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1991 (11) TMI 239
... ... ... ... ..... sworn affidavit and the same has been relied upon by the Sales Tax Tribunal, therefore, in revision this Court should not interfere. I have considered the arguments of both the parties and I am of the view that when a dispute is raised by the assessing authority about the correctness of the figures which even the Sales Tax Tribunal has not mentioned in its order to have verified at its level, it was not proper for the Sales Tax Tribunal to knock down the penalties without giving the reasonable opportunity to the assessing authority. In these circumstances the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is quashed and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority to take the fresh proceedings de novo where the assessee may produce the books of account and get the figures verified as submitted before the Sales Tax Tribunal and the assessing authority thereafter may proceed in accordance with law. The revisions are partly allowed. No order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 238
... ... ... ... ..... om January 1, 1984, it does not contain any provision validating the demand made contrary to the judgment of this Court. Though an audit objection was raised against the collection of entertainment tax from the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 3,594 per week on the ground that rule 27(10) of the A.P. Entertainments Tax Rules was amended with retrospective effect, in view of the decision of this Court holding that the petitioner was entitled to pay entertainment tax only at the rate of Rs. 3,594 per week from May 24, 1986 to March 31, 1986 and which has become final we have no other alternative than to hold that the impugned notice of demand issued by the first respondent is illegal and invalid. Therefore, the impugned notice of demand dated November 18, 1988, is quashed. In the view we have taken, the other contentions raised in the writ petition need not be gone into. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Writ petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 237
... ... ... ... ..... ied in demanding the higher rate of tax payable in respect of a theatre situated within the second grade municipality. We are unable to accept this contention. Even according to the learned Government Pleader, G.O. Ms. No. 743 dated August 24, 1987, whereunder the State Government expressed that Kamareddy municipality will be classified as a second grade municipality, was not published in the A.P. Gazette. Admittedly, the notification declaring Kamareddy municipality as second grade municipality was published in the A.P. Gazette only on April 11, 1988. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned demand notices issued by the Entertainments Tax Officer are illegal. Accordingly, the impugned demand notices are quashed. However, this order does not preclude the authorities from making a demand at a higher rate with effect from April 1, 1988. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each. Writ petitions allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 236
... ... ... ... ..... s a revival of the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment which has already been barred under the old Act. This case was not considering the amendment which was given retrospective effect. However, a Division Bench of this Court held in Firm Chaturbhuj Rikhabdas v. State of Rajasthan ILR 1958 1 Raj 947 that the amendment though retrospective in operation does not suggest that assessment which had already been made would also be reopened because of this retrospective amendment. In the absence of specific provision to that effect, the amendment, therefore, would not touch assessment which had already been made. Following this binding judgment of this Court, I am of the view that the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the Board of Revenue were justified in declaring that the proceeding initiated after the lapse of 4 years were barred by limitation and the reassessment order was rightly quashed. The revision is rejected. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 235
... ... ... ... ..... e on hand since the purchases by the assessees by transfer of documents of title, assuming letters of authority constitute the documents of title, were made only long after the raw cashewnuts had reached the port, the same must be held to be after the goods crossed the customs frontiers of India. If so, the argument of the counsel that the question as to what does the expression customs frontiers of India in section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act mean, requires to be decided in the light of the definition contained in section 2(ab) of the Central Sales Tax Act introduced in 1976, is liable to be rejected. The claim of the assessees that the sales in question were sales in the course of import therefore is not sustainable in law. We are fortified in this view by a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Davar and Co. 1969 24 STC 481 AIR 1970 SC 165. The tax revision cases accordingly are dismissed but in the circumstances no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 234
... ... ... ... ..... ually been paid by the dealer at the time of effecting purchase thereof. 6.. In view of the aforesaid provisions in the Rules, the dealer was entitled to adjustment in respect of the stock he had on November 19, 1976, the date on which he is deemed to have been registered in respect of the country liquor in question. The learned Standing Counsel for the Sales Tax Department fairly concedes the aforesaid position. In the premises, as aforesaid, we would answer the question posed to the effect that the petitioner must be held to be a dealer dealing in country liquor on November 19, 1976 and in respect of the country liquor which he had on that day and for which he had paid sales tax while purchasing, is entitled to claim adjustment against his liability subject to compliance of formality under the second proviso to rule 36 of the Rules. The Tribunal is directed to act in accordance with our answer to the question posed. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 233
... ... ... ... ..... the item must take its colour from the specific goods mentioned in the latter part. It is well-known that the specific goods mentioned in the latter part are for usual consumption by persons who can afford for the same, whereas barley is for occasional human consumption irrespective of capacity of persons to afford for the same. Consequently, Robinson s barley in sealed container cannot be considered to be an item of food/beverage so as to be covered by the rule. 3.. In the light of the above discussions, the reference at the instance of the dealer is answered against him and in favour of the Revenue. A. PASAYAT, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the negative.
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1991 (11) TMI 232
... ... ... ... ..... o error in coming to the conclusion that the declaration forms had been taken back by the assessee and it had not resubmitted them. That being the position, it did not consider the prayer for acceptance of the declaration forms in its proper perspective. As has been held by this Court in Sahu Trading Co. v. State of Orissa 1983 54 STC 122, in appropriate cases declaration forms can be produced at the appellate stage provided requirements of rule 61 of the Orissa Sales Tax Rules, 1947, are complied with. Since in the instant case the Tribunal did not consider the case in its proper perspective, our answer to the second question is that the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to accept the C declaration forms submitted by the assessee. However, the Tribunal had no occasion to consider correctness of the forms. While hearing the matter under section 24(5), it shall consider whether they are in order, and dispose of the matter in accordance with law. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree.
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1991 (11) TMI 231
... ... ... ... ..... the assessment proceedings. I am of the view that the interpretation of the Tribunal is not in accordance with law. The explanation to rule 52 even refers to the proceedings which may be commenced after the date of such order or direction in respect of any order and which may be pending on the date of such order or direction which may have been completed on or before such date and includes also all proceedings under the Act or Rules made thereunder. The explanation is comprehensive enough to confer the power on the authority in whose favour an order under rule 52 has been passed to confer the jurisdiction as an assessing authority even in respect of the matter where the assessment has been completed and an appeal is intended to be filed. Consequently, the revision is accepted and the order of Tribunal is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to hear the appeal of the assessing authority and decide it on merit after due process of law. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 230
... ... ... ... ..... ich does not have statutory backing. In other words, it amounts to assumption of certain powers under cover of executive exercise of power, though these do not have the requisite statutory support. The trade circular, which has been issued without jurisdiction, contrary to the express provisions of law and in excess of power conferred by the statute on the Commissioner is, therefore, liable to be quashed. 29.. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we have come to the conclusion that rules 19(1) and 30 of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941, as introduced by notification dated January 8, 1991, are reasonable and valid. The prayer of the applicants in this regard is, therefore, rejected. But the trade circular dated June 4, 1990, issued by the Commissioner is, however, quashed. 30.. In the result, the application is allowed in part on contest. There will be no order for costs. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application partly allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 229
... ... ... ... ..... n the present case that question does not arise. We are only concerned with the question whether the assessees having purchased the goods under form XVII declarations, did not utilise the goods as component parts of cycles. We have already held that he did not use the articles purchased as component parts of cycle. In other words the assessees had failed without reasonable cause to make use of the goods for the declared purpose as mentioned in section 45(2)(e) of the Act. We are therefore of the opinion that the Tribunal had fallen into an error in holding that the assessees had sold the dynamo lamps along with the cycles and therefore the question of penalty under section 23 of the Act will not arise. 8.. For what we have stated above we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore the order of the Deputy Commissioner (appellate authority). The tax revision cases filed by the Revenue are accepted and allowed. There will however be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 228
... ... ... ... ..... ency nature, detailed adjudication is ruled out. No specific procedure or manner of adjudication is prescribed. Compelling reasons therefore, must exist for making a departure from collecting tax on the disclosed figure. It has to be indicated here that neither in rule 94 nor form VI-B, there is any prescription for putting a valuation higher than one disclosed in the way-bill. Where the purchaser/consignee is a registered dealer, ordinarily the value indicated in the way-bill has to be accepted, unless compelling reasons exist. That is because, at the time of assessment the question of under-valuation, if any, can be adjudicated. If, however, the officer-in-charge of the check-post is of the considered view that a departure is warranted, he must record reasons therefor and indicate those to the prescribed person. Adoption of such procedure will be in tune with principles of natural justice. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree.
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1991 (11) TMI 227
... ... ... ... ..... rences in treatment must be capable of being reasonably explained in the light of the object for which the particular legislation is undertaken. This must be based on some reasonable distinction between the cases differentially treated. When differential treatment is not reasonably explained and justified the treatment is discriminatory. In view of what is stated above, we hold that sub-section (1-A) of section 4-A of the A.P. Entertainments Tax Act, 1939, in so far as it authorises the levy of a tax of Rs. 50 on every show of any film on television screen exhibited through video cassette recorder in any of the local authorities of the State is held to be unconstitutional, as being violative of articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, clause (iii) of sub-section (1-A) of section 4-A of the A.P. Entertainments Tax Act, 1939, is struck down. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200 in each. Writ petitions allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 226
... ... ... ... ..... ard, yet the Tribunal has to apply its judicial mind, and should have itself considered the question. Since that forms the foundation of assessment, the Tribunal has to take into consideration the entire scheme of assessment and the applicability of various provisions. Therefore, even after having declined to interfere in the application under section 24(2) of the Act, we remit the matter back to the Tribunal for rehearing of the appeal so that justice can be done to the parties. If the State is entitled to any revenue, it cannot be deprived therefrom. At the same time, if an assessee is not required to pay an amount as tax, the question of it being required to pay anything beyond its statutory liability shall be against the constitutional mandate as contained in article 265 of the Constitution of India. Annexure 3 to the writ application is quashed. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Writ application disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 225
Issues Involved: The judgment involves assessment of sales tax under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, determination of escaped turnover, calculation of penalty under section 16(1)(i), interpretation of the definition of "sale price" under section 2(p) of the Act, and consideration of separate pricing for warranty charges.
Assessment of Sales Tax and Penalty: The assessing authority found that the full sale price was not shown in the return, leading to tax evasion. Despite opportunity, the books of account and debit notes were not produced, resulting in the calculation of escaped turnover on an estimated basis. The tax was levied on the determined turnover, and penalty under section 16(1)(i) was imposed. The Deputy Commissioner upheld the tax levy but set aside the penalties. In the second appeal, the Sales Tax Tribunal set aside the tax levy and rejected the appeal regarding penalties.
Interpretation of "Sale Price" and Warranty Charges: The Government Advocate argued that warranty charges collected by the assessee should be part of the sale price as per section 2(p) of the Act. It was contended that warranty charges were collected uniformly from all customers, forming a consolidated sale price. However, the assessee's counsel argued that warranty charges, being optional and for future acts, should not be included in the sale price. The judge agreed that if warranty charges were voluntary and separately charged, they should not be considered part of the sale price. The matter was remanded to examine if separate pricing existed for goods with and without warranty.
Penalty Imposition and Conclusion: The judge opined that no penalty should be levied when entries exist in the books of account, and the issue pertains to the interpretation of "sale price." Accordingly, the penalty was set aside. The revision was partly allowed, with no order as to costs, and the petition was partly allowed.
This judgment addresses the assessment of sales tax, calculation of penalty, interpretation of the sale price definition, and the treatment of warranty charges under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, providing clarity on the inclusion of such charges in the sale price based on voluntary nature and separate pricing considerations.
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1991 (11) TMI 224
... ... ... ... ..... cision of the Apex Court, reported in 1977 39 STC 237 (Assistant Sales Tax Officer v. B.C. Kame) or basic principles underlying the case relating to the printer of question papers of educational institutions or court judgments. After a careful consideration of the various judgments referred to by the Tribunal as well as the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case on hand and the essential nature and vital features of the contract in question, we are of the view that supply of a xerox copy manufactured by the use of xerox machine for a price consists of an indivisible contract of sale and consequently the turnover relating to the same was rightly subjected to tax by the assessing authority. The conclusions and findings of the Tribunal do not lay down the correct position of law and consequently, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and restore that of the other authorities below. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 223
Whether the assessee are entitled to a higher rate of development rebate specified in s.33(1) (b) (B) (i)(a) and to relief under s.80 I of the Income-tax Act, 1961?
Whether the assessee are engaged in the manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or things specified in the relevant Schedule to the Act?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The assessee cited a circular of the Board that, under item 2 of the schedule, the higher development rebate would be available to an assessee who manufactured articles from aluminium scrap [vide, circular no.25 D (XIX-16) dated 10th October, 1966]. The High Court, on this basis, answered the question by saying that the assessee before it was also entitled to the higher development rebate though it produced articles only from iron scrap. This does not really answer the real question but, for the reasons we have already given, we agree with the conclusion drawn by the High Court.
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1991 (11) TMI 222
Confiscation - Smuggling - Foreign origin - Burden of proof - De-notification ... ... ... ... ..... s did not choose to verify the accounts. Since the accounts produced by the appellant and receipts etc. were not considered by the adjudicating authority and since a finding against the appellant has been given solely on ground of weight discrepancy and since as indicated above the discrepancy in weight is not much and is bound to arise depending upon the machine in which the diamonds are weighed and keeping in mind the fact that the proceedings are penal in nature, I am inclined to hold that the appellants would be entitled to the benefit of doubt arising in the facts and circumstances of the case. In this view of the matter I set aside the order of the Collector in regard to the confiscation of the diamonds in question. In the light of the view I have taken in appreciation of the evidence on facts, I do not consider it necessary to pronounce upon the legal questions argued by the learned Counsel. I, therefore, hold that the appeals would stand allowed for the above reasons.
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1991 (11) TMI 221
Whether the company had not followed any of the procedures prescribed and the right of the Corporation to deny refund of octroi on non-compliance with any of those provisions in the Rules?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. There is no evidence that any of the articles sold by the company is subject to any price control by the Government or that the company had charged any octroi separately in the bills. Invoices and the other documents of sale to the outside purchasers produced before us do not also show that any octroi was separately charged and collected by the company. It may be mentioned that in the rejoinder filed by the appellant in the writ petition they have specifically denied that they "have recovered the amount paid by them by way of octroi duty from the dealers to whom they had sold the goods or that the dealers in turn have recovered the octroi duty from the customers". In view of this the question of unjust enrichment does not arise.
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1991 (11) TMI 213
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... dabad Mfg. Co. Ltd., In re 1970 40 Comp Cas 819 (Guj). It is unnecessary to repeat that, to constitute a class, members belonging to the class must form a homogeneous group with commonality of interest and those who have such common interest, thus must be found to constitute one class, whereas those whose interests are in conflict with the interests of such a group have to be treated as a separate class. In the instant case, the requirements of section 391(1) of the Act, in our opinion, have not been fulfilled. The impugned judgment, for the said reason, is fit to be set aside and it is, accordingly, set aside. The case is remitted to the trial court for a rehearing and, if necessary, a further direction for holding of the meeting of different classes of unsecured creditors and their consent in accordance with law. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. On the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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