1966 (3) TMI 103 - SC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act.
2. Admissibility of the appellant's statement to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act:

The appellant was prosecuted under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, read with Section 9 of the Land Customs Act. The High Court had disagreed with the Calcutta High Court's decision in Sitaram Agarwala v. State, holding that even persons not directly involved in the import of prohibited goods could be liable under Section 167(81). This view was in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Sachidananda Bannerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal, which clarified that Section 167(81) could encompass individuals not directly concerned with the import of prohibited goods. Consequently, the appellant's counsel admitted that the appellant would be guilty under Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act.

2. Admissibility of the Appellant's Statement under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act:

The appellant argued that the statement made to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise was inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, as the officer should be considered a police officer. The High Court had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in the State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, which held that a Customs Officer under the Sea Customs Act was not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The appellant, however, cited the decision in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, where an excise officer under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act was deemed a police officer.

The Supreme Court acknowledged the differing views among High Courts regarding the term "police officer" in Section 25. The broader view, supported by the Bombay High Court in Nanoo Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor, suggested that any officer with investigative powers akin to those of a police officer could be considered a police officer. The narrower view, supported by the Patna High Court in Radha Kishun Marwari v. King-Emperor, confined the term to police officers properly so-called.

The Court examined the Central Excises and Salt Act, noting that its primary purpose was to levy and collect excise duties, with Central Excise Officers appointed for this purpose. These officers had powers of arrest and search to support their main function. Section 21 of the Act allowed Central Excise Officers to inquire into charges and exercise powers similar to those of an officer-in-charge of a police station during such inquiries. However, the Court noted that these powers did not include the authority to submit a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, distinguishing the case from Raja Ram Jaiswal.

The Court concluded that even under the broader view, a Central Excise Officer under the Act was not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the appellant's statement was admissible unless it was obtained by threats, which the High Court had already rejected under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the appellant's conviction was upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the interpretation of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act and the admissibility of the appellant's statement under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.