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TMI Blog1985 (12) TMI 185X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 27.9.1985, though the Order-in-Appeal had been received on 7-5-1984, an application for condonation of delay has been filed. 2. The application for condonation of delay recites the facts on the basis of which condonation is sought for. It is stated that on receipt of the Tribunal s order on 7-5-1984, the applicants filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi on 28-5-1984 in which a stay application had also been filed and stay had been granted ex-parte, for vacating which an application was filed by the Revenue on 5-12-1984. It is further stated that the application for discharge of the rule was rejected on 5.12.1984, and the Writ petition was then posted for hearing, and that on 29-7-85, the Writ petition was allowed to be withdrawn as the applicants could pursue the alternative remedy of seeking a reference of Questions of Law to the High Court. It is stated that in the order permitting withdrawal, the High Court was pleased to observe that the applicants had been prosecuting the Writ petition with due diligence. It is claimed that the period between the filing of the writ petition and the disposal thereof should be excluded in computing the period of limitation, and if s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itation under section 35G, and if so done, the present application would be found to have been presented within the 90 days mentioned in Section 35G. The provisions in the Central Excises Salt Act do not contain any provision for such exclusion in computing the period of limitation. But Shri Rangaswami contends that such exclusion is permissible under the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. But the contention of the department is that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to proceedings before this Tribunal under the Central Excises and Salt Act, and therefore, no such exclusion in computing the period of limitation, as put forward by the applicants, is permissible. 5. The primary question, therefore, for determination is whether it would be open to the applicants to have recourse to the provisions of the Limitation Act in the manner claimed by them. Shri Rangaswamy in this connection relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in re: Commissioner of Sales-Tax v. M/s. Madanlal Das Sons [(1976) 38 STC 543 = AIR 1977 SC 523]. He points out that in the said decision the Supreme Court had held that the provisions of section 12(2) of the Limitation Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the provisions of the Limitation Act apply only to application or appeals before Courts and not to proceedings before special Adjudicating authorities. It is thus seen that when the Supreme Court had to specifically consider the question of the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities (as distinct from Courts) it had consistently held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply to proceedings before such authorities. As far as the decision relied upon by Shri Rangaswami is concerned, it appears from the judgment of the Supreme Court that neither of the parties to the matter disputed the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities. The dispute appears to have been only whether in the circumstances of that case, and taking into consideration the provisions of the Act under which the adjudicating authority was functioning, the particular provisions of the Limitation Act were applicable or not. As seen earlier, the latest judgment of the Supreme Court supported the contention of the department regarding the non-applicability of the provisions of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mitation should be even permitted to be taken by the Department. He points out that after rule nisi had been issued by the High Court on 30.5.1984, the Department moved for discharge thereof on 5.12.1984, contending that as there was an alternative remedy open to the applicants by way of reference to the High Court, their Writ petition would not maintainable. Shri Rangaswami contends that the period of 90 days calculated from 7-5-1984 had expired much before 5.12.84, and, therefore, when on 5.12.84, the department put forward the contention that the alternative remedy of reference to the High Court was open to the applicants they had conceded that the remedy was even then open to the applicants, though the 90 days mentioned in Sec. 35G had expired. Shri Rangaswami contends that in the circumstances the contentions now raised by the department ought not to be allowed to be put forward. But we are unable to agree with this contention since limitation is a plea which should be taken into consideration even if it is not set up by the aggrieved party, and, in any event, there is no question of estoppel against the provisions of a State. 9. Shri Rangaswami in this connection further re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ded for filing the necessary application, and that a period of extension thereof had also been provided for, and in such circumstances the Legislature had deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying section 14 of the Limitation Act. These observations would apply to the present facts also. 11. Thus, on a careful consideration of the submissions of both sides, we hold that the exclusion of the period between the date of filing of the Writ petition in High Court and the date of disposal thereof by the High Court (as prayed for by the applicants) cannot be permitted in computing the period of limitation for the filing of this application for reference. 12. We are further satisfied that even if the above prayer of the applicants is open in law, and is to be granted in view of the observations of the High Court regarding the pursuit of the proceedings in the Writ petition with due diligence, this application will have to be dismissed, in any event, by reason of the further delay after the disposal of the Writ petition by the High Court. The copy of the order under Section 35C had been received by the applicant on 7.5.84. The Writ had been filed on 29.5.84 i.e. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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