2022 (12) TMI 822 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay in filing appeal - Time consumed while pursuing writ petition - exclusion of the said period in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - HELD THAT - It is an accepted position that the appellant had filed a writ petition before the High Court on 24.02.2018, which was not entertained vide the order dated 07.03.2018 on the ground that the appellant should approach the Appellate Authority. The appellant is entitled to ask for exclusion of the said period in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Exclusion of time is different, and cannot be equated with condonation of delay. The period once excluded, cannot be counted for the purpose of computing the period for which delay can be condoned. Of course for exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the conditions stipulated in Section 14 have to be satisfied. In the facts of the present case, we find that the period from the date of filing of the writ petition on 24.02.2018 and the date on which it was dismissed as not entertained viz. 07.03.2018, should have been excluded. The writ proceedings were maintainable, but not entertained. Bona fides of the appellant in filing the writ petition are not challenged. Further, immediately after the dismissal of the writ petition, the appellant did file an appeal before the Appellate Authority. On exclusion of the aforesaid period, the appeal preferred by the appellant would be within the condonable period. The appeal is allowed with the direction that the Appellant Authority would examine the appeal on merits.

Summary

Issues:
1. Condonation of delay in filing an appeal.
2. Interpretation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Exclusion of time for computing the period for condonation of delay.
4. Entitlement to exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Analysis:
The Supreme Court granted leave in a case where the High Court affirmed an order holding a delay beyond the condonable period as unsustainable. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was not entertained, and the court held that the appellant is entitled to ask for exclusion of the period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court clarified that exclusion of time is different from condonation of delay, and once excluded, the period cannot be counted for condonation purposes. The conditions stipulated in Section 14 must be satisfied for exclusion of time. The Court cited relevant case laws to support its interpretation.

In the present case, the Court found that the period from filing the writ petition to its dismissal should have been excluded as the writ proceedings were maintainable but not entertained. The Court noted the appellant's bona fides were not challenged, and immediately after the dismissal, the appellant filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. By excluding the period, the appeal fell within the condonable period. Consequently, the Court directed that the application for condonation of delay be allowed, and the delay was to be condoned. The appeal was allowed with directions for the Appellate Authority to examine it on merits.

The Court explicitly stated that it did not express any opinion on the merit of the case. Any pending applications were disposed of accordingly. The judgment focused on the correct interpretation and application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, ensuring that the appellant's right to exclusion of time was upheld, leading to the condonation of delay and allowing the appeal to be considered on its merits by the Appellate Authority.