TMI Tax Updates - e-Newsletter
March 20, 2025

Case Laws in this Newsletter:

GST Income Tax Customs Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy PMLA Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Indian Laws

Articles

1. Writ Petition cannot be filed directly after issuance of intimation of tax

   By: Bimal jain

2. "ITC on Construction Costs: A Post-Budget Review in Light of the Supreme Court's Safari Retreats Case"

   By: CAJOYDEB BHATTACHARYA

3. A Complete Guide to TNREGINET Stamp Duty in Tamil Nadu

   By: Sunanda Mondal

4. Do you import goods for resale or manufacture in India?

   By: Pradeep Reddy

5. You're leaving money on the table

   By: Pradeep Reddy

6. Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions: Approaches and Strategies [Environment Protection and Climate Change].

   By: YAGAY andSUN

7. Obtaining Consent to Establish (CTE) and Consent to Operate (CTO).ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS - CHEMICAL SECTOR - CTE & CTO

   By: YAGAY andSUN

8. The Indian Institute of Legal Metrology Rules, 2011

   By: YAGAY andSUN

9. National Credit Guarantee Trustee Company (NCGTC)

   By: YAGAY andSUN

10. MCGS - MSME Mutual Credit Guarantee Scheme for MSMEs (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises).

   By: YAGAY andSUN

News

1. Ruckus erupts inside MCD house on last day of budget session

2. Telangana CM lauds state budget as committed to development, welfare

3. Telangana govt presents Rs 3.05 lakh cr budget for 2025-26, allots Rs 56k cr for '6 poll guarantees'

4. Telangana govt presents Rs 3.05 lakh cr budget for 2025-26

5. Jai Ram Thakur lambasts budget, says govt would be remembered for racking up loans

6. Cong MLAs dub Haryana budget disappointing; BJP MLAs hail it, say it is progressive and futuristic

7. TMC issues whip for members to attend last 2 days of budget session

8. Bill to hike motor vehicles tax tabled in Maharashtra assembly

9. India's structural strengths provide strong foundation for growth: RBI Bulletin

10. Indian economy remains resilient despite global trade tensions: RBI Bulletin

11. ULIP Surpasses 100 Crore API Transactions: Enabling Seamless, Smart, and Sustainable Logistics

12. PARLIAMENT QUESTION: ISROs PROGRAMMES FOR STUDENTS

13. Cong MP writes to FM, flags concerns over RBI's policy changes in terms of jewel-loans repayment

14. BRISKPE Secures RBI's In-Principle Authorisation to Operate as PA-CB for Exports and Imports

15. ED searches Soros' funding agency, investment arm in Bengaluru to probe FEMA 'violation'

16. New India Bank case: Depositors draw RBI's attention to their financial woes; seek early measures

Notifications

Customs

1. 04/2025 - dated 18-3-2025 - ADD

Seeks to impose provisional ADD on Soft Ferrite Cores from China PR

2. 14/2025 - dated 18-3-2025 - Cus (NT)

Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Amendment Rules, 2025

DGFT

3. 65/2024-25 - dated 18-3-2025 - FTP

Amendment in import policy condition of Urea [Exim Code 31021010] in the ITC (HS) 2022, Schedule - I (Import Policy)

GST - States

4. 38/1/2017-Fin(R&C)(291)/27762 - dated 7-3-2025 - Goa SGST

Seeks to bring in force provisions of various rule of Goa Goods and Services Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2024

Income Tax

5. 20/2025 - dated 18-3-2025 - IT

U/s 138(1) of IT Act 1961 - Central Government specifies 'Additional Chief Secretary (IT), Department of Information & Technology, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi'

Circulars / Instructions / Orders

SEBI

1. SEBI/HO/OIAE/OIAE_IAD-3/P/CIR/2025/32 - dated 19-3-2025

Harnessing DigiLocker as a Digital Public Infrastructure for reducing Unclaimed Assets in the Indian Securities Market

2. SEBI/HO/CFD/PoD-1/P/CIR/2025/33 - dated 19-3-2025

Framework on Social Stock Exchange (“SSE”)

GST - States

3. CCT/26-4/2024-25/G/5288-36/2024-25-GST - dated 11-3-2025

Regularizing payment of GST on co-insurance premium apportioned by the lead insurer to the co-insurer and on ceding /re-insurance commission deducted from the reinsurance premium paid by the insurer to the reinsurer

4. CCT/26-4/2024-25/G/5289-37/2024-2025-GST - dated 11-3-2025

Clarifications regarding applicability of GST on certain services

5. CCT/26-4/2024-25/G/5290-38/2024-25-GST - dated 11-3-2025

Clarification on applicability of late fee for delay in furnishing of FORM GSTR-9C

6. CCT/26-4/2024-25/G/5291-39/2024-25-GST - dated 11-3-2025

Clarification regarding GST rates & classification (goods) based on the recommendations of the GST Council in its 55th meeting held on 21st December, 2024, at Jaisalmer

Highlights / Catch Notes

GST

• Agricultural Produce Market Cess Collection Ruled Unconstitutional After GST Implementation Under CGST and AGST Acts 2017

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC ruled that collection of cess by respondent authorities under the Assam Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1972 post-GST implementation was unconstitutional and ultra vires to the provisions of the CGST Act, 2017 and AGST Act, 2017. Following the precedent established in M/s. Bhatter Traders, which involved pari materia issues, the Court disposed of the writ petition in favor of the petitioner. The judgment effectively invalidates the respondent authorities' power to levy and collect such cess in the GST regime, rendering their actions unlawful and establishing grounds for the petitioner's refund claim.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Blocking of Electronic Credit Ledger Quashed: Rule 86A Procedural Requirements Not Met in GST Case

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC quashed the order blocking the petitioner's Electronic Credit Ledger under Rule 86A of KGST/CGST Rules. The Court found multiple procedural deficiencies: no pre-decisional hearing was provided to the petitioner; the order lacked independent "reasons to believe" as required by law; and the authority impermissibly relied on borrowed satisfaction from enforcement reports. Following K-9-ENTERPRISES precedent, the Court held that mandatory prerequisites under Rule 86A were not fulfilled. The respondents were directed to immediately unblock the petitioner's Electronic Credit Ledger to enable filing of returns. The petition was allowed.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Assignment of Long-Term Leasehold Rights Not Subject to GST Under Section 9 of CGST Act

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC quashed and set aside the show cause notice, ruling that assignment of long-term leasehold rights does not attract GST. Following Gujarat Chamber of Commerce precedent, the court determined that such assignment constitutes a transfer of benefits arising from immovable property rather than a taxable supply under the CGST Act. The deed of assignment represents a sale/transfer of leasehold rights for valuable consideration, placing the assignee in the position of lessee. As this transaction falls outside the scope of Section 7(1)(a) read with Schedule II Clause 5(b) and Schedule III Clause 5, it is not subject to GST under Section 9 of the Act.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• GST Proceedings Under Section 73 Not Time-Barred When Completed Before December 31 Deadline

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC examined whether proceedings under Section 73 of the U.P. GST Act, 2017 were time-barred. The proceedings commenced on 20.09.2023 via show cause notice with a final order issued on 15.12.2023. Applying the precedent established in M/s A.V. Pharma vs. State of U.P. & Ors., the Court determined that such orders could only be passed until 31.12.2023, even with time extensions. Since the proceedings were completed within this timeframe (15.12.2023), they were not time-barred. However, the Court ultimately quashed the impugned orders and proceedings, allowing the petition on other undisclosed grounds.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Taxpayer Wins as Assessment Order Set Aside Due to Improper Service of Notice Under Section 169(1) of CGST Act

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC set aside the impugned assessment order dated 28.08.2024 for AY 2019-2020 and consequential proceedings, applying precedent from MR. SAHULHAMEED case which established that assessees are entitled to service of notice under the modes prescribed in clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 169(1) of CGST Act, 2017. The petitioner was directed to submit a reply to the show cause notice within two weeks, after which respondent must provide a hearing opportunity before passing orders on merits. Any bank attachment made was ordered to be released. The petition was allowed.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

Income Tax

• Unexplained Cash Credits: Section 68 Requires Full Disclosure of Beneficiaries, Not Just Commission Amounts

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC reversed the Tribunal's order regarding unexplained cash credits under Section 68, finding that the Tribunal had adopted a casual approach by merely following earlier orders without proper reasoning. The Court held that if the assessee fails to explain beneficiaries' identity, the entire amount should be added under Section 68, not just 0.15% as commission. The Court criticized the assessee's claim of providing accommodation entries without maintaining beneficiary details, noting this was implausible since the assessee must know withdrawal recipients. The Court directed ICAI to investigate professional misconduct by the CA involved and suggested PMLA authorities investigate potential money laundering. The HC maintained the 0.15% commission rate for identified credits only.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Assessment Order Challenge Fails: Court Rules Limitation Questions Require Full Trial, DIN Issue Subject to Supreme Court Stay

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed the writ petition challenging an assessment order on grounds of limitation and absence of Document Identification Number (DIN). The Court held that questions of limitation involve mixed questions of fact and law that cannot be summarily determined on affidavits alone. Regarding the DIN issue, the Court noted that the Supreme Court had stayed a similar Calcutta HC decision in Tata Medical Center Trust. Following Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, the Court emphasized that statutory tribunals are constituted to determine questions of law and fact, and High Courts should not substitute themselves as decision-making authorities when exercising judicial review powers. The petition was deemed not maintainable as alternative and efficacious statutory remedies remained available to the petitioner.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Income Tax Assessment Order Challenge Fails Due to Limitation Issues and DIN Requirement Dispute

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC declined to entertain a writ petition challenging an assessment order on grounds of limitation and absence of Digital Identification Number (DIN). The court held that limitation involves mixed questions of fact and law unsuitable for summary determination on affidavits alone. Regarding the DIN issue, the court noted that the Supreme Court had stayed a similar ruling in the Tata Medical Center Trust case. Following Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, the HC emphasized that statutory tribunals are constituted to determine questions of law and fact, and courts should not substitute themselves as decision-making authorities during judicial review. The petition was dismissed as non-maintainable since alternative and efficacious remedies remained available to the petitioner.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Reopening Assessment Under Section 147 and Disallowance Under Section 37(1) Rejected Where Mining Operations Properly Reported

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed the Revenue's appeal challenging the reopening of assessment under s.147 and disallowance under Explanation 1 to s.37(1). The Tribunal had found that the assessee correctly reported iron ore production figures in Form H-1 submitted to Indian Bureau of Mines and in Form 3CD. The Court found no perversity in this concurrent finding of fact. Regarding the allegation of illegal mining operations without environmental clearance based on Justice M.B. Shah Commission's report, the HC noted that the Central Empowered Committee had opined that mining without clearance does not constitute illegal mining. The Court held that Explanation 1 to s.37(1) would only apply if the activity were declared illegal, penalty imposed, and claimed as expenditure by the assessee.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Reassessment Proceedings Quashed Against Dissolved Partnership Firm Under Section 148A Due to Jurisdictional Error

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC quashed reassessment proceedings initiated against a dissolved partnership firm. The Assessing Officer had erroneously issued notice under s.148A(b) and passed order under s.148A(d) in the name of the partnership firm that had been dissolved effective April 1, 2017. The Court held that such proceedings were untenable, particularly since the petitioner had provided all relevant information including the dissolution deed in response to the show cause notice. Following the precedent established in Maruti Suzuki Limited, the Court determined that reassessment notices issued in the name of a non-existent entity cannot be sustained, and accordingly set aside the impugned notice and order.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Transfer Order Under Section 127 of Income Tax Act Upheld Despite Challenge to Reasoning and Jurisdiction

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC upheld the transfer order under s.127 of the Income Tax Act, finding no grounds to interfere with the transfer of assessment from Income Tax Officer, Theni to Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle, Kochi. Though the petitioner claimed the order lacked reasoning, the Court determined that no compelling grounds existed to invalidate the transfer, particularly given the search conducted under s.132/132A and applicable CBDT guidelines. The transfer to Central Circle-2, Kochi was justified for coordinated investigation purposes. The Court concluded the impugned order was valid and required no judicial intervention.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Income Tax Exemption Denied to Trust as Entity Failed to Prove Existence Solely for Educational Purposes Under Section 10(23C)(vi)

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed a petition challenging denial of exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) of the Income Tax Act. The petitioner-trust argued that income received solely for educational purposes should be exempt. However, the Court upheld the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax's determination, noting that the exemption was claimed by the trust itself rather than by the specific educational institution (GHG Academy) it operated. Since it could not be conclusively established that the trust existed solely for educational purposes and not for profit, the Court found that exemption was correctly denied under the statutory requirements.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Fabrication Charges Not "Fees for Technical Services" Under Article 12(4)(a) of India-Singapore DTAA

  Case-Laws - AT : The ITAT ruled in favor of the taxpayer, determining that fabrication charges received could not be treated as "fees for technical services" under Article 12(4)(a) of the India-Singapore DTAA. The Tribunal noted this was a recurring issue for the taxpayer across assessment years 2015-16 to 2020-21, with consistent favorable rulings. The ITAT rejected the Assessing Officer's application of 10% tax on these charges, holding that the receipts toward fabrication of bushings did not constitute fees for technical services under the treaty, as no royalty under Article 12(3) of the India-Singapore DTAA was received by the taxpayer.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Failure to Issue Draft Assessment Order Under Section 144C(1) Renders Final Assessment Invalid for Foreign Company

  Case-Laws - AT : The ITAT held that the final assessment order under s.143(3) was invalid as the Assessing Officer failed to issue a mandatory draft assessment order under s.144C(1) for an eligible assessee (foreign company). This procedural violation constituted a non-curable defect, as it denied the assessee's statutory right to raise grievances before finalization of the assessment. The Revenue did not dispute that the assessee qualified as an "eligible assessee" under s.144C(15)(ii), which required the issuance of a draft order. Consequently, the Tribunal quashed the final assessment order, determining that such procedural non-compliance could not be remedied retrospectively.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• GIS Software License Charges from UK Company to Indian Associates Not Taxable as Technical Services Under DTAA

  Case-Laws - AT : The ITAT ruled that GIS charges received by a UK-based foreign company from its Indian AEs for software licenses do not qualify as Fees for Technical Services under the India-UK DTAA. The Tribunal determined that subletting software licenses without providing training, customization, or technical support does not involve transfer of technical knowledge or expertise. The procurement and allocation of licenses were deemed mere administrative functions rather than specialized services. The ITAT rejected the AO's application of the "make available" clause, finding no technical knowledge was imparted to Indian entities. The Tribunal directed that such receipts be examined under business income principles and deleted the addition made by the AO. The issue of fees under section 234F was set aside to the AO for appropriate action.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

Customs

• Anti-Dumping Duty of $1,732 Per MT Imposed on Chinese Stainless Steel Vacuum Flasks Under Tariff Items 9617

  Notifications : The Central Government has imposed anti-dumping duty on vacuum insulated flasks and other vacuum vessels of stainless steel imported from China PR. The duty follows DGTR's findings that these products were exported to India below normal value, causing material injury to domestic industry through price undercutting. The anti-dumping duty is fixed at USD 1,732 per MT and applies to products under tariff items 9617 00 11, 9617 00 12, and 9617 00 90. The measure excludes dispensers, casseroles, vacuum lunch boxes, ice buckets, single-walled flasks, electric kettles, and other electric vessels. This duty will remain in force for five years from the notification date unless revoked earlier.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Chinese Aluminum Foil Imports Face Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties Ranging from $619 to $873 Per Metric Ton

  Notifications : The Ministry of Finance has imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on aluminum foil up to 80 microns (excluding foil below 5.5 micron for non-capacitor application) imported from China PR. Following DGTR's preliminary findings that established dumping and material injury to domestic industry, the duties range from USD 619 to USD 873 per metric ton depending on the producer. The notification specifically identifies different rates for sampled producers (Henan Mingtai, Sunho New Materials, Jiangsu Dingsheng), non-sampled cooperative producers, and other exporters. The provisional duties will remain effective for six months from publication unless revoked earlier, with several specific product exclusions detailed in the notification.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Customs Must Compensate Owner for Destroyed Betel Nuts Worth 88 Lakhs Seized and Deteriorated While in Official Custody

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed an appeal concerning seized betel nuts that were destroyed while in Customs custody. The court determined that Customs authorities failed to discharge their burden of proving how goods valued at 88 lakhs at seizure became unfit for human consumption during the one-and-a-half years in their custody. The respondent was neither present during testing nor provided with reports to seek a second opinion. The HC established that Customs authorities are liable for deterioration of goods in their custody without satisfactory explanation, seizure-time valuation is binding absent grave error, and authorities must inform owners before destroying contested goods. Customs was directed to compensate the respondent within four weeks.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Customs Duty Relief for Fiber-Optic Cables in Exclusive Economic Zone Under Legal Question

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC stayed adjudication of a show cause notice demanding additional customs duty on imported fiber-optic cables intended for laying in India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The court found a strong prima facie case that the Customs Act and Customs Tariff Act may not apply to these imports. While the Central Government had issued notifications on January 14, 1987, extending customs legislation to the Continental Shelf and EEZ, the court noted these extensions were subject to specific purposes outlined in a February 7, 2002 notification. As the petitioner's imports did not fall within those designated purposes, the court granted interim relief pending final determination of whether customs legislation applies to such goods in the EEZ.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Customs Act Section 65 Permissions Stayed: Court Allows Power Generation Equipment Installation While Requiring 15% Payment Retention

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC stayed the operation of impugned proceedings challenging permissions granted under Section 65 of the Customs Act, finding prima facie merit in the petitioner's case regarding the applicability of Section 65 and prohibitions under MOOWR Regulations. The interim relief allows the petitioner to install and operate equipment for power generation and supply for home consumption, pending resolution of related matters before the Supreme Court in SLP(C) No. 20274-20281 of 2024. The Court directed that 15% of payments received under the PPAs dated 02.02.2022 and 07.07.2022 be deducted and retained in a fixed deposit by State Bank of India, Jubilee Hills Branch, Hyderabad until further orders, thus balancing the petitioner's rights with the Department's interests.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Customs Duty Refund Granted After Chartered Accountant Certificate Proves No Unjust Enrichment to Customers

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT ruled in favor of the appellant, finding that the burden of duty had not been passed on to customers. The Tribunal held that when a Chartered Accountant's certificate is submitted to demonstrate no unjust enrichment, the Revenue must provide evidence to contradict it. The certificate cannot be dismissed without cogent contrary evidence. The Commissioner (Appeals) merely expressed doubt without seeking clarification from the appellant. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant had shown the differential customs duty as "receivables" in financial statements, establishing that the duty burden was not passed on. Accordingly, the impugned order directing credit to Consumer Welfare Fund was set aside, and the appellant was granted refund with interest.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Foreign Currency Confiscation Order Reversed as Revenue Failed to Prove Links to Smuggled Gold Under Section 121

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT set aside the Commissioner's order confiscating currency worth Rs.1.29 crores under Section 121 of the Customs Act, 1962, and vacated penalties imposed on all appellants. The Tribunal determined that Revenue failed to discharge its burden of establishing that the seized currency constituted proceeds from smuggled gold. Despite suspicions arising from the concealment of cash and recovery of loose slips indicating gold quantities, the Commissioner's findings based on preponderance of probability were deemed insufficient without corroborative independent evidence. The currency was ordered to be released to the owner, Shri K.V. Kunhimohammed, as Revenue could not substantiate its allegations with adequate proof.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Micromax Loses Rs. 54.27 Cr Customs Duty Refund Case for Failing to Seek Re-assessment Under Sec. 17

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT ruled against Micromax's refund claims of Rs. 18.38 Cr and Rs. 35.89 Cr for Additional Duty of Customs paid on imported mobile phones. The Tribunal held that re-assessment of Bills of Entry under Sec. 17 was mandatory before filing refund applications, as established in Supreme Court precedents (Priya Blue Industries, Flock India, and ITC). Micromax's attempt to utilize Sec. 149 for amendments was rejected as inappropriate for claiming notification benefits. Additionally, the principle of unjust enrichment applied since the duty burden had been passed to consumers through MRP-based pricing. The Tribunal concluded that having missed prescribed timelines for re-assessment, Micromax was ineligible for the claimed refunds. Revenue's appeal was dismissed.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Works Rolls Classified as Capital Goods Under CTH 8455 30 00, Eligible for Full SHIS Scrip Benefits

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT ruled that imported Works Rolls qualify as "Capital Goods" rather than spare parts under CTH 8455 30 00, making them eligible for full utilization of SHIS Scrip benefits. The Tribunal determined the rolls are essential components without which rolling machines cannot function, and are independently classified as capital goods. The Tribunal also noted the Department could not maintain inconsistent positions by treating the same goods as capital goods under EPCG License but as spare parts for SHIS scrip purposes. Additionally, the extended period demand was set aside as time-barred, as the interpretation issue had been consistently settled by previous Tribunal decisions in favor of importers. Appeal allowed.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

FEMA

• Indian Rupee and Maldivian Rufiyaa Now Permitted for Bilateral Trade Settlements Under FEMA Regulations

  Circulars : Following a November 2024 MoU between RBI and Maldives Monetary Authority, bilateral trade transactions between India and Maldives may now be settled in Indian Rupee (INR) and/or Maldivian Rufiyaa (MVR) in addition to the existing Asian Clearing Union (ACU) mechanism. This regulatory amendment, issued under FEMA SSSS10(4) and 11(1), modifies the Foreign Exchange Management Regulations 2023 regarding payment methods between ACU member countries. The directive, effective immediately, establishes a framework promoting local currency usage for cross-border transactions while maintaining the ACU settlement option that was previously available.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

IBC

• Insolvency Professionals Must Disclose Carry Forward Tax Losses in Information Memorandums Under Amended CIRP Regulations

  Circulars : IBBI has mandated that IPs must include a dedicated section in Information Memorandums detailing carry forward losses under the Income Tax Act, 1961. This enhanced disclosure requirement follows an amendment to Regulation 36 of CIRP Regulations and observations that current disclosures lack robustness. IPs must now specifically detail: quantum of available carry forward losses, breakdown under specific heads per tax law, applicable time limits for utilization, and explicit mention if no such losses exist. This framework aims to provide resolution applicants with comprehensive understanding of the corporate debtor's financial position to develop more informed resolution plans.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Bank's Show-Cause Notice Quashed for Failing to Share Forensic Audit Report with Petitioner, Violating Natural Justice Principles

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC quashed and set aside a show-cause notice issued by Bank of India based on a Forensic Audit Report (FAR) prepared by BDO India LLP, as the petitioner was not provided a copy of the report, violating principles of natural justice. The Bank was permitted to withdraw the impugned notice and all consequential proceedings/actions, with liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against the petitioner. The petitioner retains the right to raise all objections in response to any fresh show-cause notice, including challenging the partiality of the FAR. The Bank was directed to communicate the withdrawal to the petitioner within 72 hours.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Exclusive First Charge Holder's Rights Upheld: Subsequent Mortgages Declared Voidable for Violating Prior Agreement's No-Encumbrance Clause

  Case-Laws - HC : HC affirmed plaintiff's status as exclusive first charge holder over two properties, declaring subsequent mortgages voidable. The court found that defendant nos. 2 and 3 created impugned mortgages without obtaining mandatory NOC from plaintiff, violating clause 13(d) of the original mortgage agreement which prohibited further encumbrances without written approval. Section 48 of TPA was inapplicable as it presupposes valid subsequent transfers. Following Bikram Chatterjee and Deccan Paper Mills precedents, the court held that mortgages created contrary to terms of prior mortgage are invalid, and allowing defendants to assert rights under such impugned mortgages would "put a premium on dishonesty." Interim application allowed.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Late Resolution Plan Properly Rejected by CoC Under Regulation 36B(6), Commercial Wisdom Upheld in Insolvency Proceedings

  Case-Laws - AT : The NCLAT held that the CoC acted properly in rejecting Respondent No. 1's late resolution plan submission. After extending the submission deadline from 05.02.2024 to 14.02.2024 (explicitly communicated as the final extension), the CoC was justified in not considering Respondent's plan received after this date. Following this decision, the CoC conducted a challenge process where the appellant was declared H-1 bidder. The Tribunal found the Adjudicating Authority erred in interfering with the CoC's commercial wisdom, as the CoC's actions aligned with Regulation 36B(6) of the IBBI Regulations, which requires committee approval for timeline extensions. The appeal was accordingly allowed, reversing the Adjudicating Authority's direction to the CoC to consider the late submission.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

Indian Laws

• Dishonored Cheques Under Section 138 Cannot Proceed When Corporate Moratorium Exists Under IBC Section 14

  Case-Laws - SC : In a case involving dishonored cheques, the SC held that proceedings against the appellant should be quashed where the cause of action under Section 138 of the NI Act arose after a moratorium was issued under Section 14 of the IBC. The Court determined that when the demand notice was issued, the appellant lacked capacity to fulfill payment obligations as he was suspended as director after the IRP's appointment. The appellant could not access corporate bank accounts as they operated under IRP instructions pursuant to Section 17 of the IBC. The SC set aside both the HC's order and the summoning order, ruling that Section 482 of the CrPC should have been exercised to quash proceedings against the appellant.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Dishonor of Post-Dated Cheque: Partnership Firm Must Be Named Party Before Partners Can Face Section 138 Liability

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC dismissed an application concerning dishonor of a post-dated cheque under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The Court held that the proceedings were fatally flawed because the partnership firm (Kishan Construction) was not made a party to the complaint, with only one partner (respondent Kishan Bouri) named as accused. Following precedents in Sarad Kumar Sanghi and Aneeta Hada, the Court emphasized that when a company/firm commits an offense under Section 138, the entity itself must be arraigned as a party before vicarious liability can attach to its partners/directors under Section 141. This defect was deemed incurable as no statutory notice was served on the firm within the prescribed 30-day period.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

PMLA

• Money Laundering Under PMLA Deemed a Continuing Offense When Proceeds of Crime Remain Concealed or Projected as Untainted

  Case-Laws - SC : The SC dismissed the appellant's appeal against money laundering charges under PMLA. The Court rejected the appellant's contention that the alleged acts occurred before PMLA's enactment or before the predicate offences were scheduled. The SC affirmed that money laundering constitutes a continuing offense that persists as long as proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. The Court found prima facie evidence of the appellant's continued involvement in financial transactions linked to proceeds of crime over an extended period. Given the severe nature of the economic offenses alleged, the Court determined that a full trial was necessary to establish the extent of wrongdoing and ensure accountability.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

SEBI

• Securities Appellate Tribunal's Decision on 188-Day Filing Delay Upheld Under Section 15Z of SEBI Act

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC declined to interfere with the Tribunal's refusal to condone a 188-day delay in filing an appeal. The Court recognized its limited supervisory jurisdiction, noting it cannot function as an appellate authority when reviewing such discretionary decisions. The Tribunal's determination regarding insufficient cause for delay showed no illegality or perversity warranting judicial intervention. The Court rejected the petitioner's misplaced reliance on CPC provisions and emphasized that the appropriate remedy was filing an appeal under Section 15Z of SEBI Act, 1992, rather than pursuing a writ petition. Finding no violation of natural justice or statutory requirements, the HC dismissed the petition as lacking merit.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

Service Tax

• Refund Claim for Erroneously Collected Service Tax on SIM Card Sales Valid Under Section 11B

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT allowed the appellant's refund claim, overturning the lower authority's rejection. The Tribunal determined that the refund claim filed on 24.09.2021 was not time-barred as it was submitted within one year of the Order-in-Original dated 22.07.2021 that dropped the service tax demand, satisfying Section 11B of Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of Finance Act. The principles of unjust enrichment were inapplicable since the amount was erroneously collected as service tax on SIM card sales, an activity established as non-taxable. The absence of ST-3 returns was deemed irrelevant since the appellant had no service tax liability for the period in question, making the lower authority's rejection grounds factually incorrect.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Service Tax Burden Falls on Service Recipient: Railways Must Reimburse Contractor After 2012 Legal Regime Change

  Case-Laws - HC : The HC ruled that the arbitration clause barring writ jurisdiction was invalid per the CORE vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) precedent. The Court determined that the dispute over service tax reimbursement following the 2012 legal regime change was not about liability to pay tax but about which party should bear the burden. The HC held that Railways must reimburse the service tax paid by the appellant, applying the principle that indirect tax incidence passes to the service recipient. Drawing an analogy to SS64A of the Sale of Goods Act, the Court concluded that new tax liabilities arising from state action post-contract should be borne by the service recipient. A writ of mandamus was issued directing Railways to reimburse the appellant with 9% interest.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

• Cricket Franchise Wins Appeal Against Service Tax on Player Fees and Central Rights Income

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT ruled in favor of the appellant cricket franchise, setting aside multiple service tax demands. The Tribunal determined that Central Rights Income from BCCI-IPL did not constitute taxable Business Support Services as no service was provided between franchise agreement members. Similarly, payments to overseas cricket professionals for promotional activities were deemed primarily for playing cricket and thus not taxable. Player release fees paid to Cricket Australia and player transfer fees received from other franchisees were held not taxable under Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services since neither cricket boards nor the appellant were engaged in providing such services. Additionally, the Tribunal found the demand barred by limitation as the Department was previously aware of all relevant facts.
  Visit to Get Source

  ---

Case Laws:

• GST

• 2025 (3) TMI 890
  Levy and collection of cess by the respondent authorities under the provisions of the Assam Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1972, post GST regime - prayer for a direction to the respondent authorities to refund the cess amount, which has been wrongfully and illegally collected from the petitioner - HELD THAT:- Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the above judgment in M/s. Bhatter Traders and order [ 2023 (12) TMI 727 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT ] the issue involved in the present case is pari materia with the facts and issue in the above cases and the same squarely covers the present case, where it was held that this Court therefore disposes of the instant writ petitions holding that the collection of the cess from the petitioners by the respondent Board or the Market Committees was unconstitutional as well as ultra vires to the provisions CGST Act, 2017 and the AGST Act, 2017. The present writ petition is disposed of, with an observation that collection of cess from the petitioner by the respondent authorities is unconstitutional as well as ultra virus to the provisions of the CGST Act, 2017 and the AGCST, 2017.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 889
  Negative blocking of the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner - pre-decisional hearing was not provided to the petitioner nor does the impugned order contain any reason to believe as to why it was necessary to block the Electronic credit ledger - HELD THAT:- In K-9-ENTERPRISES [ 2024 (10) TMI 491 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ], the following points were answered in favour of the petitioner- assessee by holding that in the absence of valid nor sufficient material which constituted reasons to believe which was available with respondents, the mandatory requirements/pre-requisites/ingredients/ parameters contained in Rule 86A had not been fulfilled/satisfied by the respondents-revenue who were clearly not entitled to place reliance upon borrowed satisfaction of another officer and pass the impugned orders illegally and arbitrarily blocking the ECL of the appellant by invoking Rule 86A which is not only contrary to law but also the material on record and consequently, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed. Thus, in the instant case since no pre-decisional hearing was provided/granted by the respondents before passing the impugned order, coupled with the fact that the impugned order invoking 86A of the KGST/CGST Rules by blocking of the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner does not contain independent or cogent reasons to believe/accept by placing reliance upon reports of enforcement authority which is impermissible in law, since the same is on borrowed satisfaction as held by the Division Bench, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. It is also pertinent note that in the impugned order the respondent No.3 except stating that the petitioner has availed the credit of input tax fraudulently by receiving the tax invoices without physical receipt of goods, no other reasons are forthcoming. On this ground also, the impugned order dated 14.10.2024 passed by the respondent No.3 deserves to be quashed. Conclusion - The Court quashed the impugned order due to the lack of a pre-decisional hearing, reliance on borrowed satisfaction, and failure to meet procedural requirements under Rule 86A. The concerned respondents are directed to unblock the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner immediately upon the receipt of copy of this order, so as to enable the petitioner to file returns forthwith - petition allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 888
  Condonation of delay in filing the appeal - providing opportunity to the petitioner to present his case - principle of natural justice - HELD THAT:- Upon hearing, it is seen that according to the petitioner, the petitioner was not aware of the show cause notice issued through the GST Portal and the physical copy of the said show cause notice was not furnished to them. Therefore, they were not aware about the issuance of show cause notice and the impugned order and therefore, the delay of nearly 210 days has occurred. Thus, this Court is of the view that the reason assigned by the petitioner for the delay in filing the appeal against the assessment order, appears to be genuine. For filing the appeal, the writ petitioner had already paid 10% of statutory pre-deposit. Since there occurred a huge delay, this Court is inclined to direct the petitioner to pay 15% in addition to the 10% pre-deposit for condonation of delay. The delay of nearly 210 in filing the appeal against the impugned assessment order dated 22.04.2024 is hereby condoned - The Appellate Authority is directed to take the appeal on record without insisting upon the limitation aspect, subject to the payment of 15% of the disputed tax demand in addition to 10% statutory pre-deposit, i.e totally 25% of the disputed tax amount in respect of the impugned assessment. Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 887
  Seeking to quash and set aside the impugned SCN - seeking declaration that the Respondents are not entitled to charge Goods and Service Tax on the transaction entered into by the petitioner of relinquishment/assignment of the long-term leasehold rights under the provisions of the Goods and Service Tax, 2017 - HELD THAT:- Deed of Assignment is nothing but a sale/transfer of the leasehold rights in favour of the assignee by the petitioner -original lessee /assignor for valuable consideration. In the case of Gujarat Chamber of Commerce [ 2025 (1) TMI 516 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] , this Court had categorically held that assignment by sale and transfer of leasehold rights of the plot of land allotted by GIDC to the lessee in favour of third party-assignee for a consideration shall be assignment/sale/ transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property by the lessee-assignor in favour of third party-assignee who would become lessee of GIDC in place of original allottee-lessee. In such circumstances, provisions of section 7 (1) (a) of the GST Act providing for scope of supply read with clause 5 (b) of Schedule II and Clause 5 of Schedule III would not be applicable to such transaction of assignment of leasehold rights of land and building and same would not be subject to levy of GST as provided under section 9 of the GST Act. Conclusion - The assignment of leasehold rights constitutes a transfer of immovable property benefits, not a supply under the CGST Act, thereby exempting it from GST. The petition succeeds and the SCN issued by the respondent No. 2 being ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction, is hereby quashed and set aside.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 886
  Time barred proceedings or not - whether the orders issued were beyond the statutory time limits prescribed by the Act? - HELD THAT:- In this case, proceedings under Section 73 of the U.P. GST Act, 2017 were initiated on 20.09.2023 by issuance of a show cause notice and final order has been passed on 15.12.2023 whereas in view of the decision in M/s A.V. Pharma vs. State of U.P. Ors. [ 2024 (11) TMI 911 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] , such an order could have been passed only till 31.12.2023 even after extension of the time limit. The facts aforesaid being undisputed in the sense that they are mentioned in the impugned order and the records itself, apparently, the proceedings culminating in the impugned order are time barred, therefore, there are no reason to call for a counter affidavit. The impugned orders and proceedings quashed - petition allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 885
  Challenge to notices for assessment, for the period 2017-2021 - main contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner can be subjected the assessment either by the State Authorities or by the Central Government Authorities and there cannot be simultaneous assessment of tax by both sets of authorities - HELD THAT:- This Writ Petition is dismissed as infructuous.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 884
  Challenge to assessment order - HELD THAT:- In view of the order passed by this Court in a batch of writ petitions in MR. SAHULHAMEED VERSUS THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, TUTICORIN-II, THIRUNELVELI, TAMILNADU [ 2025 (1) TMI 1021 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] wherein it has been held that the assessee is entitled to service of notice in the modes described under clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Section 169(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and since the said order applies to the present case, the impugned order dated 28.08.2024 for the assessment year 2019-2020 and the consequential proceedings dated 28.08.2024 are set aside. The petitioner shall submit its reply to the show cause notice within a period of two weeks from today. Thereafter, the respondent shall provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as envisaged, and pass orders on merits and in accordance with law. In view of this order, the bank attachment, if any, made shall also stand raised. Petition allowed.

  ---

• Income Tax

• 2025 (3) TMI 883
  Reopening of assessment - initiation of reassessment action in the second round - reason to believe - whether the undertaking by the petitioner constituted a corporate guarantee or a mere obligation, ? The subject-matter of challenge before the High Court [ 2025 (3) TMI 813 - DELHI HIGH COURT] was the notice for re-assessment for the assessment years 2008-2009. Short question that fell for the consideration of the High Court while deciding the petition was whether the undertaking furnished by the petitioner herein would amount to a corporate guarantee or a mere obligation and which could be viewed as an international transaction. This issue is kept open for assessee to be canvassed before the assessing officer in accordance with law. No reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. All other contentions available to the petitioner are also kept open to be canvassed before the AO.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 882
  Validity of Revision u/s 263 - notice u/s 148 referred to non-declaration of the account in ING Vysya Bank with a credit and with regard to the claim of deduction u/s 10AA HELD THAT:- It is accepted that a reassessment order under Section 148 r/w Section 143(3) of the 1961 Act was passed. Addition was not made for the first reason. In the given facts, the assertion by the Revenue that inquiry and verification in re the bank account was not made is ex-facie incorrect. This being the position, this is not a case of failure to investigate, but as no addition was made, the Revenue can argue that it is a case of wrong conclusion and decision in the reassessment proceedings. Therefore, to exercise jurisdiction u/s 263 the Commissioner of Income Tax should have examined the merits and only on reaching a finding that the re-assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue made an addition. This is not a case of no inquiry and verification , but as made out by the Revenue, a case of wrong conclusion. The difference between the two situations is clear and has different consequences. This being the position, the High Court [ 2023 (9) TMI 1343 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] was right in dismissing the appeal preferred by the Revenue.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 881
  Unexplained cash credits u/s. 68 - assessee had failed to furnish satisfactory explanation with regard to the identity of the parties and the sources and genuineness of the transaction - misconduct by CA - additions at 0.37% on the gross deposits as against 0.15% offered by the appellant - Tribunal reduced the rate of 0.37% to 0.15% by merely following its own order for earlier assessment years - statement of the Director of assessee on which heavy reliance is placed by assessee HELD THAT:- The Tribunal has not given any reasons as to if the respondent-assessee does not explain the beneficiary s identity, then why the whole amount should not be added under Section 68, but only 0.15% of the said deposit. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal has adopted a very casual approach to such a serious matter of rampant tax evasion by merely saying issue is covered. In our view, in such cases Tribunal should not go by the concession of the counsel before them but it was their duty to examine the issue in proper perspective since Tribunal is a final fact finding authority under the Act. We say so because of the admission made by the respondent-assessee in the statement of its director recorded under Section 131 of the Act on which heavy reliance is placed by the counsel for the respondent-assessee was not even considered by the Tribunal. Reliance on statement of director of assessee - Explanation cannot be accepted more so from the respondent-assessee company who is claiming to have been engaged in the business of providing accommodation entries where crores of rupees are deposited and withdrawn. If the respondent-assessee does not have the details of the beneficiaries, then we fail to understand how the money were deposited in the bank accounts of the respondent-assessee and withdrawn from such bank accounts without respondent assessee knowing the details of these beneficiaries. The only person who can operate these bank account would be the respondent-assessee, who, at least at the time of withdrawing, would know to whom the amount withdrawn is given. In the absence of any details of such beneficiaries, we cannot accept the submissions of the respondent-assessee that even if the credits are not explained or details are not given, still such credits cannot be added in the hands of the respondent-assessee. Misconduct by Chartered Accountant - Before we conclude, we will be failing in our duty as a Court of law if we do not comment on the accommodation entry provider, Mr. Mukesh Choksi through his web of shell companies and various admissions made by the counsel for the respondent-assessee. It is also important to note that Mr Mukesh Choksi, director of the respondent-assessee in his answer to question No.14 of the statement has admitted that he was a practicing Chartered Accountant but has surrendered the Certificate of Practice (COP) in 1993 and thereafter is only engaged in the business of providing accommodation entries. He has also stated that search action has been taken against him/his companies more than once. We are rather surprised that a Chartered Accountant who may not be holding a COP but, if involved in illegal activities, as to whether any action is or can be taken by the Institute of the Chartered Accountants of India against such a person. Suppose no action is taken against such a person. In that case, we hereby direct the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India to inquire whether such a person is liable for any professional misconduct as per the Chartered Accountant s Act, 1949. Shri Choksi, in this statement, has also admitted that he has abetted in evasion of tax by various beneficiaries. He has also admitted that he cannot give details of the beneficiaries. Mr. Choksi has also admitted that by engaging in accommodation entry, he has engaged in the laundering of money. Therefore, in our view, the authorities under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 should also investigate Shri Choksi on these activities. This is a case where the low deterrent effect of the law has worked on a professional talent to become a habitual economic and financial offender, and this should be stopped in the larger interest of our country. Adoption of rate of commission - In our view, what rate should be adopted as commission would be a pure question of fact and therefore, insofar as the rate of commission with respect to those credits which are identified by the respondent-assessee is concerned same should be taken at 0.15%. To conclude, we answer question (a) in favour of the appellant-revenue and against the respondent-assessee. Insofar as question (b) is concerned, we answer the same against the appellant-revenue and in favour of the respondent-assessee. Consequently, we reverse the Tribunal s order and restore CIT (A) s order subject to retaining the rate of commission at 0.15 % as adopted by the Tribunal.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 880
  Validity of assessment order being invalid and bad-in-law as it was passed beyond the period of limitation as provided u/s 153 - HELD THAT:- According to the learned advocate since limitation is a question of jurisdiction, the petitioner is entitled to invoke the powers vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without approaching the statutory authorities. As have considered such submissions on the issue relating to limitation and is of the view that the question of limitation involves mixed question of facts and law. As such, summarily considering the same only on affidavits may not be appropriate in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case. See Charminar Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd.[ 2003 (8) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT] and TOPLINE SHOES LIMITED [ 2022 (7) TMI 1584 - SUPREME COURT] DIN being absent in the assessment order which has rendered the order bad-in-law - To that effect a series of judgments have been placed by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, however the issue is too technical and the judgment delivered in Tata Medical Center Trust [ 2023 (9) TMI 1324 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT ] has been interfered by the Hon ble Supreme Court and there has been stay of the order wherein the proceedings were quashed by the High Court because of absence of DIN. Needless to state that in Tata Medical Center Trust[ 2023 (9) TMI 1324 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT ] the order was passed by the appellate authority and the Hon ble High Court exercised its power under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India vested in the High Court. As alternative and efficacious remedy is available whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Needless to say that very recently in Bank of Baroda v/s Farooq Ali Khan [ 2025 (2) TMI 1021 - SUPREME COURT ] it has been observed that the statutory Tribunals are constituted to adjudicate and determine certain questions of law and fact, the High Court should not substitute themselves as the decision-making authority while exercising their powers of judicial review. Having considered that the petitioner has directly approached the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and called upon this Court to adjudicate issues relating to facts and the application of law on the said set of facts, it is of the opinion that the present writ petition is not maintainable as an alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 879
  Validity of Assessment Order as barred by limitation - HELD THAT:- Question of limitation involves mixed question of facts and law. As such, summarily considering the same only on affidavits may not be appropriate in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case.See Charminar Cooperative Urban Bank Ltd.[ 2003 (8) TMI 551 - SUPREME COURT] and TOPLINE SHOES LIMITED [ 2022 (7) TMI 1584 - SUPREME COURT] DIN being absent in the assessment order which has rendered the order bad-in-law - To that effect a series of judgments have been placed by the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner, however the issue is too technical and the judgment delivered in Tata Medical Center Trust [ 2023 (9) TMI 1324 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] has been interfered by the Hon ble Supreme Court and there has been stay of the order wherein the proceedings were quashed by the High Court because of absence of DIN. Needless to state that in Tata Medical Center Trust [ 2023 (9) TMI 1324 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT] the order was passed by the appellate authority and the Hon ble High Court exercised its power under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act and not under Article 226 of the Constitution of India vested in the High Court. As alternative and efficacious remedy is available whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - Needless to say that very recently in Bank of Baroda v/s Farooq Ali Khan [ 2025 (2) TMI 1021 - SUPREME COURT] it has been observed that the statutory Tribunals are constituted to adjudicate and determine certain questions of law and fact, the High Court should not substitute themselves as the decision-making authority while exercising their powers of judicial review. Having considered that the petitioner has directly approached the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and called upon this Court to adjudicate issues relating to facts and the application of law on the said set of facts, it is of the opinion that the present writ petition is not maintainable as an alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 878
  Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - illegal activity attracting rigor of explanation (1) u/s 37 (1) - HELD THAT:- Appellate authority had examined Form H-1 submitted to Indian Bureau of Mines in regard to production of iron ore to find that very same figure had been reported by the assessee in its audit report in Form 3CD. The Tribunal thus concurrently found. There is no perversity in the concurrent finding of fact. No question of law, let alone a substantial question can arise from such concurrent finding on fact. It appears, the AO relied on report of Justice M.B. Shah Commission, which said, leases operated under deemed extension without statutory clearance under EIA notification dated 27th January, 1994 and amendments therein for environmental clearance is considered as illegal. Action should be initiated to recover value equivalent to market value. The assessee when show caused, came up with its explanation that Central Empowered Committee (CEC). We have not been able to find there arises a substantial question of law on the concurrent finding of fact. So far as disallowing the expenditure in terms of explanation (1) under section 37 (1) is concerned, the Tribunal said that the assessee had not claimed any expenditure on account of penalty imposed and paid. Reliance by the assessee was on report filed by the CEC pursuant to Justice M.B. Shah Commission. It was on page 29 in the report containing opinion that, inter alia, mining operations without clearance does not constitute illegal mining. Revenue will be able to apply explanation (1) under section 37 (1) if, in future, the activity is declared to be illegal, penalty imposed and claimed by assessee as an expenditure in its relevant return. Presently, there is nothing to show the activity stood declared as illegal for the explanation to be invoked. No substantial question of law arises from impugned order of the Tribunal. Decided against revenue.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 877
  Validity of reassessment proceedings against dissolved partnership firm - HELD THAT:- AO has issued the impugned notice u/s 148A (b) in the name of partnership firm as well as passed the order u/s 148A (d) in the name of the said firm which has already been dissolved with effect from 01.04.2017. In view of such undisputed fact about the dissolution of the partnership firm and issuance of the notice for reassessment in name of dissolved firm, the impugned notice and order would not be tenable more particularly, when the petitioner in the reply to the show cause notice issued u/s 148A (b) has provided all the information including dissolution deed before the respondent AO. In view of the settled legal position as held in case of Maruti Suzuki Limited [ 2019 (7) TMI 1449 - SUPREME COURT ] the impugned notice and the order are required to be quashed and set aside. Decided in favour of assessee.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 876
  Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - reason to suspect OR reason to believe - Whether the ITAT was not wrong in applying the principles enunciated by the SC in a criminal case where the discharge of burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, to the principle of reason to believe as provided in section 148 of the Act? HELD THAT:- It is trite that the concept of proving beyond reasonable doubt applies strictu senso to penal provisions/statutes. It is also trite that in taxing statutes, in particular, section 148 of the Act, the reason to believe , must be based on objective materials, and on a reasonable view. The Hon ble Supreme Court in ITO v. Lakhmani Mewal Das [ 1976 (3) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT ] has upheld the aforesaid principle. The aforesaid principle has been followed in M.R. Shah Logistics [ 2022 (4) TMI 46 - SUPREME COURT ] stating that the basis for a valid reopening of assessment should be availability of tangible material, which can lead the AO to scrutinise the returns for the previous assessment year in question, to determine, whether a notice under section 147 is called for. Predicated on the aforesaid judgments it can be safely inferred that the concept of burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not to be applied in cases such as the present one. We are not persuaded to consider the same. This is for the reason that the learned ITAT misdirected itself in predicating its entire reasoning on an incorrect and inapplicable principle of law, which are confined to purely penal provisions, which is not the case here. Thus, on this error alone the impugned judgement is found to be unsustainable in law. Once the edifice of differentiating reason to suspect and reason to believe itself is on incorrect application of the principle as explained above, the consequential appreciation on merits too would suffer the same fate. Ergo, we have no hesitation in quashing and setting aside the impugned judgement passed by the learned ITAT, and we do so. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 875
  Validity of transfer order u/s 127 - as argued order impugned was issued without assigning any reasons for transferring the assessment from the Income Tax Officer, Theni, to the Deputy Commissioner of the Income Tax, Central Circle, Kochi - HELD THAT:- There are no sufficient grounds to interfere with the impugned order. The petitioner has not demonstrated any compelling reason for the Court to set aside the transfer of the case, particularly in the light of the search conducted u/s 132/132A of the Act and as per the relevant CBDT guidelines, which necessitated the transfer to Central Circle 2, Kochi, for the purpose of the coordinated investigation. This Court is of the opinion that the impugned order does not warrant interference.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 874
  Denial of exemption u/s 11 - delay in filing Form No.10B - HELD THAT:- The reason assigned by the petitioner citing Covid-19 Pandemic would come under genuine hardship. However, the 1st respondent had failed to consider the same and passed order rejecting the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing the audit report. As far as the Assessment Year 2022-2023 is concerned, the audit report in Form No.10B is filed within the time on 30.09.2022 and the same was e-verified on 19.11.2022 and since there was an inadvertent error in the audit report, the revised audit report was filed on 19.11.2022, which shows that the delay is not intentional and the same would be the case under genuine hardship. It is obligatory to permit the assessee s to avail the benefits of exemption prescribed under the provision of law. Refusing to condone the delay could result into a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold defeating the cause of justice. Therefore, this Court is of the view that it would be appropriate to condone the delay in filing the audit report for the Assessment Years 2020-2021 and 2022-2023.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 873
  Exemption/approval u/s 10(23C) (vi) - determining if the trust existed solely for educational purposes and not for profit - petitioner submits that the trust was entitled for exemption u/s 10 (23C)(vi) with respect to the income of the educational institution and as per the plain reading of the said Section the income received was required to be exempted only if it was solely for the purpose of education. HELD THAT:- Having noticed the law, the aims and objects of the petitioner-trust, we find that the findings arrived at by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax in its impugned order do not warrant any interference. The exemption was claimed by the trust itself and not by an individual educational institute namely, GHG academy. Thus, it cannot be conclusively said that the trust was found and existed solely for advancing education purposes, hence, it was rightly not granted exemption. Accordingly, the present writ petition is hereby dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 872
  Reopening of assessment - assessee deposited huge cash into the bank account - assessee s bank account was used for depositing substantial cash amounts, purportedly belonging to another individual - HELD THAT:- Cash was deposited in the assessee s bank account in ICICI bank account which belonged to Shri Devesh Upadhyaya, who opened the bank account in assessee s name by using his PAN and operated the same for providing accommodation entries. Mr. Devesh Upadhyaya, deposited cash in the said bank account and the same was given to various parties as accommodation entries. We have also examined the statement recoded u/s 131 of the Act by the ld. AO of the said person and while answering to question no.11 to 18, Shri Devesh Upadhyaya admitted that the cash deposited in the assessee s bank account belonged to him and he used the bank account for giving accommodation entries. We even note that in his (Shri Devesh Upadhyaya) assessment framed u/s 143(3), his income was assessed by the ld. AO at the rate of 0.10% of the total cash deposits in the order dated 16.03.2016, passed u/s 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act. Thus, we are of the view that the addition is partly confirmed by CIT (A) in the hands of the assessee is uncalled for and unwarranted and cannot be sustained as this income has been assessed in the hands of Shri Devesh Upadhyaya. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 871
  Rectification u/s 154 - director s remuneration paid in cash - HELD THAT:- We find that the AO has initiated the proceedings u/s 154 by passing an order by making disallowance in respect of director s remuneration paid in cash, which is not an apparent mistake in the records and cannot be rectified by resorting to the provisions of Section 154 of the Act. In our opinion, the said issue is debatable issue and cannot be rectified u/s 154 of the Act. We note that the correct appreciation of this issue involves the interpretation of provision of the Act and therefore, the jurisdiction exercise u/s 154 of the Act is bad in law. The case of the assessee find force from the decision of Hero Cycles (P). Ltd[ 1997 (8) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] held that rectification u/s 154 of the Act can only be made when glaring mistake of fact or law has been committed by the officer passing the order and it becomes apparent from the record. Rectification is not possible if the question is debatable. Moreover, the point which is not examined on fact or in law cannot be dealt with as mistake apparent on the record. We are set aside the order of the CIT (A) and direct the ld. AO to delete the addition. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 870
  Validity of the assessment proceedings on delayed issuance of notice u/s 143(2) - notice u/s 143(2) was issued after the time line as mentioned in the first proviso to section 143(2) - HELD THAT:- The notice u/s 143(2) has to mandatorily issued with the period of three months from the end of financial year in which the return was filed but it was issued late. Therefore in our considered view the same is barred by limitation. The mere participation of the assessee in the proceedings before AO would not cure the defect or the provisions of section 292BB would not come to the rescue of the revenue. Even the decision relied by the CIT(A) is in favour of the assessee. As in the decision CIT Vs Laxman Das Khandelwal [ 2019 (8) TMI 660 - SUPREME COURT] has categorical observation that section 292BB cures the infirmities in the issuance of notice u/s 143(2) and not the absence of notice. Hon ble Apex Court in Hotel Blue Moon [ 2010 (2) TMI 1 - SUPREME COURT] held that issuance of notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory for scrutiny assessment even if the assessments are after search u/s 132(1) of the Act Accordingly we set aside the order of CIT(A) on this issue by holding that the notice issued u/s 143(2) is barred by limitation and therefore the consequent assessment framed is also invalid and is quashed. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 869
  Unexplained share capital/ share premium u/s 68 - identity and creditworthiness of the investors and genuineness of the transactions could not be established - HELD THAT:- AO has not commented on the evidences furnished by the assessee and also has not pointing out any defect or deficiency and simply made the addition by treating the share capital/ share premium as unexplained expenditure u/s 68 on the ground that there was no compliance to the summons u/s 131, as neither the directors of the assessee company nor the directors of the share subscribers company appeared before the AO and therefore, the identity, creditworthiness of the investors and genuineness of the transactions could not be examined. CIT (A) after discussing the credentials of each of the investors affirmed the order of AO. We note from the analysis and discussion made by CIT(A) about the subscribing companies of the appellate order that these company have sufficient available source of funds in their respective hands and even filed the proof of identity, creditworthiness before the AO as well as before the CIT(A). CIT (A) has relied on the decision of Govindarajulu Mudaliar [ 1958 (9) TMI 3 - SUPREME COURT] , Durga Prasad More [ 1971 (8) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT] , NRA Iron Steel (P.) Ltd. [ 2019 (3) TMI 323 - SUPREME COURT] . In our opinion these decisions are distinguishable on facts. We find that the assessee has filed all the evidences before the authorities below and mere non-compliance to the summons u/s 131 cannot be ground for making an addition. We are inclined to set aside the order of CIT(A) by directing the AO to delete the addition. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 868
  TDS u/s 195 - liability to deduct tax on interest payment made to RBS Coutts Bank Ltd., Singapore - HELD THAT:- We note that the Assessing Officer referred to the order of this Tribunal in assessee s own case as rightly pointed out by the DR. On perusal of the impugned order, we note that there was no reference to stay of operation of the order of the Tribunal by Hon ble High Court in this regard. Before us, no order as such contrary to the view taken by the ITAT, Chennai Benches in assessee s own case for the AY 2008- 09 was brought on record. In the absence of any contrary view, having no option except to follow the ITAT order in assessee s own case, we are of the opinion that the CIT(A) is justified in holding that the assessee is liable to deduct tax on interest payment made to RBS Coutts Bank Ltd., Singapore. Decided against assessee.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 867
  Income accrued in India or not - Treating fabrication charges received as fees for technical services - DTAA between India and Singapore - AO charged tax @ 10% on fees for technology services - HELD THAT:- We find that the claim of fabrication charges is the recurring issue in the case of the assessee in the A.Y. 2015-16 to 2020-21 and the ITAT in all these years has decided the issue in favour of the assessee. During the course of appellate proceedings before us, assessee has submitted the copies of orders of ITAT as discussed above wherein it is held that receipt towards fabrication of bushings cannot be treated as fees for technical services under Article 12(4)(a) of India-Singapore DTAA as no royalty as per Article 12(3) of India-Singapore DTAA was received by the assessee - Decided in favour of assessee.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 866
  Validity of final assessment order u/s 143(3) without issuing the draft assessment order as is required u/s 144C - HELD THAT:- As per provisions of section 144C(1) it is clear that the AO should mandatorily issue the draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order in the case of the eligible assessee i.e. foreign company. From the perusal of fact, we notice that the AO has passed the final assessment order without passing any draft assessment order and the fact is not disputed by the Revenue. As already stated in assessee s case, the revenue has not disputed the fact that the assessee falls within the definition of eligible assessee as per the provisions of section 144C(15)(ii) and therefore the AO ought to have passed the draft assessment order before passing the final assessment order. Failure of passing of a Draft Order under Sec 144C (1) is not a curable defect since this a violation of a statutory right of the assessee to raise grievance that can be addressed before a final assessment order is passed and appellate proceedings invoked. Thus final assessment order passed by the AO is liable to be quashed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 865
  Business income v/s FTS - Treating the reimbursement of GIS Charges - Asessee is a foreign company based in United Kingdom and has two AEs in India - assessee contended that it purchases various types of software products like Civil-3D, Navisworks, Microsoft office products etc. from third party venders for the usage of group companies globally - primary contention of the assessee is that such receipts represent mere reimbursements and do not qualify as taxable income HELD THAT:- The mere subletting of software licenses does not involve any transfer of technical knowledge, experience, or skill from the assessee to the Indian AEs. The assessee has not provided any additional services such as training, customization, or technical support to Indian entities. Consequently, the receipts do not fall within the ambit of FTS. Even assuming that the assessee has sublet the software licenses and earned a markup, such activity does not involve any managerial, technical, or consultancy services. The procurement and allocation of software licenses do not require specialized expertise or skill but are mere administrative functions. AO s reliance on the make available clause is misplaced, as no technical knowledge or know-how has been imparted to the Indian entities. Deduction of TDS by the Indian AEs at DTAA rates does not automatically classify the payments as FTS. TDS deduction is a procedural compliance, and the underlying nature of the transaction must be examined to determine taxability. In the present case, there is no element of technical or managerial service in the reimbursement of software license costs. We also note that the payments in question were for software licenses procured for group use, and even if a markup was applied, the nature of the receipts remains that of a business transaction rather than FTS. The assessee has not provided any specialized services beyond cost allocation. Therefore, the taxation of such receipts should be examined under business income principles rather than FTS. The Hon ble Supreme Court ruling in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. [ 2021 (3) TMI 138 - SUPREME COURT ] clarifies that payments for software licenses should not be treated as royalty. Similarly, we find that the reimbursement of software license costs does not constitute FTS, as no technical services were rendered. AO and DRP have erred in mischaracterizing these receipts as FTS without sufficient basis. Characterization of a transaction must be based on its substance rather than its label. In this case, the absence of technical involvement by the assessee in providing the software licenses demonstrates that the payments are in the nature of cost reimbursements or business transactions and not technical services. Hence the AO s conclusions are based on assumptions rather than verifiable evidence. GIS Charges received by the assessee do not qualify as Fees for Technical Services under the India-UK DTAA. The subletting of software licenses does not involve the transfer of technical knowledge, expertise, or skill, and therefore, the payments cannot be taxed as FTS. Furthermore, the reliance placed by the AO and DRP on the make available clause is unfounded, as no technical knowledge was transferred. Accordingly, the addition made by the AO and upheld by the DRP is deleted. Hence the ground of appeal of the assessee is hereby allowed. Levying higher fees u/s 234F - DR did not raise any objection if the issue is set aside to the file of the AO to levy the fees under section 234F in accordance to the provisions of law. We are inclined to set aside the issue to the file of the AO to levy the fee under the provisions of section 234F as applicable for the year under dispute. Hence, the ground of appeal of the assessee is hereby allowed for statistical purposes.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 864
  Denial of exemption u/s 10(23C)(via) - delay in filing of Form 10B - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that the assessee has uploaded Form 10B on 30.08.2022. Form 10B was also approved belatedly approved by the assessee on 28.09.2022. As in Indore Contract Bridge Association [ 2023 (5) TMI 313 - ITAT INDORE] following the order of Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Iron Steel Market Committee [ 2015 (4) TMI 512 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] held that the delay in filing the Form 10B is merely a procedural defect which can be rectified. Further, we also note that Form 10B has been approved by the assessee before the intimation u/s 143(1). We therefore direct the AO / CPC to allow the deduction claimed by the assessee. Thus, the ground raised by the assessee on this issue are allowed. While filing Form 10 for availing of Registration under section 10(23C) of the Act, assessee has wrongly selected the code of Clause (via) whereas in Sl. No. 5 stated Education as objective of the applicant - It appears to us that there was an inadvertently clerical error made by the assessee while filing the application. The applicant is running an educational institution and was granted approval from 2003 onwards. This clerical error could not be rectified by the applicant in spite of the efforts taken by the assessee before the concerned authorities. We are therefore inclined to direct the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax to grant one more opportunity to the assessee to rectify the clerical error while applying for renewal of Registration under section 10(23C) of the Act. Thus, the grounds are allowed for statistical purposes.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 863
  Rejection of application u/s 12AB(1)(b) - rejection of the application for approval u/s 80G - CIT(E) has cancelled the provisional registration of the assessee for the reason that the assessee trust had failed to give proper justification for regularization of provisional registration. HELD THAT:- It may be noted that assessee submitted that the assessee trust has applied for registration under RPT Act, 1959 before the competent authority and the assessee trust is likely to get the same. Therefore, we restore the matter back to the file of the ld. CIT(E) with the direction that as and when the assessee trust produces the copy of the Registration under RPT Act, 1959 then the application of the assessee trust for registration u/s 12AA of the Act be decided afresh in accordance with law. Assessee trust is also directed to produce the complete Form 10AB and produce the documents relating to the genuineness of the activities before the CIT(E) Since we have restored the appeals of the assessee with regard to the registration u/s 12AA to the file of the ld. CIT(E) for afresh adjudication, therefore, the outcome of appeals of the assessee u/s 80G of the Act are consequential in nature.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 862
  Denial of deduction u/s 80P - appellant being the registered co-operative society engaged in the activity of providing credit facilities exclusively to its members-farmers, duly eligible for deduction u/s 80P(2)(a)(i) and 80P(2)(d) - Whether the procedural errors related to the PAN (Permanent Account Number) issuance and subsequent filing of returns affected the eligibility for deductions under Section 80P? HELD THAT:- Assessee cooperative society has obtained new PAN No. and furnished balance sheet, P L account with audit report. The assessee also requested to allow to file return of income as cooperative society under their new PAN. AO as well as the CIT(A) instead of taking any corrective step, proceeded for assessment and added entire receipt as income without allowing deduction u/s 80P. Therefore, by following the decision of Wanka Vividh Karyakari Seva Sahkari Mandali Ltd. [ 2023 (10) TMI 1378 - ITAT SURAT] we allow the appeal of assessee.

  ---

• Customs

• 2025 (3) TMI 861
  Compensation of respondent for the seized betel nuts that were destroyed while in their custody - illegal importation of betel nuts - onus of proof - HELD THAT:- First of all, there is clear admission by the appellant that as on the date of seizure the value of the goods was 88 lakhs. From the date of seizure up to the date of dumping of the goods in the pit about one and a half years had elapsed. These goods were in the custody of the Customs. They had an obligation to explain how the goods were or became unfit for human consumption. If the goods at the time of seizure were unfit for human consumption, they could not have been valued at 88 lakhs at that point of time. Therefore, this condition was reached in the custody of the Customs. Whether such deterioration was natural or due to some action or inaction on the part of the Customs had to be explained by the Customs authorities. The onus of proof was upon them. They have not been able to discharge it. Even if the reports of the expert agencies like food analyst and the specialised laboratory made between December, 2017 and March, 2018 suggested that the goods were unfit for human consumption, still the respondent ought to have been given a chance to be present when the test was carried out or to be provided with a copy of the report to seek second opinion or to take some steps with regard to it. Conclusion - i) The Customs authorities are liable for the deterioration of goods in their custody if they fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the condition of the goods. ii) Valuation of goods at the time of seizure is binding unless there is evidence of a grave error or miscarriage of justice. iii) Authorities have a duty to inform the owners of goods before taking irreversible actions such as destruction, especially when the ownership and legality of the goods are contested. The Customs authorities were directed to comply with the order to pay the respondent within four weeks - Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 860
  Liability of Customs Duty - import of Fibre-optic Cables to be laid not only within the territorial waters of India but also in the Exclusive Economic Zone - HELD THAT:- The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (for short the Territorial Waters Act ) gives power to the Central Government to extend the enactments of India to the Continental Shelf, EEZ and other Maritime Zones by issuing Notifications in that regard as more particularly set out in Section 6 and Section 7 of the said Act. It is exercising powers under this Act that two Notifications have been issued by the Central Government. The first Notification is dated 14th January 1987 issued under Clause (a) of sub-Section (6) of Section 6 and Clause (a) of sub Section (7) of Section 7 [of the Territorial Waters Act] extending the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 to the designated areas in the Continental Shelf and the EEZ of India, with effect from 15th January 1987. Since there is no dispute in the present case that the Fibre-optic Cables imported by the Petitioner are not for the purposes as mentioned in the Notification dated 7th February 2002, we find that a strong prima facie case is made by the Petitioner and which really goes to the root of the matter, namely, whether the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, at all apply to the Continental Shelf and to the EEZ with reference to the goods imported by the Petitioner. Since the 3rd Respondent has issued a show cause notice to the Petitioner demanding an additional amount of duty on the goods imported and since the issue considered whether the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, at all apply to the goods imported by the Petitioner, as and by way of interim relief, it is directed that pending the final decision in the above Writ Petition, the adjudication of the SCN dated 2nd December 2024 shall remain stayed. Conclusion - A strong prima facie case is made by the Petitioner and which really goes to the root of the matter, namely, whether the Customs Act, 1962 and the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, at all apply to the Continental Shelf and to the EEZ with reference to the goods imported by the Petitioner. Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 859
  Correctness in attempting to negate the permission under Section 65 of the Customs Act, after having permitted not only the establishment of the warehouse but also the import of the equipment - HELD THAT:- It is apparent that the applicability of Section 65 of the Act and the prohibition contained under the MOOWR Regulations has been the subject matter of the decision. Hence, prima facie the contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Department does not appeal here. It is appropriate to stay the operation of the impugned proceedings dated 24.06.2024 produced as Annexure-P1, subject to the condition that this interim order shall remain in operation till any orders that may be passed by the Hon ble Apex Court in the pending SLP (C) No. 20274-20281 of 2024 preferred by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs. There shall be a direction to the State Bank of India, Jubilee Hills Branch, Hyderabad, to deduct a sum equivalent to 15% of the payment received under the PPAs dated 02.02.2022 and 07.07.2022 and retain the said sum in a fixed deposit until further orders from this Court. Conclusion - The petitioner was entitled to interim relief, allowing the installation and operation of the equipment for power generation and supply for home consumption. It imposed conditions to secure the Department s interests, such as retaining a portion of payments received under power purchase agreements in a fixed deposit. Petition allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 858
  Refund claim is hit by limitation of time and is therefore liable to rejection or not - principles of unjust enrichment - applicant has proved beyond doubt that the incidence of CVD has not been passed on to the buyers or not. HELD THAT:- It is transpired from various decision that when a Certificate of a Chartered Accountant is submitted by an assessee to substantiate that the assessee would not be unjustly enriched, then it is for Revenue to establish by evidence that either the Certificate issued by the Chartered Accountant is incorrect or that the duty was actually passed on to the buyers. The decisions also hold that there is no requirement in law that the Certificate should be issued only by statutory auditors, for so long as the Certificate is issued by a Chartered Accountant and it is consistent with the accounts such as the Financial Statement, the Certificate issued by a Chartered Accountant should be accepted. The decisions also hold that when the differential customs duty is shown as receivables in the Balance Sheet/Financial Statement, it would follow that duty has not been passed on to the customers. The decisions also hold that in such a case the legal presumption under section 28 of the Customs Act stands rebutted. A Certificate issued by a Chartered Accountant, therefore, cannot be lightly brushed aside without there being any cogent evidence to the contrary. In the present case the Commissioner (Appeals) only doubted that the amount of Rs. 1,67,88,778/- was not included in the amount of Rs. 17,38,94,156/- shown in the Books of Account of the appellant. This doubt could have been clarified from the appellant but that was not done. The decision of the Tribunal in Kohinoor India [ 2014 (11) TMI 192 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] , on which reliance has been placed by the learned authorized representative appearing for the department, holds that mere production of a Certificate of the Chartered Accountant does not ipso facto grant refund to the respondent until material is produced by the assessee to show that burden of duty has not been passed on to the buyers. This decision would, therefore, not help the department. Conclusion - The appellant had not passed the burden of duty to the customers in respect of the duty paid on the 4 Bills of Entry and was shown as recoverable from the customs department. The impugned order dated 05.07.2021, to the extent it holds that refund amount should be credited in the Consumer Welfare Fund, therefore, deserves to be set aside and is set aside. The appellant would be entitled to refund of the amount with interest. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 857
  Sale proceeds of gold smuggled into India - Seizure of Currency - Confiscation under Section 121 of the Customs Act, 1962 - penalties imposed on the individuals - HELD THAT:- The learned Commissioner in the impugned order though acknowledged at para 34 of the order that the investigation has not been able to produce evidences regarding smuggling of gold or linking the seized currency directly to smuggled gold; however making a generalized remark held that smuggling of goods including the gold is primarily an offence that takes place at the border / frontier and it is almost impossible to distinguish or identify smuggled goods from licitly imported ones, once they move into the domestic tariff area. Further he observed that the currency must have been the sale proceeds of smuggled gold. The said finding of the learned Commissioner is devoid of merit inasmuch as no evidence has been placed on record by the Revenue in discharging the onus which squarely rests on the department to establish that there has been smuggling of gold into the country and the recovered/seized currency of Rs.1.29 crores from the possession of these four passengers were sale proceeds of the smuggled gold. Needless to mention that burden lies heavily on the Revenue to establish that the currency seized was the sale proceeds of the smuggled gold. Similar view has been expressed by the Tribunal in the cases of Wall Street Finance Ltd. Vs. CC [ 2006 (9) TMI 437 - CESTAT, MUMBAI] and CC (Preventive), Mumbai Vs. Sadashiv R. Lele [ 2005 (5) TMI 176 - CESTAT, MUMBAI] . The case records reveal that the Revenue even could not able to trace or bring on record the statements of the person who handed over the currency to these four persons at Chennai, as mentioned in the notice. The statements furnished by the four persons on 05.09.2013 were retracted on the next day i.e. on 06.09.2013. Therefore, in the said circumstances, it is necessary to establish through the corroborative and independent evidence about the smuggling of the gold and the currency seized from the four persons is the sale proceeds of the smuggled gold. The loose slips recovered from the four persons indicating the quantity of gold and the rate itself do not reveal that the seized currency has got any connection with proceeds of the smuggled gold. No doubt, it leads to some doubt/suspicion in the circumstances when recovery of huge cash concealed by the said four persons was made, but that itself is not sufficient. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the conclusion of the learned Commissioner following principle of preponderance of probability, that the currency seized form these four persons are sale proceeds of the smuggled gold and liable for confiscation under Section 121 of Custom Act, 1962. Since the currency seized from the four persons could not be proved to be the sale proceeds of the smuggled gold, the same are required to be released to the owner i.e. Shri K.V. Kunhimohammed. Consequently, penalty imposed on all the appellants cannot be sustained. The impugned order is set aside and the appeals are allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 856
  Refund of Additional Duty of Customs - Requirement of Re-assessment before refund - principles of Unjust enrichment. Requirement of Re-assessment before refund - HELD THAT:- The self-assessment done by Micromax while filing Bills of Entry would also amount to assessment. Micromax imported mobile phone handsets of CTH 8517, self assessed the Bills of Entry on payment of Additional Duty of Customs @ 6%/ 10%/ 12.5%. Thereafter, they sought to claim the benefit of S. No. 263A of Notification No.12/2012 dated 17.03.2012 read with amendments and S. No. 132 of Notification no. 01/2011 CE dated 01.03.2011 as amended, which would amount to re-assessment. Re-assessment is done under Sec 17 of Customs Act, 1962, and without re-assessment of the said Bills of Entry, the said benefit under Notification cannot be availed. The Refund Application is filled with the proper officer for refund i.e. Assistant Commissioner (Refund), who can only process the refund claim. The ITC judgement [ 2019 (9) TMI 802 - SUPREME COURT (LB) ] clearly says that It will virtually amount to an order of assessment or re-assessment in case the Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Customs while dealing with refund application is permitted to adjudicate upon the entire issue which cannot be done in the ken of the refund provisions under Section 27 . As per Law of Comity, only the proper officer who has done the assessment or verification of Assessment (in case of self-assessed Bills of Entry) can only do the re-assessment. Micromax should have first opted for re assessment of the Bills of Entries, and only then they should have filed refund application. Having missed the prescribed time lines, it is held that Micromax is not eligible for the refund of Rs18.38 Cr Rs 35.89 Cr as claimed by them. The Hon ble Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. Versus Union of India [ 1996 (12) TMI 50 - SUPREME COURT] ] has held that While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 - and of this Court under Article 32 - cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11B. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. Hon ble Supreme Court has time and again held in Priya Blue Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner [ 2004 (9) TMI 105 - SUPREME COURT ] and Collector v. Flock (India) Pvt. Ltd. [ 2000 (8) TMI 88 - SUPREME COURT ] that re-assessment of Bill of Entry is mandatory before filing refund. The Revenue was permitted to implead these additional ground on the basis of Supreme court decision in the case of ITC, which was permitted vide Misc Order 50175-176/2023 dated 03.07.2023. Therefore, it is not the case that Micromax was not aware that re-assessment of Bill of Entry was mandatory before filing the refund claims. The said benefit was not availed by the appellant at the time of filing of Bills of Entry under the belief that they do not fulfill the condition as the goods were imported and not manufactured in India and filed the self-assessed Bills of Entry claiming 6% ad valorem. This is evident from the fact that they had not paid duty under protest. However, without seeking re-assessment or filing an appeal, mere filing of refund claim cannot be entertained, as laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in ITC judgment. Principles of unjust enrichment - HELD THAT:- The concept of unjust enrichment, is the retention of a benefit, which is considered contrary to justice or equity. Further, the assessment of Mobile phone was based on MRP and the goods are sold in the market accordingly, on the basis of declared MRP which include duty components. Once the goods are assessed on declared MRP having duty component, the incidence of duty is deemed to have been passed on to the buyer on sale of the same. Thus the incidence of Additional Duty of Customs @ 6% had already been passed and thus, attracting the clause of unjust enrichment. The application was for amendment under Section 149 of Customs Act, 1962 and not for re-assessment under Section 17. We are of the view that under Section 149, only amendment of factual details of Bs/E can be done but not the assessment or re-assessment which includes extending the benefit of Notification, which is a quasi-judicial function. As per Section 17(5), re-assessment is possible for extending benefit of Notification but, the time limit for such re-assessment is 60 days from the date of Out of Charge - Section 149 is for amendment of details on the basis of document evidence which was in existence at the time the goods were cleared. In the instant case, it was extending of benefit of S. No. 263A of Notification No. 12/2012 dated 17.03.2012 read with amendments and S. No. 132 of N/N. 01/2011 CE dated 01.03.2011 as amended. The fact that importers are eligible for such benefit of Notification has come to light only after Hon ble Supreme Court judgment in the matter of SRF Ltd. [ 2015 (4) TMI 561 - SUPREME COURT ] which was delivered on 26.03.2015. This fact was not available at the time of filing/ OOC of Bs/E in June-July 2014. Conclusion - i) There is a necessity of reassessment before processing refund claims. ii) The doctrine of unjust enrichment applies, barring refunds when the duty incidence is passed on to consumers. Appeal of Revenue dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 855
  Classification of imported goods - whether, the Works Rolls imported by the appellant can be treated as Capital Goods as is being claimed by the appellant or the same is to be treated as spare parts of the Capital goods, as is being claimed by the Revenue? - eligibility to utilize on 10% of the scrip amount to discharge the Customs Duty and the balance 90% is required to be paid by way of cash [TR 6 / GAR7 Challan] - Time Limitation - HELD THAT:- From the picture produced, it can be seen that the Works Rolls are attached to the machinery and are being used, in the factory of the appellant without the Works Rolls. There is no possibility for the Rolling Machine to become functional. It can be seen the under the main heading Metal-Rolling Mills and Rolls therefor, the Rolls for rolling mills are specifically classified under CTH 8455 30 00. The Other parts are classifiable under CTH 8455 90 00, which goes on to show that the Other parts ,whether in respect of Metal-Rolling Mills or in respect of Rolls for the Metal Rolls would get classified therein. Thus it is clear that Rolls for rolling mills are independent goods are in the nature of Capital Goods and are not in the nature of Spare Parts . In the present litigation, it is not the case of the Revenue that the imported goods are classifiable under CTH 8455 90 00. The appellant has adopted CTH 8455 30 00 in their Bills of Entry [sample verified by the Bench] and the Revenue has cleared the same. Even in the present proceedings, the classification is not disputed by the Revenue. An identical issue was before this Bench in the case of Comm. of Customs (Port), Kolkata vs. M/s. Cosmic Ferro Alloys Limited, [ 2024 (8) TMI 674 - CESTAT KOLKATA] . In that case, the goods in question were Roller Sets , Blades for Slitting Machines , Spacers Spares for Cold Rolling Mills and the issue was whether the import of such goods would be be covered by the definition of Capital Goods under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14.09.2009. This Bench has held that the goods imported are squarely fitting within the definition of Capital Goods as defined in the FTP (2009-14) and Notification104/2009-Customs dated 14-09-2009, as amended. We observe that the definition of Capital Goods is wide enough to cover the imported spares/parts of capital goods . In the present case, after going the factual matrix, it is found that the above decision of this Bench is squarely applicable. As a matter of fact, the present appellants are in a better footing. While in that case, the issue was as to whether the spare parts can be considered as Capital Goods for the eligibility to use the SHIS scrip, in the present case, it is already held the goods in question are Capital Goods and are not mere spare parts . Hence, there are no hesitation in applying the decision of this Bench to hold that the impugned order is not legally sustainable. Accordingly, the same set aside and allow the appeal allowed on merits. Time Limitation - HELD THAT:- The Tribunals have held that the importer would be eligible to use the SHIS scrip. Thus the bonafide belief of the appellant gets fortified by the Tribunal s decisions. Hence, the issue being that of interpretation, the Revenue is not justified in fastening the suppression clause on the appellant. Accordingly, the confirmed demand in respect of the extended period set aside even on account of limitation. Conclusion - i) The Works Rolls are by themselves Capital Goods and not Spare Parts. Hence, they are eligible to be imported against full utilization of SHIS Scrip. Therefore, on this count the Appeal succeeds on merits. ii) The Dept. is precluded from taken different stand in respect of EPCG License and SHIS Scrip, when the FTP has a common definition of Capital Goods. Hence, when the goods have been treated as Capital Goods under EPCG License, the same cannot be treated as spare parts to deny the SHIS scrip benefit. Hence, even on this count the appeal succeeds on merits. iii) The issue is that of interpretation and has consistently been settled by the Tribunals in favour of the importer. Hence, the confirmed demand for the extended period is hit by time bar. Therefore, such demand is being set aside on account of time bar also. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• Securities / SEBI

• 2025 (3) TMI 854
  Service of the order upon the counsel of the appellant - Tribunal had refused to condone the delay of 188 days in filing the appeal for the reason that the impugned order i.e. the order passed by the learned Adjudicating Authority had been duly served upon the appellant through his counsel, on his email - whether the service upon the counsel can be said to be a valid service in the eyes of law or not? HELD THAT:- Assuming for a moment that the present writ is maintainable, this Court is fully cognizant of the limited scope of appreciation in a writ of present nature. While entertaining any such writ, this Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court and can evaluate the correctness of the abovesaid order. The aspect related to condonation of delay has direct correlation with existence of sufficiency of cause. The Tribunal has refused to condone the delay and exercise of such discretionary power does not indicate any illegality or perversity either. Supervisory court, in such a situation, need not interfere where there is mere exercise of discretionary power, without there being any perversity. Nothing to indicate or suggest violation of principles of natural justice or non-compliance of statutory requirements in any manner. The reliance upon statutory provisions of CPC, in the present context, seems completely misplaced. SEBI relies upon Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited Case [ 2020 (5) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT ] and argues that High Court ought not entertain a challenge under Article 226 when the aggrieved person can avail an effective alternate remedy in the manner prescribed by law. Undeniably, remedy of appeal is creature of statute. Ideally, the petitioner should have filed an appeal under Section 15Z of SEBI Act, 1992, particularly, when even as per him, a question of law is, evidently, involved. This Court has already noted above the limited scope of appreciation it possesses, while considering any such petition filed under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the irresistible conclusion is that the present petition lacks any substance or merit.

  ---

• Insolvency & Bankruptcy

• 2025 (3) TMI 853
  Challenge to forensic report prepared by the Respondent No. 2-BDO India LLP, a Chartered Accountant s Firm - petitioner was not aware of any such final Forensic Audit Report (FAR) nor was a copy provided to him - principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is deemed fair and proper to permit the Respondent No.1-Bank of India to withdraw the show-cause notice based on the FAR dated 9th August 2023 with liberty to initiate fresh proceedings against the Petitioner. The Respondent No.1-Bank of India is at liberty to issue fresh show-cause notice to the Petitioner and the Petitioner is at liberty to raise all objections and contentions including an objection to the partiality of the FAR dated 15th September 2023 in his reply to the show-cause notice. Conclusion - The show-cause notice dated 17th August 2023 is quashed and set aside and stands withdrawn by the Respondent No.1-Bank of India. All consequential proceedings/action pursuant to the show-cause notice taken by the Bank also stand withdrawn and cancelled. The same shall be communicated by the Bank to the Petitioner within 72 hours from the date of uploading of this order. Petition disposed off.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 852
  Seeking a declaration that the Plaintiff is the exclusive first charge holder / mortgagee in respect of two properties - Seeking declaration that the Deeds of Simple Mortgage are void and illegal to the extent of the mortgage created by Defendant Nos. 2 and 3. HELD THAT:- Firstly, it is not in dispute that the Plaintiff s Mortgage is prior in point of time to the Impugned Mortgages. Also, a plain reading of clause 13(d) of the Plaintiff s Mortgage and clause 10(B) of Schedule I of the Plaintiff s Mortgage make it abundantly clear that the Mortgagor i.e. Defendant Nos. 2 3 would not be entitled to not create any mortgages, charges and encumbrances over the Mortgaged Properties i.e. the Suit Properties or any part thereof except with specific written approval/permission (NOC) from Mortgagee i.e. the Plaintiff. Thus for any subsequent valid mortgage to have come into existence, the grant of an NOC by the Plaintiff was a mandatory prerequisite - the Impugned Mortgages have been created in the teeth of the Plaintiff s Mortgage and thus, the judgement of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Bikram Chatterjee [ 2019 (7) TMI 1233 - SUPREME COURT ] would squarely apply. Reliance placed upon by Defendant Nos.1 and 5 on Section 48 of TPA would therefore be of no assistance, since the application of Section 48 of TPA presupposes that the subsequent transfer is valid. However, in present case the Impugned Mortgages are ex-facie in violation of Plaintiff s Mortgage and are hence prima facie voidable at the instance of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff having established that the Impugned Mortgages have been created contrary to the terms of the Plaintiff s Mortgage as also given the assertion of Defendant Nos.1 and 5 that the Suit properties are free from any prior charge, is entirely justified in apprehending that Defendant No.1 and/or Defendant No.5 would misuse and/or make use of the Impugned Mortgages to defeat the exclusive rights of the Plaintiff in any proceedings adopted under the IBC or under the of SARFAESI Act. Hence, the Plaintiff has made out a case under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act demonstrating the serious injury that is likely to be caused to the Plaintiff if interim reliefs are not granted. It is found that in the facts of the present case, the judgement of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Deccan Paper Mills Company Limited [ 2020 (8) TMI 533 - SUPREME COURT ] would squarely apply. There was no denial by Defendant Nos. 1 and 5 save and except to state that these rights would be lost by virtue of the law. However, it would not be open to Defendant Nos. 1 and 5 to urge this, since the Impugned Mortgages has been created contrary to the Plaintiff s Mortgage and are thus invalid in the eyes of law. Hence, to permit Defendant No. 1 and/or Defendant No.5 to assert any right under the Impugned Mortgages which would in any manner impinge upon the Plaintiff s exclusive first charge would be akin to putting a premium on dishonesty. Conclusion - i) A mortgage created in violation of the terms of a prior mortgage is voidable at the instance of the prior mortgagee. ii) The Court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of the Impugned Mortgages. Interim application allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 851
  Consideration of resolution plan submitted by respondent, by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) - applicability and interpretation of Regulation 36B(6) and Regulation 39(1B) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 - HELD THAT:- Sub-Regulation 6 provides the RP with the approval of the committee extend the timeline for submission of the plan, which pre-suppose that the CoC has to agree for extension of timeline. The present is a case where timeline was extended from 05.02.2024 to 14.02.2024, and all PRAs were informed that 14.02.2024 is the last date for last extension. In the present case, after plan was sent by Respondent No. 1, the RP placed the resolution plan of the receipt from the appellant before the CoC in its meeting dated 16.02.2024. There is one more relevant fact which need to be noticed subsequent to the decision of the CoC on 16.02.2024 and 17.02.2024, CoC decided to conduct a challenge process on 23.04.2024, which was completed on 29.04.2024, in which the appellant was declared as H 1 bidder. The Respondent No. 1 had not been invited to participate in the challenge process nor he could have been invited, it was already decided for not to accept the plan. Application filed by Respondent No. 1 was allowed subsequent to completion of challenge process on 29.04.2024, in which the appellant has declared as H 1 bidder. There was no sufficient ground on basis of which the Adjudicating Authority could have allowed the application filed by Respondent No. 1 and issued direction to the CoC. Conclusion - The CoC did not commit an error in considering the late receipt plan of Respondent No. 1 and deciding not to consider the plan which was in accordance with the statutory regulation. The Adjudicating Authority could not have interfered with the decision of the CoC, which was taken in the commercial wisdom, after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances. Sufficient ground has been made out to allow the appeal. Appeal is allowed.

  ---

• PMLA

• 2025 (3) TMI 850
  Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - scheduled offences - primary allegation was that the appellant was involved in financial transactions related to proceeds of crime, generated through fraudulent activities causing significant financial losses to the State of Gujarat - HELD THAT:- A significant ground raised by the appellant pertains to the nature of the alleged offence under the PMLA. The appellant has contended that the alleged acts do not constitute an offence under the PMLA as the same was not in force during the relevant period, or the predicate offences as alleged were not included in the schedule to the PMLA at the relevant time and, therefore, cannot be subject to proceedings under the PMLA. It has also been argued that these instances do not constitute continuing offences. This contention, however, is untenable. It is well established that offences under the PMLA are of a continuing nature, and the act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as the proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. The legislative intent behind the PMLA is to combat the menace of money laundering, which by its very nature involves transactions spanning over time. The concept of a continuing offence under PMLA has been well-settled by judicial precedents. An offence is deemed continuing when the illicit act or its consequences persist over time, thereby extending the liability of the offender. Section 3 of the PMLA defines the offence of money laundering to include direct or indirect attempts to indulge in, knowingly assist, or knowingly be a party to, or actually be involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime. Such involvement, if prolonged, constitutes a continuing offence. The law recognizes that money laundering is not a static event but an ongoing activity, as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy - The material on record indicates the continued and repeated misuse of power and position by the appellant, resulting in the generation and utilization of proceeds of crime over an extended period. The respondent has successfully demonstrated prima facie that the appellant remained involved in financial transactions linked to proceeds of crime beyond the initial point of commission. The utilization of such proceeds, the alleged layering and integration, and the efforts to project such funds as untainted all constitute elements of a continuing offence under the PMLA. Thus, the proceedings initiated against the appellant are well within the legal framework and cannot be assailed on this ground. Furthermore, it is settled law that the determination of the amount involved in a money laundering offence is not to be viewed in isolation but in the context of the overall financial trail and associated transactions - The appellant has failed to substantiate his claim with any material that contradicts the respondent s submissions in this regard. Therefore, this ground also does not aid the appellant in any manner. The illegal diversion and layering of funds have a cascading effect, leading to revenue losses for the state and depriving legitimate sectors of investment and financial resources. It is settled law that in cases involving serious economic offences, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution, and proceedings should not be quashed in the absence of compelling legal grounds. The respondent has rightly argued that in cases involving allegations of such magnitude, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and to ensure accountability - Given the severe and grave nature of the allegations against the appellant, it is imperative that he must undergo thorough judicial scrutiny during trial. A proper trial is necessary to unearth the full extent of the offence, to evaluate the evidence produced by the appellant, to analyze the complete chain of final transactions, and find out the veracity of the severe allegations and the amount of proceeds of crime. The legal framework under the PMLA serves as a crucial mechanism to ensure that individuals involved in laundering proceeds of crime are brought to justice and that economic offences do not go unpunished. Conclusion - It is evident that the appellant has failed to establish any legally sustainable ground warranting interference by this Court at a pre-trial stage. The submissions made in support of the appeal are neither legally untenable nor in the best interest of justice. The offence alleged against the appellant is clearly a continuing offence under the PMLA, and the quantum of proceeds of crime involved far exceeds the statutory threshold and requires proper investigation and judicial scrutiny. The findings of the Courts below are wellreasoned and do not call for interference. Appeal dismissed.

  ---

• Service Tax

• 2025 (3) TMI 849
  Reimbursement of service tax component in terms of tender documents followed by contract in the light of subsequent amendment of law relating to Service Tax Regime w.e.f. 1.7.2012 - arbitration clause barring the invocation of writ jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes concerning the reimbursement of the service tax component. Arbitration clause barring invocation of writ jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- The arbitration clause is hit by the Apex Court decision in CENTRAL ORGANISATION FOR RAILWAY ELECTRIFICATION vs. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) [ 2024 (11) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT (LB) ]. Therefore, the subject arbitration clause is liable to be ignored for all practice purposes. Secondly, the question is not as to the liability to pay the service tax in respect of services in question; it is essentially as to who should pay this in the light of change of legal regime of taxation post conclusion of contracts - there being no repudiation of liability for discharging the service tax, it cannot be argued that there is an arbitrable dispute merely because a question as to who should pay, eventually arises. An arbitration clause of the kind even otherwise does not constitute a China Wall against exercising writ jurisdiction. In appropriate cases, Writ Court can grant relief when the answering respondent happens to be Article 12-Entity - It is not that the Writ Courts should invariably deny relief merely because the other side disputes the fact matrix, provided that the disputed facts can be ascertained from the pleadings record. Liability of Railways to Reimburse Service Tax - HELD THAT:- On the principle of reimbursement as such, there is no dispute at all. The dispute is the extent of reimbursement in the sense that what is payable by way of service tax because of paradigm shift in the Legal Regime, with effect from 1.7.2012 i.e. post-contract period. Interpretation of Tender/Contract Clauses - HELD THAT:- Section 83 of Finance Act, 1994 read with Sections 12A 12B of Central Excise Act, 1944 raises a presumption that the incidence of duty can be passed on to the buyer unless contrary is proved and therefore, being an indirect tax, has to be borne by the service recipient vide Satya Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pearey Lal Bhawan Association [ 2015 (10) TMI 2667 - DELHI HIGH COURT ] and Meattles Pvt. Ltd. Vs. HDFC Bank Ltd. [ 2012 (10) TMI 685 - DELHI HIGH COURT ] - When the contracts in question were entered into in the year 2011, both the parties had not contemplated change of legal regime with effect from 1.7.2012 from Positive List to Negative List eventually giving rise to new tax liability. It is not just change of rates of tax, but, very taxability. Analogous Application of Section 64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 - HELD THAT:- Section 64A as such cannot be invoked because the case does not relate to tax on goods; however that does not mean that the wisdom of its underlying principle cannot be made use of by analogy - The recipient of services like the buyer of goods has to bear the new levy of service tax occasioned by State action namely the amendment to Finance Act, 1994 w.e.f. 01.07.2012, which obviously is post conclusion of contracts in question. Any other answer or view would strike at reason, at law and at logic. Conclusion - i) The arbitration clause did not preclude the exercise of writ jurisdiction in this case, given the nature of the dispute and the status of the respondent as an Article 12-Entity. ii) The Railways are liable to reimburse the service tax component to the appellant, with interest, due to the change in the legal regime post-contract. iii) New tax liabilities arising from state action should be borne by the service recipient, drawing an analogy to Section 64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. iv) A Writ of Mandamus issues directing the respondent-South Western Railway to reimburse to the appellant all that amount which it has paid by way of service tax, with 9% interest p.a. from the date the amount became payable, within eight weeks. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside - appeal allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 848
  Process amounting to manufacture - activity of chilling of milk would fall under services as defined under Section 65B(44) or would fall under the negative list as per Section 66D(d)(iii) as claimed by the appellant? - HELD THAT:- Clause (d) of section 66D provides for services relating to agriculture or agricultural produce . The appellant is therefore required to satisfy that the activity of chilling of milk falls within the category of agriculture or agriculture produce , which has not been substantiated with reference to the provisions of the Finance Act. In terms of the definition of agriculture and agricultural produce , chilling of milk is not covered. The conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions clearly shows that the activities enshrined in the negative list are only related to agricultural activities and cannot embrace within it the activity of chilling milk. The term animal husbandry as per the meaning ascribed to it in the Cambridge Dictionary is, farming of animal to produce foods such as meat, eggs and milk. The term animal husbandry being of wider import would include chilling of milk and therefore, the Gujarat High Court has rightly held the activity of chilling of milk to be exempted. However, there is no such provision in the Finance Act either in the negative list under section 66D(d)(iii) or under the definition of agriculture and agricultural produce . Conclusion - The activity of chilling of milk during the post negative period amounts to rendering services as defined in section 65B (44) and is therefore, leviable to service tax. There are no error in the impugned order and hence the same is affirmed. The appeal is, accordingly dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 847
  Classification of services - Cargo Handling Services or Goods Transport Agency Service? - HELD THAT:- It appears that loading, unloading and packing or unpacking of cargo including freight special container. The main emphasis is on the cargo and not transportation . The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant also lays stress on the main activity to classify the service under CHS or under GTA, however if the loading or unloading in the truck is a part and parcel of the Transportation of Goods Services it is an incidental/ancillary activity and the same is classifiable under GTA. In the case Dalveer Singh (supra), the Tribunal was concerned with the issue whether the activity undertaken by the appellant, i.e. transportation of material from railway station to the warehouse is covered under CHS or not. Relying on the Board s Circular dated 01.08.2002 clarifying that mere transportation of goods is excluded from the purview of CHS, allowed the appeal in favour of the assessee. In the case of Hira Industries Ltd. [ 2012 (4) TMI 430 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI] , the learned Members observed that when there is composite service which has elements fitting into the definition of both the services, recourse should be taken to Section 65A(2)(v) providing the test of most specific description to be adopted. In light thereof, it was held that transportation is not for the purpose of loading and unloading but the contrary is true i.e. loading and unloading is for transportation and therefore any person dealing with the situation perceives the services as one for transport and not for loading and unloading. Later in the case of Bhadoria Transport Co. [ 2014 (3) TMI 304 - CESTAT KOLKATA] , the Tribunal considered the Board s Circular dated 06.08.2008 clarifying that transportation is not the essential character of CHS but only incidental to the CHS and in that even the services shall be treated as GTA services and not CHS. Conclusion - The main activity which the appellant performed was of transportation of goods which is classifiable under the GTA as defined under Section 65B(26) and the activity of loading and unloading the goods is only ancillary. The impugned order is therefore set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 846
  Eligibility of benefit of N/N. 41/2016 dated 22.09.2016 - whether the respondent is eligible for claiming the benefit of N/N. 41/2016 dated 22.09.2016. Government of Kerala had entered into an agreement dated 23.02.2011 with Smart City (Kochi) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. to lease-out two pieces of land for consideration of Rs.104 Crores? - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that the lease deed was executed for entering into a Special Purpose Vehicle under Smart City (Kochi) Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and it is also an accepted fact that the said area is declared as SEZ. The fact being so, the service tax demand for the above said lease deed considering it as not covered under the Notification No.41/2016 dated 22.9.2016 is unsustainable. It was also brought to the notice of the appellant that the levy of tax was not in force at the time of entering in to lease agreements as the old lease agreements were entered on November 17, 2007 and July 29, 2008 and the total lease premium was paid by SCIPL at that time but due to certain technical reasons these two lease deeds were cancelled on February 23, 2011 and the lease premium received for the old lease agreements were adjusted in the new lease agreements and that at the time of the old lease agreement, there was no levy of service tax on renting of vacant land. It was also stated that as service tax was payable only on receipt of payment, the payment that was received at the time of the two old lease agreements could not be taxed at the time of entering of the two new lease agreements. Conclusion - The lease agreement falls within the exemption provided by Notification No.41/2016. The impugned order is upheld and the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 845
  Liability of service tax - construction services rendered under various work orders, which involved supply of materials as well as labour by appellant - HELD THAT:- The construction works undertaken was in the nature of Works Contract Service , since it involves both supply of material as well as labour. Also, it is found that the appellant are registered with Kerala VAT Act, 2003 for discharging VAT on works contract service annexed to appeal paper book. The Works Contract Service became taxable w.e.f. 01.06.2007 as held by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Larsen Toubro Ltd. [ 2015 (8) TMI 749 - SUPREME COURT] and in the said case, it has been held that prior to 01.06.2007, works contract service cannot be subjected to service tax levy by vivisecting the composite service contract, which includes both goods and service. Conclusion - The works contract services involving both goods and services cannot be taxed by dissecting the composite contract prior to June 1, 2007. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 844
  100% Software EOU - CENVAT Credit of the accumulated crredit - Management of Business Consultancy Service - Management, Maintenance and Repair Service - Information Technology Software Service (ITSS) (June 2008 onwards) - Management Consultancy Service (June 2008 onwards) - reverse charge mechanism in terms of Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 in respect of the services received from M/s. Texas Instruments Inc., USA - Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- Undisputed facts are that the appellant is a 100% EOU registered under the STPI scheme and during the relevant period, pursuant to the agreement entered into with the overseas companies viz. M/s. Texas Instruments Inc., USA and M/s. Texas Instruments, Singapore, they have exported software services and rendered services to the overseas companies. Since there was no clearance to the domestic market and entire services were exported, the appellant had filed cash refund claims of accumulated cenvat credit of Rs.14,06,03,251/- on quarterly basis during the period April 2007 to May 2008. Under Rule 5 of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 Initially the said refund claims were rejected on the ground that the output services provided by them became taxable only w.e.f. 16.05.2008; hence the cenvat credit availed itself is inadmissible. The matter has reached this Tribunal and this Tribunal following the ratio laid down in the case of mPortal India Wireless Solutions [ 2011 (9) TMI 450 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ], remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority for de novo consideration. In the de novo proceeding, the adjudicating authority allowed the cash refund claims for the period April 2007 to May 2008. Conclusion - The rejection of refund claims on the basis of non-taxability of output services is unsustainable when subsequent legal and administrative actions have sanctioned such claims. The impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed with consequential relief, if any, as per law.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 843
  Rejection of refund claim on the ground of being time barred - refund being filed beyond a period of one year from the date of payment of service tax - appellant has not filed any ST-3 returns nor even with the impugned claim - principles of unjust enrichment. Principles of unjust enrichment - HELD THAT:- It becomes clear that the amount in question does not relates to service tax liability of the appellant but got collected erroneously as representing service tax. Such amount should be refunded even without application of the provisions relating to unjust enrichment. Support drawn from the decision of the principal bench of this tribunal in the case of Hexacom Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur [ 2003 (6) TMI 2 - CESTAT, NEW DELHI ]. It is also observed that the amount in question since was deposited on 31.03.2009 towards the sale of SIM cards of financial year 2008-09, the tax was paid after the said activity of sale hence the issue of unjust enrichment of appellant does not otherwise arise. Rejection of refund claim on the ground of being time barred - HELD THAT:- Section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944 read with section 83 of Finance Act, 1994 makes it abundantly clear that if the refund claim is filed pursuant to a judgement / order, the period of one year to file refund claim shall start from the date of said judgement / order. As already observed above that the Order-in-Original dated 22-07.2021 has dropped the service tax demand holding no service tax liability of the appellant, the refund claim filed on 24.09.2021 is therefore well within one year of the period of limitation as prescribed under section 11B of Central Excise Act, 1944, explanation B(ec), read with section 84 of Finance Act 1994. In the light of this discussion, it is held that the adjudicating authority below has erred in ignoring the earlier order passed by the department in favor of the present appellant. Lack of evidence as a ground of rejection of present refund claim - HELD THAT:- The authorities below have opined that due to non-availability of ST-3 returns, it cannot be confirmed that the amount as deposited by the appellant was meant for providing the services for which the demand was dropped vide order dated 22.07.2021. However, it has been settled that the activity of sale of SIM cards does not invite any service tax liability on the amount of commission / incentive received for rendering such activity. The question of any service tax liability and filing of ST-3 returns become redundant. The appellant apparently was not registered earlier with the service tax department. It was only when department asked the appellant to get registration and to deposit service tax that the appellant took registration at the end of financial year 2008-09 and deposited the proposed amount for the said financial year. The impugned show cause notice proposed the demand for the period including 2008-09 to financial year 2011-12. Hence, this ground of rejection of impunged refund claimed is factually incorrect. Conclusion - i) The refund claim is not time-barred as it is filed within one year of the Order-in-Original that nullified the service tax demand. ii) The appellant is not unjustly enriched, and the refund should be granted. iii) The lack of ST-3 returns does not invalidate the refund claim, as the service tax demand for the relevant period was already dropped. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 842
  Levy of Service Tax on the appellant share in the Central Rights Income, CLT20 Participation Fees and prize money received from BCCI-IPL in organizing the IPL tournament under Business Support Services (BSS) - Levy of Service Tax on Support Services of Business provided by overseas cricket professionals under reverse change mechanism for wearing apparel, taking part in endorsements and other activities under Business Support Services (BSS) - Levy of Service Tax on player release fees paid to Cricket Australia under reverse charge mechanism under manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services - Levy of Service Tax on player transfer fee received from other franchisees under Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services - time limitation Levy of Service Tax on the appellant share in the Central Rights Income, CLT20 Participation Fees and prize money received from BCCI-IPL in organizing the IPL tournament under Business Support Services (BSS) - HELD THAT:- This Tribunal in the case of KNIGHT RIDERS SPORTS PVT. LTD. VERSUS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CENTRAL CIRCLE 4 (2) MUMBAI, CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (CENTRAL) 2 MUMBAI, THE UNION OF INDIA [ 2023 (6) TMI 1161 - CESTAT MUMBAI] held that In the present case, since the demand of Rs. 16,71,71,797/- in respect of Central Rights Income arising out of the franchise agreement cannot be considered as provision of any service between the members to the franchise agreement, we are of the view that such demand cannot be confirmed on the assessee-appellants. - The demand for service tax on this income was set aside. Levy of Service Tax on Support Services of Business provided by overseas cricket professionals under reverse change mechanism for wearing apparel, taking part in endorsements and other activities under Business Support Services (BSS) - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal in Kinight Rider Sports Private Limited [ 2023 (6) TMI 1161 - CESTAT MUMBAI] held the said issue has already been dealt with by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Tribunal, in the case of Sourav Ganguly v. Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata (Now Commissioner of Central Goods Service Tax Central Excise, Kolkata South), [ 2020 (12) TMI 534 - CESTAT KOLKATA] , wherein it was held that the view taken by the commissioner is not correct as the players had received the fees for the purpose of playing cricket only and even otherwise, it is a settled principle of law that if no machinery provision exists to exclude non-taxable service (playing cricket) from a composite contract, the same is not taxable since law must provide a measure or value of the rate to be applied and any vagueness in the legislative scheme makes the levy fatal. Thus, the Tribunal held in this case that the confirmation of demand could not be sustained. - the demand is set aside. Levy of Service Tax on player release fees paid to Cricket Australia under reverse charge mechanism under manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services - HELD THAT:- The core requirement that the service which is provided or to be provided, must be by a manpower recruitment or supply agency has been missed. Moreover, such a service has to be in relation to the supply of manpower. The appellant paid player release fees to CrKPH DREAM CRICKET PVT. LTD. VERSUS CCE ST, CHANDIGARH-I (VICE-VERSA) [ 2019 (5) TMI 1171 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] held that neither cricket board nor the appellant-assessee are engaged in providing Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Service of employees. Therefore, no service tax is payable by the appellant-assessee. - the demand is set aside. Levy of Service Tax on player transfer fee received from other franchisees under Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res-integra as the Tribunal in KPH Dream Cricket held that As the main activity of the appellant-assessee to play cricket, therefore, no service tax is payable by the appellant-assessee under the category of Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency service for transfer of player fee. Time limitation - HELD THAT:- A Perusal of the facts reveal that the appellant had disclosed all relevant facts and Department was well aware of the receipts, on which the appellant was not paying service tax and reasons for the same. Therefore, the averments and findings that department became aware because of audit or that the Appellant suppressed any facts is incorrect. Consequently, we hold that the demand is also barred by limitation. Conclusion - i) The income from Central Rights under a franchise agreement does not constitute Business Support Services. ii) Payments to players for promotional activities, when primarily engaged for playing cricket, are not taxable under Business Support Services. iii) Player release fees to cricket boards and player transfer fees are not taxable under Manpower Recruitment or Supply Agency Services. iv) The demand for service tax was barred by limitation due to the department s prior knowledge of the appellant s transactions. Appeal allowed.

  ---

• Central Excise

• 2025 (3) TMI 841
  Wrongful availment of CENVAT credit on ineligible capital goods taken during the period May 2013 to March 2014 - capital goods or not - MS Angles, MS Plates, MS Channels, MS Sheets, and HR Bars, which are used as components and spares for machinery - HELD THAT:- Rule 2 (a) (A) (iii) merely stipulates that capital goods means components, spares and accessories of the goods specified at (i) and (ii). It does not contain any stipulation as to the chapter headings to which such components, spares and accessories should pertain. Thus, the definition of capital goods squarely covers components, spares and accessories of the goods falling under chapter 82, 84, 85, 90, heading number 68.05 grinding wheels and the like, and parts thereof falling under heading 6804 of the First schedule to the Excise Tariff Act and pollution control equipment. It is evident that in the absence of any prescribed headings to which such components, spares and accessories should pertain, the claim of the appellant that the impugned goods are covered under the definition of capital goods merits acceptance. This tribunal finds that the adjudicating authority has erred in rendering a finding that the appellants had raised contradictory claims. The adjudicating authority has failed to appreciate that the appellants had only claimed that the components, spares and accessories of the goods specified at (i) (ii) of the definition of capital goods as given at Rule 2 (a) (A), are chapter agnostic and are thus covered under the definition. It was never a contradictory claim as found by the adjudicating authority and such a finding as upheld by the appellate authority, is wholly untenable. This Tribunal also finds that it is settled law that the scope of entry components, spares and accessories in the definition of capital goods is not restricted to the components, spares and accessories falling under Chapter 82, 84, 85 or 90 of CETA, 1985 alone but covers all spares, components and accessories of specified goods irrespective of their classification under any chapter and is thus not chapter specific. The reliance placed by the Appellant on the decision in CCE ST Vs. India Cements Ltd., [ 2014 (7) TMI 881 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and India Cements Vs CESTAT, Chennai [ 2015 (3) TMI 661 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] and Mangalam cement limited versus CC, Jaipur (1), [ 2018 (3) TMI 1547 - CESTAT NEW DELHI - LB] is apposite. The impugned order in appeal upholding the demand of the adjudicating authority and imposing penalty cannot sustain and is liable to be set aside. Conclusion - Irrespective of the classification of components, spares and accessories, when those are fitted to the machines/machineries of the above eligible Chapters, the same should also be considered as capital goods for availment of Cenvat credit of Central Excise duty paid thereon. The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.

  ---

• CST, VAT & Sales Tax

• 2025 (3) TMI 840
  Challenge to assessments made under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2007 - denial of exemption claimed by the petitioner to which a detailed reply was filed by petitioner, overruling which orders of assessment have come to be passed - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the GO clearly uses the term exercise notebooks and there can be no two views on the position that the notebooks manufactured by petitioners, used by students for the purposes of academic exercises, would satisfy that definition. In Maharaja Book Depot v State of Gujarat, [ 1978 (10) TMI 148 - SUPREME COURT] , the Supreme Court considered the interpretation of the term paper in juxtaposition with the term exercise book holding that an exercise book was nothing but a collection of sheets of paper stitched together by a piece of string or pinned together and a substance used for writing. It would therefore, clearly fall within ambit of the term paper . It does not, the Bench holds, lose the identity of paper merely because it is stitched together as a notebook. The notebooks manufactured by the Petitioner being only notebooks (ruled and unruled) used for the purposes of student exercises, are entitled to the exemption sought. In light of discussion as aforesaid, the findings and conclusions of the assessing officer in the impugned assessment orders to the effect that notebooks manufactured by petitioners do not satisfy the requirement of student exercise book is erroneous, as is the denial of exemption. Conclusion - The notebooks manufactured by the Petitioner being only notebooks (ruled and unruled) used for the purposes of student exercises, are entitled to the exemption sought. The impugned assessment orders are set aside and these writ petitions are allowed.

  ---

• Indian Laws

• 2025 (3) TMI 839
  Dishonour of Cheque - case of the appellant is that the corporate debtor is presently facing insolvency proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and a moratorium order was issued u/s 14 of the IBC - HELD THAT:- Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of NI Act makes it clear that cause of action arises only when demand notice is served and payment is not made pursuant to such demand notice within the stipulated fifteen-day period. This Court in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi [ 2009 (7) TMI 1143 - SUPREME COURT ] has explained the ingredients of Section 138 of NI Act offence has held that the cause of action arises only when the amount remains unpaid even after the expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the demand notice. The bare reading of the provision shows that the appellant did not have the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by the respondent by way of the notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 NI Act. When the notice was issued to the appellant, he was not in charge of the corporate debtor as he was suspended from his position as the director of the corporate debtor as soon as IRP was appointed on 25.07.2018. Therefore, the powers vested with the board of directors were to be exercised by the IRP in accordance with the provisions of IBC. All the bank accounts of the corporate debtor were operating under the instructions of the IRP, hence, it was not possible for the appellant to repay the amount in light of section 17 of the IBC. Conclusion - The High Court should have exercised its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the proceedings against the appellant, as the cause of action arose after the moratorium, and the appellant was not in charge of the corporate debtor s affairs. The impugned order dated 21.12.2021 and the summoning order dated 07.09.2018 set aside - appeal allowed.

  ---

• 2025 (3) TMI 838
  Dishonour of Cheque - post dated cheque as an advance payment or cheque was given as security for completing the work - absence of the partnership firm as a party to the proceedings affects the liability of the accused/respondent under Section 138 of the N.I. Act - HELD THAT:- In the present case though the respondent has taken a specific plea that the other partner of Kishan Construction namely Ganesh had handed over the cheque to the complainant but in the complaint neither Ganesh has been made an accused nor any specific role has been attributed against the present respondent Kishan Bouri. Accordingly it is apparent that the company who have committed offence under section 138 of N.I. Act, if any, has not been made a party and the respondent/partner only has been made as an accused. In Sarad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Raney [ 2015 (2) TMI 1117 - SUPREME COURT] the supreme Court has specifically held relying upon Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours (p) Ltd [ 2012 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] that, when a company has not been arraigned as a party, no proceeding can be initiated against it, even where vicarious liability is fastened under certain statute. In Aneeta Hada s Case [ 2012 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] the Court held that the words as well as the company appearing in the section make it absolutely un mistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. Needles to say that in terms of explanation to section 141, company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals and director in relation to a firm means a partner of a firm and as such the present case clearly attracts the rigour of section 141 of the N.I. Act. The question of remanding the case back to the trial court giving opportunity to the complainant to amend the complaint and to continue the proceeding after adding the partnership firm as an accused, also does not arise in the present context as the defect made in the complaint is an incurable defect, in view of the fact that no notice under section 138 of N.I. Act was served upon the partnership firm within the statutory period of 30 days. Conclusion - The requirement under Section 141 of the N.I. Act that a company or firm must be made a party to proceedings when an offense is committed by such an entity. The absence of the firm as a party is a fatal procedural defect. The absence of the firm as a party rendered the proceedings invalid. Application dismissed.

  ---