TMI Tax Updates - e-Newsletter
January 22, 2025

Case Laws in this Newsletter:

GST Income Tax Customs Corporate Laws Insolvency & Bankruptcy FEMA PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Indian Laws

Articles

1. The Scope of Accounting in International Business Expansion

   By: Ishita Ramani

2. Scheme of taxation of Virtual Digital Assets

   By: Poornima Gupta

3. Un-necessary litigation and spending on low tax effect cases. Why Senior Advocates appear in a large team in such cases? Is money making only target?

   By: DEVKUMAR KOTHARI and CA UMA KOTHARI

4. EXCHANGE EARNERS FOREIGN CURRENCY ACCOUNT

   By: DR.MARIAPPAN GOVINDARAJAN

5. LEGAL TERMINOLOGY IN GST LAW (PART -6)

   By: Dr. Sanjiv Agarwal

6. Department shall provide the copies of documents/data derived from seized items during search and seizure proceedings

   By: Bimal jain

7. Risk Management System in Customs

   By: YAGAY andSUN

8. Customs Ports: Meaning, Types, Jurisdiction, Scope, Purpose, and Conclusion.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

9. Multi Modal Transport in International Trade

   By: YAGAY andSUN

News

1. Special focus on agriculture in Haryana budget 2025-26: Minister Shyam Singh Rana

2. Budget session of Gujarat assembly from Feb 19

3. Department of Commerce introduces Diamond Imprest Authorization Scheme to boost global competitiveness of diamond sector

4. Investing in Her Future

5. Challenges in Liability Management: Maintaining the Balance (Keynote address delivered by Shri M. Rajeshwar Rao, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India - January 17, 2025 - at Mint Annual BFSI Summit & Awards 2025, Mumbai)

6. Commerce and Industry Minister Shri Piyush Goyal holds bilateral talks with Belgian Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Minister, interacts with industry leaders

7. Indian Coffee Brews Global Demand

8. India among top nations on CEOs confidence on investment plans, economic growth: PwC survey

9. MMRC cancels tender for Nariman Point land development after RBI's request

Notifications

DGFT

1. 53/2024-25 - dated 21-1-2025 - FTP

Introduction of new Scheme as 'Diamond Imprest Authorisation' under Chapter 4 of Foreign Trade Policy 2023

2. 52/2024-25 - dated 20-1-2025 - FTP

Amendment in Export Policy condition of Agarwood (Aquilaria Malaccensis) Chips and Powder and Agar Oil obtained from artificially propagated sources

3. 51/2024-25 - dated 20-1-2025 - FTP

Extension in "Free" Import Policy of Tur/ Pigeon Peas (Cajanus Cajan) [ITC(HS) 0713 60 00] under ITC (HS) 2022, Schedule - I (Import Policy) till 31.03.2026

GST - States

4. 13/GST-2 - dated 16-1-2025 - Haryana SGST

Amendment of notification no.36/ST-2, dated 30.06.2017 under the HGST Act, 2017

5. 12/GST-2 - dated 16-1-2025 - Haryana SGST

Amendment of Notification No.35/ST-2, dated 30.06.2017 under the HGST Act, 2017

6. 09/GST-2 - dated 16-1-2025 - Haryana SGST

Amendment of Notification No.47/ST-2, dated 30.06.2017 under the HGST Act, 2017

7. 08/GST-2 - dated 16-1-2025 - Haryana SGST

Amendment of notification no.46/ST-2, dated 30.06.2017 under the HGST Act, 2017

Income Tax

8. 08/2025 - dated 20-1-2025 - IT

U/s 98 (1) of Finance (No.2) Act, 2024 Central Government makes the Order to remove the difficulty - Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 (DTVsV)

Circulars / Instructions / Orders

DGFT

1. 42/2024-25 - dated 21-1-2025

Introduction of new paras in Chapter 4 of Handbook of Procedures, 2023

Customs

2. PUBLIC NOTICE NO. 21/2024 - dated 27-12-2024

Enabling Voluntary Payment electronically on ICEGATE e-Payment Platform- reg.

Highlights / Catch Notes

GST

• Statutory penalty provisions must follow moderation, reasonableness principles.

  Case-Laws - HC : Section 129 of CGST Act constitutes statutory penalty provision overriding others, but cannot override Section 126 principles of moderation for minor breaches. HC held non-obstante clause in Section 129 cannot annihilate Section 126 rules for considering penalty levy. Section 126(6) excludes fixed sum/percentage penalties, distinguishing discretionary penalties. Authorities must differentiate trivial breaches like incomplete e-way bills without tax evasion intent from serious contraventions. Confiscation u/s 130 at initial stage without evasion evidence unjustified. Fair reasoned approach essential to avoid unnecessary detention. Penalty levy guided by Section 126 embodying moderation, restraint and reasonableness principles. Petition disposed of.
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• Tax Evasion Case: HC Refuses Pre-Adjudication Interference, Petitioner to Follow Statutory Remedies.

  Case-Laws - HC : Petitioner challenged SCN alleging conspiracy to issue fake invoices without actual supply using another entity's GST registration for tax evasion. HC held petitioner has remedy to file objection for adjudication on merits. Mere assertion of lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process insufficient for invoking Article 226. When factual adjudication required, Article 226 interference ruled out as held in UOI v. Vicco Labs. Petitioner's reasons agitable before adjudicating authority itself. No grounds to entertain petition under Article 226. Petitioner relegated to pursue statutory remedies. Petition dismissed.
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• High Court denies writ against order invoking GST Section 74, directs to prefer statutory appeal.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed the writ petition challenging the order issued u/s 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The HC held that the correctness of reasons for invoking Section 74 cannot be examined in a writ proceeding as those involve disputed facts. The appropriate remedy against an order u/s 74 is to prefer an appeal u/s 107 of the Act. The HC refused to exercise writ jurisdiction despite reliance on an instruction indicating Section 74 proceedings can be invoked only in case of fraud, willful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax.
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• Opportunity for Cross-Examination Mandatory in CGST Penalty Cases: HC Allows Writ.

  Case-Laws - HC : HC allowed the petition. It held that non-granting of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose statements were relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority to impose penalty u/s 74(9) of the CGST Act violated principles of natural justice. The HC observed that Section 107(11) of the Act does not empower the Appellate Authority to remand the case for such violations, necessitating invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
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• Dismissal order set aside for 2017-18; appeal to be heard on merits for GSTR discrepancies.

  Case-Laws - HC : HC set aside dismissal order for 2017-18 assessment year and directed Appellate Authority to consider appeal on merits regarding discrepancies in GSTR-1, GSTR-3B returns. Petitioner had filed appeal within prescribed time limit under Notification No. 53/2023 and complied with condition of tax payment. Petition allowed.
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Income Tax

• Trust's private practice arrangement, donations to charities not commercial activities.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC quashed the order denying renewal of tax exemption u/s 80G to the petitioner-Trust. It held that the Trust's arrangement with doctors to use its premises for private practice did not negate its charitable purpose. The donations made by the Trust to other registered charitable organizations were ancillary expenses to achieve its objects. The revenue authorities' order was based on mere assumptions without substantial evidence. Therefore, the HC allowed the petitions and set aside the impugned orders denying renewal of tax exemption.
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• Notice for reassessment proceedings quashed as barred by limitation.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC allowed the petition and set aside the impugned reassessment notice and subsequent proceedings. The AO's satisfaction note for invoking reassessment proceedings u/s 153C of the Income Tax Act was held to be barred by limitation, as it was prepared beyond the prescribed 10-year period from the relevant assessment year. The HC concluded that the notice was invalid and quashed the reassessment proceedings initiated against the petitioner.
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• Claim for Tax Benefits and Carry-Forward of Losses Upheld by ITAT.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed the appeal, holding that no substantial question of law arose from the ITAT's order. The ITAT had allowed the assessee's claim for benefits u/ss 11 and 12, and for carrying forward losses for 7 assessment years. The HC found that the appellant had merely disputed factual findings under the guise of substantial questions of law, which is impermissible. The ITAT's order was well-reasoned, without any perversity, after considering all grounds raised by the appellant.
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• High Court quashes reassessment notice for lack of reasonable opportunity.

  Case-Laws - HC : HC quashed order u/s 148A(d) and notice u/s 148 for reopening assessment, holding that petitioner was deprived of reasonable opportunity in violation of s. 148A(c); AO's action citing time constraint was unsustainable as extended limitation period for escaped income over Rs. 50 lakh for AY 2015-16 ended on 31.03.2016, not 31.03.2022 as claimed.
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• Omnibus approval u/s 153D quashed for lack of application of mind.

  Case-Laws - AT : Approval granted u/s 153D by Addl. CIT held invalid as it lacked application of mind, being mechanical and omnibus in nature covering multiple AYs without examining records or seized materials. ITAT quashed assessment order based on such ritualistic approval, allowing assessee's appeal.
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• Assessee's books rejected but sales accepted; cash deposits partly explained.

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT partly allowed assessee's appeal. Rejected books of accounts u/s 145(3) but accepted sales of Rs. 1.24 crores based on bills and vouchers filed. Estimated net profit at 5% of sales. Cash deposits of Rs. 57.25 lacs during demonetization period accepted as explained money, remaining treated as unexplained u/s 69A. Addition restricted to 5% of gross profit. Overall, assessee's appeal partly allowed.
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• ITAT partly allows assessee's appeal, upholds revenue recognition, disallows depreciation claim.

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT partly allowed assessee's appeal. On revenue recognition issue, ITAT held AO made due enquiries, no lack of enquiry, decided in favour of assessee. On disallowance of proportionate depreciation claim, ITAT upheld PCIT's order stating AO made incorrect presumption of facts, lack of enquiry on area let out, decided against assessee. Judicial precedents cited by assessee held inapplicable to assessee's facts.
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• Protective additions on IT fees, commission disallowed post MAP resolution.

  Case-Laws - AT : The ITAT held that protective additions made by the AO concerning payments for information & technology fees and commission on sales were not tenable. Since the assessee had already settled these disputes with the competent authority under MAP and accepted the adjustments made by the TPO, no further disallowance u/s 37 was required to be sustained on a protective basis for the relevant assessment years. The assessee's appeals were allowed.
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Customs

• Petition dismissed: Interest payable on delayed customs duties for unfulfilled export obligations.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed the petition challenging the order of the Settlement Commission imposing interest on delayed payment of customs duties under a valid notification. The petitioners had availed duty exemption on import subject to export obligations which were not satisfied. The HC upheld the constitutional validity of the notification stipulating payment of interest on duties payable from the date of clearance if export obligations were not met, as the exemption was conditional. The order imposing interest as per the notification's terms was a valid settlement that must be accepted in its entirety.
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• Imported seaweed concentrate rightly classified as fertilizer, not plant growth regulator.

  Case-Laws - AT : Imported goods "Liquid Seaweed Concentrate (Crop Plus)" correctly classifiable under CTI 3101 0099 as fertilizer, not under CTI 3808 9340 as plant growth regulator. Chemical analysis confirmed majority components as fertilizers providing essential nutrients, not merely regulating plant growth. CESTAT distinguished fertilizers from plant growth regulators based on larger bench order. Impugned order upholding classification under CTI 3808 9340 set aside, appeal allowed.
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• Retracted confession, phone call insufficient to implicate appellant in gold smuggling.

  Case-Laws - AT : The CESTAT held that the appellant could not be implicated solely based on the retracted confessional statement of the co-accused. The telephonic call between them was insufficient to establish appellant's involvement in gold smuggling. Imposing penalties u/s 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was incorrect as there was no evidence of appellant dealing with the seized goods or having prior knowledge of their liability for confiscation. Consequently, the penalties imposed on the appellant were set aside and the appeal was allowed.
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FEMA

• Appellate Tribunal overturns Rs. 50 lakh penalty on export agent, finds no FERA violation.

  Case-Laws - AT : The AT set aside the penalty of Rs. 50 lakhs imposed on the appellant, an export proceeds agent who prepared documents for M/s Sparkle Gems Industries (P) Ltd by charging Rs. 750 per export document. The AT held there was no material to allege contravention of Sections 18(2) and 18(3) of the FERA Act, 1973 by the appellant, who was not shown to be part of the company. The impugned order was passed in ignorance of appellant's position. The appeal was allowed and the pre-deposited amount was directed to be released in favor of the appellant.
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Corporate Law

• Investors' interests prioritized, HC allows bail to revive real estate firm.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC observed that liquidation of the CSL is not in investors' interest as substantial amounts were invested in residential/commercial projects. Considering revival of CSL to complete pending projects, the HC held applicants made bona fide efforts to safeguard investors' interests, reflecting intent to rectify consequences rather than perpetuating fraud. The HC found reasonable grounds to believe applicants might not be guilty and are unlikely to commit offence on bail to revive CSL and complete projects, satisfying twin conditions u/s 212(6) of Companies Act. Directing surrender before adjudicating bail would hinder efforts to resolve investors' grievances. The HC allowed regular bail to applicants subject to conditions.
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• Deceased shareholder's legal reps can file oppression petition u/s 241.

  Case-Laws - AT : The NCLAT held that the respondents, as legal representatives of a deceased shareholder, have locus standi to maintain a company petition u/s 241 alleging oppression and mismanagement. The non-compliance with Section 244(1) was wrongly rejected by the NCLT. Despite pending legal proceedings, the allegations warrant examination, and the respondents are justified in representing the deceased's estate and shareholding interests. The NCLT did not exceed its jurisdiction, and the appeal was dismissed.
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• Wilful Defaulter Declaration Quashed for Violation of Natural Justice.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC quashed the orders declaring the Petitioner as a Wilful Defaulter by Respondent No. 1 Bank. The Court held that the Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters issued by RBI requires strict adherence to principles of natural justice given the grave civil and penal consequences. The Petitioner was not provided substantial opportunity of being heard or documents relied upon, violating natural justice. The HC affirmed the maintainability of the petition against the Bank under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as per the Supreme Court's decision in Jah Developers case. The statutory procedural mechanism under the Master Circular must be followed strictly.
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IBC

• Delay in filing appeal condoned; e-filing date treated as limitation date.

  Case-Laws - AT : The NCLAT condoned the 1 day delay in filing the appeal, holding that as per Rule 22 of NCLAT Rules, 2016 and its orders, the date of e-filing has to be treated as the date for calculating limitation. Regarding replacement of the Authorized Representative of homebuyers, the NCLAT held that Regulation 16A(3A) of CIRP Regulations has to be followed, and the Adjudicating Authority rightly relied on it. The appeal was dismissed as no case was made out to interfere with the impugned order.
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• NCLAT Rejects Late Claim, Upholds Approved Resolution Plan Terms.

  Case-Laws - AT : NCLAT dismissed the appeal. Appellant's claim regarding apartment was filed late on 07.02.2020, not on 11.01.2019 as alleged. As per approved resolution plan, late claims like appellant's are entitled to only 50% of principal amount, not possession or conveyance deed. Appellant's request for possession and conveyance deed was denied.
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• NCLAT dismisses delay condonation plea, cites applicant's negligence in curing defects.

  Case-Laws - AT : The NCLAT rejected the application for condonation of 166 days' delay in refiling a Company Appeal. The reasons cited by the Applicant, such as bereavement, court vacations, and repeated corrections due to defects pointed out by the Registry, were found unacceptable. The NCLAT held that the Applicant exhibited inertia, lethargy, and negligence in curing the defects promptly, and the grounds for condonation of delay were insufficient.
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Indian Laws

• High Court dismisses appeal u/s 19 for non-punishment contempt order.

  Case-Laws - HC : HC dismissed appeal filed u/s 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It held appeal u/s 19 is maintainable only against order imposing punishment for contempt, not order merely directing release of amount with interest. Since impugned order did not impose punishment or hold appellant guilty of contempt, appeal was not maintainable.
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PMLA

• Anticipatory bail granted in PMLA case despite Section 45's stringent conditions.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC granted anticipatory bail to the applicants charged under PMLA, despite Section 45's stringent conditions. Relying on SC precedents, the HC held the applicants need not satisfy Section 45's twin tests as they were not arrested during investigation. Considering the delayed prosecution after 11 years, parity with co-accused granted bail, and the circumstances, the HC allowed anticipatory bail on executing personal bonds.
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• HC rejects condonation of 132 days' delay in filing appeal under PMLA Section 42.

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed the application seeking condonation of 132 days' delay in filing an appeal against the Appellate Tribunal's order u/s 42 of the PMLA, 2002. It held that beyond the total period of 120 days stipulated in Section 42 read with its proviso, the HC has no power to condone the delay in preferring an appeal.
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• Foreign conviction no bar to Indian prosecution for distinct offenses.

  Case-Laws - HC : Foreign convictions do not preclude domestic prosecution for distinct offenses in India. The HC rejected bail for the applicant charged with drug trafficking and money laundering offenses. While the applicant's prior US conviction can be recognized, it cannot directly enforce the foreign judgment. Corroborative evidence beyond statements made under coercion is required for prosecution. The alleged Bitcoin proceeds from the applicant's drug trafficking operations remain inaccessible due to missing passwords. The ED has identified funnel accounts used to receive drug proceeds which were transferred to Indian accounts, though not frozen under Sec 60(2).
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• Attachment order upheld under PMLA Section 5; money laundering a continuing offence.

  Case-Laws - AT : The AT upheld the provisional attachment order u/s 5 of the PMLA, rejecting the appellant's contentions. It held that there was sufficient reason to believe the appellant possessed proceeds of crime. Money laundering being a continuing offence, the issue of retrospective application doesn't arise. The property's acquisition through public auction has no bearing as the definition of proceeds of crime includes property derived indirectly. The notice u/s 8(1) was valid given the evidence of proceeds of crime. Mere attachment doesn't alter ownership or possession except in exceptional circumstances per SC precedents. The procedural validity of actions under PMLA was confirmed.
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Service Tax

• Tax Authorities Directed to Accept Manual Payment Under Legacy Dispute Resolution Scheme.

  Case-Laws - HC : Petitioner sought direction to CGST and Central Excise Authorities to accept declared amount manually under Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019. HC held petitioner made bona fide attempt to make payment determined under Scheme but could not due to procedural issues and Covid-19 pandemic. Relying on precedent, HC directed respondents to accept payment specified in SVLDRS-3 along with 9% interest from 30.06.2020 till payment date and grant Scheme benefit to petitioner. Petition allowed.
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• Duty liability admission qualifies as "quantified" under SVLDRS scheme.

  Case-Laws - HC : Petitioner's admission of duty liability in communication dated June 19, 2019 qualified as "quantified" under SVLDRS, making them eligible for the scheme. HC quashed impugned orders rejecting petitioner's application and issued show cause notice. "Quantified" under the scheme means written communication of duty payable including admitted liability during investigation or audit. Matter remanded to Designated Committee to consider petitioner's declaration afresh as valid under "investigation, enquiry and audit" category and grant consequential relief. Petition allowed by way of remand.
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• Tug services contract classified as 'Supply of Tangible Goods Service', not VAT sale.

  Case-Laws - AT : The CESTAT held that the contract between the appellant and MPT for providing tug services for berthing and unberthing vessels was classifiable as 'Supply of Tangible Goods Service' u/s 65(105)(zzzzj) and not as a deemed sale liable to VAT. The taxable event for Service Tax was the receipt of payments after introduction of the service from 01.03.2008, irrespective of the contract signing date. However, the extended period of limitation and penalty were set aside due to the appellant's bona fide belief based on VAT authorities' clarification, despite the complex classification issue. The matter was remanded for reconsideration in light of these findings.
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• Cranes given to Municipal Corporation not a supply of tangible goods.

  Case-Laws - AT : Appellant supplied cranes to Municipal Corporation Bhopal (MCB) under an agreement. CESTAT held appellant did not have effective control or possession over cranes during contract period with MCB. Cranes were parked at police stations, drivers were paid by MCB. Appellant could not use cranes for any other purpose. CESTAT ruled activity was 'giving cranes on hire' not 'supply of tangible goods service'. Demand wrongly confirmed, appeal allowed.
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Central Excise

• EOU entitled to suo-moto re-credit of eligible CENVAT credit reversed by accounting entry.

  Case-Laws - AT : An EOU (100% Export Oriented Unit) is entitled to take suo-moto re-credit of the CENVAT credit earlier reversed, without following the refund procedure u/s 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944. When the original credit was eligible, and the reversal was merely an accounting entry, suo-moto re-credit is permissible. The extended period of limitation cannot be invoked without evidence of willful misstatement or suppression. Consequently, the demand of Rs.40,64,459/- u/r 14 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, interest, and penalties were held untenable by the CESTAT. The appeal was allowed.
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Case Laws:

• GST

• 2025 (1) TMI 983
  Interpretation of statute - Section 129 of the Central Goods Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) constitutes a statutory penalty provision that overrides other penalty provisions in the Act - It is submitted that Section 129 being a provision creating a statutory penalty and intended to override the scheme of Chapter XIX of the Act by virtue of the non-obstante clause that it incorporates, does not appear to be sound for reasons - incomplete E-way Bills (EWBs) without any fraudulent intent - applicability and interpretation of Sections 122, 125, and 126 concerning minor breaches and procedural errors - HELD THAT:- The non-obstante clause in Section 129 cannot possibly be interpreted as being intended to override what had been specifically provided in Section 126 or annihilate the rules of guidance which stood embodied therein. Section 129 is principally concerned with the release of goods and conveyances which may have been detained or seized. That is clearly not a subject which is regulated or controlled by any of the other provisions contained in Chapter XIX of the Act. The use of the non-obstante clause is thus liable to be appreciated and construed in the aforesaid light. In our considered opinion, since the subject of levy of penalty in connection with goods being transported in contravention of the Act had not been previously dealt with, the Legislature thought it fit and appropriate to deploy the non-obstante in order to deal with that subject. The extent of the notwithstanding phrase which introduces Section 129 into the statute book is thus liable to be construed in that light and thus the limit of its essay acknowledged accordingly. We also find ourselves unable to read Section 129 as embodying an intendment of the Legislature to either override or completely supersede and obliterate Section 126. Accepting such an interpretation would clearly amount to depriving a person of the benefit of the principles of moderation and modulation which Section 126 introduces and enjoins to be borne in consideration while considering the levy of a penalty. The provisions contained in sub-section (6) of Section 126 also cannot possibly be read as whittling down the application of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 126 when it ordains that it would not apply to cases where penalties stand specified either as a fixed sum or percentage. Section 126 (6) of the Act provides that its provisions will not apply in cases where the penalty under the Act is specified as a fixed sum or as a fixed percentage. This is further reflective of the Legislature seeking to distinguish between discretionary penalties and those that are predetermined. By excluding fixed penalties from the scope of this section, the law ensures clarity and consistency in its application, underscoring the principle that certain penalties are non-negotiable and uniformly applicable irrespective of the circumstances of the breach. It would also be pertinent to note that in Synergy Fertichem [ 2019 (12) TMI 1213 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT ], the Gujarat High Court emphasized that authorities must distinguish between trivial breaches and serious contraventions under the Act. The High Court clarified that confiscation is penal in nature and should only apply in cases of a clear intent to evade tax as opposed to mere procedural lapses such as an incomplete EWB when other valid documents are present. Further, issuing confiscation notices under Section 130 at the initial stage, without proper grounds or evidence of an intent to evade tax, the High Court held would be unjustified and would render Section 129 ineffective. The Court ultimately came to conclude that a reasoned and fair approach is essential to avoid an unnecessary detention of goods and conveyances. We are in complete agreement with the view expressed by the Gujarat High Court and which correctly explains the interplay between Sections 129 and 130 of the Act. The harsh consequences which would follow a confiscation clearly warrant the provisions of the Act being accorded an interpretation which would be fair, reasonable and in consonance with the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution. In any event, Section 129 can neither be construed as envisaging an inevitable levy of tax nor the imposition of a penalty. As noticed hereinabove, the said provision is primarily concerned with the release of seized and detained goods. Conclsuion - The levy of penalties under the Act must be guided by the salutary principles which stand embodied in Section 126. That statutory provision is undoubtedly an embodiment of the legislative intent of levy of penalties being guided by principles of moderation, restraint and reasonableness. Petition disposed off.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 982
  Challenge to SCN - issuance of fake invoices without any underlying supply of goods using the GST registration of another entity for monetary benefits - conspiracy between petitioner and two other persons to dupe the Government by issuing fake invoices and arranged fake Input Tax Credit for the purpose of evading tax at some stage - HELD THAT:- Since petitioner is assailing a show cause notice, he has a remedy of filing an objection and invite an adjudication on merits. Even though petitioner referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in SHANTANU SANJAY HUNDEKARI, VIKAS AGARWAL, YOGESH AGARWAL, MAMTA GUPTA VERSUS UNION OF INDIA, THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, NEW DELHI., STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, JOINT DIRECTOR, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GOODS AND SERVICE TAX INTELLIGENCE, GUJARAT. THE ADDITIONAL/JOINT COMMISSIONER, THANE COMMISSIONERATE, [ 2024 (3) TMI 1277 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] , the facts of the said case were totally different. In the said case, an employee of a company was prosecuted against for the alleged mischief of the company. In such circumstances, the High Court of Bombay interfered with the show cause notice. However, facts and the instant circumstances of the present case are totally different. The extraordinary remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to challenge a show cause notice unless there are exceptional reasons. In the decision in UNION OF INDIA VERSUS VICCO LABORATORIES [ 2007 (11) TMI 21 - SUPREME COURT] it was held that interference at the stage of show cause notice should be rare and not in a routine manner. It was also held that mere assertion that notice is without jurisdiction or that it is an abuse of process of law would not suffice to exercise jurisdiction. When factual adjudication is necessary, interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is ruled out. The reasons now stated by the petitioner are all matters which can be agitated before the adjudicating authority itself. The issue requires factual adjudication as well. Conclusion - There are no reason to entertain this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and relegate the petitioner to pursue other remedies available under law by filing an objection and inviting an order of adjudication. Petition dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 981
  Challenge to order issued u/s 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- This Court notices that the impugned order refers to specific reasons for invoking the powers under Section 74 of the Act. The correctness or otherwise of those reasons cannot be gone into in this proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as those are disputed facts. The normal remedy for an aggrieved person against an order issued under Section 74 of the Act is to prefer an appeal under Section 107 of the Act. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently relied upon instruction No. 05/2023 issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes Customs, which indicates that proceedings under Section 74 of the Act can be invoked only when there is fraud, willful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax - there are no merit to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and relegate the petitioner to pursue his statutory remedies. Conclusion - The appropriate remedy was an appeal under Section 107, not a writ petition. Petition dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 980
  Levy of penalty u/s 74 (9) of the Central Goods Services Tax Act, 2017 - invocation of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - availability of remedy of an appeal u/s 107 of the Act - violtion of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- On a reading of section 107 (11) of the Act, it is evident that the Appellate Authority does not possess the power to remand the case, if in case any anomaly is detected in the impugned order, or even when there is any violation of the principles of natural justice. The Appellate Authority can only confirm, modify or annul the order appealed against. The aforesaid provision has specifically curtailed the right of the appellate authority to remand the case. Hence, in cases of violation of principles of natural justice, resorting to the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is legally justified. In the instant case statements of 20 witnesses were relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority for the purpose of entering findings against the petitioner and consequentially imposing penalty. The basic requirement of the rule of law is to grant an opportunity of hearing to the person against whom proceedings have been initiated. When statements of third parties are relied upon, it is one of the fundamental requirements that the party against whom such statements have been relied upon is granted an opportunity to question the person who gave such statements. This requirement flows from the opportunity of hearing required to be given as per section 75(4) of the CGST Act. Unilateral statements behind the back of a person cannot under any circumstances be justified under the rule of law, even if the proceedings are quasi judicial in nature. Considering the nature of the order issued against the petitioner which is impugned in this writ petition, this Court is of the view that failure to grant an opportunity to the petitioner for cross-examination and relying upon the statements of persons to impose penalty have violated the principles of natural justice. Conclusion - In the instant case, the circumstances compel this Court to observe that an opportunity for cross-examination was a necessity. This Court is also compelled to observe that failure to grant an opportunity to cross-examine the person whose statements were relied upon is in effect delaying the whole proceeding. Petition allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 979
  Challenge to assessments made for the assessment years 2017-18 and 2018-19 respectively - discrepancy in GSTR-1, monthly sales return and GSTR-3B, monthly returns comprising of the sales, input tax and the output tax payable - HELD THAT:- The Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs came out with Notification No. 53 of 2023, Central Tax at Annexure-P/3, which provided for a window of filing an appeal with respect to orders which were passed prior to 31.03.2023. The time provided was up to 31.01.2024 and there was an additional condition that admitted tax plus 12.5% of the amounts in demand, shall be paid through the Electronic Cash Ledger. The petitioner filed an appeal on 20.01.2024 and complied with the condition of payment of admitted tax and deposit of 12.5% also. However, the petitioner s appeal stood dismissed as per Annexure-P/1 on the finding that the assessment order was dated on 23.06.2023 after 31.03.2023. It is deemed appropriate to direct the Appellate Authority to consider the appeal on merits. To facilitate the same, the Annexure- P/1 issued for the year 2017-18 is set aside and the Appellate Authority is directed to resume the appeal to its files and dispose it off on merits. Petition allowed.

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• Income Tax

• 2025 (1) TMI 978
  Belated deposit of employees contribution towards the EPF and ESI - High Court proceeded to consider only one of the substantial questions of law and observed that the other two substantial questions of law were covered by the Judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd . [ 2022 (10) TMI 617 - SUPREME COURT] - HELD THAT:- Appellant before the High Court erroneously contended that two substantial questions of law were covered by the Judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) against the Assessee, but that is not so. We find that an opportunity must be given to the appellant herein to make submissions on those two substantial questions of law and for the purpose of reconsidering whether they were covered by the judgment of this Court in Checkmates Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra) against the Assessee or not. For the aforesaid purpose, we have no option but to set aside the order [ 2023 (10) TMI 779 - DELHI HIGH COURT] , although the said order has been accepted by both sides and there is no challenge to the same in the context of there being any error in the said order, but being assailed only for the purpose of seeking to assail the order [ 2023 (5) TMI 1418 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and for seeking restoration ITA on the file of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi on setting aside the order [ 2023 (10) TMI 779 - DELHI HIGH COURT] dated 05.09.2023. We do not wish to consider this case on the merits of the order passed by the High Court of Delhi for the simple reason that the same has been accepted by both sides. However, the said order has to be set aside as it is a final order of the High Court, so as to enable ITA being restored on the file of the High court. Consequently, we also set aside the interim order [ 2023 (5) TMI 1418 - DELHI HIGH COURT] .

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• 2025 (1) TMI 977
  Denial of renewal benefit of tax relief u/s 80G - arrangement between the doctors and the petitioner-Trust amounted to take the premises of the Trust on rent and carrying private practice, thus, no charitable work was being carried out - Charitable activity or not? As per revenue Trust has not provided facility of space to the Doctors of various specialties under one roof and Trust has given donations to various organizations - whether the petitioner Trust is meeting out its charitable purpose or not ? - HELD THAT:- Recently, Hon ble Apex Court while considering the requirement of continuing the registration for an Educational Trust, in the case of M/s New Noble Educational Society [ 2022 (10) TMI 855 - SUPREME COURT ] proceeded to hold that the word solely would also mean that the ancillary work, which may be carried out by the Society for the purpose of enhancing education, would also be treated as work for charitable purposes. The order is based only on assumptions and there is not supportive evidence, collective or discussed in that regard. For the impugned action, we are also unable to find that until some action is taken by the respondents by saying that it does not deserve any registration because of failure to meet out the objects mentioned in clause 8 of the registration, targeting the donations alleging the same to be against the object, would not satisfy us. There would not be any dispute to the effect that the petitioner Trust runs only one Chhuttani Medical Centre . Therefore, the donations made to it cannot be doubted merely for the reason that the donations in other years are of smaller amount. Respondents have not taken note of the fact that the petitioner Trust had been making donations to Sardarni Uttam Kaur Charitable Society, which is also registered u/s 12-A and had been granted exemption u/s 80-G. Neither from the record, nor anything pointed out by the respondents that their action is in pursuance to the complaint from any person/organization/society, to which the medical services are being provided by the petitioner Trust. Actually, the respondents were required to convince itself, as to whether the petitioner-Trust is meeting out its charitable purpose or not ? Once the foundation of registration u/s 12-A is not questioned, the ancillary expenses to achieve the object of the Trust, as enshrined in the Memorandum of Object and Terms, there is no point of raising mere suspicion on the donations, which many a times are ancillary in nature and though directly or indirectly meet out the object of its registration. We find that the action of the respondents is not tenable, because same is not based upon any substantial evidence. Therefore, impugned orders are hereby set-aside and consequently, the writ petitions are allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 976
  Validity of Notice issued for reassessment as barred by limitation - limitation period u/s153C - applicability of the timeframes prescribed under Sections 149, 153A, and 153C of the Income Tax Act - HELD THAT:- AO exercising jurisdiction in respect of the petitioner had prepared the satisfaction note (in terms of Clause (iv) of Explanation 2 to proviso to Section 148 of the Act). However, that cannot be construed as a satisfaction note by the AO of the searched person. The date of the said satisfaction note cannot be considered as the start point to consider the limitation period under Section 153C of the Act. It is also material to note the satisfaction note was prepared on 23.08.2024 and was approved on 29.08.2024 by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. Thus, even if the limitation is computed on the basis of the aforesaid approval, the same would be required to be computed from the end of the assessment year relevant to the financial year in which such satisfaction note was prepared. The petitioner has set out a tabular statement in support of his contention that the AY 2015-16 is beyond the period of ten years. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed. The impugned notice and the proceedings pursuant thereto are set aside.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 975
  Admission of the appeal in High Court - substantial question of law or not? - Denial of registration u/s 12A/12AA - ITAT allowed claim - HELD THAT:- . From a bare reading of the Section, it is apparent that an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court comes to the conclusion that a substantial question of law arises from the said order, it is mandatory that such question(s) must be formulated. The expression substantial question of law is not defined in the Act. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements. A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. As in the instant case no substantial question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal as the appellant has raised all the question of facts and have disputed the fact findings of the ITAT in the garb of substantial questions of law which is not permitted by the statute itself. This Court refrains from entertaining this appeal as there is no perversity in the order passed by the ITAT since the ITAT has dealt with all the grounds raised by the appellant in the order impugned and has passed a well reasoned and speaking order. Appeal dismissed as No substantial question of law arises.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 974
  Admission of the appeal in High Court - substantial question of law, as is required to be made out under Section 260A or not? - Denial of benefits of section 11 and 12 and denial of losses claimed by the assessee to be carried forward and assessed the total income of the assessee for all the 7 years at Nil, as against the loss declared by the assessee - ITAT allowed claim HELD THAT:- From a bare reading of the Section, it is apparent that an appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court comes to the conclusion that a substantial question of law arises from the said order, it is mandatory that such question(s) must be formulated. The expression substantial question of law is not defined in the Act. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements. A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. In the instant case no substantial question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal as the appellant has raised all the question of facts and have disputed the fact findings of the ITAT in the garb of substantial questions of law which is not permitted by the statute itself. This Court refrains from entertaining this appeal as there is no perversity in the order passed by the ITAT since the ITAT has dealt with all the grounds raised by the appellant in the order impugned and has passed a well reasoned and speaking order - Appeal dismissed as No substantial question of law arises.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 973
  TP Adjustment - upward adjustment on account of the determination of ALP in respect of the international transaction - AO passed a draft assessment order which included making an upward revision on account of transfer pricing adjustment - petitioner filed an application for rectification of the order passed by the DRP on the ground that it had entered into the APA and its modified return was not considered. HELD THAT:- Revenue concedes, on instructions, that the petitioner s modified return was required to be considered as the petitioner has entered into an APA. He further requests that the matter be remanded to the concerned authorities for deciding afresh. In view of the above, the order dated 20.09.2024 passed by the DRP as well as the final assessment order dated 24.10.2024 passed by the AO is set aside. The matter is remanded to the TPO for considering afresh in light of the APA entered into by the petitioner. Additionally, we direct that the petitioner s application for rectification dated 08.12.2023 be also considered. We also consider it apposite to observe that as the final assessment order has been set aside, there is no question of adjusting any refund against the demand for AY 2020-21 and AY 2021-22 at the present stage.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 972
  Reopening of assessment u/s 147 as barred by limitation - deprive the noticee of due opportunity - HELD THAT:- The petitioner ought to have been given some reasonable opportunity else the legislative intent behind the insertion of Section 148A to the Act of 1961 by the amendment made w.e.f. 01.04.2021 would become redundant. It is pertinent herein to observe that when a statute prescribes the requirement of a notice, the opportunity therefore to be granted to show cause has to be a reasonable opportunity. Merely because the Departmental Officer woke up late and by that time, the period was almost coming to an end, would not be a justification to deprive the noticee of due opportunity. In the opinion of this Court, the action on the part of the AO was in violation to Section 148A(c) of the Act of 1961. This Court finds another reason to interfere. As stated above, the time period for issuance of notice u/s 148 is normally 3(three) years from the end of the relevant assessment year i.e. in the present case upto 31.03.2019, taking into account that for the Assessment Year 2015-16, the period ends on 31.03.2026. In the circumstances, the amount which escaped assessment was likely to amount to Rs. 50,00,000/-(Rupees Fifty Lakh) or more, the extended period for limitation would be for the Assessment Year 2015-16, not beyond 31.03.2016. Therefore, the reason so assigned in the affidavit for not granting additional opportunity to the petitioner on the ground that the period would end on 31.03.2022 amounts to complete non-application of mind. The order passed u/s 148A (d) as well as the notice u/s 148 are set aside and quashed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 971
  Exemption u/s.11 and 12 - assessee has not furnished the Audit report in Form No.10BB within the stipulated time in Rule 16CC - HELD THAT:- We find the CPC rejected the claim made by the assessee u/s.10(23C) only on technical issue, which is uncalled for CIT(A) has rightly considered all the aspects viz, registration u/s.12A and application of income for the charitable purposes while granting exemption u/s.11. We therefore find that the order passed by the CIT(A) is in conformity with the principles of natural justice. We therefore uphold the same and dismiss the grounds raised by the Revenue.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 970
  Assessment u/s 153A - Validity of Approval granted u/s 153D - mechanical nature of the approval process - single approval u/s 153D has been accorded for multiple AYs HELD THAT:- In the first para of the approval memo, the Addl. CIT referred the letter of the A.O. dated 17/12/2019, and in the second para, it was stated that the on the basis of discussion held from time to time the approval u/s 153D is granted in respect of seven cases. The approval dated accorded u/s 153D is bearing the printed date of 17/12/2019 and hand written date of 18/12/2019 and the same has been signed on 18/12/2019. There is not even mentioning of any draft assessment order or the assessment records or the seized materials in the said approval letter. Such mechanical approval cannot be sustainable in law in the light of judicial dicta available. The approval memo is totally silent on the issues involved and has granted omnibus approval without any thoughtful process being discernible. A single approval u/s 153D has been accorded comprising out of seven Assessment Years. Thus the assessment order based on ritualistic approval stands vitiated and thus quashed by allowing Ground of appeal of the Assessee.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 969
  Rejection of books of accounts u/s 145(3) - estimating the Net Profit @ 5% without pointing out any major discrepancies in books of accounts - assessee contended that the complete details of sales including cash sales were filed before AO and also the details of purchases, sales and comparative chart was filed before the AO - HELD THAT:- Admittedly the assessee has produced bills and vouchers and from the summary of purchase and sales made and duly reflected in the VAT returns clearly shows that assessee purchases are duly reflected in the books of accounts and the bills and vouchers and without verifying the bills and vouchers, sales cannot be denied so lightly and so cannot be disbelieved. This can be a good reason for rejection of books of accounts but sales cannot be disbelieved. Hence, we are of the view that the assessee s sales as per bills and vouchers is at Rs. 1.24 Cr. and even cash sales during October, 2016 to December, 2016 quarter during demonetization period has to be accepted. Accordingly, we assessed the sale at Rs. 1.24 Cr. and estimate the profit rate at 5%. We accept the rejection of books of accounts but rejection of the turnover is without any basis. Despite the fact that the assessee before AO and CIT(A) has filed complete details of sales as well as purchases and there is no reason not to accept this sale which has been disclosed by assessee. In term of the above ground of assessee s appeal is partly allowed. Cash deposit made during the demonetization period u/s 69A of the Act as unexplained money - As we accepted the cash sales carried out by assessee, the cash deposit to the extent of Rs. 57.25 lac is also accepted as explained. The addition of balance cash is sustained. In term of the above, this issue of assessee s appeal is partly allowed. Addition restricted to 5% of the gross profit - As we have adjudicated the first issue and restricted the overall additions to the extent of 5% of overall sales offered for a sum we refrain ourselves for adjudicating this ground being academic and without prejudice. Appeal filed by Assessee is partly allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 968
  Revision u/s 263 - Disallowance with regards to Revenue recognition - HELD THAT:- On going through the contents of the order passed u/s 263 and the submissions of the assessee, we observe that the assessee has specifically submitted that the balance revenue had been recognized by the assessee in subsequent years and hence no prejudice was caused to the Revenue. While passing the 263 order, PCIT has not dealt with this aspect submitted by the assessee while holding the order to be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. We observe from the records placed before us that the AO had made due enquiries with regards to the methodology of revenue recognition adopted by the assessee and there is apparently no lack of the enquiry on part of the AO, on this aspect. Decided in favour of assessee. Disallowance of proportionate depreciation claim by the assessee - AO noted that assessee had let out some portion of the building and offered the income received as income from house property after claiming deduction @30% under Section 24 - HELD THAT:- From the assessment records, there is no discussion on this aspect as well that it was the assessee who was effectively using the rooms for it s business purposes for the entire part of the year. Therefore, in our view, the PCIT has correctly observed that the very basis of disallowance was on an incorrect understanding of facts by the AO, which resulted from evident of lack of enquiry on this aspect, during the course of assessment proceedings. The Counsel for the assessee cited various judicial precedents in it s support. It is a well-established principle that each case is rendered on it s own set of facts and cannot have general applicability to other cases, unless there is an absolute parity of facts. Decided against assessee. Judicial precedents cited by the assessee have no applicability to the above set of facts, which are peculiar to the assessee only. Accordingly, the judicial precedents relied upon by the assessee would be of no assistance, looking into the assessee s set of facts. PCIT has correctly observed that the assessment order was framed on an incorrect presumption of facts and also there was a lack of enquiry on the correct amount of area which was let out and therefore, we find no infirmity in the observations made by Ld. PCIT on this issue, so as to call for any interference. Decided against assessee. Appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 967
  TDS u/s 195 - Disallowance u/s 40(a)(i) - assessee paid software service charges to a foreign entity in Italy but did not deduct tax at source on the ground that such software payments do not require withholding tax u/s 195 - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of order of Hon ble High Court of Madras [ 2021 (12) TMI 1447 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] we find that the substantial question of law as raised by the revenue has been answered against the revenue as relying on ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED [ 2021 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT] held in assessee s case that the assessee is not liable to deduct tax at source on payments made to non-resident towards software support charges and consequently, expenses could not be disallowed u/s. 40(a)(i) of the Act Application of Arm s Length interest rate - assessee had outstanding trade receivables from its AE - TPO proposed to benchmark the same. The assessee stated that the said transaction would not be an international transaction - CIT(A), substantially confirming the stand of TPO, held that average LIBOR rate would be the most appropriate rate of interest in the international market - HELD THAT:- We find that the adjudication of Ld. CIT(A) is in accordance with cited decision of this Tribunal in M/S. PLINTRON GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS, PRIVATE [ 2018 (3) TMI 1901 - ITAT CHENNAI] wherein held that while working out deemed notional interest on delay in repatriation of overdue receivables from foreign AEs, LIBOR rate will be most appropriate. Therefore, the adjudication of Ld. CIT(A) could not be faulted with. We order so. Assessee appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 966
  Stay of demand - Partial payment already made - determination of 20% of the outstanding demand - HELD THAT:- As considered the challan placed before us of Rs. 4.4 crores paid by the assessee for AY 2021-22 on 31.3.2024 against the addition made in the above assessment order. Admittedly, though the amount outstanding is Rs. 20.34 crores had this information been provided to the AO, naturally the outstanding demand would have been less by the above sum and interest would have also gone down substantially. We find that the assessee has paid tax of Rs. 4.4 crores for which credit has not been given to the assessee, therefore naturally this amount can be considered towards 20% of the outstanding demand. Assessee has categorically shown that there is an error in the computation of margin with respect to trading manufacturing segment which is accepted by the ld. TPO in the remand report, but as the ld. DRP did not comment on the same, TPO/AO continued with the computational error. We are of the view that for such computational errors, the ld. TPO/ld. DRP has failed to do their duty to make such corrections when it is so obvious. No doubt, while computing interest on outstanding receivable from AE, assessee did not give the invoices-wise information, but that does not mean that the ld. TPO should have computed interest by taking figure for which there is no substantial evidence. The application made by the assessee u/s. 154 of the Act is also pending, which clearly shows that if such arithmetical inaccuracy is removed, the addition of Rs. 18 crores will come to half of that. As the assessee has already deposited Rs. 4.4 crores, which is more than 20% of the outstanding demand, the assessee deserves stay of demand on this ground. Accordingly, we direct the ld. AO to verify the payment of Rs. 4.4 crores by the assessee and then to keep the balance demand in abeyance, till disposal of the appeal or 180 days from the date of receipt of this order, whichever is earlier.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 965
  Protective addition made concerning the payments made under the head information technology fees - HELD THAT:- Since the assessee has already settled its dispute with competent authority under MAP and has also accepted the adjustments made by the TPO on account of information technology fees protective addition made by the AO in the present year is not tenable and hence, deserves to be deleted. It is settled position of law that when substantial addition has been confirmed/ settled as in this case, then protective addition has no legs to stand. In assessment year 2011-12 also, the amount has been paid by the assessee on account of information technology fees. This amount has also been accepted by the assessee in MAP proceedings before the competent authority. Therefore, in this year also no further disallowance u/s 37 of the Act, on protective basis is required to be sustained. Addition made under the head commission on sales - For AY 2013-14 is concerned, the amount in dispute is payment on commission made by the assessee on sales. Perusal of page A2 of the paper book, which is the part of communication made by competent authority would show that amount as also been accepted by the assessee under the head commission on sales . It is relevant to mention here that this addition was in fact made by the ld. DRP during proceedings before the dispute resolution panel. Be that as it may, since the assessee has already offered this amount in MAP, no protective addition as made by the ld. DRP deserve to be sustained. Appeals of the assessee are allowed.

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• Customs

• 2025 (1) TMI 964
  Seeking declaration that the Petitioner is not required to obtain NOC from the Narcotics Commissioner (Respondent No. 2) for exporting its product, namely ADCOTE 545S containing Methyl Ethyl Ketone (MEK) - Whether ADCOTE 545S, which contains Methyl Ethyl Ketone (MEK), is covered under Schedule-B of the 2013 Order. - confiscation - penalty - it was held by High Court that This Petition is dismissed with the liberty to reply to the show cause notice and face the adjudication proceedings. HELD THAT:- It is felt appropriate to direct the concerned authorities to decide the question(s) raised in the present matter within a period of five weeks from the date a copy of this order is received by them. SLP disposed off.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 963
  Seeking grant of regular bail - smuggling of commercial quantity of Heroin - Investigating Agency failed to comply with the mandate provided under Section 50 of the NDPS Act - satisfaction of provisions of Section 37 of NDPS Act or not - applicant s status as a foreign national - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the complaint, filed by the Customs authorities before the learned Trial Court, reveals that the present applicant Ghulam Hazrat Mirzale along with co-accused Abdul Khaliq Noorzai, both nationals of Afghanistan, were intercepted at the IGI Airport. Both the accused persons as well as the trolly bags carried by them were searched by the Customs officials. In their trolly bags, some shampoo/hair color bottles were found, containing black coloured-thick liquid having an unusual smell. The said liquid, upon testing, was found to be Heroin. Total 17 bottles, weighing about 4.02 kg (including the weight of bottles) were recovered from co-accused Abdul, and total 15 bottles, weighing about 3.60 kg (including the weight of bottle) were recovered from the present applicant. Concededly, the quantity of narcotic substance recovered in this case from the present applicant is commercial quantity, i.e. about 3.60 kg of heroin. Therefore, the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act will have to be satisfied by the applicant so as to be entitled to grant of bail. When this Court considers the material placed on record by the respondent, specifically the fact that recovery of 15 bottles containing Heroin of about 3.60 kgs was made from the trolly bag of the present applicant at the IGI Airport, this Court is of the opinion that a prima facie case, at this stage, is made out against the applicant for commission of offences punishable under the provisions of NDPS Act. Notably, the applicant herein is a foreign national, and the trial is at a crucial stage i.e. the evidence of prosecution witnesses is being recorded. Considering the same, this Court finds no ground to grant regular bail to the applicant at this stage. Conclusion - Bail denied based on the failure to meet Section 37 conditions, the lack of significant procedural prejudice, and the applicant s foreign nationality, which increased the risk of absconding. Bail application dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 962
  Interest payable on CVD levied under Section 3 of the CT Act or on SAD levied under Section 3A of the CT Act - Constitutional validity of the Notification No. 18/2015-Cus dated 01.04.2015 - HELD THAT:- The expression case is defined in Section 127A (b) of the Act to mean proceedings under the Act or any other Act for the levy, assessment, and collection of customs duty, pending before an adjudicating authority on the date on which an application is made under Sub-section (1) of Section 127B of the Act. The proviso to Section 127A (b) of the Act also clarifies that any proceedings referred by any Court, Appellate Tribunal or any other authority for a fresh adjudication or decision, would not fall within the scope of proceedings within the meaning of the said Section and thus cannot be considered as a case. Section 127C of the Act provides for procedure to be followed on receipt of an application under Section 127B of the Act. In terms of Section 127C(1) of the Act, the Settlement Commission is required to issue a notice to the applicant to explain why its application should be allowed. After taking into consideration the said explanation, the Settlement Commission is required to pass an order either to proceed with the application or reject the same. A copy of the said order is required to be sent to the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs having the jurisdiction. The Principal Commissioner of Customs or the Commissioner of Customs, as the case may be, is required to furnish a report within thirty days on receipt of communication from the Settlement Commission. Sub- section (4) of Section 127C of the Act empowers the Settlement Commission to direct further enquiry or investigation if it considers apposite and records the reasons in writing. Sub-section (8) of Section 127C of the Act also expressly provides that an order passed under Sub-section (5) of Section 127C of the Act shall provide for terms of settlement including payment by way of duty, penalty or interest and the manner in which the sums shall be paid - In the present case, the impugned order expressly provides that the order would be void and immunities granted would be withdrawn if the petitioners fail to comply with the order. Admittedly, the petitioners had not satisfied the conditions subject to which import of material had been permitted without payment of duties. Thus, interest on such duties was payable as was stipulated in terms of the Notification dated 01.04.2015 - Admittedly, the petitioners had bound themselves to the said conditions and had availed the benefit of the said Notification. In this view, it cannot be accepted that the impugned order imposing interest on delayed payment of duties is contrary to law. Constitutional vires of the Notification dated 01.04.2015 - HELD THAT:- The petitioners challenge to the Notification is insubstantial. The exemption was granted subject to the importer satisfying its export obligations. The petitioners do not challenge the grant of advance authorizations and permission to import the goods in question without payment of duties on the condition of fulfilling the export obligations. Clearly, if the conditions were not satisfied, the petitioner would be liable to pay the duties on the material imported - Admittedly, such duties would be payable on the date of clearance of the goods and therefore stipulating that the interest would be payable on such dates if the conditions are not satisfied cannot by any stretch be stated to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Conclusion - The order of the Settlement Commission is a settlement that must be accepted in its entirety; interest can be imposed as a condition of duty exemption under a valid notification. There are no merit in the petition, the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 961
  Dismissal of application on the sole ground of limitation (time barred) - satisfactory explanation for the delay or not - power of Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay - HELD THAT:- The Commissioner (Appeals) has power to entertain appeal within 60 days from the date of communication of such decision or order and he may allow such appeal within further period of 30 days after giving finding on sufficient cause on which the appellant was prevented to file appeal within stipulated time period. Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of SINGH ENTERPRISES VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., JAMSHEDPUR [ 2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT ] has, inter alia, held that the Commissioner (Appeals) has no power to condone the delay beyond the condonable period of 30 days. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and is bound to act within the four walls of the statute. Tribunal has no discretionary power to condone the delay beyond the time limit prescribed under the Act. Thus, admittedly the appellants were served the OIOs dt.13.03.2023 14.03.2023 on 20.03.2023 and they have filed the appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) on 03.10.2023. In the normal course, these appeals should have been filed by 19.05.2023, which is 60 days from the date of communication of OIOs and Commissioner (Appeals) has discretion to condone the delay up to 30 days only beyond this period. In the present case, the appellants have filed the appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) after more than 6 months from the date of communication of OIOs. Therefore, Commissioner (Appeals) was correct in dismissing the appeals on time bar itself without going into merit. There are no scope or reason to interfere with the Orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) - appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 960
  Classification of imported goods - Liquid Seaweed Concentrate (Crop Plus) - to be classified under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 3101 0099 as claimed by the appellants or under CTI 3808 9340 as determined by the Department? - benefit of concessional rate of Basic Customs duty under Serial No. 196 of Notification No. 12/2012-Cus. dated 17.03.2012 - HELD THAT:- It is found that in the SCN, the Department has stated that Seaweed extract is used as Liquid Organic Bio Fertilizer because of its organic micro nutrient, NPK and Natural Growth Hormones content such as Cytokinins, Alginic Acid, Mannitol, Gibberellins, Seaweed is used as Plant Growth Promoter for all kinds of plants. However, the proceedings were initiated in the said SCN to change the classification of the imported goods as Plant Growth Regulator under CTI 3808 9340 as mentioned in paragraph 5 therein. In support of change in classification of the imported goods, the SCN had not specifically assigned any reason as to why the classification of the said product was changed from CTI 3101 00 99to CTI 3808 9340. Further, it is also found that in support of the classification of imported goods under CTI 3808 93 40,the authorities below have stated the reason that the said goods contains very negligible percentage of Nitrogen/Phosphorous/Potash (NPK) and micro nutrients and thus, the vital role played in respect of the imported goods is towards plant growth regulator and the same is appropriately be classified under CTI 3808 9340. However, on perusal of the certificate of analysis available in the case file, it is found that the said certificate had specifically stated the chemical composition of the goods as organic components derived from Ascophyllum nodosum seaweed as 28.000% as also Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus (P2O5) and Soluble Potash (K2O)as 9.8%. Since the majority of the components of the said goods constitute Fertilizers, the same cannot be termed as Plant Growth Regulator , in order to classify the same under CTI 3808 9340. The Larger Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/S. P.I. INDUSTRIES LIMITED (FORMERLY M/S. ISAGRO (ASIA) AGROCHEMICALS PVT. LTD.) ; M/S. AGRO PACK; SHRI PARTH H. PATEL VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE CUSTOMS, SURAT-II, SURAT [ 2024 (9) TMI 1655 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD (LB)] has made the distinctive features between the Fertilizer and Plant Growth Regulator where it was held that plant growth regulators are chemicals that influence plant growth and development by affecting physiological processes like cell division, elongation, and differentiation. They can regulate plant growth by promoting or inhibiting certain functions such as flowering, fruit setting, and root development. In a nutshell, fertilizers provide essential nutrients for plant growth, while plant growth regulators control specific aspects of plant growth and development. In the present case, since the chemical analysis report submitted by the Research and Development Unit of the manufacturer-exporter had confirmed that the composition would constitute as Fertilizer and as per the order of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal, the imported goods cannot be considered as Plant Growth Regulator for classification under CTI 3808 9340. Conclsuion - Fertilizers provide essential nutrients for plant growth, while plant growth regulators control specific aspects of plant growth and development. There are no merits in the impugned order, insofar it has upheld the classification of the disputed product under CTI 3808 9340 and resultant confirmation of the adjudged demands on the appellants. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 959
  Levy of penalty u/s 112(a) and/or 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 - Habitual offender or not - smuggling of the impugned gold bar of foreign origin - actively colluded with other members of the syndicate and tried to mislead the investigating agency - entire case has been built against the appellant on the basis of the statement dated 24.05.18 of third person (from whom the Gold was recovered/co-accused) - HELD THAT:- It is observed that one kg of gold was recovered from Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta on 24.5.18 by DRI officers and Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta has stated that the appellant as the important person connected with the smuggling of gold in that case. Apart from the statement of Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta there was no other evidence to implicate the appellant in the present case. The appellant had categorically stated that he was known to said Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta since both of them were working together at Chhat Puja Committee at Phuentshelling. Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta had also corroborated such fact during the course of cross-examination. In such circumstance, it is observed that no adverse conclusion can be arrived at against the appellant on the basis of the sole confessional statement of the co-accused which had been retracted and also denied to be voluntary during cross-examination. In the impugned order, it has also been alleged that there was a telephonic call between the appellant and Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta about half an hour before the time of interception of Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta - it is observed that such a telephone call cannot be the basis for the assumption that the appellant was involved in the alleged act of smuggling of gold. It is an admitted position that the appellant and Shri Krishna Kumar Gupta were known to each other and there is nothing irregular or illegal in exchange of call between two known persons. Accordingly, on the basis of such telephonic call, it cannot be assumed that the appellant was involved in any act of smuggling. Penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- There is no circumstance in the present case where the provision of Section 112 ibid can be applied against the appellant. Evidence available on record does not indicate that the appellant has played any role in the alleged offence which rendered the impugned goods liable for confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962. It is observed that the Ld. Adjudicating authority had imposed penalty upon the appellant under Section 112(a) 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 together - the appellant had not dealt with the goods under seizure with a prior knowledge or reason to believe that the goods are liable for confiscation. Accordingly, penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 is not imposable upon the appellant and hence we set aside the penalty imposed on the appellant. Conclusion - No adverse conclusion can be arrived at against the appellant on the basis of the sole confessional statement of the co-accused which had been retracted and also denied to be voluntary during cross-examination. The penalty imposed is set aside. Appeal allowed.

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• Corporate Laws

• 2025 (1) TMI 958
  Challenge to orders passed by the Respondent No. 1 declaring him as Wilful Defaulter on the basis of a Transaction Audit Report - procedural requirements under the Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters issued by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) complied with or not - substantial opportunity of being heard not provided - documents on the basis of which a decision to declare him as Wilful Defaulter was taken, were not provided - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Clause 2.5 of the Master Circular provides for initiation of penal measures against the persons or entities declared as wilful defaulter under Clause 2.1.3 of the Master Circular, which includes non-grant of additional loan facility by any bank or financial institution in the future; debarring them from floating new venture for a period of five years from the date of removal of name as wilful defaulter; initiation of criminal proceedings; change of management of borrower unit; non-induction of the person in the Board of the company etc. The object of the Master Circular is salutary. The Master Circular aims to protect the country s banks and financial institutions from unscrupulous entities and individuals. It is intended to identify and punish those entities and individuals who have diverted or siphoned off borrowed funds for purposes other than for which the loan facility was availed leading to default in the repayment obligations. Such individuals and entities must be identified and their names be published in public domain so that they are barred from availing any further loan facility from any other bank. If such an exercise is not undertaken, the cycle of diversion/siphoning of borrowed funds; default and re-borrowing, leading to same situation may continue. Such a scenario may adversely affect the liquidity of the banking system and affect the overall financial health of the country. There is, thus, no doubt that the Master Circular aims to achieve a very laudable object. Notably, the scheme of the Master Circular indicates that it is both a punitive and preventive measure. The Supreme Court in the case of Jah Developers [ 2019 (5) TMI 862 - SUPREME COURT ], had an occasion to examine the consequences of a person being declared as wilful defaulter under the Master Circular. The Supreme Court held that a person declared as wilful defaulter affects the fundamental right of a person under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution as it directly affects the right to do business and thus, the Master Circular must be construed reasonably. The graver the consequences of such civil action, the higher is the degree of proof required. If this principle of law is tested on the anvil of the Master Circular, it is clear that the Master Circular entails not only grave civil, but also penal consequences. Considering the subject matter and grave civil and penal consequences, the validity of an order declaring as wilful defaulter would require a closer scrutiny as to whether such an order falls within the four corners of the procedural mechanism prescribed in Master Circular or is it otherwise. It is thus safe to accept that the basis of issuance of the SCN was primarily the findings in the TAR, which were observed by the NCLT to be mere assumptions. Considering the grave consequences that follow a finding by the WDC, the degree of proof required and expected to have been relied upon by the WDC should be much higher and not simply based on a TAR which itself was unacceptable to the NCLT. Principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is not for the WDC to shrug away its responsibility under the pretext of such presumptions and assumptions. The statutory procedural mechanism laid down in the Master Circular, interpreted in various decisions of the Supreme Court must be followed by the Respondent No. 1 and its committees in letter and spirit. There are no hesitation in agreeing with the Petitioner that the personal hearing cannot be construed to be meaningful with the Petitioner having his hands tied behind in the context of the Respondent No. 1 withholding the necessary documents and expecting to offer his comments. Maintainability of the present petition against the Respondent No. 1-Bank - HELD THAT:- The Supreme Court in the matter of Jah Developers [ 2019 (5) TMI 862 - SUPREME COURT ] clearly expressed its view that Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India is attracted as the moment a person is declared as wilful defaulter there is a direct and immediate impact on his fundamental right to carry on business. It is settled law that a Fundamental right under Article 19 or 21 can be enforced even against persons other than State or its instrumentalities - there are no hesitation in holding the present petition to be maintainable against the present Respondent No. 1. Conclusion - The statutory procedural mechanism laid down in the Master Circular, interpreted in various decisions of the Supreme Court must be followed by the Respondent No. 1 and its committees in letter and spirit. The necessity of adhering to procedural fairness and natural justice in proceedings that have severe consequences, such as being declared a wilful defaulter established. The SCN and related orders quashed due to procedural lapses and violations of natural justice, while affirming the maintainability of the Petition under Article 226. Petition allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 957
  Seeking grant of Regular bail - allegations of serious fraud and financial mismanagement under the Companies Act, 2013 and 1956 - twin conditions under Section 212(6) of the Companies Act, 2013, which pertain to the grant of bail in cases involving serious frauds investigated by the SFIO satisfied or not - HELD THAT:- It is observed by this Court that it is a common ground between the CSL and the investors that the liquidation of the Company is not in the interest of the investors as substantial amounts have been invested by them in residential/commercial projects proposed by the CSL and the said fact has been duly noted by the concerned Company Court in its order dated 24th August, 2023 (which is part of the record). It is pertinent to mention here that the said facts and circumstances were also taken into consideration by the Predecessor Bench of this Court while deciding the grant of interim bail to the applicants. It would not be impermissible under the law to consider the aspect of grant of regular bail in order to allow the accused applicants to revive the CSL in furtherance to the completion of the pending projects - This Court is well cognizant of the fact that the Courts ought to bear in mind that in a matter of regular bail under Section 439 of the CrPC (now Section 483 of the BNSS), the larger interest of the State must be taken into consideration. Further, a sensitive approach is required to be acquired by the Courts while dealing with the offences constituting economic offences which are increasing plight of this nation as the same impacts the individual roots of the society which is a common man, ultimately leading to minimize the trust of the public in law. Section 212(6) of the Companies Act imposes twin conditions for granting bail to accused persons in cases involving serious frauds investigated by the SFIO. These conditions are, that an offence covered under Section 447 of the Companies Act shall be cognizable and no person accused thereof shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release and where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he not likely to commit an offence while on bail. In the present case, this Court, while refraining from adjudicating on the merits of the allegations, observes that the applicants have made bona fide efforts to revive the projects and safeguard the interests of the investors. The said actions not only reflect their intent to rectify the consequences of the alleged offences rather than perpetuating fraudulent activities, but also prima facie satisfies this Court that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicants might not be guilty of the offences and they are not likely to commit any offence while on bail as they have sought bail so that they may make efforts towards revival of the CSL and complete the pending projects. This Court holds that the applicants meet the twin conditions under Section 212(6) of the Companies Act and their release on bail would serve the larger public interest without compromising the ongoing legal proceedings. Conclusion - This Court is of the considered view that directing the applicant to first physically surrender and then proceeding with the adjudication of the instant regular bail applications would not serve any substantial purpose and accepting the argument of the respondent might hinder the applicants ongoing pending efforts to resolve the grievances of the investors by implementing the proposed revival schemes. Both the applicants be released on regular bail subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed - bail application allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 956
  Dissolution of the company - Section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- Having heard the learned advocate for the Official Liquidator and on perusal of the record of this report and in the facts of the case the report deserves to be accepted. The Official Liquidator is permitted to make payment towards professional fees of Rs. 1,500/- to M/s. P. C. Rathod Co., Chartered Accountants towards preparation of Auditor s Certificate from common pool account available with the Official Liquidator since there is no fund in the account of the company in liquidation. Conclusion - M/s. Tirupati Foundry Private Limited (In Liquidation) is hereby dissolved under Section 481 of the Act and the Official Liquidator attached to this Court stands discharged and is relieved as liquidator of M/s. Tirupati Foundry Private Limited., (in Liquidation).

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• 2025 (1) TMI 955
  Maintainability of the company petition - non-compliance of Section 244(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 was wrongly rejected by Ld. NCLT - Petition filed by legal representatives of a deceased shareholder - locus standi of the respondents to file the petition - HELD THAT:- Admittedly the consent terms were taken on record in such Testamentary Suit No.883/2014 also. Admittedly all legal heirs who had entered the consent terms were Class II legal heirs of Late Smt Tanna and it was noted in the order dated 04.05.2017 in view of consent terms Probate was not required. Now the Probate was only required when all legal heirs had wished to act under the Will of Late Smt Tanna but, admittedly, they never acted under such Will. Thus to say the Respondents No.1 and 2 could not have acted under the consent terms is not correct. A bare perusal of the impugned order, in the facts of this case pleaded before us depicts of no infirmity. Admittedly the shareholding of the deceased Smt Tanna have been brought from 66% to 6% after her death and the reason given is she could not invest more money after her death. Looking at the conduct of Respondent No.3 who was in control of appellant company after the death of Smt Tarla Tanna, it gives all the more reason that her Estate be represented by someone who could protect the interest of legal heirs either per Consent Terms and/or under a Will, if Respondent No.3 succeeds in any of the cases, but till such time her Estate and her shareholding needs to be protected and for this reason there must be someone to represent her estate/shareholding in the company. Conclusion - The respondents have the locus standi to maintain the company petition under Section 241. The NCLT did not exceed its jurisdiction, and the pending legal proceedings do not preclude the petition s maintainability. The allegations of oppression and mismanagement warrant examination, and the respondents are justified in representing the deceased s estate. Appeal dismissed.

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• Insolvency & Bankruptcy

• 2025 (1) TMI 954
  Seeking condonation of 1 day delay in filing the Appeal - applicant contends that the ground taken in the Application is that due to bulky and voluminous nature of documents delay was caused - HELD THAT:- The issue which is sought to be raised in the present Appeal by Learned Counsel for the Respondent was considered by this Tribunal in the matter of Innovators Cleantech Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Pasari Multi Projects Pvt. Ltd. [ 2024 (8) TMI 211 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL , PRINCIPAL BENCH , NEW DELHI] . This Tribunal in the aforesaid Judgment has held that as per Rule 22 of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 and Orders issued by this Tribunal on 21.10.2022 and 24.12.2022, the date of e-filing has to be treated as date for calculation of the limitation. It was further noticed that the date of refiling after curing the defects cannot be treated to be date of filing of the Appeal for purposes of computation of limitation and date of e-filing cannot be treated to be fresh date of filing of the Appeal. For purposes of computation of limitation, the date of e-filing of the Appeal which is 24.08.2024 has to be treated the date for purposes of computing the limitation. 30 days period after 24.07.2024, having expired on 23.08.2024, there is a delay of only 1 day in filing of the Appeal - there are sufficient cause in the grounds taken in the Application for condonation of 1 day delay. The delay of 1 day in filing the Appeal is condoned. Replacement of the Authorised Representative of the homebuyers - HELD THAT:- When a procedure for replacement of the Authorised Representatives have been introduced in the Regulations by 16A(3A) inserted on 18.09.2023, the said statutory provision has to be followed for replacement of Authorised Representatives. Adjudicating Authority did not commit any error in relying on the Regulation 16A(3A) of the CIRP Regulations for not accepting the Application of the Appellant. Conclusion - The delay in filing the appeal was condoned. The application for replacement of the Authorised Representative was dismissed. The court declined to exercise inherent powers absent compelling evidence. Thus, no case has been made out to interfere with the impugned Order - appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 953
  Admission of Section 7 Application filed by the Financial Creditor against the Corporate Debtor (CD) - pledged shares were sufficient to cover the debt owed by the CD to the Financial Creditor or not - HELD THAT:- The findings recorded by Adjudicating Authority with regard to debt are not even questioned. The case setup by the Appellant before the Adjudicating Authority as well as before this Tribunal to settle the matter and discharge its liability, itself indicate that there was a debt and default. In paragraph 6.13, the Adjudicating Authority has noticed the amount released by sale of pledged shares and it was found that amount of Rs.2,05,54,296 is still due and payable. The submission of the Appellant is that had the shares been transferred on the date when shares were pledged, the Financial Creditor would have obtained amount of Rs.6 crores, sufficient to clear the claim, cannot be accepted. Under the MoU, it was the sole discretion of Financial Creditor to invoke the shares and pledge invocation was noticed on 29.11.2022 and thereafter shares were realized and the amount, which was realized by the sale of shares have been noticed, which did not discharge the debt of the Financial Creditor. The fact that CD has taken steps to settle the dues before the Adjudicating Authority as well as this Tribunal, itself indicate that both, debt is there and default is an admitted fact. Conclusion - The debt and default having been proved, there are no error in initiating the CIRP against the CD. There are no ground to interfere with the impugned order in the present Appeal - appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 952
  Admission of appellant s claims as a financial creditor - inclusion in the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - HELD THAT:- Admittedly in the present IAs there was no such direction sought to refer the matter to RP to consider the claims of the appellants but a direction was sought from the Ld. NCLT to direct the RP to admit and include its claims in the capacity of Financial Creditor. It is evident to note in its order dated 04.11.2022 the Ld. NCLT had kept IAs No.5284 and 5181 of 2022 pending and the RP was rather directed to place on record his decision before the Tribunal. Further on both these IAs viz. No.5181/2022 and 5284/2022 the arguments were finally heard on 1.11.2023 despite the decision dated 10.11.2022 of the RP on record, and parties were even given liberty to file written synopsis alongwith case laws. However, if one peruse the impugned order the arguments made in IA No.5284/2022 as well as in IA No.5181/2022 were never discussed and such applications were , disposed off in terms of orders passed on 13.09.2023 by the Ld. NCLT though such orders had nothing to do with issues involved in the present IAs filed by the appellant. The issue in those applications was to consider the belated claims or to hand over the possession of the flats to bona fide allottees (including RERA decree holders) irrespective of whether they (RERA decree holders) have filed their claims or not or filed their claims after 90 days from CIRP date but claims were not admitted due to late filing and the Ld. Counsel for RP rather submitted all bona fide allottees irrespective of whether they have filed claims or not or had filed belated claims will be given possession of the flats. Conclusion - The necessity for a tribunal to provide a detailed and reasoned order addressing the specific issues and arguments presented by the parties involved. The NCLT was directed to reconsider the appellant s applications with a detailed hearing and a reasoned order. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 951
  Challenge to order admitting Section 7 Application - power of Central Bank to file Section 7 Application as it was only lead Bank, who as per inter-se Agreement, can take steps for enforcement of the securities - HELD THAT:- Section 7 Application, which was filed by the Oriental Bank of Commerce, was filed in the year 2020 claiming default of Rs.246,30,21,036/-, in which Section 7 Application, a reply was filed and after hearing the parties, the Adjudicating Authority after finding debt and default has admitted Section 7 Application. The proceeding for auction, which was initiated in pursuance of Decree passed by DRT on 02.03.2020 on the Application filed by Central Bank of India, where assets were auctioned on 05.11.2021 for an amount of Rs.37.60 crores, has now stand cancelled on 24.04.2023. The Writ Petition, which was filed by Central Bank of India being Writ Petition No.22367 of 2021 and Writ Petition No.11117 of 2022 filed by the CD were both heard and decided on 24.05.2024 by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA AND M/S KAUR SAIN SPINNERS LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ 2024 (6) TMI 714 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT ] has noted the order PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK (SUCCESSOR OF ORIENTAL BANK OF COMMERCE) THROUGH MR. ASHISH VERMA CHIEF MANAGER OVERSEAS BRANCH, INDUSTRIAL AREA-A, LUDHIANA VERSUS M/S. KAUR SAIN SPINNERS LTD. [ 2024 (5) TMI 1507 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW TRIBUNAL CHANDIGARH] , by which Section 7 Application was admitted. The High Court has held in the judgment that by virtue of order of admission under Section 7 of IBC, both the Writ Petitions have become infructuous. The Writ Petition was decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 24.05.2024. The submission made on behalf of the CD before the Adjudicating Authority to defer the hearing of Section 7 Application, has become infructuous. The Adjudicating Authority having found the debt and default, there are no error admitting Section 7 Application. The submission of the Appellant that under inter-se Agreement it was only the lead Bank, who could have taken steps, is also without any substance, since lead Bank, i.e., Oriental Bank of Commerce has also filed Section 7 Application, which has been admitted by the impugned order. The submission of the Appellant that Section 7 Application was filed for recovery of dues and was not maintainable, also cannot be accepted. It is well settled law that the fact that Financial Creditor has initiated proceedings before the DRT does not preclude them to take remedy under Section 7, which is a special remedy provided under the IBC. To the submission of the Appellant that OTS proposal if accepted by Financial Creditors, there can be no impediment in filing Section 12-A Application before the NCLT for withdrawal of the proceedings through IRP by giving Form-FA, in accordance with law, no exception can be taken. Conclusion - No grounds have been made out by the Appellant to interfere with the impugned order admitting Section 7 Application by the Adjudicating Authority. However, in event the OTS proposal as submitted by the Appellant is accepted by Financial Creditors, it shall be open for the Financial Creditors to file Application under Section 12-A read with Regulation 30A of IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 within two weeks from today. Appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 950
  Rejection of petition to initiate Insolvency Resolution Process against the Corporate Debtor - transaction in question constitutes a Financial Debt under Section 5(8)(e) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - default on the part of the Respondent or the amount transaction was involved as a Financial Debt - HELD THAT:- Adjudicating Authority has made observation that in the date of default is an important factor and there is no sufficient reasoning given for arriving at the date of default. Appellants having been writing to the Respondent that about the value of the iron ore and the fact that has been sold and the fact that amount of Rs.1 Crore was remitted by Respondent clearly proves that the said amount was paid towards the price for sale of iron ores. No justification has come as to why the Respondent has not paid back the amount of Rs.1.65 Crores as claimed by the Appellant. In the Reply which was filed by the Respondent before the Adjudicating Authority it was sought to contended that the claim of damages cannot be decided in proceeding under Section 7 and there is no time value of money involved in the case. Acknowledgment of liability was also denied. Conclusion - The Appellant has proved that the transaction involved as Financial Debt within meaning of Section 5(8)(e) of the IBC and Adjudicating Authority erred in rejecting the Application filed by the Appellant under Section 7. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 949
  Seeking direction to Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) to decide the claim Form dated 11.01.2019 submitted by the Appellant for getting the Conveyance Deed of the Apartment GBD-00-001 (Block D) in IREO RISE (Gardenia Block) executed - Appellant s claim regarding the apartment was filed on 11.01.2019 or 07.02.2020 - what is the date, on which the Appellants can be said to have filed their claims? - HELD THAT:- The filing of the claim was not in accordance with public announcement. The claim was required to be filed at the address and email given at Item Sl. No.10 of the public announcement at the New Delhi address. It is further relevant to notice that Appellants itself has submitted that it has filed its claim on 29.10.2018 with regard to claim of Plot, which was well within time by email. Thus, the Appellants were well aware that claim has to be filed by email at the email address or at New Delhi address, mentioned above. Thus, the pleadings made by the Appellant itself prove that there was no claim filed as per public announcement. Hence, the plea of the RP has to be accepted that claim for the first time was filed on 07.02.2020. The Appellants case also is that on 07.02.2020 they have submitted their claim, after receiving the email from the RP. The Appellant never filed any claim on 11.01.2019 and the claim for the first time was filed on 07.02.2020. The Resolution Plan, which is brought on the record as Annexure A-4, is dated 24.08.2019, which was finally approved on 04.09.2019. Thus, the Clause 18.4 (xi) has to be read with reference to the date when the Plan was approved. On the date, when Plan was approved, the Appellant has not filed the claim, admittedly. Their case of submitting claim on 11.01.2019 has not been accepted as noted above. The purpose and object of Clause 18.4 (xi) is to even protect those allottees, who have not filed the claim, so as to consider their claims on merits and the claims, which were not filed, were not extinguished for the purpose to mitigate the hardship of those, who have not filed their claims within the time. The Resolution Plan having been approved, all stakeholders, including allottees are clearly bound by the same. Conclusion - The Appellant never filed any claim on 11.01.2019 and the claim for the first time was filed on 07.02.2020. The Appellant s claim was filed late and is covered by Clause 18.4 (xi), entitling them to 50% of the principal amount. The request for possession and execution of the Conveyance Deed was denied. Appeal disposed off.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 948
  Condonation of 166 days delay in refiling of Company Appeal - sufficient reasons for delay or not - HELD THAT:- Coming to the first explanation offered which was bereavement in the family of the counsel and the need to perform attendant rituals, we are inclined to agree to the time lapse of a month as has been claimed by the Applicant to justify the delay. This period of one month admittedly came to an end in mid-May, which time this Tribunal was fully operational. However, there seems to have been total inertia and non-action on the part of the Applicant to take any steps towards removing the defects. Delay thereafter from June onwards has been conveniently attributed to the summer vacations of the court. This is a lame and hackneyed excuse which clearly has no legs to stand on since the Registry is always open and working even during vacation time. It is not impressed with vacations being made the scapegoat to cover up the Applicant s lethargy in curing the defects. Another ground cited by the Applicant is that a lot of time got consumed as they had to repeatedly make corrections because of defects being pointed out by the Registry on four different occasions. This argument is not convincing either as it only substantiates the contention of the Respondent that the Applicant was lackadaisical and negligent while making the corrections and removing the defects in a timely manner. Had the Applicant been more alert, careful and vigilant, they would not have been required to undergo the rigmarole of correcting defects four times. Conclusion - Sufficient grounds have not been made out for condonation of 166 days in refiling of the Company Appeal. The refiling delay condonation application is rejected.

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• FEMA

• 2025 (1) TMI 947
  Contravention under FERA Act - Failure to recover the export dues within the stipulated period of six months from the date of the export therefore it contravened Section 18(2) r/w Section 18(3) of the Act, 1973 was made - Penalty imposed - HELD THAT:- Considering status of the appellant, an export proceeds agent prepared the document by charging Rs. 750 per export documents. He is not shown to be part of the M/s Sparkle Gems Industries (P) Ltd. Bombay yet penalty of Rs. 50 lakhs have been imposed on him while imposing penalty of 85 Lakhs on the company. No material to allege contravention of Section 18(2) and Section 18(3) of the Act of 1973 by the appellant. The respondents have failed to show appellant s involvement in contravention of the presence of the Act of 1973. A scratchy order has been passed against the appellant in ignorance of his position which cannot be considered to be of the nature where contravention of Section 18(2) and Section 18(3) of the Act of 1973 could have been alleged against him. We cause interference of the impugned order quo the appellant and accordingly, the impugned order is set aside against the appellant. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid. The appellant has deposited 0% of the amount towards pre-deposit. The respondents would release the amount aforesaid in favour of the appellant.

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• PMLA

• 2025 (1) TMI 946
  Seeking modification of the bail conditions imposed by this Court - HELD THAT:- The condition no.4 (i) is modified and substituted to the extent that the respondent/ applicant shall not leave the limits of the NCR Region without the permission of the concerned Special PMLA Court at Patiala House. Rest of the bail conditions imposed by this Court vide the Order dated 04.08.2023 passed in SLP(Crl.) No. 7409 of 2023, shall remain unchanged. Application disposed off.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 945
  Money Laundering - first anticipatory bail application under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - applicability of Section 45 of the PMLA - HELD THAT:- The Hon ble Supreme Court in the matter of Siddharth vs. State of U.P. [ 2021 (8) TMI 977 - SUPREME COURT] held that There is no force in argument advanced by the learned Special Counsel for the respondent that the applicants before grant of bail required to pass test of 45 of PMLA. The position would have been different, had the applicants arrested during investigation. The investigating agency as mentioned hereinabove consciously preferred not to arrest the applicants during investigation or post filing of charge sheet. It is not in dispute that the FIR was registered on 19.02.2010 whereas the respondent filed a complaint arraying the applicants as accused in ECIR on 04.01.2021 i.e. after 11 years. The judgments relied on by learned counsel for the respondent state that the twin conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA Act are to be satisfied but at the same time, the judgment passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the matter of Satender Kumar Antil [ 2022 (8) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT] cannot be lost sight of and other co-accused persons against whom similar allegations were levelled, have already been granted anticipatory bail by the Hon ble Supreme Court and by this Court, therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the present is a fit case to extend the benefit under Section 482 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to the applicants. It is directed that in the event of arrest of the applicants in connection with the aforesaid offence, they shall be released on anticipatory bail on their furnishing a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the arresting officer and they shall abide by the conditions imposed. Conclusion - The circumstances and legal precedents justified such relief despite the stringent conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA. The anticipatory bail application is allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 944
  Money Laundering - Provisional Attachment Order - condonation of delay of 132 days in approaching this Court after the Appellant withdrew its Appeal from the Gujarat High Court - Section 42 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal on any question of law or fact arising out of such order. The proviso to Section 42, and which is important for our purposes, stipulates that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, may allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. What can be discerned from these provisions is that an appeal has to be filed within sixty days [the initial period], and if not done so, then, on sufficient cause being shown, the High Court can condone the delay up to a further period of sixty days. The question that arises in the present case, is whether by virtue of the said proviso, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is excluded. This Court, in the case of MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI VERSUS ANUSAYA SITARAM DEVRUKHKAR ORS. [ 2025 (1) TMI 783 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] , after reviewing the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Company [ 2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT ], Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and others [ 2010 (4) TMI 1031 - SUPREME COURT ], Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Gujrat Energy Transmission Corporation Ltd. and others [ 2017 (3) TMI 1628 - SUPREME COURT ] and Bengal Chemist and Druggists Association Vs. Kalyan Chowdhary [ 2018 (2) TMI 487 - SUPREME COURT ], came to the conclusion that beyond the stipulated period of 120 days, this Court would have no power to condone the delay. The decision rendered by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai would apply with full force to the facts of the present case. There are no hesitation in holding that after the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, read with its proviso, the High Court would have no power to condone the delay in preferring the Appeal. There are no hesitation in holding that beyond the total period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 [read with its proviso] of the PMLA, 2002, this Court has no power to condone the delay. Since admittedly, in the facts of the present case, the application seeking a condonation of delay is beyond the total period of 120 days. Application seeking condonation of delay is hereby dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 943
  Seeking grant of bail - offences of drug trafficking and money laundering - applicant has already been tried and convicted by the US authorities for the offence - can applicant be prosecuted in India again? - HELD THAT:- In the case of PRABODH K. MEHTA VERSUS CHARUBEN K. MEHTA [ 2018 (3) TMI 2049 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] , the Full Bench of the Hon ble Bombay High Court had considered the principles of law, as laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Panchal [ 2009 (2) TMI 912 - SUPREME COURT] and answered the reference which has already been quoted hereinabove. According to the settled law now that judgment and order of conviction of a foreign court for the offence committed in that country can be noticed/looked into and recognized by judicial and quasi judicial authorities in India. But, it has been held in the case of Prabodh that if the judgment of the foreign court is held binding on the courts and authorities in India, it would amount to directly or indirectly enforcing the judgment of the foreign courts. It was held that the effect of such order of conviction would depend upon variety of facts. In the instant case also at some later stage those factors would fall for consideration in the trial of the applicant. It is positive case of the ED that the applicant under Section 50 of the Act has stated that in the year 2017, he and his brother Parvinder Singh did split as they stopped the said business. In the said split Parvinder Singh got 4250 Bitcoins. Those Bitcoins according to the ED are still in the block chain, but they could not be accessed for the want of passwords or key phrases. Search has already been made to recover those passwords and key phrases - What is being argued is that the proffer and statement under Section 50 of the Act is not a substantive piece of evidence. There admissibility is not in dispute, but their evidentiary value depends on as to whether such statement finds independent corroboration or not? Admittedly, the applicant had entered into a plea agreement in the United States. The BTC were surrendered and the applicant received the reduced sentence. The money was transmitted in the Indian accounts during that period only. In the request for assistance sought by the United States Department of Justice, the United States authorities have informed the Indian authorities that during investigation, the US authorities identified several Pay Pal, Money Gram and Western Union accounts (Collectively, the funnel accounts) used by the Singh DTO to receive proceeds on drug trafficking. The money was transferred accordingly in the India accounts. It is also true that under Section 60 (2) of the Act, such account have not been freezed. Conclusion - Foreign convictions do not preclude domestic prosecution for distinct offenses. It also highlighted the need for corroborative evidence when relying on statements made under coercion. This Court is of the view that there is no ground to enlarge the applicant on bail - bail application is rejected.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 942
  Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - no reasons to believe - scheduled offences - acquisition of property in a public auction conducted by the SBI - validity of notice - legality of provisional attachment of the property under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). The first contention of the appellant in the appeal is that there was no reason to believe on the basis of information in possession that the appellant is in possession of proceeds of crime - HELD THAT:- In view of the detailed and very specific reasons which have been discussed in detail in the Provisional Attachment Order, and also considering the discussions in paragraphs 48-51 of the impugned order by the Ld. AA before whom this very issue had been raised by the defendants therein, there are no merit in the contention that there was no material in the possession of the officer passing the order to have reason to believe that the appellant was in possession of proceeds of crime. Accordingly, this contention of the appellant is hereby rejected. It is next contended that the subject property was purchased by the appellant on 19.02.2009 and at that time, the relevant provision of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) were not scheduled offences and the Legislature has not given retrospective effect to the amendment to the Schedule which came into force w.e.f. 01.06.2009 - HELD THAT:- It is by now well-settled that the issue of retrospectivity or otherwise in so far as offence of money laundering is concerned has to be examined with reference to the act which constitutes money laundering under Act, regardless of the time of occurrence of the scheduled offence. Further, the offence of money laundering is a continuing offence. A continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once and for all. A continuing offence occurs and re-occurs, and each time, an offence is committed. It was so held by the Hon ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar Vs. Deokaran Nenshi [ 1972 (8) TMI 133 - SUPREME COURT ]. In Dyani Antony Paul and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. [ 2020 (12) TMI 1296 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ], the Hon ble Karnataka High Court has held that money laundering is a continuing offence and, as such, the issue of retrospective effect does not arise. The decision of the Hon ble Delhi High Court in Prakash Industries Limited [ 2022 (7) TMI 877 - DELHI HIGH COURT ] may also be referred to in this context, wherein, it was held that it is well settled relating to retroactive application of penal previous that merely because requisite or facet for initiation of action pertains to a period prior to the enforcement of the statute, that would not be sufficient to characterize statute as being retrospective. It must be borne in mind that the Act with which are concerned penalizes acts of money laundering. It does not create a separate punishment for a crime prescribed under the Penal Code. The Act does not penalize the predicate offence. That offence merely constitutes the substratum on which charge of money laundering is being raised. The next contention of the appellant is that the appellant company had acquired the property in a public auction conducted by the SBI which was a perfectly legal activity and the consideration paid by the appellant for the same has absolutely no linkage to the alleged criminal activity - HELD THAT:- There is no merit in the appellant s contention that there is no linkage between the alleged proceeds of crime and the acquisition of the assets by the appellant company. It is to be noted that the definition of proceeds of crime under Section 2(1)(u) includes not only property derived or obtained directly as a result of criminal activity, but also property derived indirectly as a result criminal activity. Furthermore, it is also includes the value of such property . In this regard, the Hon ble Supreme Court in its landmark judgment in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [ 2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB) ] has held that the definition of proceeds of crime is vide enough to not only refer to property derived or obtained as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence, but also the value of such property. The definition of property as in Section 2(1)(v) is equality vide enough to encompass the value of property of proceeds of crime. The Hon ble Apex Court held that such interpretation of the term would further the legislative intent in recovery of the proceeds of crime and vesting it in the Central Government for effective prevention of money-laundering. It is next contended that the notice issued by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8(1) was not valid because the same is dependent on the requirement of the property being proceeds of crime - HELD THAT:- There was more than sufficient evidence to come to the conclusion at this stage of the proceedings that the subject property constituted proceeds of crime so as to place it under attachment until the outcome of criminal proceedings under the Act. It may be mentioned in this context that the legal position is well-settled that attachment of property is a balancing arrangement to secure the interests of the person, as also ensure that the proceeds of crime remain available to be dealt with in the manner provided by the Act. Mere attachment of property does not alter the position with regard to the ownership to even possession/use of the properties which are the subject matter of such attachment. The Hon ble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid case of Vijay Mandanlal Choudhary, [ 2022 (7) TMI 1316 - SUPREME COURT (LB) ] and further clarified in the case of Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. [ 2022 (8) TMI 1047 - SUPREME COURT ] that possession of properties attached under the PMLA, 2002 can only be taken under exceptional circumstances, such as crimes involving terrorist activities, drug cartels or organized criminal activities. Therefore, at this stage, when the criminal trial of the appellants herein is still pending before a court of competent jurisdiction, even the balance of interests lies in favour of continued attachment of the subject properties. Conclusion - Money laundering is a continuing offence and that the procedural and substantive requirements of the PMLA must be strictly adhered to. The provisional attachment is upheld. The procedural validity of the actions taken under the PMLA confirmed. The present appeal is hereby dismissed.

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• Service Tax

• 2025 (1) TMI 941
  Prayer for a direction to CGST and Central Excise Authorities to accept the declared amount manually as per the statements issued in Form SVLDRS-3 - entitlement for benefit of Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the petitioner was required to make the payment as determined in Form SVLDRS-3 and the petitioner tried to make the payment through RTGS on 29.06.2020, however, the same was not accepted by the receiving bank and the payment was returned to the petitioner which is apparent from the bank statement produced on record. It also appears from the record that the petitioner could not generate the challan successfully for making the payment and after the advice of its Chartered Accountant, tried making payment through NEFT/RTGS out of abundance caution and to demonstrate the bona fide of the petitioner to make the payment as determined under the Scheme by respondent No. 2 Designated Committee. In view of the bona fide attempt made by the petitioner to make the payment cannot be doubted and therefore, the substantive benefit of the Scheme cannot be denied to the petitioner on the ground of procedural technicalities more particularly, in time of Covid-19 Pandemic. In the given facts and circumstances, the petitioner made bona fide attempt to make the payment as determined under the Scheme and is also prepared to pay the amount in question in accordance with the Scheme along with interest for the period for which the petitioner was not permitted to make payment by respondent authorities considering extreme Pandemic condition of Covid-19, it is opined that this is a fit case for invocation of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This Court in similar circumstances in case of M/S LG CHAUDHARY VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [ 2022 (10) TMI 631 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] allowed the petition by directing the respondent authorities to accept the payment as specified in SVLDRS-3 along with interest and grant the benefit of SVLDRS to the petitioner therein. The respondent authorities are directed to accept the payment as specified in SVLDRS-3 along with interest @ 9% per annum from 30.06.2020 till the date of payment and grant the benefit of the Scheme to the petitioner - Petition allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 940
  Quantification of petitioner s duty liability on or before June 30, 2019, during the enquiry or investigation, making them eligible for the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 (SVLDRS) - petitioner s admission of liability in their communication qualifies as quantified under the SVLDRS or not - It is the case of the petitioner that he having admitted the liability, is entitled for the benefit under the aforesaid scheme, which has been incorrectly rejected, thereby passing the aforesaid impugned order and issuance of show cause notice. HELD THAT:- On considering the communication in the wake of the provisions of Section 121 of Chapter V, which provides for SVLDRS, 2019, the petitioner s case is very much qualified to have the benefit, particularly having regard to the definition of quantified under clause (r) thereunder and also Section 123, which provides for tax dues. The petitioner was eligible to make a declaration under the aforesaid Scheme as on June 19, 2019. The petitioner has admitted the liability to pay the service tax in the communication dated June 19, 2019, which was duly acknowledged by the respondents - the stand taken by the respondents so as to claim that the petitioner was not eligible in terms of Section 123 of the Finance Act, 2019 cannot be accepted in view of the admission of liability already communicated. The impugned communication dated February 11, 2020 issued to the petitioner, produced at Annexure-7, thereby rejecting the online application of the petitioner and consequently the impugned show cause notice dated June 25, 2020, produced at Annexure-10, are not sustainable and are liable to be quashed and set aside and are accordingly quashed and set aside. Conclusion - The word quantified under the scheme would mean a written communication of the amount of duty payable which will include a letter intimating duty demand or duty liability admitted by the person concerned during enquiry, investigation or audit. Matter remanded back to the respondent No. 2-The Designated Committee of SVLDRS to consider the declaration of the petitioner dated December 05, 2019 in the wake of admission given by the petitioner in his communication dated June 19, 2019 afresh as a valid declaration in terms of the Scheme under the category of investigation, enquiry and audit and may proceed to grant the consequential relief to the petitioner. Petition allowed by way of remand.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 939
  Classification of service - supply of tug to MPT - to be classified under the category of Supply of Tangible Goods or not - deemed sale - taxable event - Extended period of limitation. Whether in the given facts of the case and especially the contract dt.25.05.2007, the activities of the appellant in relation to MPT would be classifiable under Section 65(105)(zzzzj), as service under Supply of tangible goods or it would be in the nature of deemed sale and therefore, liable to VAT and not liable to Service Tax? - HELD THAT:- There are many conditions which would indicate that the transfer of right to use is not absolute and there are certain conditions and provisions which make the contract different than a pure legal transfer of right i.e., lease of goods. For example, the contract itself is for hiring of motor tug sigma with all its complement of qualified and experienced master, officers and crew for a specified purpose of berthing and unberthing of vessels at Mormugao Port and the appellants are required to pay the wages and allowances of the master and crew as well as to pay for victualling, paints, repairs and survey costs for maintaining her classification certificates. Effectively, this would mean that during the period of contract, apart from providing skilled manpower to operate the tug, its repairs and other statutory compliances are with the appellant and not with the MPT. Further, there is a clear clause, whereby, the MPT will not be liable against third party claim for which the appellants are required to take appropriate insurance and provide copy of the said insurance to the MPT. A holistic reading of all the clauses of the contract and the arguments made by both the sides, it would be apparent that the contract is not passing the five tests stipulated in the BSNL case and therefore, on that count itself, cannot be treated as a contract, where there has been transfer of right to use as well as effective control - when the substantial control remains with the contractor/appellant and is not handed over to the MPT, there is no transfer of right to use. Therefore, it cannot be said that this hire agreement is involving deemed sale and therefore, liable to VAT. Whether in the event of the activities being classifiable under Supply of tangible goods , the taxable event i.e., signing of contract, being prior to introduction of service would lead to non-levy of Service Tax on the considerations received post introduction of the service or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- The Service Tax up to 28.02.2011 was required to be paid by the 5th of the month immediately following the calendar month in which the payments are received, towards the value of the taxable services. Further, the rule also provides that notwithstanding the time of receipt of the payment towards the value of services, no Service Tax shall be payable for the part or whole of the value of services, which is attributable to services provided during the period when such services were not taxable . Therefore, for the period prior to 01.03.2011, Rule 6 will govern the payment of Service Tax and therefore, if any Service Tax is demanded for the period when the service itself was not leviable to Service Tax, the same cannot be sustained. On this count, the demand for Service Tax for the period prior to introduction of STG i.e., 01.03.2008 will not sustain on this count itself. Therefore, it is evident that the payments are being received before 7th day of the succeeding month of hire on submission of certificate of satisfactory service from the Deputy Conservator of MPT and therefore, it means that it is only afte satisfactory compliance, the payments are being made and therefore, the argument of the appellants that service has been rendered when the tug is delivered is misplaced - the said hire agreement is for providing services of berthing and unberthing and not for supply of tugs and that it is for continuous supply of said service, which is required to be assessed on monthly basis and only subject to satisfaction, the payments are released in the succeeding months. Time limitation - Penalty - HELD THAT:- In the facts of the case, the department has not been able to produce any positive evidence about the appellant s intent to evade payment of Service Tax or deliberately suppressing the relevant facts with intent to evade payment of Service Tax. Considering the complex nature of classification of STG without transfer of legal right to use and effective control vis- -vis, provisions under the VAT Rules for deemed sale, there is some relevance in the arguments that they were under bonafide belief that the transaction would not be a transaction of supply of service rather it will be covered by deemed sale, more so when they got a clarification from the statutory authority under VAT laws, which may not be binding on Service Tax authority working under the provisions of the Finance Act, 1994. There are force in the contention of the appellant that they were under bonafide belief, especially, when they had got clarification from the concerned commercial tax authorities and in fact, they started paying VAT also. Thus, merely because a copy of the contract was found in the course of audit, in the absence of any positive and cogent grounds for invoking extended period or for imposing penalty, etc., the extended period as well as imposition of penalty is not sustainable in the facts of the case. Conclusion - i) The contract was classified as a service under STG, not a deemed sale, and thus subject to Service Tax. ii) Service Tax was applicable on payments received post-introduction of the STG service, regardless of the contract s signing date. Appeal allowed in part by way of remand.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 938
  Concessional rate of duty under the Works Contract Service composition scheme - denial of benefit for the reason that erection/construction of the electricity distribution lines do not fall under the ambit of service in relation to transfer of electricity - HELD THAT:- The issue is no longer res integra having been decided by this Bench in their own case M/S. KEC INTERNATIONAL LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CGST, GURGAON AND COMMISSIONER OF S.T., DELHI [ 2022 (8) TMI 992 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] where it was held that The appellant is, therefore, clearly entitled to the benefit of both the notifications dated 20.07.2010 and 27.02.2010. Conclusion - The appellant s services fall within this scope, qualifying for exemption. The impugned orders cannot be sustained - Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 937
  Classification of services - Supply of Tangible Goods Service or not - transfer of right to possession and effective control of the cranes to the Municipal Corporation Bhopal (MCB) - demand confirmed on the basis of presumptions - HELD THAT:- MCB had all legal rights to use the same exclusively during the period of agreement. Since the cranes were taken at instance of Traffic Police, those used to be parked in the premises of the jurisdictional police stations. The appellant had no control on the movement of the crane nor upon the driver thereof, except, that the cost of driver and cost of maintenance of the crane was being paid by the appellant. During the period of contract, the appellant was not supposed to give that crane to anybody else - the effective control and possession with respect to cranes given to MCB was not with the appellant. The appellant getting paid a fixed price per crane from MCB. Resultantly, we hold that the impunged activity was that of giving cranes on Hire instead of it being wrongly classified as Supply of Tangible Goods . The Commissioner (Appeals) has not given any reason on which basis the effective control and possession was held to be with the appellant. Apparently and admittedly, appellant has not collected any tax from Municipal Corporation Bhopal on the invoices raised to MCB. There are no reason to consider the invoice amount to be inclusive of service tax. Conclusion - The effective control and possession with respect to cranes given to MCB was not with the appellant. The right to possession and effective control are crucial in determining service tax liability under Supply of Tangible Goods Service. The demand is held to have been wrongly confirmed - appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 936
  CENVAT Credit - input services - advertising agency services - Commercial Training and Coaching Services - exemption vide mega N/N. 12/2012 - HELD THAT:- The decision in career Point Infosystems Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CCE, Udaipur [ 2019 (2) TMI 768 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] is also perused on which reliance has also been placed by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal observed impugned services are Business Auxiliary Service which are not taxable hence not eligible for taking audit are therefore held to be an erroneous finding, in the given facts and circumstances. The advertising agency service received by the appellant was the eligible input service for Cenvat credit and as such credit is held to have been rightly availed by the appellant. And finding no difference in facts of the present case, the order under challenge is set aside - Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 935
  Classification of services - Works Contract Service or Maintenance or Repair Service? - services related to transmission and distribution of electricity - exemption from service tax under N/N. 45/2010-ST - interest - penalty. Services related to transmission and distribution of electricity - exemption from service tax under N/N. 45/2010-ST - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the Notification reveals that the said notification exempts all services rendered in connection with transmission and distribution of electricity. A perusal of the work orders received by the appellant indicates that the appellant has received the work orders from the West Bengal State Electricity Distribution Company Limited (WBSEDCL), Siliguri Zone, a state- owned electricity Distribution Company. Thus, the instant services rendered by the appellant which are in connection with the transmission and distribution of electricity are exempted from payment of service tax. Accordingly, the portion of the demand pertaining to transmission and distribution of electricity is not sustainable. Classification of services - HELD THAT:- The appellant has rendered construction services to various Government Departments, Government undertakings, and local statutory bodies like CPWD, PWD, WBSEDCL, PHD and BSNL. The services provided by him included supply of goods/machineries, equipment, parts and installation thereof. Post installation maintenance was also included in the contract. With the introduction of Works Contract Service in the Finance Act, 1994, the said services rendered by them with material is appropriately classifiable under the category of Works Contract Service . The law is now settled by the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Larsen Toubro Ltd [ 2015 (8) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT] . From the impugned order, it is observed that the Ld. Adjudicating authority has rejected this claim of the appellant on the ground that they have not produced any evidence regarding supply of materials. From the documents provided by the appellant, it is observed that the appellant has paid Sales Tax/Vat wherever applicable - the services rendered by the appellant are appropriately classifiable as Works Contract Service for the purpose of levy of Service Tax. Interest - penalty - HELD THAT:- Since, the demand itself is not sustainable, the question of demanding interest or imposing penalty does not arise. Conclusion - The appellant s services were classified under Works Contract Service , and the services related to electricity distribution were exempt. The extended period of limitation was not applicable. The demand for service tax, interest, and penalties was set aside. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 934
  Levy of service tax - Business Auxiliary Services - incentives received by the appellant - if it is chargeable to service tax then whether the demand on the entire amount shown under the Heading Commission and Incentive is chargeable to service tax or otherwise? - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that based on the Profit Loss Account, the Department has raised the demand and this is based on the reflection of Commission and Incentive under the same Heading. There was no bifurcation given for the commission and incentive separately either in the Profit Loss Account or in the course of adjudication - in view of the fact that there is no bifurcation of commission and incentive, therefore, the amount of incentive that would not be required to be subjected to service tax needs to be worked out. Moreover, as pointed out in the Order-in-Original the claim of the appellant that both the commission and incentives were reflected together in Profit Loss Account, is not disputed but as no supporting documents could be adduced by them to clearly bifurcate the quantum of commission and incentive separately, the relief sought was denied. Conclusion - Incentives are not liable to service tax under the category of Business Auxiliary Services unless clearly documented and bifurcated from commissions. The matter is required to be remanded back to the Original Adjudicating Authority, who shall decide the total quantum of commission and total quantum of incentive separately to come to the final demand - Appeal is allowed by way of remand.

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• Central Excise

• 2025 (1) TMI 933
  Challenge to SCN issued u/s 11-A of the Central Excise Act - petitioners contended that petitioners are not the manufacturers and hence no notice could have been issued to them under Section 11-A of the Central Excise Act - HELD THAT:- The judgment of the Apex Court in Supermax Personal Care Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, Commissioner CGST CEX Audit-Thane, Commissioner CGST CE Thane Commissionerate [ 2021 (4) TMI 368 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT ] has no applicability to the facts of the present case, for the very reason that suspicious material was found at the place of the petitioners and it was found that petitioners were clandestinely involved in manufacturing of Cigarettes and even goods were being supplied which were actually relating to the manufacturing of Cigarettes. The law which emerges from the above judgment is that when an alternate efficacious remedy is available and there are disputed questions of facts, the High Court should decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. Present is a case where on search, it was revealed that petitioners were indulged in clandestine supply of goods to manufacturers of Cigarettes in Bihar. Therefore, in a manner petitioners were also involved in manufacturing of Cigarettes. Though this fact is disputed by the petitioners, but since petitioners have only been given a show cause notice, petitioners are free to raise all objections before the concerned Competent Authority in reply to the show cause notice. It is not inclined to entertain the present Civil Writ Petition and the same is accordingly, dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 932
  100% EOU - entitlement to take suo-moto re-credit of the Cenvat credit that was earlier reversed, without following the refund procedure under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- Indisputably it is also evidence from the records that the cenvat credit taken and utilized by the appellant, stands fully recouped, consequent to the reversal entries and payments made, including interest thereon. By such reversal and payments, it is evident that the effect of such reversal is entirely borne by the appellant and the original credit taken stands expunged. Thereafter, as intimated by the appellant when it takes credit of the proportionate cenvat credit, out of the amount of cenvat credit on licit input services which it even otherwise was originally entitled to take credit of, there is no illegality attached to the said taking of credit. Moreover, such taking of credit stands reported in the ER-2 return filed by the appellant. This Tribunal is of the view that in such circumstances there is no necessity to put the appellant through the rigors of seeking refund by following the procedures of section 11B of the Act. The reliance placed by the adjudicating authority on the decision of Tribunal larger bench in BDH Industries [ 2008 (7) TMI 78 - CESTAT MUMBAI-LB] is misplaced. This tribunal in Sopariwala Exports Pvt Ltd v CCE, Vadodara [ 2013 (5) TMI 430 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] has already held that when the High Court decision holds the field the larger bench decision does not have binding effect. It is also pertinent that the jurisdictional officer has not raised any objection to the appellant s intimation of its intent to avail the credit being reversed at a later date, when communicated vide appellant s letter dated 21.07.2009. That apart, the appellant has also stated that they had intimated the availment of the credit in the ER 2 returns filed and further that to an audit objection against the availment during March 2011, they had, vide letter dated 27.04.2011, replied that the objection is unsustainable - Even otherwise, when the appellant has already communicated its intent to take the credit reversed at a later date upon completion of the work and when it reflects the credit taken in the ER-2 returns, the appellant cannot be held to have made any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts with intent to evade payment of duty warranting invoking of the extended period of limitation. Therefore, given that the SCN in this case is dated 11.09.2013 and has been issued invoking the extended period of limitation for making demand of the credit taken in the month of December 2009, it is evidently beyond the normal period stipulated in Section 11A and thus the demand is also barred by limitation. Conclusion - Suo-moto re-credit is permissible when the original credit is eligible, and the reversal is merely an accounting entry. The extended period of limitation cannot be invoked without evidence of willful misstatement or suppression. The demand made of Rs.40,64,459/- under Rule 14 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 read with Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the demand of appropriate interest thereon as well as the penalties imposed under the impugned order in original, are untenable. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 931
  Liability to pay interest - reversal of Cenvat credit - whether the appellant is liable to pay interest and can also be imposed with penalty, if the Cenvat credit is reversed even before utilising the Cenvat credit? - inclusion of the terminal charges in the assessable value - price revision of petroleum products with retrospective effect. Interest on reversal of Cenvat credit and penalty - HELD THAT:- The Hon ble High Court of Karnataka in the matter of COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE SERVICE TAX LARGE TAXPAYER UNIT, BANGALORE VERSUS M/S BILL FORGE PVT LTD, BANGALORE [ 2011 (4) TMI 969 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ], held that if the Cenvat credit is reversed before utilization of credit, it amounts to not taking credit, no liability to pay interest. Hence, we find that against show-cause notice dated 04.12.2006, the appellant is not liable to pay interest on the reversal of unutilized Cenvat credit and thus no penalty under Rule 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 can be imposed for that reason. Demand of interest in the other two show cause notices and imposition of penalty under Rule 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 in show cause notice dated 20.09.2006 - HELD THAT:- The inclusion of the terminal charges in the accessible value and the revision of petroleum products with retrospective effect has resulted in payment of differential duty, which the appellant has discharged and there is no dispute on these two issues. The appellant has paid the differential duties and is only contesting the payment of interest and imposition of penalty - since there is no limitation prescribed under the statute for payment of interest and there is no interest on the interest, the appellant is liable to pay interest for the period of delay in payment of differential duty, it is found that once the differential duty is paid, consequentially the interest for the delayed payment need to be paid, hence the interest on delayed payment of duties in these two show cause notices was rightly confirmed by the Adjudicating and the Appellate authorities and is tenable. Conclusion - Reversal of unutilized Cenvat credit negates interest liability. Interest is payable on delayed differential duty payments. The penalty under Rules 25 of Central Excise Rules, 2002 is set aside. Appeal allowed in part.

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• CST, VAT & Sales Tax

• 2025 (1) TMI 930
  Time limitation for completion of assessment - assessment completed on 30.11.2018 for the assessment year 2013-2014 was barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 17 (6) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (KGST Act) or not - notice not issued - HELD THAT:- It was imperative on the part of the revenue to issue a notice or communicate the order of the Deputy Commissioner to the assessee before the expiry of the original period of limitation contemplated under Section 17 (6) of the KGST Act, if it intended to extend the period of completion of assessment by a further period of one year as provided under Section 17 (7) of the KGST Act. This not having been done, the findings arrived at by the appellate tribunal agreed, that the assessment completed on 30.11.2018 was barred by limitation. The S.T. Revision therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed.

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• Indian Laws

• 2025 (1) TMI 929
  Maintainability of appeal filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - appellant submitted that the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge without taking into consideration the entirety of the matter - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- In order to understand the settled position of law regarding the appeals against the orders in contempt proceedings, it is pertinent for this Court to understand the interpretation of Section 19 of the Act. Therefore, it is apposite to mention the case of MIDNAPORE PEOPLES CO-OP. BANK LTD. ORS. VERSUS CHUNILAL NANDA ORS. [ 2006 (5) TMI 537 - SUPREME COURT ] wherein the Hon ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that the appeal under Section 19 of the Act is maintainable only against an order in which punishment has been awarded to the contemnor. In view of the above case, the position of law pertaining to Section 19 of the Act is that the appeal against the orders passed in the contempt proceedings cannot be maintainable if such an order is devoid of any punishment or guilt imposed upon the contemnor. Therefore, in the instant case, the instant appeal under the said provision is maintainable before this Court only if the impugned order awarded punishment or held the appellant guilty of the contempt proceedings. Taking into consideration the contents of Section 19 of the Act as well as the case-laws mentioned hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, challenging the order passed in the contempt proceedings, is maintainable only when such an order records or imposes any punishment or guilt of the contemnor. However, upon perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that the learned Single Judge has merely directed the appellant to release the amount already deposited along with the interest accrued thereupon @ 6% p.a. till date while making concession towards the statutorily prescribed grace period of 120 days in favour of the respondent and therefore, the same cannot be construed to be punitive in nature. Conclusion - An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. Appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 928
  Seeking action in respect of alleged unauthorised construction by respondent No. 3 - HELD THAT:- The rights and contentions of the owners/occupants of the subject property are expressly reserved. MCD is directed to take action strictly in accordance with law, and after complying with all statutory formalities and bearing in mind the Supreme Court judgment in IN RE: DIRECTIONS IN THE MATTER OF DEMOLITION OF STRUCTURES [ 2024 (11) TMI 1414 - SUPREME COURT] . The court disposed of the petition, reserving the rights and contentions of the property owners/occupants. MCD is instructed to act according to law and comply with all statutory formalities, referencing the Supreme Court judgment dated 13.11.2024 regarding demolition of structures.

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• 2025 (1) TMI 927
  Permissibility of restitution u/s 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) when a sale deed is executed pursuant to an ex parte decree that has been subsequently set aside - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the sale deed has been executed pursuant to the exparte decree passed in the suit filed for specific performance of the contract said to have been executed in the year 2004. Now the said exparte decree has been set aside in I.A.No.102 of 2016 and delay has also been condoned. It is to be noted that the above Orders have not been challenged. Now it is stated by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that they have filed SLP. However, no number has been assigned. Be that as it may. Further, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the restitution cannot be applied cannot be countenanced. Even assuming that the provision under section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure is not strictly applicable to the facts of the present case, that will not deter the trial Court to exercise its jurisdiction which is inherent in it and arrest the prejudice caused to the parties at the act of the Court. It is to be noted that only on the basis of the sale executed by the Court, the revision petitioner claim title. If the said sale deed is allowed to be on record and used for any other purpose, it would certainly cause prejudice to the respondents . Therefore, trial Court by its inherent jurisdiction has set right the mistake and restored the status quo ante which will not cause prejudice to either party. Therefore, the trial Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction which is inherent in it to prevent prejudice. In such view of the matter, there are no merits in the revision petition. Conclusion - The trial Court by its inherent jurisdiction has set right the mistake and restored the status quo ante which will not cause prejudice to either party. This Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.

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