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2012 (3) TMI 200 - SC - CustomsWhether Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962, which stipulates that on demitting office as Member of the CESTAT a person shall not be entitled to appear before the CESTAT, is ultra vires the Constitution of India - held that - the provisions of Section 129(6) of the Customs Act and its operation cannot be faulted with. Another half-hearted attempt was made to raise a contention that the appellants can continue to appear before the Tribunal as they are permitted to do so in terms of Section 146A of the Customs Act, despite the provisions of Section 129(6) of the Customs Act. We are unable to find any merit in this contention as well. The provisions of Section 129(6) of the Customs Act are specific and both these provisions have to be construed harmoniously. We find nothing contradictory in these three provisions. Section 146(2)(c) of the Customs Act refers to the appearance by a legal practitioner who is entitled to practice as such in accordance with law. Section 129(6) places a restriction, which is reasonable and valid restriction, as held by us above. Thus, the provisions of Section 146A of the Act would have to be read in conjunction with and harmoniously to Section 129(6) of the Customs Act and the person who earns a disqualification under this provision cannot derive any extra benefit -contrary to Section 129(6) of the Customs Act from the reading of Section 146A of the Customs Act.
Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962. 2. Applicability of Section 129(6) to the petitioner, considering its introduction post the petitioner's tenure as a CESTAT member. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Constitutionality of Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962 Background and Arguments: The appellants challenged Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962, which bars former members of the Customs, Excise, and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) from appearing before the Tribunal. They argued that this provision is ultra vires Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution of India. The High Court had previously rejected these contentions, emphasizing that the restriction was aimed at enhancing the administration of justice and removing perceived biases. Judgment: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 129(6), stating that: - The restriction is not absolute but partial, allowing former members to practice in other courts and tribunals. - The restriction serves a larger public interest by maintaining professional standards and public confidence in the Tribunal's administration of justice. - The restriction is reasonable and falls within the scope of Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Legal Principles: - Fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution are subject to reasonable restrictions. - The right to practice law is a statutory right under the Advocates Act, 1961, and is subject to reasonable restrictions. - The restriction imposed by Section 129(6) is intended to prevent any conflict of interest and maintain the integrity of the Tribunal. Case References: - Sukumar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal: Upheld restrictions on private practice by medical practitioners who were also teaching. - Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai: Validated closure of butcher houses on certain days as a reasonable restriction. - Devata Prasad Singh Chaudhuri v. Patna High Court: Upheld restrictions on Mukhtiars' right to practice. - Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen: Validated restrictions on legal practitioners appearing before Industrial Tribunals. - Lingappa Pochamma Appelwar v. State of Maharashtra: Rejected the contention that advocates have an absolute right to appear before any court or tribunal. Issue 2: Applicability of Section 129(6) to the Petitioner Background and Arguments: The appellants argued that Section 129(6) should not apply to them as it was introduced after they had already served as members of the Tribunal and had started practicing as advocates. They contended that applying this provision retrospectively would be unfair and unconstitutional. Judgment: The Supreme Court rejected this contention, stating: - The right to practice law is subject to statutory and constitutional limitations. - The restriction imposed by Section 129(6) is not retrospective but retroactive, affecting the right to practice before the Tribunal in the present and future. - The restriction is not punitive but a criterion for eligibility to practice before the Tribunal. Legal Principles: - The distinction between retrospective and retroactive laws: A law is retroactive if it affects rights in the present based on past events but is not necessarily retrospective. - The right to practice law is not absolute and can be regulated by reasonable restrictions. - The restriction imposed by Section 129(6) is reasonable and serves a legitimate public interest. Case References: - R. v. Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel: Discussed the application of laws that draw requisites from past events. - Vijay v. State of Maharashtra: Applied the rule of fairness in interpreting statutory restrictions. - Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq: Held that statutes providing new remedies or manners for enforcement apply to both future and past causes of action. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed all the appeals, upholding the constitutionality and applicability of Section 129(6) of the Customs Act, 1962. The Court found the restriction to be reasonable, serving a larger public interest, and not violating the fundamental rights of the appellants. The judgment emphasized the importance of maintaining professional standards and public confidence in the administration of justice by the Tribunal.
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