1985 (12) TMI 185 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Condonation of Delay
2. Applicability of the Limitation Act to Tribunal Proceedings
3. Exclusion of Time Spent in Writ Petition for Limitation Computation
4. Inherent Powers of the Tribunal

Detailed Analysis:

1. Condonation of Delay:
The appellants filed an application for condonation of delay under Section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act. The application was filed on 27-9-1985, though the Order-in-Appeal had been received on 7-5-1984. The appellants argued that the period between the filing of the writ petition and its disposal should be excluded in computing the period of limitation. The Tribunal noted that the application was beyond the 90-day limit prescribed under Section 35G and required sufficient cause for the delay. The Tribunal found that there was no proper explanation for the delay between the disposal of the writ petition and the filing of the reference application, thus rejecting the condonation plea.

2. Applicability of the Limitation Act to Tribunal Proceedings:
The appellants contended that the period spent in prosecuting the writ petition should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However, the Tribunal observed that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities like the Tribunal. The Tribunal cited several Supreme Court decisions, including Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, which held that the Limitation Act applies only to Courts and not to quasi-judicial authorities. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that the Limitation Act does not apply to its proceedings.

3. Exclusion of Time Spent in Writ Petition for Limitation Computation:
The appellants argued that the time spent in prosecuting the writ petition should be excluded from the limitation period. The Tribunal referred to the High Court's observation that the writ petition had been prosecuted with due diligence but left the question of exclusion under the Limitation Act open. The Tribunal concluded that the High Court had not observed that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply, leaving the question of exclusion to the Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the exclusion of the period between the filing and disposal of the writ petition could not be permitted in computing the limitation period.

4. Inherent Powers of the Tribunal:
The appellants urged the Tribunal to exercise its inherent powers to exclude the period spent in the writ petition. The Tribunal noted that it has no inherent powers to condone the period of limitation, as it is a statutory body. The Tribunal also referred to the Supreme Court's observation in AIR 1975 S.C. 1039 that the Legislature had deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act in such cases. Therefore, the Tribunal rejected the plea to exercise inherent powers for condonation.

Conclusion:
The Tribunal dismissed the application for condonation of the delay, citing the lack of a proper explanation for the delay and the non-applicability of the Limitation Act to its proceedings. Consequently, the application for reference was also dismissed as barred by limitation.