A STATUTE IS AN EDICT OF THE LEGISLATURE

[Mr. M. GOVINDARAJAN]

A statute is stated to be edict of the legislature. The statute expresses the will of the legislature. The function of the court is to interpret the document according to the intent of those who made it. The construction of statute, it is a settled rule, is that the provisions should be interpreted by applying plain rule of construction. The courts normally would not imply anything which is inconsistent with the words expressly used by the statute. The Court would keep in mind that its function is jus dicere, not jus dare. For example right of appeal being creation of the statute and being a statutory right does not invite unnecessarily liberal or strict construction. The best norm would be to give literal construction keeping the legislative intent in mind.

The Supreme Court in 'Shiva Shakthi Co-operative Housing Society V. Swaraj Developers' - (2003) 6 SCC 659 referred to the principles of interpretation of statutory provisions. In this case the Supreme Court held that it s a well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature enacting it. The Supreme Court also discussed the decisions taken in the following case laws:

In the case 'Chartered Accountants of India V. Price waterhouse' it was held that the intention of the legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.

In 'Crawford V. Spooner' it was held that the courts cannot aid the legislatures' defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.

In 'State of Gujarat V. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel', it was held that it is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. In 'Stock V. Frank Jones (Tipton Ltd)' it was held that rules of interpretation do not permit courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of a doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself.

The Law Commission of India, in its 183^rd report, while dealing with the need for providing principles of interpretation of statute as regards the extrinsic aids of interpretation in General Clauses Act, 1897, expressed the view that a statute is a will of legislature conveyed in the form of text. Noticing that the process of interpretation is as old as language, it says that the rules of interpretation were evolved at a very early stage of Hindu civilization and culture and the same were given by 'Jaimini' the author of Mimamsat Sutras; originally meant for shrutis, they were employed for the interpretation of Smritis as well.  While referring to the historical background, the Law Commission said: "It is well settled principle of law that as the statute is an edict of the legislature, the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of the legislature. The intention of legislature assimilates two aspects - one aspect carries the concept of 'meaning' i.e., what the word means and another aspect conveys the concept of 'purpose'. The process of construction, therefore, combines both the liberal and purposive approaches. However, necessity of interpretation would arise only where the language of a statutory provision is ambiguous, not clear or where two views are possible or where the provision gives a different meaning defeating the object of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no need of interpretation would arise.

In 'R.S. Nayak V. A.R. Antulay' - AIR 1984 SC 684 the Supreme Court held that if the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating.

In 'Grasim Industries Limited V. Collector of Customs, Bombay' - (2002) 4 SCC 297 the Supreme Court observed that where the words are clear and there is no obscurity and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for Court to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions.

Thus the court can safely apply rule of plain construction and legislative intent in light of the object sought to be achieved by the enactment. While interpreting the provisions of the Act, it is not necessary for the court to implant, or to exclude the words or over emphasis language of the provision where it is plain and simple. The provisions of the Act should be permitted to have their full operation rather than causing any impediment in their application by unnecessarily expanding the scope of the provisions by implication.