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1991 (11) TMI 3
This is not a fit case for interference under article 136 of the Constitution for the simple reason that the amount which is being claimed as deduction by the assessee had already been allowed to him in 1960-61. Virtually, what he is seeking in this appeal is the deduction for the same amount in 1961-62. The claim is unequitable and uncalled for. In the circumstances, the civil appeal is dismissed
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1991 (11) TMI 2
Whether the Tribunal is justified in holding that the income derived by the Radhasoami Satsang, a religious institution, is entitled to exemption under sections 11 and 12 - Held, yes
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1991 (11) TMI 1
Development Rebate - whether an assessee manufacturing iron rods and girders out of iron scrap would be entitled to the higher development rebate - assessee cited a circular of the Board that, under item No. 2 of the Schedule, the higher development rebate would be available to an assessee who manufactured articles from aluminum scrap [vide Circular No. 25D (XIX-16) - though articles produced only from iron scrap, rebate is entitled to assessee
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1991 (10) TMI 328
... ... ... ... ..... ch inquiry as deemed necessary and make recommendations for the grant or refusal of the application for affiliation to the University. In my opinion, impugned letter dated 15-4-1991 (Annexure-E) issued is in violation of Section 53(5) of the Act. 12. In the result and for the reasons stated above I proceed to pass the following ORDER (1) Writ Petition is allowed. (2) The impugned letter dated 15-4-1991 (Annexure-E) issued by the second respondent is quashed. (3) The respondent No. 2 is directed to submit the application filed by the petitioners seeking affiliation for the academic year 1991 -92 along with the proceedings of the Academic Council and Syndicate relating thereto to the State Government-respondent No. 1 under Section 53(5) of the Act for necessary action within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and thereafter the State Government to take action as required under Section 53(5) of the Act within a period of 45 days. (4) No costs.
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1991 (10) TMI 327
... ... ... ... ..... ing through the case record and the nature of the prosecution case, I do not find the Magistrate has committed any error or any illegality in passing the impugned order inasmuch as in the case of forgery the document which is the subject matter of forgery has to be examined by the court for proper decision of the case. That apart, in the present case the prosecution though closed its evidence, the accused statement has not been recorded. Therefore, the question of prejudice to the petitioner does not arise at all. It is unfortunate, a case of this nature has been lying over almost for the last four years from the date of passing of the impugned order. 8. In the result, there is no merit in the revision which is accordingly dismissed since the lower court order is confirmed. The trial court shall make all endeavour to dispose of the case within a period of six months from the date of appearance of the parties. The lower court records be sent back forthwith. Revision dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 326
... ... ... ... ..... ing the circular. The infirmity pointed out that it was not issued in the name of the President, therefore, relates only about the form and not with regard to the substance. The circular of course, ought to have been issued in the name of the President as required under Article 148(5) of the Constitution, as it affects the service conditions of persons in the Audit and Accounts Department. But since the Government has approved the circular and the circular was in accordance with the declared policy of reservation, we do not want to restrain the Comptroller Auditor General from enforcing it. We are thus of the view that the impugned circular is valid and binding. The circular by its own provides for reservation. The authorities concerned must take that into account while affecting promotions under the rules. The result is that the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1991 (10) TMI 325
... ... ... ... ..... ion in order to embrace different approaches to it or to bring out the essence of the question referred or proposed or to clarify some obscurity therein or to pin-point the real issue between the taxpayer and the department or for some identical reasons. However, under the purported exercise of the power to reframe the question, this Court has no jurisdiction to raise a new question of law not flowing from the question posed before it, the reason being that this Court under section 256 does not exercise original or appellate jurisdiction but exercises only advisory jurisdiction. If a plea was never raised in the application under section 256(1), it cannot be allowed to be raised by refraining the question before this Court, hardship to the assessee or the revenue notwithstanding. 14. On the facts found by the Tribunal, in our opinion, no question of law arises. 15. In the result, all the three applications are dismissed with costs, which we assess at ₹ 200 in each case.
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1991 (10) TMI 324
... ... ... ... ..... is of some evidence which was in the possession of the disciplinary authority it already stood proved that the petitioner was guilty of the charge. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in Khem Chand's case (supra) that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to have bee??? done aptly applies to the facts of the present case. On this ground also, the whole enquiry proceedings are vitiated and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It is not necessary for me to go into the question of quantum of punishment on account of the view I have taken on other points raised by the petitioner's counsel. 17. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed and the order dated 2.5.1991 Annexure P-5 dismissing the petitioner from service is hereby quashed resultantly the petitioner would be reinstated forthwith in service from the date of dismissal order with all consequential benefits. However, there will be no order as to costs. 18. Petition allowed.
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1991 (10) TMI 323
Issues Involved: 1. Lapse of Motion upon Dissolution of Lok Sabha 2. Justiciability of the Removal Process 3. Constitutionality of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 4. Requirement of Natural Justice 5. Judicial Remedy for Judicial Misconduct 6. Mala Fides of the Speaker 7. Locus Standi of Petitioners 8. Effectiveness of Court's Writ
Summary:
1. Lapse of Motion upon Dissolution of Lok Sabha: The Court examined whether a motion for the removal of a Judge lapses upon the dissolution of the House of Parliament. It was held that the motion does not lapse and remains pending. The Court stated, "The effect of these provisions is that the motion shall be kept pending till the committee submits its report and if the committee finds the Judge guilty, the motion shall be taken up for consideration."
2. Justiciability of the Removal Process: The Court discussed whether the process for the removal of a Judge is justiciable. It concluded that the constitutional process for removal of a Judge up to the point of admission of the motion and constitution of the Committee are not strictly proceedings in the Houses of Parliament and are thus subject to judicial review. The Court stated, "The constitutional process for removal of a Judge up to the point of admission of the motion, constitution of the Committee and the recording of findings by the Committee are not, strictly, proceedings in the Houses of Parliament."
3. Constitutionality of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968: The Court held that the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is constitutional and intra vires. It stated, "The provisions of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 are not unconstitutional as abridging the powers and privileges of the House."
4. Requirement of Natural Justice: It was argued that the Speaker should have given the Judge an opportunity to be heard before admitting the motion. The Court held that at the stage when the Speaker admits the motion, the Judge is not entitled to such notice as a matter of right, stating, "The scheme of the statute and rules made thereunder by necessary implication, exclude such a right."
5. Judicial Remedy for Judicial Misconduct: The Court rejected the argument that the judiciary itself has the jurisdiction to restrain a Judge from exercising judicial functions pending inquiry. It emphasized that the constitutional scheme does not permit such an interim direction, stating, "The relief of a direction to restrain the Judge from discharging judicial functions cannot be granted."
6. Mala Fides of the Speaker: The Court found no merit in the allegations of mala fides against the Speaker, stating, "A case of mala fides cannot be made out merely on the ground of political affiliation of the Speaker either."
7. Locus Standi of Petitioners: The Court upheld the locus standi of the petitioners, including the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, stating, "The present matter is of such nature and the constitutional issues of such nature and importance that it cannot be said that members of the Bar, and particularly the Supreme Court Bar Association have no locus standi in the matter."
8. Effectiveness of Court's Writ: The Court declared the correct constitutional position without issuing specific writs, emphasizing that the decision of the House on whether the motion has lapsed is binding, stating, "Having regard to the nature of the subject matter and the purpose it is ultimately intended to serve all that is necessary is to declare the legal and constitutional position and leave the different organs of the State to consider matters falling within the orbit of their respective jurisdiction and powers."
Separate Judgment by L.M. Sharma, J.: Justice L.M. Sharma dissented, holding that the writ petitions should be dismissed and that the courts have no jurisdiction in the matter. He emphasized that the constitutional scheme vests the power of removal of a Judge exclusively in the Parliament and not in the judiciary. He stated, "The courts including the Supreme Court do not have any jurisdiction to pass any order in relation to a proceeding for removal of a Judge of the superior courts."
Conclusion: The Court disposed of Writ Petition Nos. 491 and 541 of 1991 by declaring the appropriate legal positions and dismissed Writ Petition Nos. 542 and 560 of 1991. The Transfer Petition No. 278 of 1991 was allowed, and the transferred writ petition was also dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 322
... ... ... ... ..... proceedings under the Indian Stamp Act for the redressal of their grievance. To hold it otherwise, would amount to deprivation of a valuable opportunity to the petitioners to participate in the enquiry which the 1st respondent is obliged to hold. I therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the argument of the-learned Government Pleader. 17. In view of the above discussion, I direct the 1st respondent to reconsider the question of valuation and form the necessary opinion afresh after holding an enquiry under Rule 3(3) keeping in view the observations in this judgment. It is only after such reconsideration, if the 1st respondent feels that the document shall be referred to the Collector under S.47-A of the Stamp Act, he shall make a reference afresh to the Collector. The reference made by his letter dated 13-8-1991 to the Collector is declared as illegal. The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. No costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 100/- in each. 18. Order accordingly.
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1991 (10) TMI 321
... ... ... ... ..... ore, during arguments, the Court asked the learned counsel to advance arguments on the question as to whether the winning party would like to have an order of costs and, if so, what, they consider, would be a reasonable amount for quantification of counsel fee. Both the learned counsel expressed their desire to postpone the argument on this point, till the conclusion of the arguments on merit. But at the end of the arguments on merit, this point got somehow omitted to be argued, perhaps, because no party wanted to press for costs. Certificate of counsel fee was also not filed by either of them. In the circumstances, this is a fit case for making no order as to costs. 35. These are the reasons for the order that I passed on 22-8-1991 which runs as under The revision is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, the application under Order VII Rule II of the Code of Civil Procedure is allowed and the plaint is rejected. There shall be no order as to costs. Reasons shall follow.
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1991 (10) TMI 320
... ... ... ... ..... ute of-a new plaint-or a new cause of action in place of what was originally there" is not sought and that even "very defective pleadings-may be permitted to be cured, so as to constitute a cause of action where there was none, provided necessary conditions, such as payment of either any additional court fees, which play be ..payable, or, of costs of the other side are coupled with." (7) The ouster of Order 6 rule 17 will throttle the very life line of Order 7 rule 11. Instead of promoting, it would defeat the ends of justice . I refuse to be a patty to such an approach. (8) Before dropping the curtain, a word or two on the two judgments from this court Both of them must betaken to be confined to their own facts and in any case, in both, applications for amendment were disallowed by the pout in exercise of its discretion. They must with respect be taken to say no more. (9) Order 6 role 17 is thus hold to be neither restricted nor controlled by Order 7 rule 11.
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1991 (10) TMI 319
... ... ... ... ..... ence this argument must also be rejected. 33. In the premises, rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The order passed by respondent No. 7 dated 4th April, 1989, Exhibit F to the petition, to the extent that it declares respondent No. 8 as validly nominated for election to the post of the president of respondent No. 6, as well as election of respondent No. 8 to the post of the president of respondent No. 6 Bank pursuant to the election held on 23rd April 1989, is set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly with costs. 34. Dr. Naik, who appears for respondent No. 8, applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In our view, no important question of law of public importance arises. Hence the application is rejected. 35. On the application of Dr. Naik, operation of this order is stayed for a period of eight weeks from today. He agrees to give 48 hours' notice to the petitioners of any application that may be moved before the Supreme Court. 36. Order accordingly.
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1991 (10) TMI 318
... ... ... ... ..... ce worth accepting to conclude that Avtar Singh was in exclusive possession as a tenant. The High Court rightly held that the finding of subletting or parting with possession of the premises in dispute was vitiated in law as it was primarily based on inadmissible evidence. Having found the finding vitiated, it was open to the High Court to re-examine and reappreciate the evidence on record. On reappraisal it disbelieved-the oral evidence. We do not find any error in such reappraisal. It is then sought to be contended that Gulzar Singh had other business and it implies that he is not in exclusive possession of the demised premises. We find no force in the contention. It may be that Gulzar Singh had other business but that does not lead to the conclusion that Gulzar singh is not in exclusive possession of the demised premises as tenant or that he sublet the premises to Avtar Singh. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 317
... ... ... ... ..... ontention as the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy available to it by way of appeal before the Asstt. Commissioner. 3. In view of what has been stated above, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The truck in question, namely, truck No. U. P. 53-A/6266 is directed to be released immediately on the production of a certified copy of this order before the Sales Tax Officer, Dharaulim, district Ballia. The relief in regard to the goods being transported by that truck is, however, refused on the ground of alternative remedy. 4. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel on payment of requisite charges today.
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1991 (10) TMI 316
... ... ... ... ..... P. Sales Tax Act. Learned Standing Counsel representing the respondent does not dispute that at this stage the truck could not legally be detained and seized. 3. In this view the petition is disposed of with the direction to the Sales Tax Officer, Bhipura, Check Post, Ghaziabad to release Truck No. U. P. 27-5007 immediately on production of a certified copy of this order before him. This order shall, however, not cover the goods which have also been seized with respect to which the petitioner may pursue his remedy in accordance with the provisions of U. P. Sales Tax Act before the Sales Tax Authorities themselves. 4. A copy of this order may be issued to the learned counsel by tomorrow on payment of usual charges.
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1991 (10) TMI 315
... ... ... ... ..... 111 and 49 of 1981. The decision in the said cases has nothing to do in this case and so questions (c) and (d) do not arise for consideration. 6. In question No. (e) the poser is this When is the sale completed ? Ordinarily it depends upon the intention of the parties. Admittedly, there was an agreement, entered into between the parties, which would decide the issue. That is not a part of the paper book before us and we are not in a position to advert to the nature of the agreement, entered into between the parties and as to when the sale has taken place according to the intention of parties. No material is placed before us to decide whether question No.(e) mentioned in paragraph 8 of the O. P. is a referable question of law. So the five questions formulated as questions (a) to (e) in paragraph 8 of the O. P., which alone were specified in the application filed before the Tribunal under s. 256 (1) of the Act, are not referable question of law. We dismiss the O. P. No. costs.
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1991 (10) TMI 314
... ... ... ... ..... of ₹ 50,000/- per month, first of such payment to be made on or before last day of each month. (3) Thereafter the defendant shall not be liable to deposit any further amount with the Court Receiver under this order. At that stage the parties shall be at liberty to apply to the Court for further directions. The Court may then discharge or continue the receiver with the agency of the defendant to use the machinery as agent of the receiver on reduced amount of compensation as deemed fit or pass some other appropriate order. 20. The Notice of Motion is finality disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. 21. On application of Mr. Doctor, it is hereby directed that the Court Receiver shall not require the defendant to execute the agency agreement till 20th of November, 1991. 22. It is hereby clarified that this order shall not prevent the Board from performing its statutory functions under Act I of 1986 in accordance with law. 23. Issue of certified copy is expedited.
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1991 (10) TMI 313
Issues Involved: Interpretation of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 in relation to possession given to competent authority under the Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1972.
Judgment Summary:
The Supreme Court considered the question of law regarding the interpretation of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 in a case where possession was given to a competent authority under the Himachal Pradesh Requisition and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1972. The Court analyzed whether such possession constituted vacation without sufficient cause under the Rent Control Act.
The Court examined the meaning of "vacate such building without sufficient cause" in the context of the second proviso. It was determined that vacating a building under a requisition order by the competent authority does not amount to vacation without sufficient cause, as the landlord is compelled to vacate under legal constraint.
The Court emphasized that the sufficiency of cause under the Rent Control Act should not be influenced by the validity or invalidity of an order under the Requisition Act. The reasons for vacating a building under different circumstances should be considered independently.
Furthermore, the Court held that the Rent Control authorities cannot assess the merit of an order under the Requisition Act, and therefore, such an order should not be a determining factor in concluding that a building was vacated without sufficient cause.
Additionally, the Court addressed the requirement for the landlord to occupy the building and found that the appellant had a genuine need to occupy the premises, as he had no other building in the urban area and had vacated his previous building for sufficient reasons. Therefore, the appellant was entitled to seek eviction of the tenant.
In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the lower courts, and directed the appellant to approach the Rent Control authorities for appropriate directions. Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.
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1991 (10) TMI 312
... ... ... ... ..... ) of Sub-section (3) of Section 22A of SCR Act. The petitioner-company's case is that since transfer of less than 50 shares under circumstances other than those enumerated in Article 47A of the articles of association is prohibited, the board of directors have rightly refused the registration of transfer of shares. Since there is a specific provision which seeks free transferability and registration of transfers of listed securities, according to us any provisions which puts any restriction on the free transferability of shares would be a negation of the expressed provisions of law and would be self-defeating. 10. In view of the foregoing, we hereby direct pursuant to the provisions of Sub-section (7)(a) of Section 22A of the SCR Act, that the transfer of shares involved in these four references, which are the subject-matter of this order, shall be registered by Kinetic Engineering Limited within ten days from the date of receipt of this order. 11. No orders as to costs.
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