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1991 (10) TMI 311
... ... ... ... ..... side of the petitioner is Mahesh Kumar Chauhan v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 148 1990 SCC (Cri) 434 . In that case the Sponsoring Authority caused a delay of 17 days in forwarding the comments and there was no explanation as to why such a delay had occurred. Having regard to those facts, this Court held that the unexplained delay had vitiated the order of detention. 7. As we have already pointed out there was an inordinate delay of nearly 28 days in forwarding the comments by the Sponsoring Authority which delay stands unexplained in the instant case. 8. In these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the undue and unexplained delay in the present case in the disposal of the representation of the detenue has rendered the impugned order invalid. 9. In the result the impugned order of detention is set aside and the detenue is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless the petitioner's detention is required for any other cause. 10. The writ petition is allowed.
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1991 (10) TMI 310
Issues involved: The issue involves the determination of whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises for the purpose of instituting a suit for eviction under Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
Judgment Summary:
The plaintiff, as an allottee of a flat from a housing cooperative society, sought eviction of the tenant based on reasonable requirement under Section 13(1)(ff) of the Act. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff, finding the premises were reasonably required. However, the 1st appellate court and the High Court held that the plaintiff, being a lessee under a 99-year sub-lease, was not the 'owner' as per Section 13(1)(ff) and thus not entitled to seek eviction under that provision.
The High Court and the 1st appellate court erred in setting aside the trial court's decree solely on the question of the plaintiff's title, which was never raised as an issue during the trial. As per legal principles, the plaintiff, as an allottee with a 99-year heritable and transferable title, has a superior right in relation to the defendant, making him the owner for the purposes of the Act.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the 1st appellate court, and remanded the case for fresh disposal based on the merits of the respondent-tenant's appeal. The appellant was awarded costs throughout the proceedings.
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1991 (10) TMI 309
... ... ... ... ..... y were seized. Having regard to the fact that in the course of the arguments there was a lot of dispute with regard to the manner in which or the places from where the documents are alleged to have been seized or recovered, no such consequential orders are being made. It shall be open to the respective parties to apply to the trial Court for appropriate orders. As regards the documents in respect of which the learned Additional Sessions Judge has passed an order that the same be returned to the accused forthwith, the interim order passed by this Court will continue to operate in respect of those documents for a period of 6 (six) weeks. After the appeal period is over and if no other Court is by then seized of the matter, it shall be open to the parties to apply to the trial Court for appropriate orders in respect of those documents. Until that time, the documents which, I am informed, are in safe custody shall continue to be retained in that condition. 62. Order accordingly.
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1991 (10) TMI 308
Issues Involved: 1. Whether compliance with sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 22 of Bombay Town Planning Rules 1955 is mandatory. 2. Whether the violation of these sub-rules invalidates the final town planning scheme. 3. Whether a tenant or sub-tenant is entitled to notice under these sub-rules.
Summary:
Issue 1: Compliance with Sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 22 The Supreme Court examined whether the compliance with sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 22 of the Bombay Town Planning Rules 1955 is mandatory. The Court held that the issuance of special notice of at least three clear days duration and giving sufficient opportunity to the person affected to put forth his views of the scheme are mandatory. The Court emphasized that these sub-rules subserve the principles of natural justice to avoid arbitrariness offending Art. 14 and to be just and fair procedures satisfying the mandate of Art. 21. Non-compliance would render the scheme illegal.
Issue 2: Violation and Invalidity of the Final Scheme The Court concluded that non-compliance with the requirements of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 21 does vitiate the scheme. The use of 'shall' in the given circumstances was construed to be mandatory and not directory. The Court stated that public interest is always a paramount consideration, and since non-compliance injuriously affects the right to property of the owner or interest of the tenant or sub-tenant, it shall be construed to be mandatory.
Issue 3: Entitlement of Notice to Tenant or Sub-tenant The Court held that a tenant or a sub-tenant is a person interested and is entitled to notice. Under s. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, a lease creates a right or an interest in the enjoyment of the demised property, and a tenant or a sub-tenant is entitled to remain in possession until the lease is duly terminated and eviction takes place in accordance with law. Therefore, a tenant or a sub-tenant in possession of a tenement in the Town Planning Scheme is a person interested within the meaning of Rules 21(3) & (4) of the Rules.
Conclusion: The appeal was allowed to the extent that the respondent is directed to provide an alternative premises by allotting a suitable shop within the city to the appellant and to put it in possession thereof. Until then, the appellant is allowed to occupy the demised shop. The decree of the Courts below was upheld in other respects, and parties were directed to bear their own costs.
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1991 (10) TMI 307
... ... ... ... ..... er, will be responsible for discharging the onus of proving that the goods had moved outside the State. In this view of the matter also I find that the Tribunal has committed an error of law in approaching the case from a wrong angle regarding the burden of proof. Learned counsel for the assessees also does not dispute this proposition of law. That apart, the finding recorded by the first appellate authority that the assessees had got prepared a forged record relating to Bilties regarding the aforesaid transport in these cases has also not been considered and adequately dealt by the Sales Tax Tribunal. 13. For the foregoing discussions, in my opinion, the impugned order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside and is hereby set aside. 14. With the aforesaid observations all the aforesaid 99 revisions filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, U. P., Lucknow succeed and are allowed with one set of costs which are assessed at ₹ 300.
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1991 (10) TMI 306
Issues Involved: 1. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to withdraw and dispose of the suits and criminal proceedings. 2. Compliance with Order XXIII Rule 3B, CPC. 3. Quashing of criminal proceedings. 4. Prohibition of future criminal proceedings. 5. Consideration of the settlement as stifling prosecution. 6. Necessity of a "Fairness-Hearing" and "Re-opener" clause. 7. Restitution of funds in case of setting aside the settlement. 8. Adequacy of the settlement fund and the Union of India's liability to make good any shortfall. 9. Medical surveillance costs and operational expenses of the hospital. 10. Provision for future claims and compensation for latent injuries.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to withdraw and dispose of the suits and criminal proceedings: The Supreme Court held that it had the necessary jurisdiction and power u/s 142(1) of the Constitution to withdraw to itself the original suits pending in the District Court at Bhopal and dispose of the same in terms of the settlement. Similarly, the Court had the jurisdiction to withdraw the criminal proceedings.
2. Compliance with Order XXIII Rule 3B, CPC: The contention that the settlement is void for non-compliance with the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3B, CPC was rejected. The Court held that the principle of natural justice underlying Order XXIII Rule 3B was not violated.
3. Quashing of criminal proceedings: The Court held that it had the jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings under Article 142(1) but found that the quashing of the criminal proceedings was not justified in the particular facts and circumstances. The criminal proceedings were directed to be proceeded with.
4. Prohibition of future criminal proceedings: The provisions in the orders prohibiting future criminal proceedings were held to be merely consequential to the quashing of the criminal proceedings. Since the quashing was reviewed, this part of the order was also set aside.
5. Consideration of the settlement as stifling prosecution: The contention that the settlement and the orders of the Court thereon are void as opposed to public policy and as amounting to a stifling of criminal proceedings was rejected. The Court held that the settlement did not suffer from the vice of unlawfulness of consideration.
6. Necessity of a "Fairness-Hearing" and "Re-opener" clause: The Court held that the incidents and imperatives of the American procedure of "Fairness Hearing" were not strictly attracted to the Court's sanctioning of a settlement. Likewise, the absence of a "Re-opener" clause did not, ipso facto, vitiate the settlement.
7. Restitution of funds in case of setting aside the settlement: The Court held that if the settlement is set aside, the UCC shall be entitled to the restitution of the US 420 million dollars brought in by it pursuant to the orders of the Court. However, such restitution shall be subject to the compliance with and proof of satisfaction of the terms of the order dated 30th November 1986, made by the Bhopal District Court.
8. Adequacy of the settlement fund and the Union of India's liability to make good any shortfall: The Court held that the settlement is not vitiated for not affording the victims and victim-groups an opportunity of being heard. However, if the settlement-fund is found to be insufficient, the deficiency is to be made good by the Union of India as indicated in paragraph 72.
9. Medical surveillance costs and operational expenses of the hospital: The Court directed the establishment of a hospital with at least 500 beds strength with the best of equipment and facilities for medical surveillance of the population of Bhopal exposed to MIC for a period of eight years. The UCC and UCIL should agree to bear the financial burden for the establishment and equipment of the hospital, and its operational expenses for a period of eight years.
10. Provision for future claims and compensation for latent injuries: The Court directed the Union of India to take out an appropriate medical group insurance cover from the Life Insurance Corporation of India or the General Insurance Corporation of India for compensation to those who might become symptomatic in future and to those later-born children who might manifest congenital or prenatal MIC related afflictions. The premia shall be paid out of the settlement fund.
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1991 (10) TMI 305
... ... ... ... ..... the intestate shall not devolve upon the heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified thereunder but upon heirs of the husband. The, object seems to be not to eliminate the other heirs under sub- section (1) and not to exclude them from inheritance altogether. There is no justice in such a construction of Section 15. The Parliament could not have intended that result. In this view of the matter, we dismiss the Civil Appeal No. 851 of 1991 preferred by the State but not for the reasons stated by the High Court. We allow the appeal arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 13923 of 1985 and set aside that portion of the decree made by the High Court as against the defendants 2 to 6. The suit filed by the plaintiff as against defendants 2 to 6 stands dismissed. The parties may adjudicate elsewhere the subsistence or otherwise of the mortgage in question. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. CA No. 851/91 dismissed and CA No. 4125/91 allowed.
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1991 (10) TMI 304
Issues Involved: 1. Whether the industries manufacturing sugar from sugarcane are covered by Entry 15 of Schedule I to the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977. 2. Interpretation of the term "vegetable" in the context of the Cess Act. 3. Whether the manufacture of alcohol from molasses falls under Entry 15 of Schedule I.
Summary of Judgment:
Issue 1: Coverage of Sugar Manufacturing Industries u/s Entry 15 of Schedule I The primary question was whether sugar manufacturing industries fall under Entry 15 of Schedule I to the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977, which pertains to "processing of animal or vegetable products industry." The Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Allahabad High Court held that sugar manufacturing industries come within Entry 15, while the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Patna High Court held the opposite view. The Supreme Court concluded that sugar manufacturing industries do not fall under Entry 15, as sugarcane is not considered a vegetable in common parlance.
Issue 2: Interpretation of "Vegetable" The term "vegetable" was interpreted in its common parlance rather than its botanical sense. The Court referred to various dictionaries and previous judgments to conclude that "vegetable" typically refers to edible plants or parts of plants used for food, such as those grown in kitchen gardens or farms. The Court emphasized that the Cess Act is a fiscal enactment and must be strictly construed. Therefore, sugarcane, being an agricultural product and not a vegetable, does not fall under the term "vegetable" as used in Entry 15.
Issue 3: Manufacture of Alcohol from Molasses The Court also addressed whether the manufacture of alcohol from molasses falls under Entry 15. Since the sugar manufacturing industry itself does not fall under Entry 15, the manufacture of alcohol from molasses, a by-product of sugar, also does not fall under this entry.
Conclusion The Supreme Court allowed the civil appeals and writ petitions challenging the inclusion of sugar manufacturing industries under Entry 15 of Schedule I to the Cess Act. The Court dismissed the appeals supporting the inclusion and made the Rule Nisi absolute.
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1991 (10) TMI 303
Whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in custody and if so was there any material to show that there were compelling reasons to order detention inspire of his being in custody?
Held that:- Sections 111 and 113 of the Customs Act provide for confiscation of improperly imported goods and exported goods respectively. The submission of the learned counsel is that the petitioner being in custody in India can no more indulge in smuggling and therefore the detention on the ground that he is likely to indulge in smuggling is non-existent. We see no force in this submission. The potentialities of the detenu as gathered from his act of smuggling that form basis for detention. It is difficult to comprehend precisely the manner in which such a detenu with such potentialities may likely to indulge in the activities of smuggling. It is for the detaining authority to derive the necessary satisfaction on the basis of the materials placed before him. In the result this Writ Petition is also dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 302
Issues Involved: 1. Defects in the accounts and incorrect/incomplete returns. 2. Justification of penalty under section 12(5) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. 3. Interpretation and scope of sections 12(4) and 12(5) of the Act. 4. Bona fide belief and its impact on penalty imposition.
Summary:
1. Defects in the accounts and incorrect/incomplete returns: The respondents/assessees, engaged in the business of readymade garments, filed returns for the assessment year 1979-80 declaring a total turnover of Rs. 3,04,295 and taxable turnover of Rs. 78,935, claiming exemption on Rs. 2,25,360. The assessing authority identified two defects: (1) Purchase of hosiery goods under a brand name from outside Tamil Nadu for Rs. 35,124.29 was not separately accounted for, resulting in a taxable turnover of Rs. 42,990 at 5%. (2) Inter-State purchase of readymade goods amounting to Rs. 68,091 was wrongly included in the total purchase, leading to a taxable turnover of Rs. 83,341 at 2%. Consequently, the returns were rejected as incorrect and incomplete, and the turnover was determined u/s 12(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
2. Justification of penalty under section 12(5) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959: The assessing authority proposed a penalty of Rs. 1,478, being 50% of the tax due on the undeclared turnover. The appellate authority upheld the assessment and penalty, noting that the assessees disclosed transactions in the accounts but failed to file a revised return. The Tribunal, however, found no deliberate concealment or dishonest conduct by the assessees, thus ruling out the penalty u/s 12(5) of the Act.
3. Interpretation and scope of sections 12(4) and 12(5) of the Act: The Revenue argued that deliberate concealment or wilful suppression is not necessary for levying penalty u/s 12(5) of the Act. The assessees contended that a bona fide belief regarding exemption or tax rate does not warrant a penalty. The court examined the legislative intent behind sections 12(4) and 12(5), introduced by Tamil Nadu Act 47 of 1979, and distinguished them from sections 12(3) and 16(2) which involve wilful failure. The court emphasized that if the assessment is based on the accounts and the return is found incorrect or incomplete, penalty u/s 12(5) is justified.
4. Bona fide belief and its impact on penalty imposition: The court referred to various judgments, including the Supreme Court's ruling in Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, which held that a return cannot be deemed false unless there is deliberateness. The court acknowledged that bona fide legal pleas should not attract penalties even if found incorrect. It concluded that each case must be analyzed on its facts to determine if the return was incorrect or incomplete due to a bona fide belief or an intent to evade tax.
Conclusion: The court found confusion in the assessing authority's findings regarding whether the assessment was based on the books of accounts or de hors the accounts. It remanded the case back to the assessing authority to clarify this aspect and determine the applicability of penalties u/s 12(3) or 12(5) of the Act, considering the observations made in the judgment. The petition was allowed, and the matter was remitted for fresh orders on the penalty issue.
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1991 (10) TMI 301
... ... ... ... ..... ncern the petitioner is obliged to pay arrears either under section 16 or under section 18 of the Act. Added to that, the petitioner has given an undertaking to the Commercial Tax Officer that in case Sri Om Prakash did not pay the amount due as arrears from M/s. Kamal Oil Mill, it may be recovered from him, that is, from M/s. Ambica Oil Mill. This conduct of the petitioner disentitles him from any discretionary relief from this Court even assuming that all the legal submissions advanced by the petitioner are correct. In that view, we are not persuaded to hold in favour of the petitioner. The attempt to recover the arrears of tax due from M/s. Kamal Oil Mill from the petitioner, either as partner thereof or as transferee thereof in conducting the same business in the same premises under the same lease, cannot be considered as illegal or unsustainable. We therefore, dismiss the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 350. Writ petition dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 300
... ... ... ... ..... cular. If the Commissioner has changed his mind as is contended by the learned Standing Counsel, one would have expected him to withdraw the said circular. He did not. In the circumstances, I see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Tribunal which applied and followed the said circular and gave its benefit to the assessee herein. Sitting in revision, I cannot say that the Tribunal-or for that matter the first appellate authority-was not justified in following the said circular. For this reason, it is not necessary for me to go into the precise question regarding the meaning of the word accessory nor to go into the question whether, as a matter of law or fact, the trailer concerned herein are accessories of jeeps. Suffice it to say that in view of the circular aforesaid issued by the Commissioner which has been followed by both the appellate authorities, I am not inclined to interfere in these revisions. They accordingly fail and are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 299
... ... ... ... ..... he opinion of the Joint Commissioner that since the dealers had themselves admitted their liability to pay tax on such insurance charges, which they had included in the sale price and on which sales tax had been collected, it would imply that even in respect of those bills where freight charges and insurance charges were shown separately and not included in the composite sale price, the assessees would not be entitled to exemption, is not at all sustainable for, by no stretch of imagination can such charges be construed to form a part of the sale price of the goods. In the admitted facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the Joint Commissioner of including the insurance charges amounting to Rs. 1,49,295.02 in the taxable turnover was clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and restore that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (10) TMI 298
... ... ... ... ..... the respondent-assessee, contended that the said observations uphold his contention. I am unable to agree. All that the learned Judge said was that the said contention appears to have some force but then he sent the matter back precisely to find out whether Notification No. 3867 did or did not supersede Notification No. 4748. Indeed, if the learned Judge had accepted the petitioner s contention, as contended by Sri Mathur, then there was no occasion to send the matter back to the Tribunal to verify the said aspect. When I asked the learned counsel as to what decision did the Tribunal take in pursuance of the said order of remand, I am told that the Tribunal has not so far decided the matter. If indeed it is so, it is but proper that the Tribunal decides the matter at an early date. For the above reasons, both the revisions are allowed. The order of the Sales Tax Tribunal is set aside and the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) is restored. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (10) TMI 297
... ... ... ... ..... aintained by the assessee may afford. 6.. In the instant case, the suppression detected covered a period of four months. Therefore, the estimate does not appear to be unreasonable and merely because the enhancement was made with reference to the statement of the assessee it cannot be said that there was no material to justify enhancement. The Tribunal has indicated the period of suppression, and magnitude of purchase suppression to justify the enhancement. These are essentially conclusions on facts. The answer to the first limb of second question is that there can be best judgment assessment and enhancement while making assessment under section 12(8) of the Act. So far as the second limb is concerned, the Tribunal was justified in sustaining the enhancement of Rs. 2,50,000 on the facts as enumerated above. The reframed second question is answered accordingly. 7.. The questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree.
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1991 (10) TMI 296
... ... ... ... ..... in the peculiar facts of the present case, the right of appeal should not be denied to the petitioner for non-deposit of the entire amount being claimed. As per the allegations, the petitioners stopped their business in the year 1979 and six years thereafter the matter was taken up by the Assessing Authority. As already stated above, the assessing authority held the assessment to be barred by time and in the meantime substantial amount had been recovered from the petitioner. We direct that the appeal of the petitioner which is pending before the appellate court against the order passed under section 48 of the Act be now disposed of without insisting the payment of the remaining amount, as substantial amount had already been recovered from the petitioner. The parties, through their counsel, are directed to appear before the appellate authority on October 28, 1991. The writ petition stands disposed of with the above directions. No costs. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (10) TMI 295
Issues Involved: 1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain and allow the enhancement petition. 2. Legality of the penalty levied u/s 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. 3. Justification of the penalty levied u/s 12(5)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.
Summary:
1. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain and allow the enhancement petition: The petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain and allow the enhancement petition, arguing that there was nothing to be enhanced since the appellate authority had deleted the entire penalty. The court referred to previous judgments, including State of Tamil Nadu v. Jakthi Veliyeetakam [1977] 40 STC 466 and Doveton Cafe v. State of Tamil Nadu [1981] 47 STC 345, which suggested that the Tribunal could not restore a penalty set aside by the appellate authority. However, the court noted that the word "enhance" is wide enough to include the imposition of a penalty that was not imposed by the appellate authority. The court concluded that the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to entertain the enhancement petition and impose the penalty.
2. Legality of the penalty levied u/s 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959: The assessees had collected a surcharge on cotton yarn and hosiery yarn, which were exempted from such levy. The penalty of Rs. 26,492 was proposed and later imposed for this illegal collection. The appellate authority canceled the penalty, but the Tribunal restored it, directing the department to refund the amount to the assessees, who would then refund it to the customers. The court upheld the Tribunal's decision, stating that the levy of penalty for the collection of surcharge is legal and valid as per the judgment in Deputy Commissioner (CT) v. M. Murugesan and Bros. [1985] 58 STC 143.
3. Justification of the penalty levied u/s 12(5)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959: The assessees admitted the omission to report a turnover of Rs. 4,76,793.04 but contended that the omission was due to bona fide disputes about supplies, which were regularized and sale invoices raised on March 30, 1980. The penalty of Rs. 5,559 was imposed despite the assessees voluntarily disclosing the turnover and paying the tax before the assessment order was finalized. The court referred to judgments in Kalyani Agencies v. State of Tamil Nadu [1984] 10 STL (Mad.) 151 and State of Tamil Nadu v. P.S. Srinivasa Iyengar & Sons [1993] 89 STC 349, which supported the view that if the correct turnover is disclosed before the final assessment, no penalty should be levied. The court found that the assessees had disclosed the turnover and paid the tax before the pre-assessment notice and thus, the penalty u/s 12(5)(iii) was not justified. The penalty of Rs. 5,559 was deleted.
Conclusion: The revision was accepted in part. The penalty of Rs. 5,559 imposed for the suppression of the turnover was deleted, while the penalty u/s 22(2) of the Act to the extent of Rs. 20,492 was upheld. The tax revision case was allowed in part, with no order as to costs.
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1991 (10) TMI 294
... ... ... ... ..... including the Tribunal. It was found that the plea of bona fide set out by the assessees was not merited. The very fact that later on these very items, i.e., polythene bags, chloric acids and chemicals got included in the certificate of registration would go to show that the assessees knew that their certificate of registration did not authorise them the purchase of those articles by use of C form declarations at the relevant time. Since the assessees had misused form C , they had rendered themselves liable under section 10(b) of the Act, and consequently, the levy of penalty under section 10-A of the Act was justified. The Tribunal has already reduced the quantum of penalty and we see no reason to show any further indulgence. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any cause to interfere with the orders of the statutory authorities in exercise of our revisional powers. The tax revision case, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 293
... ... ... ... ..... when the goods are handed over to the carrier and that it shall be at the risk and responsibility of the purchaser thereafter, the stipulation made the carrier an agent of the purchaser for taking delivery of the goods and the handling charges in such cases which were incurred after the delivery to the carrier, would only be post-sale expenses and the Tribunal rightly found that the same could not be included in the sale price and had to be excluded from the taxable turnover. In taking the view, the Tribunal relied upon Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan 1979 43 STC 13 which undoubtedly supports the case of the assessees. In the fact-situation noticed above, and the terms of the contract between the purchaser and the assessees, we find that the Tribunal committed no error in excluding from the taxable turnover the handling charges. The tax (revision) case has no merit. It fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (10) TMI 292
... ... ... ... ..... plastic goods would give rise to an inference that there was no resale of the plastic goods and the Joint Commissioner rightly found that the plastic goods were given away free. The assessees failed to adduce any reasonable excuse for use of the goods for purposes other than for resale either before the Joint Commissioner or even before us. Since the condition that the goods must be used for the specific purpose permitted in the registration certificate was violated by the assessees and no reasonable excuse or explanation was furnished for the same, the Joint Commissioner was fully justified in holding that the assessees had violated section 10(d) of the Act and were liable to suffer penal consequences envisaged under section 10A of the Act. The order of the Joint Commissioner under the circumstances, does not require any interference at our hands. Consequently we find no merit in this appeal. The same is hereby dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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