TMI Tax Updates - e-Newsletter
March 6, 2025

Case Laws in this Newsletter:

GST Income Tax Customs Corporate Laws Securities / SEBI Insolvency & Bankruptcy Service Tax Central Excise CST, VAT & Sales Tax Indian Laws

Articles

1. Step-by-using-Step Guide to Online Brand Registration in India

   By: Ishita Ramani

2. Activities to be Undertaken for GST Compliances of FY 2024-25 in March 2025

   By: Bimal jain

3. ORAL SHOW CAUSE NOTICE -VALID UNDER CUSTOMS ACT, 1962?

   By: DR.MARIAPPAN GOVINDARAJAN

4. Farmers as Exporters: Initiatives of Government of India to Double the Farmers' Income.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

5. Digital Initiatives for Augmentation of Exports Trade of India.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

6. LEGAL TERMINOLOGY IN GST LAW (PART 11)

   By: Dr. Sanjiv Agarwal

7. How to set up and manage an export business.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

8. Import of Genetically Modified (GM) Food, Feed, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), and Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) into India: Legal and Regulatory Framework.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

9. Destructive Insects and Pests Act, 1914, PFS Order, 1989, and Plant Quarantine (Regulation of Import into India) Order, 2003.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

10. History of Boiler Accidents in India.

   By: YAGAY andSUN

News

1. Meghalaya CM presents Rs 1,970 crore deficit budget in assembly

2. Veterans speaking out on Trump administration's plans to cut VA's budget

3. China hikes defence budget to USD 249 billion amid hectic military modernisation

4. China to increase defence spending by 7.2 per cent this year

5. Budget 2025-26 to be growth-oriented: Haryana CM Nayab Saini

6. Uttar Pradesh Assembly passes 2025-26 budget of over Rs 8 lakh cr

7. UP economic growth outpaces national average: CM Yogi

8. CCI approves the proposed acquisition of certain shareholding of Schott Poonawalla Private Limited by TPG Scion SG Pte. Ltd.

9. Commission approves acquisition of equity shares of PSP Projects Limited by Adani Infra (India) Limited

10. CCI approves the proposed acquisition of up to 72.8% shareholding of Orient Cement Limited by Ambuja Cements Limited

11. CCI approves the proposed acquisition of 100% equity share capital of Raj Petro Specialities Private Limited by Shell Deutschland GmbH and Shell Overseas Investments B.V.

12. Competition Commission of India (CCI) approves the acquisition by Alpha Wave Ventures II, LP of a 12.44% shareholding in Advanta Enterprises Limited

13. CCI approves the proposed combination involving acquisition of pharma solution segment and product lines of Nourish segment of International Flavors & Fragrances Inc.(IFF) by Roquette Frères S.A.(Roquette)

14. CCI approves proposed acquisition of 100% shareholding in KSK Mahanadi Power Company Limited by JSW Energy Limited

15. Shri Ajay Bhadoo Appointed as CEO of Government e Marketplace

16. Department Of Financial Services (DFS) Hosts a Post Budget Webinar On Theme "Regulatory, Investment, And Ease Of Doing Business (EODB) Reforms"

17. DRI busts major gold smuggling racket with seizure of 14.2 kg foreign-origin gold worth Rs. 12.56 crore and other assets worth Rs. 4.73 crore

18. China keeps its economic growth target at 'around 5%' for 2025

19. PM Sharif highlights challenges faced in securing economic stability, vows to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan

20. IBC moratorium does not shield individuals from penalties under consumer law: SC

Notifications

DGFT

1. 60/2024 - dated 5-3-2025 - FTP

Amendment in Import Policy and Policy Condition of Platinum covered under HS Code 7110 of Chapter 71 of ITC (HS) 2022, Schedule -I (Import Policy)

GST - States

2. 08/2025-State Tax - dated 12-2-2025 - Gujarat SGST

State Tax Notification for waiver of the late fee

3. 07/2025-State Tax - dated 12-2-2025 - Gujarat SGST

Gujarat Goods and Services Tax (Amendment) Rules, 2025

4. S.O. 17/P.A.5/2017/S.128/2025 - dated 24-2-2025 - Punjab SGST

State Tax Notification for waiver of the late fee

5. G.S.R. 4/P.A.5/2017/S.164/Amd.(73)/2025 - dated 24-2-2025 - Punjab SGST

Punjab Goods and Services Tax (First Amendment) Rules, 2025

6. G.O.Ms.No. 16 - dated 22-2-2025 - Telangana SGST

Appointing the Appellate Authorities

7. 1664 /XI-2-24-9(47)-17-T.C.-271- U.P.Act-1-2017-Order (334)-2024 - dated 8-1-2025 - Uttar Pradesh SGST

Notified relevant date specified in the table.

8. 1650 /XI-2-24-9(47)-17-T.C.-270- U.P.Act-1-2017-Order (333)-2024 - dated 8-1-2025 - Uttar Pradesh SGST

Seeks to bring in force provision of Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 2024

9. 1503 /XI-2-24-9(47)-17-T.C.-269- U.P.Act-1-2017-Order (332)-2024 - dated 7-1-2025 - Uttar Pradesh SGST

Seeks to bring in force provision of Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax (Amendment) Act, 2024

SEBI

10. F. No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2025/234 - dated 4-3-2025 - SEBI

Corrigendum - Notification No. SEBI/LAD-NRO/GN/2025/230 dated 14th February, 2025

Circulars / Instructions / Orders

Customs

1. 06/2025 - dated 4-3-2025

Disposal of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)/Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)/Drones

Highlights / Catch Notes

GST

• Failure to Prove Physical Movement of Goods Results in Seizure Under Section 129 of GST Act

  Case-Laws - HC : HC upheld seizure of goods under GST Act due to petitioner's failure to establish actual physical movement of goods from West Bengal/Assam to Delhi via Kanpur. Following precedent from SC in Ecom Gill Coffee Trading, burden of proof in original proceedings lies with assessee to demonstrate genuine transactions and physical movement of goods. Petitioner failed to provide essential evidence like truck numbers or toll receipts documenting the journey. Court affirmed that under-valuation with intent to evade tax justifies seizure under Section 129 of GST Act. Seizure was deemed lawful as petitioner failed to declare true value of goods and provide supporting documentation. Petition dismissed as no grounds found for interference with impugned order.
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• Input Tax Credit Claims Under GST Valid Within Extended Timeline Despite Section 16(4) Bar Under Section 16(5)

  Case-Laws - HC : HC quashed assessment order concerning Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims under GST regime. The matter involved interpretation of limitation periods under Section 16(4) and 16(5) of CGST Act, 2017. Following precedent in similar cases, Court held that while ITC claims were barred under Section 16(4), they remained valid within the extended limitation period provided under Section 16(5). The ruling effectively preserved petitioner's right to claim ITC within the extended statutory timeframe despite exceeding initial limitation period. Writ petition allowed with directive to reassess ITC claims in accordance with Section 16(5) parameters.
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• Input Tax Credit Claims Valid Under Section 16(5) Despite Exceeding Initial Time Limit Under Section 16(4)

  Case-Laws - HC : HC quashed order relating to Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims that were time-barred under Section 16(4) of CGST Act but fell within limitation under Section 16(5). Following precedent from Sri Ganapathi Pandi Industries case, Court determined that while ITC claims exceeded initial limitation period under Section 16(4), they remained valid within extended timeframe provided by Section 16(5). Consequently, original tax assessment order, penalties, and interest charges were set aside to extent they denied ITC claims falling within Section 16(5) period. Writ petition allowed, affirming taxpayer's right to claim ITC within extended statutory timeframe despite exceeding initial limitation period.
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• GST Assessment Order Nullified Due to Denial of Personal Hearing Under Section 75(4), Matter Remanded for Fresh Consideration

  Case-Laws - HC : HC quashed GST assessment order dated 22.04.2024 for violation of natural justice principles under Section 75(4) of GST Act, 2017. Despite petitioner filing two detailed replies (25.01.2024 and 14.03.2024) to Form GST DRC-01 notice, respondent authority passed final order without granting mandatory personal hearing. The scheduling of hearing dates (03.01.2024 and 11.03.2024) prior to reply submission deadlines (25.01.2024 and 14.03.2024 respectively) was procedurally improper. Matter remanded back to respondent authority for fresh consideration after providing proper hearing opportunity to petitioner in accordance with statutory provisions.
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• PVC Raincoats Classified Under HSN 3926 20 As Plastic Articles For 18% GST Based On Material Composition

  Case-Laws - AAR : AAR ruled PVC raincoats must be classified under HSN 3926 20 (plastic articles) rather than HSN 6201 (textile garments), attracting 18% GST. While raincoats function as garments/apparel in common usage, the primary material composition of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) determines classification. PVC sheets cannot be considered woven fabric or textile materials. The ruling follows the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, where specific provisions prevail over general ones. Despite being worn as apparel, the plastic composition makes it classifiable under "Articles of apparel and clothing accessories" in the plastics chapter, subject to Schedule-III tax rate regardless of price point.
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• PVC Raincoats Classified Under HSN 3926 20 for GST Based on Plastic Material Composition Rather Than Apparel Use

  Case-Laws - AAR : AAR ruled PVC raincoats must be classified under HSN Code 3926 20 (plastic articles) rather than HSN 6201 (textile garments). Despite functioning as apparel, PVC raincoats are primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride, not textile fabric. PVC sheets cannot be considered woven fabric or textile material in common trade practice. Following the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific composition of the item prevails over its general use as apparel. The ruling confirmed PVC raincoats attract 18% GST under Schedule-III Entry 111 of relevant GST notifications, regardless of price point. The classification is based on material composition rather than utility.
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• PVC Raincoats Classified Under HSN 3926 20 as Plastic Articles, Not Textile Garments, Subject to 18% GST Rate

  Case-Laws - AAR : AAR ruled PVC raincoats must be classified under HSN 3926 20 (plastic articles) rather than HSN 6201 (textile garments), attracting 18% GST. Though raincoats function as garments/apparel in common usage, their primary composition of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) determines classification. The authority rejected applicant's argument for textile classification, noting PVC sheets cannot be considered woven fabric or textile material. Following the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant, the specific material composition prevails over general garment usage. The ruling confirmed applicability of Schedule-III Entry 111 of GST notifications, regardless of the raincoat's price point, maintaining 18% rate uniformly.
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• Liquidator Must Register for GST When Selling Company Assets During Insolvency Under Section 7 and 24 CGST Act

  Case-Laws - AAR : Sale of assets by NCLT-appointed liquidator for Company A in liquidation constitutes supply of goods/services under Section 7 of CGST Act 2017. AAR ruled that liquidator must obtain mandatory GST registration per Section 24 of CGST/WBGST Acts, following special procedures outlined in Notifications 11/2020-CT and 39/2020-CT. These notifications specifically address corporate debtors under IBC 2016 whose affairs are managed by IRP/RP during insolvency resolution. Decision aligns with previous AAR ruling that liquidator-conducted asset sales qualify as taxable supply requiring GST registration. The registration requirement applies from liquidator's appointment until completion of corporate insolvency process.
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Income Tax

• Section 263 Revision Invalid: AO's Treatment of Disclosed Income During Survey Valid After Proper Inquiry Through Show Cause Notice

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT held revisionary powers under s.263 cannot be invoked as assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to Revenue's interests. During survey, assessee surrendered undisclosed income which was included in tax returns. AO conducted specific inquiry regarding applicability of s.115BBE through show cause notice. PCIT cannot merely substitute their view that income should be treated as unexplained investment under s.69 (Rs.66,50,000) and unexplained money under s.69A (Rs.9,50,000). Amendment via Explanation 2(a) expanding revisionary powers does not grant unlimited authority. No errors of law or fact were found in AO's order, which represented a plausible interpretation after proper inquiry. Appeal decided in assessee's favor.
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• Tax Additions Under Section 69A Reversed: Employee's Cash Possession and Stock Discrepancies Sent for Fresh Investigation

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT set aside unexplained money additions under s.69A made on cash found in possession of employee. Despite assessee's retraction from statement under s.131, initial assessment treated cash as unexplained money taxable under s.69A read with s.115BBE. Matter remanded to AO for fresh verification of assessee's claims regarding cash sales and collections. Similarly, additions for excess stock found during survey proceedings remanded for detailed examination of quantity/valuation differences. AO directed to provide opportunity to assessee to explain discrepancies. Special tax rate application under s.115BBE to be determined based on AO's fresh findings on remand. Grounds allowed for statistical purposes.
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• Excess Trading Stock Found During Survey Cannot Be Taxed Under Section 69B As Unexplained Investment

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT determined that excess stock discovered during survey, though surrendered by assessee, cannot be taxed under Section 69B read with Section 115BBE. The undeclared stock, being indistinguishable from regular business inventory and lacking independent physical identity, represents undisclosed business receipts rather than investment. The tribunal reasoned that since the excess stock was part of assessee's regular trading inventory without distinct physical characteristics, it constitutes business income subject to normal tax rates, not unexplained investment under deemed provisions. The difference was purely in value terms, forming part of overall business operations. Accordingly, ITAT allowed assessee's appeal, ruling that normal tax rates apply instead of punitive provisions under Section 115BBE.
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• Assessment Order Valid: Cash Deposit from Cancelled Land Deal Found Legitimate After Proper Verification Under Section 263

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT ruled against revision under s.263, finding the original assessment order valid and not prejudicial to revenue interests. The disputed cash deposit of Rs.4.5 lakh, initially part of a land transaction that was subsequently cancelled, resulted in nil cash flow impact. The AO had properly followed assessment procedures under s.143(3) r.w.s 147/148, issuing required notices and examining bank statements, agricultural income declarations, and supporting documentation. The tribunal determined the assessment of Rs.6,710 plus Rs.7,80,000 agricultural income was reasonable, with due verification completed. The PCIT's attempt to invoke s.263 was rejected as the original assessment demonstrated proper examination of facts and application of law.
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• PCIT's Method of Reducing Brought Forward Additional Depreciation Before Computing Current Year's Depreciation Under Section 32 Rejected

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT ruled against PCIT's interpretation of depreciation computation under Section 32(1)(ii) and 43(6)(c). The tribunal rejected PCIT's method requiring brought forward additional depreciation from AY 2017-18 to be first reduced from opening WDV before computing current year's depreciation for AY 2018-19. ITAT affirmed depreciation must be calculated on WDV of block assets per prescribed rates, with WDV computation only adjusted for asset additions and disposals during the year. The tribunal found assessee's depreciation claim aligned with ITR utility format and Tax Audit Report requirements. Since no erroneous treatment prejudicial to revenue interest was established, assessee's appeal was allowed, invalidating revision under s.263.
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• Tax Additions Under Section 69A Reversed: Digital Ledger With Mixed Entries Cannot Be Sole Basis Without Supporting Evidence

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT reversed additions made under s.69A based on seized digital ledger "Hazir Johri." The disputed ledger "Sanmati 1586" contained merged entries of multiple unrelated parties alongside assessee's transactions. Revenue authorities failed to provide concrete evidence linking assessee to all transactions or substantiate the nature of entries where assessee was named. No corroborative documentation like bills, vouchers, or stock registers established cash sales attribution to assessee. Following precedent where similar merged ledgers were deemed insufficient basis for additions, ITAT held that reliance on Hazir Johri software alone cannot sustain additions without supporting evidence. Assessee's explanation was considered plausible, and additions were deleted.
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• Assessment Order Under Section 143(3) Set Aside Due To DRP Communication Gap, Rs.10,000 Costs Imposed

  Case-Laws - HC : HC set aside the impugned assessment order under s.143(3) r.w.s.144C(3) and remitted the matter to DRP. While petitioner filed objections to draft order with DRP, they failed to notify the assessing officer, leading to final assessment issuance. Though AO was not at fault, considering similar precedent circumstances, court exercised discretion to grant additional opportunity. However, due to petitioner's procedural lapse in not informing AO about pending DRP objections, costs of Rs.10,000 were imposed payable to HC employees medical welfare fund. Court emphasized this discretionary relief was case-specific based on peculiar facts and not a general precedent.
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• Tax Demand Stay Granted After Taxpayer Agrees to Pay Additional 5% Under CBDT Instructions, Total Payment Reaches 20%

  Case-Laws - HC : HC accepted petitioner's alternative proposal to pay additional 5% of outstanding tax demand for AY 2011-12, bringing total payment to 20% of assessed amount. This compliance with CBDT instructions dated 31.07.2017 results in stay of balance demand. Court deemed adjustment of AY 2024-25 refund against AY 2011-12 demand permissible, subject to increased payment. Ruling aligns with established tax administration guidelines on partial payment requirements for demand stays. Court found proposal equitable, balancing revenue interests with taxpayer's financial position.
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• Cross-Objections Under Income Tax Act Section 260A Limited to Questions Connected With Main Appeal

  Case-Laws - HC : HC held that cross-objections are not maintainable under Section 260A of the Act absent specific statutory recognition, unlike Section 253(4). A respondent's right under Section 260A(6)(b) is limited to advancing contentions on adverse Tribunal findings only if they are intrinsically connected to the substantial question of law in the admitted appeal. The provision is merely enabling and does not confer an independent right to raise challenges disconnected from the admitted question. While respondents may support ultimate decisions by pressing connected issues decided against them without separate cross-objections, they must pursue appropriate appellate remedies for unconnected grievances rather than filing cross-objections.
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• Section 69C: Unexplained Business Purchases Cannot Be Partially Allowed Through Profit Estimation When Source Remains Unproven

  Case-Laws - HC : HC ruled in favor of revenue department, reversing lower authorities' decision to apply 12.5% estimation on bogus purchases. Assessee failed to explain source of expenditure for alleged purchases during reassessment proceedings. Though assessee provided limited details of sundry debtors, creditors, and stocks before CIT(A), they did not establish transaction genuineness. Before Tribunal, assessee only sought percentage-based estimation without proving purchase authenticity. HC held AO justified in adding entire amount of unexplained expenditure under Section 69C, as partial allowance through profit estimation contradicts statutory provisions. Revenue's appeal allowed, rejecting assessee's claim of having discharged burden of proof regarding purchase genuineness and payment sources.
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• Bad Debt Claim Under Section 36(1)(vii) Rejected as Group Company Transaction Deemed Colorable Device to Evade Tax

  Case-Laws - HC : HC reversed ITAT's ruling on allowance of bad debts under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act. The court found that Assessee's claim failed to meet statutory requirements as the debt was neither accounted for in computing prior year income nor represented money lent in ordinary course of banking/lending business. HC determined the arrangement between Assessee and CIPL (group company) was a deliberate device to transfer losses from loss-making entity to profit-making entity within same group. Evidence showed CIPL had financial capacity to partially settle dues, demonstrated by its Rs. 10 crore donation. The court concluded this was a colorable device to reduce tax liability, with CIPL benefiting from liability write-off while being tax-exempt due to losses.
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• Tax Assessee Can Claim Omitted Surcharge Payments Through Section 154 Rectification Even If Not In Original Return

  Case-Laws - HC : HC held that Section 154's rectification scope extends to legitimate claims omitted from income tax returns, rejecting the tribunal's narrow interpretation. The court determined that 'record' under Section 154 encompasses financial statements and books of accounts across assessment years, not limited to the specific year under review. Upon verification of ledger accounts demonstrating payment of Rs. 95,36,264/- (including Rs. 65,22,000/- on 20.11.1997), the HC overturned the tribunal's order. The court emphasized that mechanical objections should not defeat Section 154's remedial purpose and confirmed the assessee's right to claim previously omitted surcharge payments through rectification proceedings, even when such claims were not included in the original return.
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• Income Tax Reassessment Notice Under Section 147 Quashed Due To Time Bar And Lack Of Fresh Evidence

  Case-Laws - HC : HC invalidated reassessment notice under s.147 as time-barred and lacking new material evidence. AO's attempt to reopen assessment was based on existing records previously disclosed during s.143(3) assessment, where assessee had furnished complete details regarding Chapter VI-A deductions. Court held no failure by assessee in material fact disclosure. Reopening constituted mere change of opinion as AO relied on already available information without new tangible material, which is legally impermissible. Revenue's reexamination of existing records cannot form basis for reassessment beyond limitation period. Assessment notice quashed.
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• Mushroom Cultivation Income Qualifies for Agricultural Tax Exemption Under Section 10(1) After Meeting Essential Criteria

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT determined that income derived from mushroom cultivation qualifies as agricultural income exempt under section 10(1). Following precedent from Inventaa Industries, the Tribunal affirmed that mushroom cultivation involves essential agricultural operations requiring human skill and labor on land to produce an edible commodity for consumption and trade. The cultivation process meets the fundamental criteria of agricultural activity through basic land operations resulting in a consumable product. The Revenue's appeal was dismissed, upholding the first appellate authority's ruling that mushroom farming income merits agricultural income classification and corresponding tax exemption.
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• Denial of Section 80JJAA Employment Deduction Cannot Be Done Through Rectification Under Section 154 of Income Tax Act

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT ruled that denial of deduction under section 80JJAA through rectification proceedings under s.154 was invalid. The tribunal emphasized that s.154's scope is strictly limited to correcting apparent mistakes from records and cannot extend to complex issues requiring detailed examination. The claim for employment-related deduction under s.80JJAA involves analysis of multiple conditions and factual verification, making it a debatable matter falling outside s.154's purview. The Centralized Processing Center's attempt to disallow the deduction through rectification was held improper as it required substantive legal interpretation. The tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal, setting aside the rectification order.
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• Assessment Order Under Section 143(3) Invalid as Passed Beyond Extended Timeline of March 31, 2022

  Case-Laws - AT : ITAT upheld CIT(A)'s decision that assessment order under s.143(3) r.w.s. 144C(3) r.w.s. 144B was time-barred. TPO reference under s.92CA(1) was made on 13.09.2021, with TPO order under s.92CA(3) issued on 28.01.2022. Per s.153(4), deadline extended to 31.03.2022, but assessment order was passed on 30.09.2022, beyond statutory limitation period. Without CBDT extension or statutory provision extending timeline, assessment order was invalid. Jurisdictional issue of limitation decided against Revenue, confirming assessment as time-barred.
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Customs

• Bank Guarantees and Customs Bonds Must Follow SFMS Electronic Transmission Rules for Valid Processing

  Circulars : The text appears to be a comprehensive legal document outlining bank guarantee and customs bond procedures. Here's the focused legal summary: The document establishes procedures for bank guarantees and customs bonds under Indian customs law, detailing obligations for importers/exporters (obligors) and banks. Key provisions include: The bank guarantee framework requires banks to undertake payment to the government up to a specified amount in case of breach by obligors. Banks must provide unconditional guarantees without demur upon government demand, with liability restricted to the guaranteed amount. The guarantee remains effective until obligations are fulfilled and certified by relevant authorities. Banks cannot revoke guarantees during currency without prior government consent. Electronic transmission through SFMS (Structured Financial Messaging System) is mandatory for operationalizing paper bank guarantees, with specific message formats and field requirements. Non-compliance with SFMS procedures may prevent guarantee confirmation and subsequent processing.
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• Cross-examination Rights in Show Cause Notice Cases Must Be Decided Through Reasoned Order Before Final Adjudication

  Case-Laws - HC : HC addressed a challenge regarding natural justice principles in adjudication proceedings. Petitioners sought cross-examination rights of DRI officers following Show Cause Notices. Court directed respondents to consider petitioners' request for cross-examination on merits after granting one personal hearing. If respondents reject cross-examination request, they must issue a reasoned order before proceeding with final adjudication. Such decision must be communicated to petitioners within one week. Court maintained existing interim stay on proceedings pending this determination. Emphasized that rejection of cross-examination rights must be through speaking order, preserving respondents' authority to subsequently pass final adjudication order on merits in accordance with law.
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DGFT

• Import Policy Changed: Platinum Import Now Restricted Except 99% Pure Alloys Under Section 3 & 5 FT(D&R) Act

  Notifications : DGFT notification amends import policy for platinum under Chapter 71 of ITC (HS) 2022, Schedule-I. Import status of platinum under HS codes 71101110 (unwrought form), 71101120 (powder form), and 71101900 (other forms) is changed from "Free" to "Restricted." Exception granted for platinum alloy containing 99% or higher purity by weight, which remains under free import category. Amendment exercised under Sections 3 and 5 of FT(D&R) Act 1992, read with FTP 2023 provisions. Policy revision affects all forms of platinum including unwrought, semi-manufactured, and powder forms, except specified high-purity alloys.
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Corporate Law

• Share Transfer Dispute Petition Dismissed Due to Prior Litigation Bar and Suppression of Facts Under Article 226

  Case-Laws - HC : HC dismissed petition concerning illegal share transfer dispute. Court found petition barred by constructive res judicata under Henderson principle, as issues could have been raised in previous litigation. Petitioners suppressed material facts regarding prior litigation, violating duty of candor under Article 226. Court noted abuse of process through forum shopping and parallel proceedings. Being a disputed question of fact, writ jurisdiction deemed inappropriate given Companies Act's self-contained nature. Court emphasized that writ remedy is equitable, requiring clean hands, and condemned petitioners' pattern of relentless litigation aimed at oppressing respondent company. Petition dismissed with stern warning against future abuse of process.
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IBC

• Moratorium Period Under IBC Section 14 Must Be Excluded When Calculating Time Limits For Civil Case Restoration

  Case-Laws - HC : HC determined that moratorium period under IBC Section 14 must be excluded when calculating limitation period for restoration applications under CPC Order IX Rule 9. During moratorium (14.05.2018 to 28.11.2019), Ex-Directors/Management lacked legal authority to pursue civil litigation. Court rejected argument that moratorium applied only to proceedings against Corporate Debtor. Despite delay between IRP instructions (05.10.2018) and application filing (06.12.2018), Court condoned delay considering company's successful Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. Impugned order set aside, matter remanded to Trial Court for further proceedings. Appeal allowed with moratorium period exclusion principle established for restoration applications.
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Indian Laws

• Limited Liability Partnership Disputes Arbitrable Under LLP Agreement Even When LLP Not Direct Signatory to Agreement

  Case-Laws - HC : HC held disputes between partners of LLP and the LLP itself are arbitrable under the arbitration agreement in LLP Agreement, even when LLP is not a signatory. The First Schedule's provisions govern mutual rights and duties between LLP and partners, with Item 14 mandating arbitration for partner disputes. The dispute concerning partner expulsion necessarily involves examining injury to LLP's interests, making LLP a necessary party to arbitration proceedings. Court rejected respondents' objection that LLP was extraneous to LLP Agreement as untenable and frivolous, noting these objections appeared aimed at delaying arbitration. Application under Section 11 of Arbitration Act was disposed of, affirming arbitrability of the dispute including LLP as party.
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• Petition to Stay Cheque Dishonor Case Under Section 138 NI Act Rejected Due to Distinct Subject Matter

  Case-Laws - HC : HC upheld trial court's rejection of petition under s.210 CrPC seeking stay of proceedings under s.138 NI Act. While CID Case No.03/2017 involving misappropriation of Rs.1.36 crores was previously quashed, the current complaint pertains to dishonor of cheque worth Rs.81 lakhs. Court found subject matters distinct and unrelated - misappropriation allegations versus cheque dishonor. Previously quashed CID case cannot form basis for staying present proceedings. Alternative prayer for quashing entire criminal proceedings under s.482 CrPC also rejected as Trial Court committed no irregularity in rejecting stay application. Order dated 12.10.2018 in CR Case No.3204/2017 upheld, finding no grounds for interference.
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• Directors Cannot Escape Vicarious Liability Under NI Act Sections 138/141 Without Proving Non-involvement During Trial

  Case-Laws - HC : HC affirmed vicarious liability of company directors under Sections 138/141 of NI Act in cheque dishonor case. Directors challenged summoning orders claiming non-involvement in company's daily operations. Court held that while complainant must aver director's responsibility for company affairs, burden shifts to accused to prove non-involvement during trial. Court rejected premature quashing under Section 482 CrPC, noting disputed facts require trial determination. Mere documentary evidence presented insufficient to establish directors' non-involvement conclusively. Petition dismissed as complaint contained requisite elements to proceed against directors, maintaining presumption of vicarious liability pending full trial examination of factual defenses.
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• Dishonored Cheque Case: Defendant's Inconsistent Claims Fail as Section 118 NI Act Presumptions Remain Unrebutted

  Case-Laws - HC : Defendant's dishonored cheque for Rs.3,00,000/- led to legal proceedings where HC upheld trial court's verdict favoring plaintiff. Court found plaintiff's substantive evidence regarding transaction and cheque issuance credible through PW1's testimony. Defendant's inconsistent claims - initially alleging misuse of blank signed papers, later denying signature - lacked evidentiary support. HC affirmed presumptions under Section 118 of NI Act favoring plaintiff remained unrebutted. Defendant's remand plea rejected as court held remand cannot be granted merely to fill evidential gaps. Appeal dismissed with costs awarded to plaintiff/respondent, confirming trial court's decree.
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SEBI

• Alternative Investment Funds Get One-Month Extension For Reporting Differential Rights Under Section 11(1) Of SEBI Act

  Circulars : SEBI extended the reporting deadline for differential rights issued by AIFs from February 28, 2025 to March 31, 2025. The extension applies to AIFs/schemes whose Private Placement Memoranda were filed with SEBI on or after March 1, 2020, and have issued differential rights not aligned with Standard Setting Forum implementation standards. The relaxation follows industry representations requesting additional compliance time. The directive, issued under Section 11(1) of SEBI Act 1992 and AIF Regulations 20(22) and 36, aims to facilitate regulatory compliance while maintaining investor protection and market development objectives. The extension provides immediate relief to affected AIFs in meeting their reporting obligations.
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• SEBI Public Offer Extended: 600 Crore Deposit Required Under Regulation 20(1) for Continuation Until SEBI's Final Decision

  Case-Laws - SC : SC extended public offer deadline to 12.02.2025, contingent on appellant depositing 600 crores per SEBI Regulations by specified date. Key dispute centered on determining public announcement date under Regulation 20(1) - whether 18.01.2025 or 03.10.2023. Court mandated that if deposit requirement is met, offer will continue until third day after SEBI's ruling on pending application. Original respondents had previously deposited 330 crores in escrow. Court preserved rights of aggrieved parties to seek appropriate remedies following SEBI's determination on announcement date, exemption eligibility, and offer price issues. Order specified as interim in nature.
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Service Tax

• Promotional Services to Foreign Company on Cost-Plus Basis Qualify as Export, Not Intermediary Services Under GST

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT determined appellant's promotional and marketing services to Air BNB Ireland qualified as export services, not intermediary services. The tribunal found no agent-principal relationship existed, as appellant operated as independent contractor on cost-plus markup basis, directly billing Air BNB Ireland. Key factors: appellant provided only main service without auxiliary services, held no direct contracts with Air BNB's customers, and subcontracting arrangements did not constitute intermediary status per CBIC circular. Revenue's failure to initiate Section 73 proceedings under Finance Act 1994 for service tax collection implicitly acknowledged export status. Tribunal directed refund of unutilized CENVAT credit, overturning original rejection.
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• Construction Services for Non-Profit Organizations and Private Residences Exempt from Service Tax Demands Under Section 65

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT dismissed Revenue's appeal regarding service tax demands on construction services. The Tribunal held that construction services for IIM, DDA, and CEAI were non-taxable as these were not-for-profit organizations using buildings for non-commercial purposes. Construction of private residences for individual clients fell outside service tax scope. Free of cost materials were not includible in taxable value. Advances and miscellaneous income were unrelated to taxable services. Freight and cartage expenses did not qualify as GTA services. Extended limitation period, interest, and penalties were inapplicable as respondent's interpretation was reasonable without malafide intent to suppress facts. Revenue's appeal failed on all counts.
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• Service Tax Exemption Granted for Non-Branded Cable Services Under Notification 33/2012-ST; Cenvat Credit Rules Apply for MSO

  Case-Laws - AT : CESTAT determined appellant's service tax liability and Cenvat credit eligibility. Court held appellants were not providing branded services to subscribers, qualifying them for exemption under Notification 33/2012-ST. Extended period of limitation was deemed inapplicable, resulting in demand restriction to normal limitation period and cancellation of Section 78 penalties. Regarding Cenvat credit, appellants entitled to credit of service tax paid by MSO, subject to Cenvat Credit Rules compliance, specifically the one-year time limit from document submission. Credits claimed beyond prescribed period were denied, following established precedent. Matter remanded to Original Authority for demand re-quantification, with appeals partially allowed.
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Case Laws:

• GST

• 2025 (3) TMI 250
  Vires of extension of time limits specified under the CGST Act - Chellenge to N/N. 9/2023-Central Tax dated 31st March, 2023, N/N. 56/2023 Central Tax dated 28th December, 2023, N/N. 9/2023-State Tax dated 24th May, 2023 and N/N. 56/2023 dated 16th January, 2024 - HELD THAT:- In a similar matter, in the case of Aspect Integrated IT Pvt. Ltd Vs. Union of India [ 2024 (7) TMI 1601 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] , the Nagpur Bench of this Court has directed the Respondents in the said matter not to take any coercive action against the Petitioner. Here also, since the issue is whether the Notifications are valid and whether the impugned order could have been passed (especially, if Notifications dated 28th December, 2023 and 16th January, 2024 are set aside), a strong prima facie case is made out for granting interim relief to the Petitioner. Liberty granted to the parties to apply in the event the matter before the Hon ble Supreme Court is disposed of one way or the other.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 249
  Seizure of goods on the ground of under valuation - sufficient evidence to prove the actual movement of goods from West Bengal/Assam to Delhi via Kanpur or not - burden to prove - power to seize goods - HELD THAT:- Under the taxing statute, in the original proceeding or in the summary proceeding, the primary burden is to be discharged by the assessee by bringing on record the cogent material. The burden of proof is shifting to the department only in the re-assessment proceeding or subsequent proceeding not being the original proceeding. In other words, the assessee in the original proceeding is duty bound to bring the material on record in support of its claim but in the subsequent proceeding i.e. re-assessment proceedings, the burden shifts on the revenue - Under the taxing statute, in the original proceeding or in the summary proceeding, the primary burden is to be discharged by the assessee by bringing on record the cogent material. The burden of proof is shifting to the department only in the re-assessment proceeding or subsequent proceeding not being the original proceeding. In other words, the assessee in the original proceeding is duty bound to bring the material on record in support of its claim but in the subsequent proceeding i.e. re-assessment proceedings, the burden shifts on the revenue. The Hon ble Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. M/s Ecom Gill Coffee Trading Pvt. Ltd. [ 2023 (3) TMI 533 - SUPREME COURT ] has held that burden was upon the dealer to prove beyond doubt its claim. Further, the Apex Court has emphasised in the said judgement that if the dealer is claiming any exemption, then burden to prove the genuineness of the transaction is upon the person claiming the benefit. On that background, the Hon ble Apex Court has held that dealer has to prove the actual physical movement of the goods. Following the said judgement, this Court in the case of M/s Shiv Trading Vs. State of UP and Others [ 2023 (11) TMI 1157 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT ] has held that onus to prove and establish beyond doubt the actual transaction, physical movement of the goods as well as genuineness of transaction is required. In the case in hand, the petitioner was duty bound to establish beyond doubt the actual physical movement of the goods from West Bengal / Assam to Delhi via Kanpur but the petitioner has failed to do so, therefore, accompanying tax invoices and other documents cannot said to be genuine. In other words, it is a clear case of contravention of Act as well as the Rules - The petitioner has failed to bring on record any material to show actual movement of the goods from West Bengal / Assam. The details of truck number or toll receipt crossed during its journey from West Bengal / Assam to Kanpur have not been filed at any stage. The petitioner even failed to bring on record any cogent material to show actual movement of the goods. Once the actual journey as claimed by the petitioner was not proved, the proceedings cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary - Section 129 of the GST Act refers that any person transports any goods while they are in transit in contravention of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder, the said goods shall be liable to be detained or seized. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Shiv Shakti Trading Company Vs. State of UP and Others [ 2011 (5) TMI 874 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT ], has an occasion to upheld the seizure of the goods being made on the ground of under valuation. The Division Bench has held that it is incumbent on a person, who is transporting goods, to declare the true value of the goods and failure to declare the same, would result non proper document in the context of the valuation, therefore, the power of seizure of goods has correctly been exercised against the petitioner. Conclusion - i) Under-valuation with intent to evade tax justifies seizure under the GST Act. ii) The seizures were lawful and the petitioner failed to provide necessary evidence to challenge the findings of the respondent authorities. Thus, no interference is called for by this Court in the impugned order - petition dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 248
  Refund of IGST - zero rated supply - HELD THAT:- The issue raised in the writ petition is no longer res integra . The Hon ble Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in the decision reported in M/s.Amit Cotton Industries Through Partner, Veljibhai Virjibhai Ranipa Vs Principal Commissioner of Customs [ 2019 (7) TMI 472 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] had categorically held that the aforesaid circular cannot prevail over Rule 96. The Hon ble Division Bench observed that the circular will not save the situation for the Department. The impugned order dated 24.11.2020 is set aside and the respondent is directed to refund a sum of Rs. 25,84,277/- together with applicable interest to the petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - Petition allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 247
  Challenge to assessment order - reversal of ITC claim - HELD THAT:- The issue involved in the present Writ Petition, has been squarely covered by the common order of this Court, in SRI GANAPATHI PANDI INDUSTRIES, REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR VERSUS THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (STATE TAX) (FAC) TONDIARPET ASSESSMENT CIRCLE, CHENNAI [ 2024 (10) TMI 1631 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] , wherein, this Court has categorically held that The orders impugned in all Writ Petitions are quashed insofar as it relates to the claim made by the petitioners for ITC which is barred by limitation in terms of Section 16 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017 but, within the period prescribed in terms of Section 16 (5) of the said Act . The order impugned in all Writ Petition is quashed insofar as it relates to the claim made by the petitioner for ITC which is barred by limitation in terms of Section 16 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017 but, within the period prescribed in terms of Section 16 (5) of the said Act - petition allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 246
  Reversal of ITC claim - imposition of tax, penalty and interest - HELD THAT:- The issue involved in the present Writ Petition, has been squarely covered by the common order of this Court, in SRI GANAPATHI PANDI INDUSTRIES, REP. BY ITS PROPRIETOR VERSUS THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (STATE TAX) (FAC) TONDIARPET ASSESSMENT CIRCLE, CHENNAI [ 2024 (10) TMI 1631 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] , wherein, this Court has categorically held that The orders impugned in all Writ Petitions are quashed insofar as it relates to the claim made by the petitioners for ITC which is barred by limitation in terms of Section 16 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017 but, within the period prescribed in terms of Section 16 (5) of the said Act . The order impugned in all Writ Petition is quashed insofar as it relates to the claim made by the petitioner for ITC which is barred by limitation in terms of Section 16 (4) of the CGST Act, 2017 but, within the period prescribed in terms of Section 16 (5) of the said Act - petition allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 245
  Cancellation of petitioner s registration on the ground of non-filing of return - petitioner has paid all the revenue due and further agrees to pay any outstanding revenue for restoring its registration - HELD THAT:- This petition is disposed of by setting aside the impugned order of both the concerned authorities and by directing the respondent CGST/WBGST authority to restore the petitioner s registration and open the portal for a period of 45 days from date of communication of this order by the counsel of the respondent authority to enable the petitioner to make the payment of revenue due as well as any other due including penalty to be indicated by the respondent authority concerned within a period of 15 working days.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 244
  Violation of principles of natural justice - failure on the part of the respondent to provide an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner prior to the passing of impugned order - HELD THAT:- Initially, the notice in Form GST DRC-01 was issued on 26.12.2023, wherein the time limit was fixed for filing the reply on or before 25.01.2024. Accordingly, the reply was filed on 25.01.2024. Further, in the said notice, the date of personal hearing was fixed on 03.01.2024, which is 3 weeks prior to the expiry of time limit, provided by the respondent, for filing the reply. Though a detailed reply dated 25.01.2024 was already filed by the petitioner, without considering the same, a reminder notice dated 07.03.2024 has been issued by the respondent, whereby once again the time limit for filing the reply was fixed as on or before 14.03.2024 and the date of personal hearing was fixed on 11.03.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner had filed his 2nd reply dated 14.03.2024 along with a copy of the 1st reply dated 25.01.2024. Thereafter, without providing any opportunity of personal hearing, the respondent had passed the impugned order dated 22.04.2024, which is contrary to the provisions of Section 75(4) of the GST Act, 2017. Conclusion - The impugned order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice without providing any proper opportunity to the petitioner. In such view of the matter, this Court is inclined to set aside the impugned order dated 22.04.2024 passed by the respondent. Petition disposed off by way of remand.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 243
  Challenge to impugned cancellation of GST Registration Order - HELD THAT:- The issue stands covered by a series of judgments, commencing with the decision in Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center Vs. Appellate Deputy Commissioner (ST) (GST) and others [ 2022 (2) TMI 933 - MADRAS HIGH COURT ], wherein, under identical circumstances, this Court has directed the revocation of registration subject to conditions. The benefit extended by this Court vide its earlier order in Suguna Cutpiece Centre s case, may be extended to the petitioner. Petition disposed off.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 242
  Direction for compliance of the Order Passed by the Hon ble High Court of Haryana and Punjab - refund the amount deposited by the Petitioner - HELD THAT:- There are no justification to entertain this instant writ petition which shall stand disposed of with liberty reserved to the writ petitioner to initiate such proceedings as may be permissible in law, if it be its case that the judgment of that High Court has not been complied with.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 241
  Cancellation of GST registration of the petitioner - non filing of the GST return for a continuous period of six months - petitioner is ready to make the payment towards GST return for a period of six months as well as the penalty, if any, imposed by the respondent-department - HELD THAT:- In view of the consensus between the parties, the matter is covered by the order passed in SUNIL SAH VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [ 2024 (9) TMI 904 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT] , the present writ petition is also decided in terms of the said order. The petitioner shall be at liberty to move an application for revocation or cancellation of the order under Section 30(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, within two weeks. Petition disposed off.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 240
  Classification of goods - PVC raincoats - to be classified as plastic (HSN Code 3926) or textile (HSN Code 6201) items under GST? - GST rate of PVC raincoat - If the price of PVC raincoat comes under Rs. 1000/- then does it attract 5% tax on it? - HELD THAT:- Hon ble Supreme Court in case of Commercial Tax Officer v Binani Cement Ltd [ 2014 (3) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT] emphasized on latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e, general law yields to special law when operate in the same field on same subject. In the case in hand, there can be no denying that the only function of using raincoat is to take shield from rain and therefore, it is used as garment/apparel in common parlance. PVC sheet cannot be regarded as a woven fabric. Even in common parlance, the item PVC sheet is not considered as textile materials. The contention of the applicant canot be accepted that the item PVC raincoat would be classified under HSN 6201 40 10 since to qualify to be an item under chapter 62, it must be an article of textile fabric. It is not disputed that the item PVC raincoat, in common parlance, is known as apparel. The item being an apparel, which is primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), would be classified under HSN 3926 20 as Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts). Conclusion - Supply of PVC raincoat as manufactured by the applicant would be covered under Heading 3926 and would attract tax @ 18% vide entry no. 111 of Schedule-III of Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 [corresponding West Bengal State Notification No.1125 F.T. dated 28.06.2017], as amended.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 239
  Classification of goods - PVC raincoats - to be classified as plastic (HSN Code 3926) or textile (HSN Code 6201) items under GST? - GST rate of PVC raincoat - If the price of PVC raincoat comes under Rs. 1000/- then does it attract 5% tax on it? - HELD THAT:- Hon ble Supreme Court in case of Commercial Tax Officer v Binani Cement Ltd [ 2014 (3) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT ] emphasized on latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e, general law yields to special law when operate in the same field on same subject. In the case in hand, there can be no denying that the only function of using raincoat is to take shield from rain and therefore, it is used as garment/apparel in common parlance. PVC sheet cannot be regarded as a woven fabric. Even in common parlance, the item PVC sheet is not considered as textile materials. The contention of the applicant canot be accepted that the item PVC raincoat would be classified under HSN 6201 40 10 since to qualify to be an item under chapter 62, it must be an article of textile fabric. It is not disputed that the item PVC raincoat, in common parlance, is known as apparel. The item being an apparel, which is primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), would be classified under HSN 3926 20 as Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts). Conclusion - Supply of PVC raincoat as manufactured by the applicant would be covered under Heading 3926 and would attract tax @ 18% vide entry no. 111 of Schedule-III of Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 [corresponding West Bengal State Notification No.1125 F.T. dated 28.06.2017], as amended.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 238
  Classification of goods - PVC raincoats - to be classified as plastic (HSN Code 3926) or textile (HSN Code 6201) items under GST? - GST rate of PVC raincoat - If the price of PVC raincoat comes under Rs. 1000/- then does it attract 5% tax on it? - HELD THAT:- Hon ble Supreme Court in case of Commercial Tax Officer v Binani Cement Ltd [ 2014 (3) TMI 905 - SUPREME COURT] emphasized on latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant i.e, general law yields to special law when operate in the same field on same subject. In the case in hand, there can be no denying that the only function of using raincoat is to take shield from rain and therefore, it is used as garment/apparel in common parlance. PVC sheet cannot be regarded as a woven fabric. Even in common parlance, the item PVC sheet is not considered as textile materials. The contention of the applicant canot be accepted that the item PVC raincoat would be classified under HSN 6201 40 10 since to qualify to be an item under chapter 62, it must be an article of textile fabric. It is not disputed that the item PVC raincoat, in common parlance, is known as apparel. The item being an apparel, which is primarily composed of polyvinyl chloride (PVC), would be classified under HSN 3926 20 as Articles of apparel and clothing accessories (including gloves, mittens and mitts). Conclusion - Supply of PVC raincoat as manufactured by the applicant would be covered under Heading 3926 and would attract tax @ 18% vide entry no. 111 of Schedule-III of Notification No. 01/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 [corresponding West Bengal State Notification No.1125 F.T. dated 28.06.2017], as amended.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 237
  Supply of goods/services - sale of assets by the Liquidator - whether the Liquidator must obtain GST registration? - HELD THAT:- Notification nos. 11/2020-Central Tax dated 21.03.2020 39/2020-Central Tax dated 05.05.2020 were issued, which seeks to provide special procedure for corporate debtors undergoing the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. As per the said Notification, the Government, has notified those registered persons, who are corporate debtors under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (31 of 2016), undergoing the corporate insolvency resolution process and the management of whose affairs are being undertaken by interim resolution professionals (IRP) or resolution professionals (RP), as the class of persons who shall follow special procedure as prescribed therein, from the date of the appointment of the IRP/RP till the period they undergo the corporate insolvency resolution process. The West Bengal Authority for Advance Ruling has given a ruling vide in the case of Mansi Oils and Grains Pvt. Ltd. [ 2020 (7) TMI 141 - AUTHORITY FOR ADVANCE RULING, WEST BENGAL ] that the sale of the assets of the applicant by NCLT appointed liquidator is a supply of goods by the liquidator, who is required to take registration under section 24 of the GST Act. Conclusion - i) Any sale of assets of the company Maheshwary Ispat Limited which is in liquidation, done by the Liquidator of the company results in a supply of goods and/or services or both within the meaning of supply as defined under section 7 of the CGST Act 2017. ii) The Liquidator who is an insolvency professional being appointed by the Hon ble NCLT Kolkata Bench as a liquidator, is required to obtain GST registration in terms of Section 24 of the CGST Act, 2017 and WBGST Act 2017 read together with the Notification no. 11/2020-Central Tax dated 21-March-2020 and Notification no. 439-F.Tdated 03-April 2020, issued under the WBGST Act, 2017.

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• Income Tax

• 2025 (3) TMI 252
  Revision u/s 263 - assessee was surveyed and he surrendered a sum comprising of undisclosed debtors, excess cash found and unaccounted construction - HELD THAT:- PCIT has to be satisfied the twin conditions, namely the order of the AO sought to be revised is erroneous; and it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. If any one of them is absent i.e. if the assessment order is not erroneous but it is prejudicial to the Revenue, Sec.263 cannot be invoked. While filling the return of income assessee has admitted the additional income disclosed in the survey proceedings. While conducting the assessment proceeding the AO initiated a specific enquiry to the assessee and a show cause notice was issued proposing the variation in the assessment asking the assessee-appellant as to why the provision of section 115BBE should not be applied vide notice dated 24.09.2021. There is not the case of the revenue that the assessing officer has not raised the issue and has not conducted any enquiry, but while doing so he has applied his mind and taken a plausible view on the matter. That view so taken being not erroneous and prejudicial ld. PCIT merely cannot impose her view that the ld. AO should have considered that income so offered u/s 69 as Unexplained Investment for Rs. 66,50,000 (45,50,000+21,00,000) and Rs. 9,50,000/- (Unexplained Money) u/s 69A of the Act. It is noted that even the amendment [i.e.Expl. 2(a)] does not confer blind powers and it is held that despite there being an amendment, enlarging the scope of the revisionary power of the ld. PCIT u/s 263 to some extent, it cannot justify the invoking of the Expl. 2(a) in the facts of the present case. Thus, it is not at all a case where the subjected assessment should be alleged to be erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. There is neither error of law nor of facts. There is no erroneous assumption by the AO of either the facts or of law, as alleged by the ld. PCIT. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 251
  Unexplained money u/s 69A - additions made on account of the cash found from the possession of employee - HELD THAT:-Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also the retraction made by the assessee from his earlier statement recorded u/s 131 the version of the assessee was not found acceptable and therefore, it is considered that the amount found from the possession of Shri Shyam Singh Rathore and belongs to Shri Turab Ali Bohra was considered as unexplained money of Shri Turab Ali Bohra for which he has not been able to satisfactorily prove the sources thereof. Accordingly, an addition was made to the total income of the assessee on substantive basis by considering the same as his unexplained money u/s 69A r.w.s. 115BBE of the I.T. Act, 1961 and brought to tax accordingly. Assessee though retracted from the statement, and he has filed the details relating to the claim and substantiated his case to support the cash found in possession of the employee of the assessee - DR objected that since these records are not discussed or verified the relief cannot be granted to the assessee without being confronted to the assessee on the material placed on the record - In light of this set of facts before us, we deem it fit to restore the matter to verify the contention that has been made by the assessee with that of the statement recorded at the time of survey. AO will verify the contentions of the cash sales made by the assessee and consequential collection of cash from that collection centre is requires in depth verification. Therefore, we deem it fit in the interest of justice to restore the matter to the file of ld. AO who will verify the contentions raised at the time of assessment which though contrary to the statement recorded at the time of survey. Ground allowed for statistical purposes. Addition being the amount of excess stock found at the premises of the assessee, during survey proceedings - During hearing of the present appeal when the details of difference of stock and the inventory prepared at the time of survey was requested to be placed on record. But both the parties did not consider it fit to place on record that as to how the difference is arrived whether it is on account of quantity difference or on account of valuation difference. Considering that peculiar facts being not available before us we deem it fit to restore the matter before ld. AO who will justify the addition after discussing the reasons of difference and after affording due to opportunity to the assessee to explain the difference. Based on these observations, ground No. 3 raised by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Charging a special rate of tax on account of provisions of section 115BBE - Since we restore the matter of dispute to the file of ld. Assessing Officer on merits, so obviously the levy of tax being consequential in nature will depend upon the finding of the ld. AO.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 236
  Maintainability of appeal before Supreme court on low tax effect - TP Adjustment - MAM for Royalty payment - TNMM or CUP - as decided by HC [ 2023 (8) TMI 458 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] wherein as concur with Appellant that having accepted the TNMM method as the most appropriate, it was not open to the TPO to subject only one element, i.e, payment of royalty, to an entirely different CUP method. HELD THAT:- It is stated that the tax effect is less than 5 crores; hence, the Revenue would not press the present special leave petition. In view of the statement made, the special leave petition is dismissed as not pressed, leaving the question(s) of law open. In view of the aforesaid order, we are not examining the application for condonation of the delay.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 235
  Refusal to condone the delay in filing income tax returns - no reply to notice of defective return promptly - as submitted financial position of the Petitioner company is not quite strong, and the business activities suffered considerably due to the Covid pandemic and submitted that the Petitioner had candidly disclosed that a part-time accountant received the intimation of the notice of defective return, but the same was not brought to the notice of the directors for a considerable time HELD THAT:- The records show that this is a case where the Petitioner had filed the returns within the prescribed period. However, the returns were found to be defective, and the Petitioner was informed of the defective return. However, for reasons the Petitioner attributes to the part-time account, such intimation was not addressed, resulting in the delay. The explanation offered does not smack of any mala fides. Mr Jose Pulikkoden pointed out that earlier there used to be delays in granting refunds. Therefore, the Petitioner bona fide believed that the refund issue was pending with the department. Only at the later stage, when enquiries were made, it was realised that the matter was pending due to non-clearance of the defects in the returns as may have been pointed out to the Petitioner. Considering the explanation and the statement that no interest would be claimed if a refund is allowed, the delay deserves to be condoned. Mr Jose Pulikoden pointed out that, according to the Petitioner, the refunds would be in the range of Rs. 5,65,000/-. He submitted that this refund means much to the Petitioner company, which is presently in reduced financial circumstances. Accordingly, we are inclined to allow condonation. As submited that the Petitioners do not have a copy of the defect notice. Accordingly, we direct the Respondents to furnish a copy of the defect notice to the Petitioner within two weeks of uploading this order. The return so filed after clearing the defects pointed out should be scrutinised by issuing notice u/s 143 (2) and making an assessment u/s 143 of the Income Tax.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 234
  Final assessment order u/s 143 (3) r.w.s. 144C (3) along with consequential notices of demand - Petitioner lodged objections to the draft order but failed to inform the assessing officer about the objections being filed before the DRP. Consequently, the final assessment order was made - HELD THAT:- We are inclined to set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the DRP. The facts, in this case, are comparable in Sulzer Pumps India Private Limited [ 2021 (12) TMI 891 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] where, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, after recording that the assessing officer was not at fault still, granted the assessee in the same matter an additional opportunity since factually, objections had been filed with DRP, and such objections were pending. The relief in Sulzer Pumps (supra) was granted based on facts like those in the present case. Therefore, it is not as if the Sulzer Pumps (supra) or this order is a precedent for exercising discretion in every matter of this nature, irrespective of the factual position. At the same time, we also agree that the assessing officer who made the impugned assessment order in this case was not at fault because there was no intimation by the Petitioner about the pendency of objections before the DRP. Though, in the peculiar facts of the present case, which are quite similar to those in Sulzer Pumps (supra) we are indulging the Petitioner, it is only appropriate that the Petitioner, for her lapse, she pays costs of Rs. 10,000/- favouring the High Court employees medical welfare fund at Mumbai.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 233
  Rejection of refund application - department s website indicates that some of the Petitioner s applications seeking refund have been rejected based on the remarks indicated in the last column - as argued such rejection is arbitrary since there was no compliance with natural justice and the Petitioner was denied the opportunity to show how the Petitioner was entitled to a refund - HELD THAT:- Respondent should have heard the Petitioner before rejecting the refund applications. The rejection of refund applications involves civil consequences, and typically, the principles of natural justice must be complied with. At the hearing, the Petitioner could possibly have been able to explain why the refunds were due, and such refund applications could not have been rejected based upon objections like alleged non-submission of Form-26B etc. On the above grounds, we set aside the rejection of the Petitioner s applications seeking a refund. The matters are remitted to the Respondents for fresh consideration. We also direct the Respondents to decide the Petitioner s applications for refund after giving the Petitioner and their representative an opportunity to be heard.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 232
  Adjustment of the refund for the assessment year 2024-2025 against the outstanding demand for the assessment year 2011-2012 - alternative submission made by the Petitioner to pay an additional 5 percent of the demand - HELD THAT:- This Court is of the opinion that the alternative submission made by Mr Jain is required to be accepted. The alternative submission being that the Petitioner is ready to pay additional 5 percent of demand for assessment year 2011-2012 so that the total payment would be 20 percent of the demand and since same would be in accordance with the instructions of the CBDT dated 31 July 2017, the balance demand would be stayed. In our view, this submission is fair, and the same is required to be accepted.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 231
  Right to prefer cross-objections in an appeal referable to Section 260A - Appeals to the High Court on substantial questions of law - HELD THAT:- The various judgments that were cited and noticed above, have principally focused on the provisions of the Code and had interpreted the phrase as far as may be as being sufficient to hold that a cross-objection would lie even in an appeal from an appellate decree. However, here we are not only faced with the restrictive stipulation enshrined in Section 260A (6) of the Act but also by the prominent absence of a right to prefer cross-objections having been incorporated in Section 260A despite that avenue having been accorded statutory recognition in Section 253 (4) of the Act. In our considered opinion and bearing in mind the language of Section 260A (6)(b), the right of a respondent can at best stretch to advancing a contention in relation to any finding returned by the Tribunal adverse to that party and which has an indelible connect with the question of law on which the appeal may be admitted. We thus find ourselves unable to countenance sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 260A as conferring an independent right in a respondent to maintain or continue an apparent challenge in respect of a finding rendered by the Tribunal de hors or disconnected with the substantial question of law on which such an appeal may be entertained. In summation, we would hold that absent a specific adoption of a right to prefer cross-objections and the same being statutorily acknowledged to be part of the appeal procedure laid out in Section 260A of the Act, a cross-objection would not be maintainable. Section 260A (6) is merely an enabling provision and which empowers a respondent to agitate an issue that may have been decided against it by the Tribunal subject to the condition that the same is indelibly connected with the decision which gives rise to the question of law on which we admit an appeal. The said provision cannot be construed as conferring an independent right upon a respondent to raise a challenge divorced or isolated from the question on which the appeal comes to be admitted. This would also be in line with the decisions rendered in the context of the Code and the maintainability of cross-objections in a second appeal and where it was held that in case the objection be indelibly coupled to the main question, there would be no legal requirement of preferring cross-objections separately. This since the same would merely entail the respondent seeking to press an issue though decided against it, in support of the ultimate decision rendered. Considering indisputable fact that the present applicants had preferred cross-objections before the Tribunal which came to be partly allowed. For instance, while Ground Nos. 1 and 2 thereof came to be rejected, Ground No. 3 came to be partly allowed alongside Ground No. 6 of the Revenue. The cross-objections thus came to be partly allowed. It was the stand of the respondent itself that a cross-objection is akin to an appeal. If that were so, the applicant could have possibly taken appropriate steps to assail the order of the Tribunal to the extent that it was so aggrieved. However, and for reasons assigned above, the remedy was clearly not that of a cross-objection.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 230
  Bogus purchases - estimation of income - CIT (A) findings that only 12.5% of the bogus purchases should be added - HELD THAT:- As in the instant case, the respondent-assessee has offered no explanation of the source of the expenditure incurred on account of purchases and, therefore, AO was justified in making an addition of the said amount and the Appellate Authorities were not justified in estimating the profit rate and thereby impliedly grant deduction of such unexplained expenditure which is contrary to the express provision of Section 69C. In the instant case before us, assessee has not appeared in the re-assessment proceedings to discharge its onus on proving purchase transactions under consideration. Before the CIT (A) for the first time, scanty details of sundry debtors, creditors and stocks were given. CIT(A) gave a finding of the respondent-assessee s involvement in bogus transaction. Therefore, the finding of the AO on the genuineness of the purchases was confirmed by the CIT (A). Before the Tribunal, assessee has not canvassed any submission on the genuineness of the purchases but only pleaded for an estimation of a certain percentage of such bogus purchases to be added. Therefore, assessee has not proved the genuineness of the purchases, which inter alia include the source of making the payment for such purchases. Today before this Court assessee s submissions that they have discharged the onus cast upon them to prove the genuineness of the purchases, including the source cannot be accepted. Appeal of the appellant-revenue is allowed by answering the question in favour of the appellant-revenue and against the respondent-assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 229
  Penalty imposed u/s 271(1)(c) - non specification of clear charge - defective notice - HELD THAT:- In this case, the notice issued to the Assessee did not clarify whether the penalty was proposed to be imposed on the grounds of concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars. The necessary box containing the two options was not ticked. Thus, the Assessee had no clear notice about the case it was required to meet. Thus, we are satisfied that the questions now proposed, stand answered against the Revenue, inter alia by Mohd. Farhan [ 2021 (3) TMI 608 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT (LB)] - Revenue Appeal is dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 228
  Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - time limit for notice - computation of the relevant assessment year - HELD THAT:- The record would reflect that pursuant to a search and seizure operation conducted in respect of a third person on 02 March 2022, the petitioner was served a notice under Section 148 on 06 October 2023. Undisputedly and for the purposes of reopening, bearing in mind the proviso to Section 149 (1), action could have been initiated only up to AY 2015-16. It is ex facie evident that AY 2014-15 falls beyond the ten-year block period as set out u/s 153C r.w.s. 153A of the Act. Consequently, the impugned notice is rendered unsustainable. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 227
  Penalty u/s 271 (1) (c) - denial of benefit of Section 11 as they did not have a registration certificate u/s 12A - HELD THAT:- Trust has came into existence on 17 October 2007 and the first accounting year of the Trust is from 25 October 2007 to 31 March 2008. Assessee also undertook to file the audited accounts before 30 September 2008, which was duly done. However, the application dated 5 September 2008 came to be disposed of by the CIT (E) only on 31 March 2009. The delay in disposing of the application and making it applicable from AY 2009-2010 only cannot be attributed to the Appellant-Assessee. There is no reason given as to why the registration could not have been granted with effect from the date when the firm came into existence. In any case, the Appellant-Assessee is a Charitable Trust and was under a bona fide belief that the registration certificate would be granted from the date of its existence and it was on the basis of that bona fide belief that the claim was made. It was first year of the Appellant-Assessee. In our view, no case is made out for concealment of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income since the application for registration u/s 12A was filed with the Respondent-Revenue and the same was on record at the time of filing the return of income while making the claim. No justification for imposing the penalty of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income u/s 271 (1) (c) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 226
  Disallowance of bad debts - Borrowers defaulted in the repayment obligations to the Lender - It is the Assessee s case that CIPL had become financially sick on account of heavy losses and therefore, it was not feasible to recover any further amount from the said company ITAT set aside the deletion of bad debts as it found that the Assessee was engaged in the business of lending and advancing money and therefore, furnishing a guarantee to the Lender fell within the scope of its business and accepted the Assessee s explanation that it was unable to recover the guarantee commission as CIPL was not in the financial condition to pay the same - HELD THAT:- In terms of the Commitment Agreement the income by way of commission would accrue after the expiry of three years of the agreement. Thus, the Assessee could not account for the income by way of commission prior to the expiry of three years from the date of the Commitment Agreement. However, by that time, the Borrowers had defaulted in payment of the amounts due to the Lender and therefore, it is clearly doubtful whether the commission could be recovered. In the given circumstances, non-recording of income by way of commission on bank guarantees could not be a ground for rejecting the expense of bad debts suffered if the same was during the course of its business. We find no infirmity with the decision of the learned ITAT in not accepting the AO s decision that the bad debts were not allowable as expense as the Assessee had not recognized the commission receivable in respect of guarantees as income in the given facts. The first question projected by the Revenue is not a substantial question of law in the given facts of this case. Whether the amount of bad debts as claimed by the Assessee is allowable as an expense under Section 36 (1) (vii) read with Section 36 (2) (i) of the Act and whether the Assessee s claim for this allowance is a colorable device to reduce the tax liability - ITAT has misdirected itself. The issue flagged by the AO and learned CIT(A) was that the Assessee had deliberately refrained from taking any steps for recovering the dues from CIPL as it was a group company. Further, the facts indicated that CIPL had the wherewithal to pay at least part of the funds. This was established by the fact that it had made a donation of Rs. 10 crores during the said financial year. The AO and the learned CIT(A) had found that the Assessee had arranged the affairs in a manner whereby it had reflected a loss on account of bad debts, which could be set off against its income. On the other hand, CIPL, which had suffered losses, would in any event not be liable to pay tax on account of writing off its liability. Thus, the arrangement in effect transfers the loss within the same group from a loss-making entity to a profit making entity and conversely profits resulting from remission of liability to a loss making entity. The allowance in respect of bad debts [Under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act] is allowable only if: (a) the debt was taken into account for computing the income of the assessee in the previous year in which the amount is written of or prior previous years; or (b) represents money lent in the ordinary course of business of banking or money lending. In the present case, we concur with the decision of the learned CIT (A) that none of the two conditions are satisfied. Substantial questions are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 225
  Appeal pending adjudication for more than 2 years before the CIT(A) - HELD THAT:- This court is cognizant of the large number of statutory appeals pending for disposal before the NFAC and express concern over the delay in disposal of such appeals, for which the NFAC was envisaged. We expect that the NFAC would endeavour to implement the said remedial measures in all earnest. So far as the present petition is concerned, we note with some concern that the appeal filed on 14.10.2022, is still pending adjudication for more than 2 years before the CIT(A). We, therefore direct the said appeal filed on 14.10.2022 under e-filing acknowledgment be taken up for consideration and disposed of with expedition not beyond a period of eight weeks from date.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 224
  Assessment u/s 153A - disallowance of deduction u/s 80IA - Sunstantial question of law or fact - ITAT deleted addition as no incriminating material was found during the course of search - HELD THAT:- An appeal to the High Court from a decision of the Tribunal lies only when a substantial question of law is involved, and where the High Court comes to the conclusion that a substantial question of law arises from the said order, it is mandatory that such question(s) must be formulated. The expression substantial question of law is not defined in the Act. Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements. A finding of fact may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said finding, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. The Tribunal being a final fact finding authority, in the absence of demonstrated perversity in its finding, interference with the concurrent findings of the CIT (A) as well as the ITAT therewith by this Court is not warranted. For the aforesaid reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law arises from the order of the Tribunal requiring consideration of this court. Revenue appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 223
  Record for the purposes of Section 154 - Whether entire records of the assessee for all the assessment years and not pertaining to only the year under consideration? - HELD THAT:- Tribunal states that if at all the assessee was of the opinion that the contractual liability had been settled in the previous year relevant to AY 1998-99, it ought to have been made the claim in the return itself. This conclusion does not appeal to us as the petition u/s 154 has been filed solely for the reason that the claim was not made in the return of income. The application of Section 154 would extend to situations such as the present where legitimate claims have been omitted to have been made, for a variety of reasons. Hence, the observations of the Tribunal rejecting the claim of the assessee on this ground are completely misconceived. Directions of the Tribunal in order in the appeal filed for AY 1992-93, was not so unequivocal that the assessee could claim relief solely based on such directions - We agree. However, the appellant has not rested its claim solely on those observations but has been proactive in moving an application seeking rectification of Return for AY 1997-98. It was hence incumbent upon the assessing officer, while disposing the application u/s 154, to have looked into the plea for rectification on the merits thereof. If at all the AO wished to test the claim of the assessee and verify whether the amounts had actually been paid, necessary documentary evidence could well have been sought. Tribunal states that the Assessing Authority has not tested whether the amounts were actually paid at the time of original assessment proceedings - This statement is again misconceived for the reason that there could be no verification of a claim that was never made by the assessee in the return of income. In fact, this is the very reason why the assessee has filed a petition for rectification. The object of Section 154 cannot be defeated by reason of such mechanical and technical objections. As to what constitutes record for the purposes of Section 154, undoubtedly the records of assessment would include the financials for the years in question and the books of accounts including ledgers. Hence, it cannot be said that the payment of surcharge in Financial Year 1996-97 was not a matter of record. If at all any break-up/details of payments were required, nothing prevented the authority concerned to have called for the same. Since the records in question are more than two decades old, we are loathe to remit the matter to the authority for verification. In order to satisfy ourselves that the amount of surcharge had, in fact, been paid as claimed, we had called for supporting documents, and the assessee has produced ledger accounts that establish payment of a sum of Rs. 95,36,264/- that includes a sum of Rs. 65,22,000/-, being the subject payment on 20.11.1997. The documents have been made available to the learned standing counsel as well who has also been afforded opportunity to verify the same. There is no dispute that the amount of surcharge was paid in the financial year relevant to the year in question, and for the detailed reasons set out herein above, we find that the order of the Tribunal impugned before us calls for intervention.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 222
  Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Notice issues beyond the period of limitation prescribed under statute - HELD THAT:- It emerges that the Revenue has relied upon the information which was already available on record. Therefore, the reasons so recorded is not based on any new or tangible material. Revenue has merely re-verified its record pertaining to the case of the assessee. If we perused the reply of the assessee which was filed at the time of framing of assessment u/s 143(3) of the act, the entire details with regard to deduction claimed under Chapter VI-A were produced. Thus, we believe that it is not failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts before the AO. The impugned notice u/s 148 of the Act, therefore, is clearly barred by limitation as prescribed under the statute. Change of opinion - AO has sought to reopen the assessment from the material already produced on record, meaning thereby, while issuing and recording of reasons, the AO was not having any new and / or tangible material in his possession. Thus, according to us, the assessment sought to be reopened on the material which was already available can be said to be change of opinion and the same is impermissible in the eye of law. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 221
  Revision u/s 263 - Allowability of deduction u/s. 10AA challenged - AO s decision to allow deductions under Section 10AA on disallowance made u/s 14A - HELD THAT:- PCIT himself has given a finding in the notice that disallowance u/s. 10AA of the Act was made in the earlier years for A.Y. 2013-14 to A.Y. 2016-17 which was allowed by the ITAT, however, the Department has not accepted the decision and filed appeal before the Hon ble Bombay High Court which is currently sub-judice before the Hon ble Court. Therefore, once the Tribunal has taken a view in favour of the assessee on the issue of deduction u/s. 10AA, merely because the Revenue has filed an appeal before the Hon ble Bombay High Court against the order of the Tribunal which is pending for decision, the order of the AO cannot be held to be erroneous although it may be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Disallowance made by the AO u/s. 14A was allowed by him as deduction u/s. 10AA in light of the decision of Gem Plus Jewellery India Ltd. [ 2010 (6) TMI 65 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] Therefore, once the AO has allowed the claim of deduction u/s. 10AA on the enhanced disallowance u/s. 14A which is in consonance with the decision of the Hon ble Jurisdictional High Court, the order cannot be held to be erroneous although it may be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Thus PCIT in our opinion is not justified in assuming jurisdiction u/s. 263 as order is certainly not erroneous lthough it may be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Since the twin conditions are not satisfied in the instant case, set aside the order of ld. PCIT and the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 220
  Classification as agricultural income - cultivation of mushroom falls within the purview of agriculture or not? - HELD THAT:- As decided in M/S. INVENTAA INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED [ 2018 (8) TMI 69 - ITAT HYDERABAD] held that Hence as basic operations are performed by expenditure of human skill and labour on land by the assessee, which results in the raising of the product called Edible white button mushroom on the land and as this product has utility for consumption, trade and commerce, the income arising from the sale of this product is agricultural income and hence exempt u/s 10(1) of the Act . Thus, consistent with the view taken therein, we decline to interfere with the order passed by the first appellate authority and dismiss the grounds raised by the Revenue.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 219
  Rectification u/s 154 - denial of deduction u/s 80JJAA as all the conditions laid down u/s 80JJAA - HELD THAT:- The claim of deduction u/s 80JJAA of the Act being a controversial issue is beyond the ambit of provisions of section 154. It is pertinent to note that the scope of rectification of mistake u/s 154 of the Act is very limited and circumvented only to rectify the mistake apparent from record and cannot be extend ed to the issues which requires a long drawn reasoning and decisions. The claim of deduction u/s 80JJAA cannot be disallowed without examining the relevant facts as well as law on the point. Accordingly disallowance of deduction u/s 80JJAA of the Act by the CPC u/s 154 of the Act is not valid as the said issue is beyond the scope of provisions of section 154 - Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 218
  Penalty levied u/s 271(1)(c) - Addition of bogus expenses by rejecting the books - estimation of the profit at 40% of the turnover as reduced to 7% by the Appellate Authority - HELD THAT:- Addition made by the A.O. was based on estimation at 40% of the turnover which was modified by the Appellate Authority to 7% in the present case. Therefore no question of levying Penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of the Act and the same is liable to be deleted, and we direct so to delete the same. Appeal filed by the Assessee is allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 217
  Revision u/s 263 - computation of depreciation and the treatment of additional depreciation carried forward from the preceding year - as per CIT AO has failed to examine the claim of depreciation made by the assessee as a consequence of claiming brought forward additional depreciation from earlier assessment year 2017-18, which has resulted in the assessee availing excess depreciation - PCIT held that brought forward additional depreciation from AY 2017-18 should have first been reduced from the opening WDV and thereafter current year s normal and additional depreciation should have been computed for AY 2018-19. HELD THAT:- Method of computation provided by the Pr. CIT is not correct as Section 32(1)(ii) provides that depreciation has to be charged on the written down value of any block of assets as per the rates prescribed. Section 43(6)(c) of the Act provides that the written down value of a block of asset shall be computed by taking the WDV as on the opening date, which shall be increased by the actual cost of the assets acquired during the year and be reduced by the moneys payable in respect of assets sold during the year and no further adjustment is allowed to be made to the WDV computed as per the provisions of the said section. It is on such WDV so computed that the depreciation has to be computed. The format of income tax return utility notified by the CBDT, the amount of depreciation chargeable on plant and machinery is auto computed in Schedule DPM. An assessee is meant to submit the figure of opening WDV of the block, details of additions made during the year classified by the period for which such asset is put to use (more than or less than 180 days) and the details of assets sold during the year. Basis the aforesaid details submitted, the utility as conceived by the Income-tax Department, calculates the amount of normal and additional depreciation allowable on the block of asset. No mechanism for the assessee to first compute and reduce the additional depreciation for the preceding year from the opening WDV and then compute the normal depreciation for the relevant year, as directed by the Ld. PCIT. The said computation of depreciation, as provided in the income tax return utility, has also been found to be in consonance with the Clause 18 of the Tax Audit Report. If the method suggested by the Ld. PCIT in the impugned order were to be followed, in that case, the total depreciation allowable to the assessee, would be higher in subsequent years since the closing WDV would be higher. Being so, the assessee would be allowed higher depreciation is subsequent years. There is no error in the depreciation claimed by the assessee, hence no case of order being erroneous inasmuch as it is prejudicial to the interest of revenue could be made out. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 216
  Assessment u/s 153C - Addition u/s 69A - addition based on the seized digital ledger Hazir Johri - On perusal of seized data, among others, a ledger named Sanmati 1586 allegedly pertaining to assessee was found - CIT(A) affirmed the additions made in the assessment order by observing that since the bank transactions found recorded in the seized ledger were correct and pertained to the assessee firm, it will not be appropriate to accept that the cash transaction mentioned in the same account did not pertain to the assessee - As argued that the seized ledger is a dumb document, in as much as it makes no accounting sense to merge the entries of unrelated parties into one ledger HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the entries reflected in the said software pertains to other unrelated parties with the assessee. Admittedly, the said ledger is a combined ledger account of various transactions pertaining to other unrelated parties with the assessee and contains few transactions pertaining to the assessee. There is no concrete material brought on record by the lower authorities to implead assessee with all those transactions. Even for the transactions where assessee s name was mentioned, the revenue was not able to bring any corroborative evidence to prove the nature of such transaction. Hence it could be safely concluded that the assessee had given a plausible explanation about the contents of the said software. Further more, as rightly pointed out by the Ld.AR, there is no corroboration of those entries with the bills / vouchers, sales, stock registers etc, showing the cash sales to prove that the alleged cash sales belong to the assessee firm. Hence those entries cannot be relied upon for making an addition in the hands of the assessee. As decided in the case of Anoop Kumar Soni [ 2023 (12) TMI 391 - ITAT DELHI] while adjudicating almost similar facts related to search on JBL, the Tribunal held that since the ledger found during the search AP contains the entries of parties other than assessee, then said ledger cannot be said to be belonging to assessee and addition made on the basis of assumption was deleted. Thus, no addition could be made in the hands of the assessee by placing any reliance on Hazir Johri Software. Accordingly, the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 215
  Assessment u/s 153C - Addition of on-money sum going by the contents of the seized material - HELD THAT:- Revenue s instant sole substantive ground has to be declined only as the above seized document which is neither signed by the assessee nor its name is mentioned therein, could be held as belonging to it nor contents lead to any inference of actual on-money payment forming subject matter of addition in the assessee s hands. Unaccounted cash payment - AY 2007- 08 - CIT(DR) is indeed very fair in taking us to the assessment findings dated 30.12.2009 at pages 2 and 3 wherein same rough jottings and alleged map was seized from the searched person which is indeed in the nature of dumb document only in light of Girish Chaudhary,[ 2007 (5) TMI 176 - DELHI HIGH COURT] . We wish to reiterate here that the above seized document merely indicates some rates than pinpointing any specific on-money payment or receipt; as the case may be, involving the assessee. Faced with this situation, we are of the considered view that the learned CIT(A) has rightly accepted the assessee s contentions directed against the impugned addition. Mandation to record satisfaction - AY 2008-09 Revenue could hardly dispute the clinching fact that AO had recorded his section 153C satisfaction against the assessee. That being the clinching case, we quote section 153C(1) 1st proviso that the addition of search in such an instance is to be construed as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents by the AO having jurisdiction over such other person , and hold that once the assessee s assessment for the impugned assessment year 2008-09 was pending in light of its return filed on 02.12.2008 the departmental authorities could not have assessed it under the normal provisions u/s 143(3) going by Ojjus Medicare (P) Ltd.[ 2024 (4) TMI 268 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and Jasjit Singh [ 2023 (10) TMI 572 - SUPREME COURT] Disallowing the assessee s bad debts u/s 36 or business loss u/s 28 - CIT(A) has made it clear in his lower appellate discussion that the assessee had indeed made advances in the real estate and land purchases business which stood written off as the corresponding transactions could not be materialized. He accordingly concludes that the said claim indeed amounts to the assessee s loss in the ordinary course of its business.CIT(DR) is indeed very fair in not disputing the assessee s claim on merits regarding bad debts forming subject matter of addition before us. We thus reject Revenue s instant sole substantive ground herein on merits as well.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 214
  D enial of exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiae) - assessee, a trust, had not filed its original return of income for the relevant assessment year but had filed the return in response to a notice u/s 148 - HELD THAT:-Section 139(4C) of the Act, only mandates the filing of the return of income in specified circumstances by entities claiming their incomes as exempt under different provisions of the Act. Such section does not provide for denial of claim of exemption if the return of income is not filed. Even otherwise, the income returned by the assessee and accepted by the AO amounts to only Rs. 1,00,760/-. Assessee being a trust has been assessed in the capacity of AOP which finds mention in the body of the assessment order also. The basic limit upto which incomes of AOP s are not subject to tax, it was pointed out to us was Rs. 2,50,000/-. This was pointed out by assessee and not controverted by the DR. Even considering the provisions of section 139(4C) of the assessee, the assessee was not required to file any return of income. Therefore, it is evident from the above discussion that the denial of claim of exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiae) was not in accordance with the provisions of law. The order passed by the CIT(A) is therefore set aside. Appeal of the assesse is allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 213
  Reopening of assessment - notice after four years - disallowing deduction for payment of car hire charges - HELD THAT:- Reasons recorded do not spell out failure on the part of the Appellant to disclose fully and truly any material facts. In the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellant that specific query in relation to vehicle hiring charges was raised during the relevant assessment proceedings and in response to the same the Appellant had made disclosure of primary facts and furnished supporting documents during the assessment proceedings. We note that during the assessment proceedings the Appellant had filed letter giving justification regarding car hiring charges paid to Shri Deepak More for hiring of three vehicles. Appellant had also filed Vehicle Hiring Agreement. It is admitted position that reassessment proceedings have been initiated in the present case after the expiry of 4 years from the end of the relevant assessment year. As per Proviso to Section 147, no action can be taken for reopening after four years unless the AO has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. Since in the case before us in the reasons recorded there is nothing to indicate that reopening is sought on the ground of the failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose fully and truly material facts, the initiation of re-assessment proceedings u/s 147 of the Act cannot be sustained and is, therefore, held to be bad in law. Assessee appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 212
  Penalty imposed u/s 271E - violation of provisions of Section 269T by making repayment of a sum in cash - HELD THAT:- Assessing Officer nowhere recorded satisfaction that it was a case of violation of provisions of section 269T calling for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271E of the Act. In Jai Laxmi Rice Mills Ambala City s case [ 2015 (11) TMI 1453 - SUPREME COURT] while dealing with penalty order u/s 271E of the Act, observed that in the fresh assessment order, no satisfaction was recorded regarding penalty proceedings u/s 271E of the Act, and that the AO had expressed therein only for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c). Accordingly, it was held that the penalty levied u/s 271E of the Act could not be levied without recording of satisfaction in the assessment order as regards penalty under section 271E of the Act. Thus, AO having not recorded satisfaction that it was a case calling for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s 271E penalty order deserves to be set aside. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 211
  Addition u/s 68 - unexplained cash credits - onus to prove - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- In the present case, the assessee not only disclosed the source of the credits reflected in its books of accounts but also furnished the assessment records of the creditor, demonstrating that the source of funds in the creditor s hands had been subjected to scrutiny. Assessee discharged its initial onus under Section 68, and any addition made without further investigation or rebuttal of the evidence provided by the assessee would be untenable in law. We are of the considered opinion that the assessee has satisfactorily explained the source of credits in his books and consequently, the CIT(A) has rightly deleted the additions after relying on various judgments made by the AO, and no further intervention is warranted under these circumstances. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 210
  Addition u/s 69B r.w.s. 115BBE - assessee surrendered the additional stock so found during the course of survey - AO observed that the assessee has treated the surrendered income as business income in the Profit Loss Account and the assessee has not given any explanation about the source of making the investments in purchase of excess stock HELD THAT:- In the instant case as well, it is an admitted fact that the surrender on account of excess stock is of regular stock in which the assessee deals in and thus related to the business being carried on by the assessee. Further the stock so found is not physically distinguishable and there is as such no physical distinction between accounted stock and unaccounted stock and no such physical distinction was found by the Revenue either. We therefore find that the difference in stock so found out by the authority has no independent identity and is in terms of value terms only, as evident from the surrender letter, which infact has formed the basis of findings of the AO, and thus part and parcel of entire sock therefore it cannot be said that assessee has an undisclosed asset which existed independently and thus what is not declared to the Department is receipt from the business operation and not any investment as it cannot be correlated with any specific asset and difference thus be treated as business income. The amount representing the excess stock found during the course of survey cannot be brought to tax under the deeming provisions of Section 69B of the Act and the same has to be assessed to tax under the head business income and in absence of any deeming provision the question of application of Section 115BBE does not arise and normal tax rate shall apply which has been applied by the assessee while filing the return of income. Appeal of the assessee is allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 209
  Revision u/s 263 - A notice u/s 148 as issued to the assessee on the basis of an information that the assessee had deposited cash in his bank account during the year under consideration - HELD THAT:- We have examined and perused the document i.e agreement to sell dt. 01/06/2011 and receipt dt. 11/06/2011 while it is true that basis land mentioned therein transaction of Rs. 4.5 lakh took place on 01/06/2011 and later got cancelled on 11/06/2011 can be no basis to dub the amount of Rs. 4.5 lakh as bogus entry to manipulate the availability of funds in order to explain the cash deposit made by the assessee in his bank account on 09/06/2011. AO did not try to conduct any enquiries to ascertain the identity of Shri Sukhwinder Singh, his credit worthiness and genuineness of the given transaction; as the amount was returned by the assessee. The need to conduct enquiries would have arisen had the amount of Rs. 4.5 lakh would not have been returned by the assessee. The Ld. PCIT therefore has erred in law as in cash flow the result is NIL. In the premises after examining the record, papers and proceedings of the impugned order as well as the original assessment order dt. 03/06/2019 passed under section 143(3) r.w.s 147/148 we are of the considered view that there is no legal infirmities in the order of Ld. AO dt. 03/06/2019. We hold that due process of law with all rigorous were duly followed by the Ld. AO; appropriate notice(s) u/s 147/148, 143(2) and 142(1) were duly given and were received by the assessee. The return of income was filed as an agriculturist on 25/04/2019 declaring net income as agriculture income. Detailed questionnaire were issued on 01/05/2019 for 15.05.2019 which were properly replied to by the assessee. Assessee attended the assessment proceedings and it is recorded that AR furnished all requisite information / documents called for during the course of assessment proceedings the Ld. AR furnished detailed reply alongwith documentary evidences of cash deposited in bank during the period under consideration which were duly examined and were placed on record. Further upon many queries raised a yet another reply is on record dt. 22/05/2019 wherein it was highlighted that actual cash deposit is Rs. 16,91,000/- not Rs. 32,41,000/- as alleged in notice(s). It is expressly stated in the assessment order dt. 03/06/2019 that during the course of the assessment proceedings reply as well documents filed were examined. Queries were raised and were duly answered with supporting. The bank statement were verified and that after detailed examination of the case the income was assessed at returned income of Rs. 6710/- + Rs. 7,80,000/- as agriculture income. We see no infirmities with the assessment order of Ld. Ao dt. 03/06/2019. The order is well merited and all due process of law has been followed. We therefore hold that such an assessment order cannot be called erroneous and prejudicial within the meaning of Section 263 Explanation 2 as due process was followed and all necessary verification and examination of documents in plausible and reasonable manner were done so. We do not see any unreasonableness and arbitrariness in the original assessment order impugned under section 263 and that the same cannot be clothed with erroneous and prejudicial charge by Ld. PCIT. Decided in favour of assessee.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 208
  Assessment u/s 153A - Addition u/s 68 on account of the unexplained credits - search was conducted at the premises of Assessee husband - HELD THAT:- Having regard to the subject transactions recorded in the books of accounts of the husband of the appellant and also in the bank statement pertaining to the account of the assessee-appellant, it can safely be said that concerned transactions had already been recorded in the said record. It is not in dispute that after the husband of the assessee-appellant had furnished Income Tax Return in the concerned assessment year, no such step was taken by the AO for scrutiny or reassessment. Previously the income disclosed by the husband of the assessee-appellant was not doubted, including the said transactions, which have subsequently been picked up after search and seizure action. There is no explanation from the Department as to why no scrutiny was made regarding the said assessments while processing the ITR furnished by the husband of the assessee-appellant at the relevant time or within the prescribed period of limitation. We find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant above- said 3 entries pertain to transfer of amounts to the assessee by the proprietorship concern being run by her husband and since the ledger did not indicate any financial implication, said entries could not be said to be unexplained cash credit, attracting the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. Having record to the material placed on record by the assessee-appellant, before the AO as well as CIT(A) and before this Appellate Tribunal, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned assessment framed by the AO and the impugned order passed by CIT(A) deserves to be set aside accordingly, same hereby set aside. Whether statement of the assessee was the only material available against the assessee? - In this regard, suffice it to state that the Assessing Officer nowhere mentioned in the assessment order about any statement made by the assessee u/s 132 of the Act. As mentioned here that subsequently, during pendency of the appeal, on behalf of the appellant an application came to be presented with the prayer seeking permission to raise three grounds mentioned therein. First additional ground is that no DIN number having been generated as regards the impugned assessment order, same is nullity being non-est. Second additional ground is that the impugned assessment order has not been digitally signed as per procedure prescribed by CBDT, same is non-est. No prior approval, as mandated by section 153D of the Act was obtained and as such the impugned assessment has been framed without any jurisdiction - As it may be mentioned that as noticed above, the impugned order passed by CIT(A) and the impugned assessment framed by the AO deserve to be set aside, for the abovesaid discussion and reasons, the three additional grounds sought to be raised on behalf of the appellant for academic purposes, are not being taken up. No other argument has been advanced before us.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 207
  Validity of assessment order as barred by limitation - assessment Order u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(3) r.w.s. 144B - HELD THAT:- We noted that the issue is very simple and there is no extension of time limit by CBDT or by Act in term of section 153(4)of the Act for completion of assessment u/s. 143(3) of the Act. Admittedly, the reference to TPO was made u/s. 92CA(1) of the Act on 13.09.2021 and who passed the order u/s. 92CA(3) of the Act on 28.01.2022. Since the reference u/s. 92CA(1) of the Act was made to TPO, consequent to section 153(4), due date for passing of order get extended upto 31.03.2022 but in the present case, the assessment u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 144C(3) r.w.s. 144B of the Act was passed vide order dated 30.09.2022, which is clearly barred by limitation. No infirmity in the order of CIT(A) holding the assessment order as barred by limitation and we confirm the findings of the CIT(A). Hence, this jurisdictional issue of limitation is decided against the Revenue.

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• Customs

• 2025 (3) TMI 206
  Violation of principles of natural justice - Seeking to forbear the second respondent from conducting adjudication pursuant to the SCN without acceding to the request made by the petitioners for cross examination of the persons and officers of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence - HELD THAT:- No prejudice would be caused to the respondents in the light of the fact that as on date, the petitioner is having the benefit of interim stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the issuance of the Show Cause Notices to the respective petitioners to consider the petitioners representation through their interim replies seeking for right of cross examination of the persons mentioned therein, on merits and in accordance with law within a time frame to be fixed by this Court, after affording one personal hearing to the petitioners. If the respondents come to the conclusion that the petitioners are not entitled to cross examine the witnesses and if they decide to reject the petitioners request, by passing a speaking order in respect of the request made by the petitioners that the petitioners are not entitled to cross examine the persons, they have a right to pass a final adjudication order pursuant to the issuance of the Show Cause Notices, on merits and in accordance with law. The order passed on the petitioners request seeking for cross examination has to be communicated to the petitioners within a period of one week from the date of passing of such an order. Petition disposed off.

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• Corporate Laws

• 2025 (3) TMI 205
  Illegal share transfer - Maintainability of petition - present petition is barred by delay and latches or not - suppression of material facts and continuance of the present petition would tantamount to an abuse of process of law or not - issues raised in the present petition are barred by Res Judicata or not. Whether or not the present petition is barred by delay and latches? - HELD THAT:- The substratum of the dispute relates to illegal share transfer and the same has been litigated and reagitated time and again and no useful purpose will be served in oppressing the opposite parties herein. The only addition in the present petition is to create a cause of action seems to be that certain RTI applications have been made by various parties and no suitable response has been received with regard to them which seems to be more like an afterthought which has been introduced to create a fresh cause of action in order to make the present petition maintainable. Even otherwise the present petition raises disputed question of facts thus a Writ Court not the appropriate remedy, especially given the fact that the Companies Act is a self-contained Code and in relation to matters therein, there is a specific bar from other Courts entertaining pleas which are the subject matter of the said Act. However, in the present scenario this Court deems it fit to go into other issues as well and does not incline to reject the present petition on the ground of maintainability alone. Whether or not the present petitioners are guilty of suppression of material facts and continuance of the present petition would tantamount to an abuse of process of law? - HELD THAT:- This Court cannot ignore the fact the Petitioners might be in cahoots with other setup unscrupulous persons who have earlier agitated the self-same issue guised as public interest petitions . Although a party is never precluded from raising genuine claims in collusion with others are indulging in blatant forum-shopping and are taking recourse to multiple parallel proceedings for the same subject matter. It is well-settled that re-litigation of the same matter itself amounts to an abuse of the process of law and ought to be nipped at the bud. This Court in the given factual backdrop is constrained to hold that not only has there been a suppression of material facts but, in fact, there are persons who seem to be relentless in their pursuit to oppress Opposite Party No. 8 company for reasons best known to them. Such a fact cannot be lost sight of and is a matter of grave concern and needs to be dealt with sternly. In the case of Prestige Lights Ltd. v. SBI [ 2007 (8) TMI 446 - SUPREME COURT ] it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty-bound to place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Petitioners have dishonestly not disclosed the above material facts in the present writ petition. The Petitioners have abused the process of law by suppressing the aforesaid litigations. It is well-settled that writ remedy is an equitable remedy and since the Petitioners have not approached the court with clean hands it is appropriate that their challenge deserves to be rejected. Whether the issues raised in the present petition are barred by Res Judicata? - HELD THAT:- . The Hon ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Celir LLP Vs Sumati Prasad Bafna Ors. [ 2024 (12) TMI 879 - SUPREME COURT ] has exhaustively dealt with the principle of Res Judciata/ Constructive Res Judicata and has propounded the Henderson principle as a corollary of Constructive Res-Judicata. It is therein been recognized that the is intrinsically tied to issue estoppel and cause of action estoppel . The Supreme Court in the case of Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer, Ratlam [ 1964 (10) TMI 43 - SUPREME COURT ], clarified and highlighted the need to extend rule of constructive res judicata to writ proceedings. It was held that it would not be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time, and would be inconsistent with considerations of public policy. The Petitioner No. 2 herein who had petitioned this Court earlier could have and ought to have relied upon the grounds with relation to the applications made to the registrar of companies (between 2013 to 2015) at the time of filing of that Writ Petition. After having not being done it would be impermissible to allow the same petitioners to urge the said facts which were otherwise had occurred at that point in time when that prior Writ Petition had been filed. That being the case, the instant case is squarely covered by the discussion here in above. The subsequent/ successive petition i.e. the present petition would be barred by the principles of constructive res judicata by applying the Hendersen principle . Conclusion - This Court arrives at a clear and unequivocal conclusion that the present Writ Petition is not only liable to be dismissed at the very threshold on account of the principles discussed and issues framed hereinabove. But also, on account of the fact that the Petitioners have approached this court with unclean hands and the conduct of the petitioners herein leaves much to be desired. This Court can only express hope that the petitioners will be well advised not to indulge in such unbecoming practice of abusing the process of law in the future. Petition dismissed.

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• Securities / SEBI

• 2025 (3) TMI 204
  Public offer date - Determination of date on which a public announcement of an open offer, in terms of clause (1) to Regulation 20, has been made - It is the case of the appellants that the date on which the public announcement was made would be 18.01.2025 - case of the private respondents that the public offer date must be taken as 03.10.2023 and, therefore, the application filed by the appellants is belated and beyond time. HELD THAT:- Clause (9) of Regulation 20 states that, upon the public announcement of a competing offer, an acquirer who had made the preceding offer shall be entitled to revise the terms of his open offer provided the revised terms are more favourable to the shareholders of the target company. The acquirers making the competing offers shall be entitled to make upward revisions of the offer price at any time up to one working day prior to the commencement of the tendering period. The tendering period, we are informed, has come to an end today, that is, on 07.02.2025. During the course of arguments, it was noted that there have been several attempts to stall the public offer, but without success. We have noted the said aspect, but at the same time, we have also taken into account the fact that the application filed by the appellants is still pending consideration by the SEBI and has not been disposed of. SEBI would be more concerned about public investors and their rights and interests. The main question that arises and has to be decided by the SEBI relates to the date of public announcement of the open offer, as contemplated in Regulation 20(1) of the 2011 SEBI Regulations. The second question would be whether or not to grant exemption, if the situation requires it. Third issue relates to the public offer price. It is pointed out by the private respondents that they deposited a sum of 330 crores way back on 26.09.2023 in an escrow account. Keeping all the aforesaid facts in mind, we are inclined to pass the following order: - 1. The appellant, Digvijay Laxhamsinh Gaekwad (Danny Gaekwad) or their nominee/applicant before SEBI, as suggested by his counsel, shall deposit a sum of 600 crores in terms of the 2011 SEBI Regulations, in the form of cash and/or bank guarantee, on or before 12.02.2025. In case the amount is not deposited by the said date, the directions in the present order shall be automatically vacated without further reference to the Court. 2. The public offer, which is to close today, will be continued till 12.02.2025. In case the appellant, Digvijay Laxhamsinh Gaekwad (Danny Gaekwad) or their nominee/applicant before SEBI, deposits 600 crores in terms of the 2011 SEBI Regulations, the offer will continue till the end of third day post the date of the order to be passed by SEBI on the application of the appellants. 3. A party aggrieved by the order passed by SEBI would be entitled to take recourse to an appropriate remedy. Present directions are in the nature of an interim order.

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• Insolvency & Bankruptcy

• 2025 (3) TMI 203
  Seeking restoration of the suit - Exclusion of period of moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) for filing an application under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for restoration of suits dismissed for non-prosecution - HELD THAT:- The proceedings under the IBC were initiated by the appellant/plaintiff, i.e., the erstwhile Corporate Debtor on 29.01.2018. Thus, there is no merit in the plea that the application under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC was filed by the same set of counsels, for the simple reason that the moratorium that crept in on filing of the proceedings under the IBC left no legal right or power in the Ex-Directors/Management to continue with the civil suit. The plea by the learned counsel for the respondent that the order dated 14.05.2018 applied moratorium only to suits or legal proceedings instituted against the Corporate Debtor, and not to those initiated by the Corporate Debtor, is only recorded to be rejected. This Court finds merit in the plea advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff that the period of moratorium, i.e., from 14.05.2018 to 28.11.2019, must be excluded. It is during such period that the two suits were dismissed for non-prosecution on 04.06.2018. The fact that the application was filed on 06.12.2018, despite instructions from the IRP on 05.10.2018, does not carry significant weight, especially considering that the appellant/plaintiff was entangled in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, which was eventually successful and resulted in the revival of the company. The said delay, if any, ought to be condoned. Conclusion - The period of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC must be excluded when computing the limitation period for filing restoration applications under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC. The impugned order set aside - matter is remanded back to the learned Trial Court for further trial of the matter in accordance with law - appeal allowed.

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• Service Tax

• 2025 (3) TMI 202
  Scope of SCN - Appellant was registered under the category of Manpower Recruitment and Supply Agency Services but was simultaneously providing certain other services without intimating the Department - difference in figures of amounts reflected in ST-3 Returns vis- -vis those disclosed in P L A/c and Balance Sheet - Invocation of Extended period of limitation. Scope of SCN - HELD THAT:- The SCN nowhere specified the nature of services on which service tax was sought to be recovered. Since the period covered by the SCN was prior to 01.07.2012 and the charge of service tax under Section 66 during that period was only on services defined under various clauses of clause (105) of Section 65, hence the SCN was clearly vague and not sustainable in law. While it is correct that the nature of other services were described in the adjudication order, but the SCN being completely silent on the nature of services, the deficiency in SCN cannot be removed by the adjudication order, as SCN is the foundation of the case set up by the revenue and revenue cannot be permitted to travel beyond the scope of SCN, as held in CCE vs. Shital International [ 2010 (10) TMI 19 - SUPREME COURT] . Invocation of Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The demand is barred by limitation having been raised by invoking extended period of limitation. A perusal of the appeal records shows that the demand is worked out on the figures disclosed by the Appellant in its Balance Sheet and Profit Loss A/c. This Tribunal in catena of cases held that demand based on figures of Balance Sheet, which is a public document, cannot be made by invoking extended period of limitation. Since the SCN was issued on 20.09.2013, the demand of service tax beyond the period of eighteen months from 20.09.2013 i.e. till 20.03.2012 is in any case barred by limitation. However, since the SCN lacks material particulars for raising the demand, the demand for the period 20.03.2012 to 20.09.2013 cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the demand of service tax of Rs.5,11,989/- along with interest and equal penalty under Section 78 are set-aside. Conclusion - The demand for service tax and penalties set aside due to limitations in the SCN and the lack of specificity regarding the nature of services. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 201
  Short payment of service tax - classification of service - preparing the advertising material - advertising service or not - extended period of limitation. Classification of service - preparing the advertising material - advertising service or not - HELD THAT:- The appellants are engaged only in writing and/or printing banners which were given to them by the clients. They had no role in the design and conceptualization of the advertisement. It has been held in the cases cited above, that mere preparing the advertising material does not come under the ambit of advertising and therefore, the activity undertaken by the appellants cannot be held to be advertisement agency service . Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The show cause notice has been issued invoking the extended period. However, no positive act of suppression, mis-statement etc. on the part of the appellants has been brought on record. Further, the show cause notice has been issued on the basis of the data available with the Income Tax Department in the form of TDS details and 26AS statements. Revenue has not conducted any enquiry so as to ascertain what was the service rendered? When it was rendered? To whom it was rendered? What was the consideration received by the appellants? etc. The burden of proving the same was with the Department for alleging non-payment of service tax by the appellants. Such a confirmation of duty cannot be sustained. Extended period cannot be invoked under such circumstances. Conclusion - i) Mere preparing the advertising material does not come under the ambit of advertising and therefore, the activity undertaken by the appellants cannot be held to be advertisement agency service . ii) Extended period cannot be invoked. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 200
  Refund of the unutilized CENVAT credit - rejection on the grounds that the services rendered by the appellants are Intermediary Services in nature and therefore, cannot be treated as Export of Services - whether the appellants are appellants are intermediaries as far as the services rendered to M/s Air BNB Ireland are concerned? - HELD THAT:- The authorities below have not interpreted the clauses of the agreements and the facts of the case correctly. The terms of the agreements give an unmissable understanding that Only the main service i.e. promotional and marketing services is being provided by the Appellant and there is no auxiliary service is involved; the compensation to the appellant is on cost plus markup basis; appellant is an independent contractor of Airbnb Ireland; there is no agent-principal relationship; appellant may have entered in to subcontracts for the provision of service, agreement will be between subcontractor and the Appellant and the responsibility will be on the Appellant; the Appellant raises bills on Air BNB Ireland and not on their Customers. The appellant has no contract with the customers of Airbnb Ireland. The fact that the appellant has subcontracted does not make them an intermediary as per CBIC Circular dated 20.09.2021. It was held in M/s Blackrock Services India Pvt Ltd [ 2022 (8) TMI 874 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH ] following the decision in JFE Steel India Pvt Ltd [ 2020 (3) TMI 1342 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH ] that if the case of Revenue is that the activities undertaken by the appellants in present case is not amounting to Export of Service then the proceedings need to be initiated against the appellant for demanding the service tax in respect of the taxable services provided by the appellant. In the present case no such proceedings demanding the Service Tax on these taxable services provided by the appellant have been initiated in terms of Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994. By not initiating any such proceedings Revenue itself has allowed these taxable services provided as Export of Services. Having done so they cannot in a proceeding under Rule 5 for refund of accumulated credit take the contrary stand and deny refund treating the services provided not to be export of services. Conclusion - The appellant s services were not intermediary in nature and thus qualified as export services. Consequently, the appellant was entitled to the refund of the unutilized CENVAT credit. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 199
  Non-payment of service tax on taxable service relating to Construction of Commercial or Industrial building and civil structure and Works Contract - Non-payment of Service tax on construction services provided to IIM, DDA, CEAI, Mr. Manoj Arora and Mr. Anuj Dandone - Short payment of Service tax on construction services provided to Sweta Estates Private Limited, AVA Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Birla EduTech Limited - Non-payment of Service tax on Advances and Miscellaneous Income shown in balance sheet - Non-payment of Service tax on Freight and Cartage Expenses shown in balance sheet. Non-payment of Service tax on construction services provided to IIM, DDA, CEAI, Mr. Manoj Arora and Mr. Anuj Dandone - HELD THAT:- IIMs are not-for-profit educational bodies and not in the nature of commercial concerns. It is submitted that services in relation to the construction of Noida campus for IIM, Lucknow were carried out for not-for-profit organization and constructed buildings were not primarily used for commerce or industry. Hence, the impugned services are not covered under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service or Works Contract Service - reliance placed in the decision in the case of Banna Ram Choudhary Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur, [ 2017 (9) TMI 86 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] , wherein it was held that buildings used for educational purpose by recognized educational institutions cannot be categorized as commercial buildings , and the construction thereof is not leviable to Service tax under commercial or industrial construction service . Similarly Delhi Development Authority (DDA) is observed to be a statutory body established under Delhi Development Act, 1957 (DDA Act) with the primary objective to promote and secure the development of Delhi as stated in Section 6 of the DDA Act. It is an autonomous body which reports directly to the Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India. Hence, construction of Indoor Stadium at Siri Fort Sport Complex was for being used by the Government for holding Commonwealth Games and not for generating any profit from the same. It was a non-commercial project, and the construction was undertaken for national interest. Above all, it is submitted that the stadium is a public used for the recreation of the public. Thus, it cannot be said that construction services were used by DDA primarily for commerce or industry. Further consulting Engineering Association of India Limited (CEAI) is incorporated under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956 as a not-for-profit company as stated in Preamble of Memorandum of Association (MOA) of CEAI. Clause 5.0 of MOA of CEAI stipulates that all the income, earnings, movable, immovable properties of the Association shall be solely utilized and applied towards the promotion of its aims and objectives only as set forth in the Memorandum of Association. No profit thereof shall be paid or transferred directly or indirectly by way of dividends, bonus, profits or in any manner whatsoever to the present or past members of the Association who shall have no personal claim on any moveable or immoveable properties of the Association or make any profits whatsoever by virtue of his membership . - it is clear that CEAI also is a not-for-profit organization and not in the nature of commercial concerns. It is submitted that construction services of Secretariat Building for CEAI were carried out for a not-for-profit organization and constructed buildings were not primarily used for commerce or industry. Hence, the impugned services are not covered under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service or Works Contract Service . All onus is on department to establish that the building was being used for such purposes by which the organization using the same was making profit. We draw our support from the decision in the case of Manisha Projects Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise S.T., Ghaziabad [ 2019 (3) TMI 448 - CESTAT ALLAHABAD] . In view of above discussions, it is held that construction services provided to IIM, DDA and CEAI are not taxable under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service , Construction of Complex Service or Works Contract Service . Thus, the impugned demand is not sustainable. Construction activities pertaining to private residence of Shri Manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone - HELD THAT:- The construction activities pertaining to private residence of Shri Manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone were outside the ambit of Service Tax, it is held that the impugned services are not covered under sub-clause (a) to Section 65(25b) and sub-clause (ii)(b) of the Explanation to Section 65(zzzza) of the Act, therefore, not taxable under Commercial or Industrial Construction Service or Works Contract Service - In the present case, the respondent had undertaken the construction of single residential unit for Shri Manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone, which cannot qualify as residential complex as defined under Section 65(91a) for the purpose of sub-clause (a) of Section 65(30a) and sub-clause (ii) (c) of the Explanation to Section 65(zzzza) of the Act. Thus, impugned services are not covered under Construction of Complex Service or Works Contract Service . Construction services provided to Sweta Estates Private Limited, AVA Builders Pvt. Ltd. and Birla Edutech Limited - HELD THAT:- The issue is no longer res integra as the value of free of cost material is not includible in the value of gross amount charged for payment of service tax. The value of free of cost material supplied by M/s. Sweta Estates Private Limited (service recipient) to the Respondent (service provider) was not required to be included in the assessable value for determination of service tax liability as it does not form part of the value charged by the service provider for rendering the services. The value of free of cost material is neither an amount charged by the service provider, nor a consideration paid by the service recipient. Service tax demand on advances and miscellaneous income shown in the balance sheet is with respect to the advances received during relevant period includes the amount is respect of the construction services provided to IIM, DDA, CEAI, Shri manish Arora and Shri Anuj Dandone - HELD THAT:- Said advances were also not liable to service tax. Also the amount declared as miscellaneous income in the balance sheet during 2009-10 to 2011-12 was not pertaining to any taxable services. The said amount pertained to the unclaimed amount by the creditors and security deposits received by the respondent. The said facts are not in dispute in the present appeal. Thus, the impugned demand of service tax on miscellaneous income is not sustainable. Service tax demand on freight and cartage expenses that amount shown as Freight and Cartage Expenses - HELD THAT:- The amount shown as a cartage is related to payments made to the supplier of the goods which included the transportation cost. Transportation and pumping charges are in respect of pumping of ready-mix concrete (RMC) material for construction activity. The aforesaid expenses also include expenses towards insurance and car policy and site expenses (payment made to cab supplier). The said amount/expenses/charges were not paid by the respondent directly to the transporter for transportation of any goods. Thus, the said activity cannot be covered under GTA Services, hence, no service tax liability can be levied on the aforesaid amount/expenses/charges under GTA services. Interest and penalties - invocation of extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The respondent followed a reasonable and correct interpretation of law. Therefore, the respondent cannot be alleged to have suppressed fact with the malafide intention - subsequent SCN for the same period could not be issued invoking extended period of limitation. In this regard, reliance is place on J.K. Enterprises Vs. Principal Commissioner of Central Excise, Alwar [ 2023 (1) TMI 936 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] . Resultantly, no interest is recoverable and no penalties are imposable. Conclusion - i) IIM, CEAI, and DDA are not commercial concerns, and their construction services are not taxable. ii) Single residential unit constructions are not taxable under the relevant service categories. iii) FOC materials are not includible in the taxable value for service tax. iv) Advances related to non-taxable activities and miscellaneous income not linked to taxable services are not subject to service tax. v) There are no suppression of facts or intent of tax evasion by the respondent. Interest, penalt and extended period cannot be invoked. Appeal of Revenue dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 198
  Adjournments beyond the statutory limit of three times as per Section 35C(1A) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 - non prosecution od appeal in terms of Rule 20 of CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982 - HELD THAT:- In case of Ishwar lal Mali Rathod [ 2021 (9) TMI 1301 - SUPREME COURT] condemning the practice of adjournments sought mechanically and allowed by the Courts/Tribunal s Hon ble Supreme Court has observed Considering the fact that in the present case ten times adjournments were given between 2015 to 2019 and twice the orders were passed granting time for cross examination as a last chance and that too at one point of time even a cost was also imposed and even thereafter also when lastly the High Court passed an order with extending the time it was specifically mentioned that no further time shall be extended and/or granted still the petitioner defendant never availed of the liberty and the grace shown. Conclusion - There are no justification for adjourning the matter beyond three times which is the maximum number statutorily provided. The Appeal is dismissed for non prosecution in terms of Rule 20 of CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 197
  Levy of penalty - whether penalty has been properly imposed or the matter should have been remanded on this aspect also for penalty under Section 78 required to be imposed? - HELD THAT:- The period involved in this case is January- 2014 to March-2015. It is found that the order setting aside penalty under Section 78, imposed penalty under Section 76 and remanded matter on various points. Same has been correctly passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals).The fact is also noted that there was an earlier show cause notice issued to the party and that was done after thorough scrutiny of its functioning. Therefore, the matter was well within the knowledge of the department. Any provision relating to non-filing of return or not paying tax dues does not bring the concept of intent to evade payment of Tax as the same could be outcome of contentious issues on taxability, at times. As found by the Learned Commissioner (Appeals), only quantum of service tax was disputed and not the liability itself. In view of various payments made by the appellant as mentioned above, the order taking note has set aside the penalty under Section 78 of Finance Act, 1994. Conclusion - There is no error in the impugned order which set aside penalty under Section 78. Even otherwise imposition of simultaneous penalties under Section 76 and Section 78 is debatable in various High Courts. Appeal of the department is therefore liable to be rejected.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 196
  Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - benefit of threshold exemption and cum tax benefit - branded service to the subscribers or not - extended period of limitation - Admissibility of Cenvat credit. Recovery of service tax with interest and penalty - benefit of threshold exemption and cum tax benefit - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- It is settled principal in law that a subsequent judgment cannot be a basis for making the demand by invoking extended period. In this decision Tribunal has concluded that extended period of limitation would not be available for making this demand. Accordingly, the extended period of limitation would not be available for making this demand and the demand should be restricted to normal period of limitation. Admissibility of Cenvat credit - HELD THAT:- There are no reason to disagree with the findings recorded in the impugned order. The credit have to be allowed strictly as per the provisions of the Cenvat Credit Rules and appellant should have taken the credit within one year from the date of submission of document against which credit has been taken. In the case of Kusum Ingots Alloys Ltd. [ 2000 (7) TMI 108 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI] referred by Authorised Representative appearing for revenue, Tribunal have upheld the denial of credit taken beyond the period prescribed by Central Excise Rules, 1944 - it is not inclined to allow the benefit of Cenvat credit availed in respect of the documents which admissibly are more than one year beyond one year from the date of issuance of show cause notice which goes contrary to Rule 4 of Cenvat Credit Rules. Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The extended period of limitation could not have been invoked in this matter, therefore, penalties imposed under Section 78 is also set aside. Conclusion - i) The appellants are not providing any branded service to the subscribers and are entitled to avail the benefit of exemption Notification No. 33/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012. ii) Extended period of limitation could not have been invoked in this matter, therefore, penalties imposed under Section 78 are also set aside. iii) The appellants are entitled to avail Cenvat credit of the service tax paid by the MSO, subject to compliance with the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. iv) The demand should be restricted to the normal period of limitation. Matters are remanded back to the Original Authority for re-quantification - Appeals are partly allowed and matter remanded to original authority for re-quantification of demand.

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• Central Excise

• 2025 (3) TMI 195
  Lapse of cenvat credit under Rule 11(3) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 - rebate claim of duty paid on exported goods - HELD THAT:- Sub-clause (i) of sub-rule 3 of Rule 11 will have to be treated as distinct and separate from sub-clause (ii). Sub-clause (ii) alone provides for lapse of cenvat credit. Sub-clause (i) does not provide for lapse. The appellants have conceded that the case on hand falls only sub-clause (i) of sub-rule 3 of Rule 11 of CCR, 2004. The logical consequence is that the subject cenvat credit cannot be treated as having lapsed. The argument of the learned standing counsel that sub-clause (ii) should be read integrally with sub-clause (i) stands rejected. The provision for lapse set out in sub-clause (ii) cannot be applied in respect of the situation covered by sub-clause(i). Whether these writ appeals are competent? - HELD THAT:- The latest Instruction dated 06.08.2024 reads that appeal shall not be filed in the CESTAT, High Court and Supreme Court if the case fell within the prescribed monetary limits. Exceptions have also been carved out. It is noticed that the direction is appeal shall not be filed . If in contravention of the instruction, an appeal is filed, the assessee can bring it to the notice of the concerned authority and seek withdrawal of the appeal. It may not be open to the tribunal or the High Court to dismiss the appeal filed by the revenue by citing the said Instruction. Once the appeal has been filed, it is required to necessarily deal with the issue on merits. Conclusion - i) The cenvat credit of the company did not lapse under Rule 11(3)(i). ii) Once an appeal is filed, it must be heard on its merits, even if it falls within the prescribed monetary limits set by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs. Appeal dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 194
  Rrefund of the duty paid in cash - appellants have procured capital goods under EPCG Scheme and have not availed CENVAT credit of the same - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the procurement of capital goods being from a domestic manufacturer, wherein policy provides that such domestic manufacturer can avail the refund of excise duty paid by them under the condition that the recipient, the appellant in this case, does not avail CENVAT credit. In the instant case, the appellants are in a better position inasmuch as CENVAT credit was not available to them in case the supplier availed the refund. In fact, the condition in Para 8.5 of the Exim Policy needs to be looked at from the supplier s angle and not from the recipient s angle, in this case, the appellant s angle. As long as the appellant has not availed the credit, the appellant has not violated any condition of the Notification regarding the exhaustion of the available credit. As submitted by the appellants, exhausting the credit necessarily means the credit they have taken and not certainly the credit which they have not taken. If the appellant had more credit, they would have paid less in cash and if the credit was on the lower side, they would have paid more in cash. The appellants contend that either way, the situation is revenue neutral or the credit available at the hands of the buyers will not be altered by the manner in which the appellants pay duty on the products they cleared. Conclusion - The condition in the Exim Policy regarding the exhaustion of available credit should be viewed from the supplier s perspective, not the recipient s. The appellants had not violated any conditions by not availing CENVAT credit. The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 193
  CENVAT Credit - input service of transportation of goods upto the place of removal - extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The issue to determine is the admissibility of Cenvat credit in respect of outward transportation whether the supply of goods on FOR basis or at the factory gate. If Board has clarified through the circular on FOR basis the credit should have been admissible in the present case, it is found from the purchase order reproduced bellow that the supply of total cost basis at the premises of the appellant and in case of any defect entire sale was to be rejected. From the perusal of the above purchase order the condition, it is found that the entire supply is made on total cost basis, and could have been rejected by the buyer for any defects noticed subsequent to delivery. The above condition of purchase order is enough to hold that transit risk was with the appellant and supply was made on FOR basis. That being so, on the basis of Board Circular the credit could not have been denied. Extended period of limitation - HELD THAT:- The Board has specifically directed against invocation of extended period of limitation, as the issue involved is interpretational in nature. The demand made by invoking extended period of limitation goes contrary to the spirit of the circular. Thus there are no merits in the same and also the penalties imposed under Rule 15 read with section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944. There are no merits in the impugned order and the same is set aside - appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 192
  Valuation of goods manufactured by the appellant during the period from 28.08.1986 to 31.03.1989 - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact that the dispute pertains to the period from 28.08.1986 to 31.03.1989 and the issue is coming up for hearing for the third time. The appellant was following the procedure laid down in Rule 173C (11) of Central Excise Rules, 1944 and duty payment was based on value shown in the SDAs. It was further sold by the sister concern of the appellant at higher rate by adding additional items as optional items, including battery etc., which are manufactured by other manufactures. Even as per the statement of the Senior Manager dated 30.10.1990, the purchase order was received from sister concern M/s. Keltron controls and transactions were regulated through Sectional Debit Advices (SDAs). He also stated that the appellant was not aware of the original orders of M/s. Keltron controls and has also not verified the invoices of M/s. Keltron controls regarding sale of UPS system including optional items and the excise duty remittance was not based on the realization of the amount by their sister concern M/s. Keltron controls. The original Adjudicating Authority, only after considering the above facts, held that since the appellant had filed SDAs along with RT-12 Returns and when it is made available to the concerned officer, there is a failure on the part of department to probe the matter further and due to that reason, the demand invoking the extended period of limitation and penalty proposed in the show cause notice were dropped. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, invoking extended period of limitation is unsustainable. Considering the above, demand, if any for the normal period is confirmed in accordance with law. The demand by invoking the extended period of limitation and penalty imposed as per the impugned order on the appellant are set aside. Conclusion - The penalty imposed were not justified due to the lack of evidence of undervaluation or suppression of facts by the appellant. Appeal allowed in part.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 191
  Classification of goods manufactured by the appellant - classifiable under Tariff Item 84369100 of CETA, 1985 or under 73.14 - HELD THAT:- The Division Bench of this Tribunal in the appellant s own case [ 2016 (9) TMI 572 - CESTAT CHANDIGARH] where the identical issue was in dispute, has held that Welded Wire Mesh is classifiable under Tariff Item 84369100 of CETA, 1985. The said decision of the Tribunal was appealed against by the Revenue before the Hon ble Apex Court but the Hon ble Apex Court vide its order dated 20.09.2024 has dismissed the same on monetary ground. Conclusion - The goods are classified under Tariff Item 84369100. The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 190
  CENVAT Credit - input services - outdoor catering services - period post amendment w.e.f. 01.04.2011 - interest - penalty - HELD THAT:- The issue of availment of Cenvat credit of service tax paid on outdoor catering services , it is no more res integra and it is decided by the Larger Bench in Wipro Limited, [ 2018 (4) TMI 149 - CESTAT BANGALORE - LB ] that cenvat Credit of service tax paid on outdoor catering services cannot be availed, post 01.04.2011 in view of the exclusion clause C(ii) to the definition of input service 2(l) of Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004. Therefore, service tax paid on outdoor catering services is not eligible for availment of Cenvat credit. Demand of interest - HELD THAT:- The confirmation of demand of interest on the cenvat credit demand is not sustainable following the decision of the Hon ble High Court of Karnataka in case of M/s. Bill Forge. Penalty - HELD THAT:- It is found for the earlier period this Tribunal has set aside the penalty proceedings under Rule 15(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and also in the adjudications for the subsequent periods the penalty has been dropped by the adjudicating authority, hence, it is found that penalty imposed in this appeal is unsustainable. Consequently, the confirmation of demand of interest and the imposition of penalty in the impugned order is unsustainable and needs to be set aside. Conclusion - The appellant was not entitled to avail Cenvat credit on outdoor catering services post the amendment. However, the demand of interest and penalty imposed on the appellant set aside, deeming them unsustainable based on legal precedents and the specific circumstances of the case. Appeal allowed in part.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 189
  Benefit of N/N. 63/1995-CE dated 16.03.1995 to the vendors, who supply goods to the enlisted companies/organisations in the Notification - HELD THAT:- The Tribunal in the case of Vulcan Gears Vs. Commissioner of C. Ex. [ 2010 (5) TMI 781 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] held that the Tribunal while deciding in favour of the appellant, took note of the Circular issued by the Board in respect of Notification No. 184/86, which is the precedent Notification to Notification No. 63/95-CE. In Circular vide F. No. 213/18/91-C.Ex.6, Circular No. 5/92, dated 19-5-1992 and another letter from Ministry of Finance F. No. IV/16/4/2003, dated 7-11-2003, it has been clarified that the exemption will be extended to all job workers and vendors supplying inputs required by BEML for manufacture of finished goods supplied to Ministry of Defence. The appellant has relied on the case laws mentioned, wherein it is held that the beneficial Notification should be given effect retrospectively and oppressing Notification should be given effect, prospectively. The appellant has paid duty on the goods supplied to BEML from November 2009, after the issue of clarification by the Board Vide Circular F. No. 110/32/2009-CX-32 dated 27.10.2009. The appellant contended that the period involved in this case is from June 2009 to October, 2009 i.e., before the issue of the clarification by the Board, hence they have contended that they are eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 63/1995-CE, in view of their above submissions and the decisions of the Hon ble Apex Court and the Tribunals. Appeal allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 188
  CENVAT Credit - input invoices which were received more than 6 months before availing credit in the factory - Civil charges - Electrical License - Pest Control - Testing charges for Civil works - RCM-Repairs - contravention of Rule 2(l) of CCR, 2004 - cenvat credit on input service invoices issued prior to 01.09.2014 and credit availed in October 2014 - applicability of 6 months pursuant to issuance of Notification No. 21/2014-CE (NT) dated 11.07.2014 which has been brought into effect from 01.09.2014 for invoices issued prior to 01.09.2014 - HELD THAT:- The issue is no more res integra and covered by the judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Roquette Riddhi Siddhi Pvt. Ltd. V. CCE, Customs and Service Tax, Belgaum [ 2024 (1) TMI 1210 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] , wherein it is held that appellants have correctly taken the cenvat credit on 18/09/2014 for the invoices issued prior to 01/09/2014. The confirmation of demand of cenvat credit of Rs. 1,04,80,736/- on this count is unsustainable in law, accordingly, set aside. Since the appellant had submitted not to pursue the confirmation of cenvat credit of Rs. 1,75,320/- as they have already reversed a major portion of Rs. 1,11,999/- and the balance amount is negligible, the order confirming the demand on this count is upheld. However, the imposition of penalty for availing the said credit being interpretation of law cannot be sustained, accordingly set aside. Appeal is partly allowed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 187
  Reduction of penalty under Section 11AC of CEA - duty and interest not paid within 30 days from the date of communication of the order of the Central Excise officer - interest under Section 35FF of the Act for delayed refund of the amount deposited - HELD THAT:- The proviso to Section 11AC of the Act is clear. The reduction of penalty to 25% will apply only in those cases where the amount of duty determined by the Central Excise officer along with interest is deposited within 30 days from the date of communication of the order of the Central Excise officer. There is no reference to order of an appellate authority such as Commissioner (Appeals), Tribunal or High Court or Supreme Court. As the appellant had not fulfilled the conditions of this proviso, he was not entitled to the benefit of reduced penalty. Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner was correct in calculating the penalty as equal to 100% of the duty under Section 11AC of the Act and consequently, reducing the amount of refund. Interest as applicable under Section 35FF of the Act - HELD THAT:- It is clear from section 35FF that where an amount of duty deposited by the appellant under section 35F is required to be refunded consequent upon the order of the appellate authority or tribunal and such amount is not refunded within three months from the date of communication of such order, interest has to be paid. In this case, the order of the Tribunal is dated 29.01.2019 but the appellant had communicated the copy of this order to the officer and sought refund only on 01.07.2022. There is nothing on record to show that the Final Order of this Tribunal was communicated to the Assistant Commissioner through any other means. The Assistant Commissioner passed the order on 05.08.2022 i.e., within less than two months of the application. Conclusion - i) Assistant Commissioner was correct in calculating the penalty as equal to 100% of the duty under Section 11AC of the Act. ii) The appellant was not entitled to interest under Section 35FF due to the delay in seeking the refund. The appeal is rejected and the impugned order is upheld.

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• CST, VAT & Sales Tax

• 2025 (3) TMI 186
  Challenge to appellate order by which assessment order was confirmed - whether the petitioner was right in his contention that the output tax demand for the period during which the eligibility certificate was not renewed or rejected, namely, 4.3.2015 to 31.3.2015 could be adjusted with the forwarded accumulated input tax credit? - HELD THAT:- The learned tribunal had rightly took into consideration the provisions of the West Bengal Value Added Tax Act and found that the rejection of the renewal of the eligibility certificate will render the petitioner/dealer ineligibility for output tax for discharging the liability the dealer will have to pay the taxes. However, the claim of the petitioner/dealer to adjust the carry forward input tax which was carried forward to the subsequent quarter is not feasible as there is no such provision under the Act. Conclusion - The learned tribunal was perfectly right in holding that the output liability for the rejected period, namely, from 4.3.2015 to 31.3.2015 was to be paid by the writ petitioner within 30 days of such rejection in terms of Rule 180 of the said Rules and having not done so, the authorities were justified in demanding the same by passing the impugned order. The petitioner has not made out any case for interference with the order passed by the learned tribunal - Petition dismissed.

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• Indian Laws

• 2025 (3) TMI 185
  Rejection of application filed by the appellant herein, seeking leave to appeal against the judgment and order - acquittal of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - issuance of statutory notice - HELD THAT:- It is inclined to remand the matter to the High Court, it is not proposed to say anything further. However, all that we want to say at this stage is that the High Court while declining to grant leave, should have kept in mind Section 139 of the NI Act as well as Section 118 of the NI Act. The High Court should have tried to consider the case of the complainant applying the two provisions to the facts of the case, more particularly, having regard to the evidence on record oral as well as documentary. This aspect has not been touched even by the Trial Court and therefore, it was necessary for the High Court to look into it closely. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside - Appeal disposed off.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 184
  Interpretation of statute - Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Whether disputes between partners of a limited liability partnership (LLP) and the LLP can at all be covered by the arbitration agreement contained in a limited liability partnership agreement (LLP Agreement) to which the LLP is not a signatory? - HELD THAT:- Under Item 1 of the First Schedule the mutual rights and duties of the LLP and its partners, subject to the LLP Agreement, is governed by the provisions of the First Schedule. Item 14 of the First Schedule provides that all disputes among partners arising out of the LLP Agreement that cannot be resolved in terms of the LLP Agreement, shall be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration Act. This is another statutory indication that the subject matter of the LLP Agreement includes duties owed by partners to the LLP and also duties owed to the partners by the LLP. This would necessarily render the LLP a necessary party to the arbitration proceedings relating to the LLP s operations and governance, despite the LLP not being a signatory to the LLP Agreement. Therefore, even if there had been no arbitration clause at all in the LLP Agreement, the First Schedule would lead to an arbitration agreement being in existence in the eyes of law, for disputes among the partners. The dispute at hand relates to the expulsion of a partner from the LLP. Whether the Managing Partner alone was responsible for it and other partners acquiesced in or approved of that decision is a subject matter of merits of the dispute. Whether the expelled partner s conduct warranted expulsion, is a question that would necessarily require examination of the injury, if any, occasioned to the LLP s interests by such partner s conduct for the drastic step of expulsion to be taken. Therefore, it would be simply impossible for this Court to reject this Application under Section 11. The upshot of this contention is that the LLP is not a necessary party to the dispute. Even a plain reading of the invocation notice addressed to Kothari would show that it was issued to him in his capacity as the Managing Partner. Therefore, to read it as a personal dispute of Radia with Kothari in his individual capacity is a misconceived contention. This argument has to be stated to be rejected. The dispute inter alia relates to expulsion of Radia. The expulsion is from the LLP. The cause for expulsion would necessarily have to relate to the injury allegedly occasioned to the LLP and to its partners, by the alleged conduct of Radia that led to the expulsion. Conclusion - The objections raised by the Respondents to allowing this Section 11 Application are totally devoid of merit. Despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the LLP Agreement and in Item 14 of the First Schedule, the contention that the LLP itself is extraneous to the very LLP Agreement governing the LLP, in my opinion, is untenable and frivolous. Such objections have been raised evidently to delay and frustrate the commencement of arbitration proceedings. Applocation disposed off.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 183
  Challenge to impugned order, rejecting the petition filed u/s 210 Cr.PC. - proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act should be stayed or quashed - HELD THAT:- From the record it is seen that a petition for quashing was also filed by the petitioners praying for quashing of the CID (Assam) P.S. Case No. 03/2017 and accordingly the further proceeding was also stayed by this Court vide order dated 14.11.2018 and which was registered as Criminal Petition No. 828/2017 was subsequently allowed by quashing the CID Case No. 03/2017. During pendency of the CID case, the complaint case u/s 138 of the N.I. Act was filed alleging the dishonour of cheque amounting to Rs. 81 lacs. But, from the perusal of the records and the annexures filed along with the petition, it is seen that the subject matter of both the cases cannot be considered as same or similar one to pass any order to stay the proceedings by calling any police report in connection with CID P.S. Case No. 03/2017. In CID P.S. Case No. 03/2017 the allegation of misappropriation of money was amounting to Rs. 1,36,97,352/- whereas the Criminal Case No. 3204/2017 is only in connection with the dishonour of cheque amounting to Rs. 81 lacs which is alleged to have been issued by the present petitioners. From the entire facts and circumstances of the case, it is seen that the subject matter of both the proceedings cannot be considered as same or similar to stay the proceedings of the criminal complaint case. More so, it is also seen that the CID (Assam) Case No. 03/2017 has already been quashed by this Court and hence the question of stay of the present proceeding also does not arise at this stage. Further, the alternative prayer of the petitioners to convert the prayer of the present case for setting aside and quashing of the entire criminal proceeding also cannot be entertained at present for quashing of the entire case by invoking power u/s 482 Cr.PC. Conclusion - The learned Trial Court below committed no irregularity or mistake by passing the order dated 12.10.2018 by rejecting the prayer of the petitioners filed u/s 210 Cr.PC and hence there is no reason for setting aside and quashing the said order by invoking the power u/s 482 Cr.PC and hence this Court is of the opinion that there is no need of any interference in the order passed by the learned JMFC dated 12.10.2018 in C.R. Case No. 3204 of 2017. Petition dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 182
  Dishonour of Cheque - vicarious liability of directors - it is alleged that Trial Court has mechanically passed the summoning orders without appreciating that the petitioners were not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the accused company - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is well settled that under Section 138/ 141 of NI Act, the complainant is to make the particular averment in the complaint, to the effect that the accused person was the director of the accused company at the relevant time and is responsible for its day-to-day affairs, and therefore is vicariously liable for the offence. Thereafter, the onus of proving that at the relevant time, the accused persons were not the directors of the accused company and were not responsible for its day-to-day affairs, lies upon the accused persons and the same is matter of trial. It must be borne in mind that Section 141 of the NI Act is a penal provision that creates vicarious liability for the accused. The petitioners have been implicated on the premise that they were responsible for the day-to-day affairs of the company. It is also settled that every person, regardless of whether they are in charge of the company during each series of act necessary to constitute the offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act or not, could be proceeded against if they are in charge of the affairs of the company even during one of the omissions that is necessary to constitute an offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act. The Court can exercise its jurisdiction only upon unimpeachable and uncontroverted evidence being placed on record, however, in the absence of such evidence, the fact whether the accused person is responsible for the affairs of the accused company becomes a factual dispute, which is to be seen during trial - In a situation where the accused moves the Court for quashing even before the trial has commenced, the Court s approach should be careful not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption supporting the complaint. The factual issues that serve as defences in the case are not appropriate for determination under the powers conferred by Section 482 of the CrPC at this stage. It is well-established that this Court should refrain from expressing any views on disputed questions of fact in proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, as doing so could pre-empt the findings of the trial court. Conclusion - Considering the contradicting material on record, the documents adduced by the petitioners cannot be said to be of such sterling and unimpeachable quality that it merits the quashing of the summons and consequential proceedings thereof. It cannot be said that the petitioners are not responsible for the functioning of the accused company or that the complaint is bereft of the requisite ingredients so as to proceed against the petitioners. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned orders - petition dismissed.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 181
  Dishonour of Cheque - invocation of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C - application for sending the alleged cheque to handwriting expert for determination of the age of the contents and the signature has been turned down - HELD THAT:- The petitioner has indeed not disputed his signature contained in the cheque. Therefore, the trial court has rightly rejected the prayer for sending the cheque and other exhibits to handwriting experts. The trial court has also taken into consideration the delayed motion of the petitioner to send the exhibits to the handwriting experts. Although the judgments in subject cited by both the parties at the Bar are conflicting views on the subject but the fact remains that under the statutory command every case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act needs to be concluded within a stipulated time framed as prescribed under Section 143 of the N.I. Act. In the instant case, the complaint was filed on 24.02.2020 and about five years have gone by. However, the matter is still pending for conclusion of the trial. In that scenario, the trial court s order rejecting the application of the petitioner appears to be unquestionable. At the same time, right of an accused to defend in the criminal case is indefeasible. In the case of present nature when presumption is operating against the petitioner, which is rebuttable in nature, the right of the petitioner-accused to lead evidence in his rebuttal is also inalienable right. Therefore, the petitioner being accused has right to adduce all evidence under his command to disprove the case of the complainant-opposite party. The petitioner should get at least an opportunity to lead his evidence in rebuttal. Therefore, it is open for the petitioneraccused to obtain report from a private handwriting expert and place it on record, if so advised. It is also open for the petitioner to lead any other evidence to prove his case on his defence, but that should not be at the cost of delaying the proceeding inordinately. Conclusion - The petitioner is allwoed an opportunity to present defense evidence, including expert reports, to rebut the complainant s case. The CRLMC is disposed of.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 180
  Dishonour of cheque - insufficient funds - discharge of legal liability or not - plaintiff proved the transaction led to execution of Ext.A1, so as to get the suit amount, as claimed or not - trial court went wrong in holding that the plaintiff proved Ext.A1 and the defendant s case is contrary, to be acted upon - HELD THAT:- On reappreciation of the available evidence, the case of the plaintiff as to borrowing of Rs.3,00,000/- during the month of January, 2005, by the defendant and consequential issuance of Ext.A1 cheque dated 31.05.2005, were proved by the evidence of PW1, since the substantive evidence given by PW1 in this regard was not shaken. The defendant, in fact, had inconsistent contentions. That is to say, before filing the written statement, when Exts.A6 and A8 notices were issued, the case of the defendant was that the plaintiff was attempting to misuse the blank signed papers and blank signed cheques of the defendant, stolen away by Sri.Vijayakumar. But, thereafter in the the written statement even the signature in the cheque was also denied. It is the well settled law that, when a fact is disputed, the evidence to prove the same is substantive evidence, though corroborative evidence also can be adduced to support the substantive evidence. Indubitably, corroborative evidence will not stand unless there is no substantive evidence. In the instant case, the substantive evidence as that of the plaintiff in the matter of transaction, which led to execution of Ext.A1 cheque was not shaken during cross-examination. Therefore, presumptions under Section 118 (a) to (g) of the NI Act is to be adjudged in favour of the plaintiff. The inconsistent case put up by the defendant is not supported by even remote piece of evidence and therefore the said case not at all established, inturn the presumptions in favour of the plaintiff not rebutted. In such view of the matter, the trial court rightly granted decree. In fact, the said verdict does not require any interference. In view of the above, remand cannot be made merely for the purpose of enabling a party to fill up the lacuna in the evidence. Accordingly, the remand plea at the instance of the learned counsel for the defendant also is liable to fail. Conclusion - The presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act in favor of the holder of a negotiable instrument and the necessity for defendants to provide credible evidence to rebut such presumptions. The appeal stands dismissed and the verdict under challenge stands confirmed. Considering the nature of the case, there is no reason to disallow the cost of this proceedings to the plaintiff/respondent.

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• 2025 (3) TMI 179
  Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remdy of appeal - jurisdiction of RERA - non-compliance with certain provisions of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA Act) - HELD THAT:- There is a bestowment of a statutory right in any aggrieved person to file a complaint with the authority or before the adjudicating officer, thus relating to any violations or contraventions qua any provisions of the Act or of the rules and regulations made thereunder, and, the said statutory endowment is stated therein to be ably raisable against any promoter, allottee or Real Estate Agent, as the case may be. Resultantly, therebys, the issue relating to the exercising of able jurisdiction, upon, the apposite complaint rather becomes more pointedly underpinned, on the supra provisions relating to the adjudicatory capacity of the RERA, than visa-vis respective omissions being made to either sub-Section 1 to Section 3 of RERA Act or to the second proviso to sub-Section 1 of Section 3 of RERA Act. The vesting of jurisdictional competence, in the RERA authority, is pinpointedly grooved upon the bestowment of a remedy to the aggrieved, thus through the statutory mandate enclosed in Section 31 of RERA Act, than upon, the necessity of compliances being made by the promoter, vis-a-vis the mandate which occurs in sub-Section 1 of the Section 3 of RERA Act. Moreover therebys wants if any of compliances rather even by the competent authority, vis- -vis, the mandate enclosed in the second proviso to sub-Section 1 of Section 3 of RERA Act, thus is not the apposite statutory precursor rather for vesting the competent adjudicatory jurisdiction in the RERA Authorities. Since the gamut of the apposite jurisdictional provisions, relating to the conferment of competent adjudicatory jurisdiction, upon the RERA vis-a-vis the instant controversy, when but also naturally covers promoter(s), who irrefutably also is the present petitioner, as he has evidently in terms of the definition of promoter , offered through Annexure P-3 rather the subject project for sale to the prospective buyers. Resultantly, when on makings of plain and literal interpretation of the supra provisions, but manifests that therebys the competent adjudicatory jurisdiction vis-a-vis complaints, as received from any ill act of even a promoter, as the present petitioner, thus is, hence becomes conferred upon the RERA authorities. Conclusion - i) The writ petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative appellate remedy under the RERA Act. ii) The jurisdiction of the RERA Authority to adjudicate complaints, even in the absence of project registration under Section 3, confirmed. iii) The non-registration of the project did not invalidate the RERA Authority s jurisdiction or render its actions coram non judice. Petition dismissed.

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