further process have been undertaken there should have been a finding given by any of the authorities which is completely lacking in the present case and as such the order passed by the Tribunal is quashed and Tribunal is directed to give the finding about the nature of the process undertaken by the assessee as to whether the same will bring the assessee in the category of manufacturer so that the benefit of notification dated March 23, 1963 can be availed of by the dealer. The Tribunal will also consider that the tax is payable only at a single point. No injustice is done to the assessee in case the department has actually received tax to avoid the double taxation. The matter is sent back to the Tribunal for decision in accordance with the directions given above. 3.. The revision is allowed. 4.. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 248
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... ... ..... he tax is payable only at the first point and if the first point has already been exhausted and sale has been made at the second or subsequent point, then no liability of tax can be fastened on the assessee in the series of successive sales even if taken by interruption of unregistered dealer after a first sale is made by a registered dealer, then the second or subsequent sale by the registered dealer cannot be subjected to tax. It has neither been contended nor alleged that the bottles were imported from outside the State of Rajasthan. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) has gone even to the extent that the sale of bottle along with the wine has not been proved. The department has not challenged the findings before the Board of Revenue and in view of the fact that the matter is covered by the decision of this Court, I do not find any justification in interfering in revisional jurisdiction. 3.. The revision is accordingly rejected. 4.. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 247
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... ... ..... ealised, shall not be realised till disposal of any appeal/revision from the order of penalty if already filed and till disposal of any appeal/revision which has not yet been filed but may be filed within a fortnight from this date. But, if there is no pending appeal/ revision from the order of penalty after a fortnight from this date respondents will be at liberty to enforce the order of imposition of penalty. Any amount of penalty, if already paid or realised, shall abide the ultimate result of appeal/ revision, if any, from the order of penalty. The sum of Rs. 30,000 which was deposited by way of security in terms of interim order dated February 29, 1989 passed by this Tribunal shall abide the ultimate result of any appeal/revision from the order of penalty. 14.. The application is thus disposed of without costs on the above terms. Interim orders are vacated. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 246
Whether a specific claim in the plaint is necessary to grant the compensation?
Held that:- In the present case there is no difficulty in assessing the quantum of the compensation. That is ascertainable with reference to the determination of the market value in the land acquisition proceedings. The compensation awarded may safely be taken to be the measure of damages subject, of course, to the deduction therefrom of money value of the services, time and energy expended by the appellant in pursuing the claims of compensation and the expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award.
Confirm the finding of the High Court that Respondent was willing and ready to perform the contract and that it was the Appellant who was in breach. However, in substitution of the decree for specific performance, we make a decree for compensation, equivalent to the amount of the land acquisition compensation awarded for the suit lands together with solatium and accrued interest, less a sum of ₹ 1,50,000 (one lakh fifty thousand only) which, by a rough and ready estimate, we quantify as the amount to be paid to the appellant in respect of his services, time and money expended in pursuing the legal-claims for compensation. Therefore, there is no need for Respondent to pay the sum of ₹ 15,000 additionally
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1991 (11) TMI 245
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... ... ..... finding given in the assessment order that the non-disclosure in the return is because of the deliberate action on the part of the assessee to evade the tax. It has been the consistent view of this Court that if an entry is existing in the books of account and the matter relates only to the interpretation about the nature of the transaction or non- taxability on account of the interpretation of the provision of law, then the authorities under the Act would not be justified in levying the penalty. In the present case the finding which has been given by the Tribunal while upholding the tax is that the entries were existing in the books of account and the action was bona fide and the matter stood covered by the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court reported in the Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax 1980 45 STC 197. I do not find any justification to interfere in the revision which is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 244
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... ... ..... . No. 483 dated September 9, 1986, by having recourse to the principle of promissory estoppel or otherwise does not arise. We, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioner and hold that section 3 of the A.P. Act 20 of 1987 fully applies to the petitioner s case and the Act having come into force with retrospective effect from January 1, 1976, it is not legally possible to grant a direction to extend the benefit conferred by G.O. Ms. No. 224, dated March 9, 1976, read with G.O. Ms. No. 483, dated September 9, 1986, contrary to the above legislative provision, the validity of which has already been upheld by this Court. The demands raised by the Commercial Tax Officer (third respondent) are therefore valid in law. Of course, it is open to the petitioner to question the assessment orders and demands on any other grounds. Writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Government Pleader s fee Rs. 200 in each case. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 243
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... ... ..... ccount books. On a perusal of the impugned notice along with the notice dated March 29, 1988, it is evident that the respondent wanted to verify the account books in order to satisfy himself whether the exemption granted in respect of certain items of turnover by the assessing authority was valid or not. However, he did not mention the specific items of turnover in respect of which the petitioner shall produce the books of account. Therefore, we direct that the respondent shall issue a proper notice to the petitioner in the exercise of power under section 20 and continue further proceedings in accordance with law. We also make it clear that it is open to the respondent to initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside the order of assessment in exercise of the power under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 242
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... ... ..... d by the assessing authority. Secondly, when section 16(1)(i) refers to the concealment of the transaction it refers to the mental element of the assessee by an overt act. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) in the present case has held that the transaction is duly recorded in the books of accounts, and the mala fide intention of the appellant has not been proved beyond any shadow of doubt. As pointed out earlier, when an assessee is dealing with a particular commodity which is purchased by him as tax-paid as well as taxable, there may be a bona fide mistake on the part of the assessee in showing the goods as tax-paid. The finding which has been given by the Deputy Commissioner of Appeals and upheld by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal is not controverted by any evidence on record and, therefore, I am of the view that the levy of penalty under section 16(1)(i) has rightly been set aside. The revision is accordingly partly accepted. No order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 241
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... ... ..... tion and its meaning changes, so as to take the color of, or be in accord with, the subject to which it is applied . In that sense, it can apply to household furniture to be used in a drug or other store, as the furniture thereof differ in kind and according to the purpose which they are intended to subserve. It can also apply to those equipments to be employed in several places for ornament, or to promote comfort, or to facilitate the business therein. 3.. We have no hesitation to hold that barber chair will be furniture and is different from a dental chair. The clarification issued regarding dental chair cannot be applied in the case of barber chair. On this short ground, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal cannot stand. The common order of the Appellate Tribunal dated July 25, 1990 is vacated. The orders passed by the assessing authority and confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner will stand restored. The tax revision cases are allowed. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 240
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... ... ..... ourt s process would be to dismiss this petition in limine. It is hence, accordingly, dismissed. Interim orders stand vacated. 10.. As considerable judicial time of the court was taken by the company with the court and the Government Pleader taken for a ride and left and kept under an erroneous impression on the bona fides of the company, we direct the company to pay to the respondents costs quantified at Rs. 5,000 (rupees five thousand). 11.. Learned counsel seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. There is no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution nor any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Indeed, major part of the arguments before us indicated that the writ jurisdiction of this Court was invoked more by way of a mercy petition to grant indulgence by way of instalments but on terms which did not inspire courts confidence. Leave to appeal is rejected. Writ petition dismissed.
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