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TMI Blog1971 (10) TMI 114X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the revision petition was filed by Surinder Singh. The Chief Settlement Commissioner allowed him to deposit the balance of the auction price up to 30th May, 1968. He again failed to pay this amount within time and it is said that the Chief Settlement Commissioner gave him further time for doing so till 30th August, 1968. As Surinder Singh did not make the deposit up till that date as well, the Settlement Officer on 2nd October, 1968, cancelled the auction sale conducted on 24th August, 1959. This property was again put to auction on 17th January, 1969. Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal then gave the highest bid of ₹ 27,025.20 per cent of this amount was deposited at the time of auction and the balance had to be paid later. In the meantime, Surinder Singh filed an appeal against the order, dated 2nd October, 1968, passed by the Settlement Officer cancelling the auction sale in his favour, before the Assistant Settlement Commissioner having the powers of Settlement Commissioner. The said Officer rejected the appeal on 2nd April, 1969. Surinder Singh then filed a revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the same was dismissed by him on 13th August, 1969. A petition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government and Ors . 1963 P.L.R. 599, had held that an auction sale, which had been conducted before the promulgation of the Rules by the Central Government for the disposal of evacuee agricultural lands, situate in urban areas, was not void ab initio, but the same was voidable at the instance of a party, which was entitled to purchase the same at the reserve price under Chapter 5A of the said Rules. 4. We have gone through both the judgments referred to by the learned Counsel and are of the opinion that there is merit in this contention. In Bishan Singh's case, to which I was a party, it was held: That the holders of urban agricultural land form a separate class of displaced persons, and, therefore, it was necessary for the Government to frame rules for this class. The existing provisions, both in the Act and in the rules do not cover this class of displaced persons. Press-Notes, dated 4th June, 1957, and 15th October, 1958, issued by the Central Government and the Memorandum, dated the 27th November, 1958, issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner are not valid and no action can be taken thereon and the Central Government cannot sell evacuee urban agricultural land ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... because, according to them, as their writ petition had been accepted, the same auction sale had automatically been set aside, the same having been conducted on the basis of the impugned press-notes and the circular, which had admittedly been quashed by Bishan Narain, J. This matter was placed before S.B. Capoor, J., and myself and during the course of arguments before us, it was agreed by both the parties that the applicants would have a right to purchase the property in dispute only, if they were lessees of the same. Their claim on this basis was being opposed by the auction purchaser. Bishsn Narain, J., had mentioned in his order that he was not deciding the question as to whether the applicants were the lessees of the property or not and whether they were entitled to the transfer of the property on that account and this matter was left open to be determined in other proceedings. In the course of our judgment, it was observed: All that was decided (by Bishan Narain, J.) was that the press-notes and the circular were void. In other words, if the Department was refusing to transfer the land to the applicants because of certain restrictions contained in them, then it was not jus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be upset. As he himself was not deciding the question in the writ petition regarding the applicants alleged right to the property, he left that matter to the Rehabilitation Department. At any rate, we were not limiting the right to challenge an auction sale conducted on the basis of the impugned press-notes and the memorandum to the lessees of the land in question only. As the applicants in that case happened to be the lessees, it was, therefore, that this word was used in that authority. From the observations quoted above, which were relied on by the learned Single Judge and also pressed into service by the counsel for the Respondent before us, at the most all that could be concluded was that the auction sale would be set aside at the instance of some interested or aggrieved party. In a writ petition, the Petitioner is generally asked as to how he is aggrieved by the impugned order. If he is unable to show that, the writ petition is normally rejected on that ground alone. This Court usually does not set aside an order merely at the instance of by standards, who are not in any way affected by it. The Petitioner has to show which legal right of his is being infringed for which he c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ffected if the earlier auction sale in favour of Respondent No. 2 had been confirmed. They had deposited 20 per cent of the purchase price and were in possession of the property for many years and were anxious to buy the same. The only hurdle in their way of getting this property was the earlier auction sale in favour of Respondent No. 2. Their case was that the said auction, dated 24th August, 1959, was void, because it had been conducted on the basis of the illegal press-notes and the circular. They had even made an application before Mr. S.N. Bahl, Settlement Commissioner, for being impleaded as a party to the appeal filed by Respondent No. 2 before him. This application was rejected by the said Officer observing that no action was required thereon because Respondent No. 2's request for payment of the balance of the auction price was being rejected by him. Under these circumstances, according to the learned Counsel, they should have been heard by Mr. Rajni Kant before passing the impugned order. 10. In my view, this submission of the learned Counsel is also not without substance. The learned Single Judge repelled this contention by observing that the Appellants had not ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y were very much interested in the transfer of the property in dispute in their favour and wanted the auction sale in favour of Respondent No. 2 to be set aside. In all fairness to them they should have been heard by Mr. Rajni Kant, if he was inclined to accept the prayer of Respondent No. 2 for allowing him more time for depositing the balance of the purchase price, after setting aside the orders of all the subordinate Officers. If they were present before Mr. Rajni Kant, they would have brought to his notice that the auction sale in favour of Respondent No. 2 was of no legal effect, the same having been conducted on the basis of the press-notes and the circular. The impugned order, in my view, had thus been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 13. As regards the Supreme Court ruling, referred to above, and relied on by the learned Counsel for the Respondent, it may be stated that all that it says is that the declaration that a. person was the highest bidder at an auction sale did not amount to complete sale and transfer of the property to him. The bid had to be approved by the Settlement Commissioner and till that was done, the auction purchaser had no rig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... His subsequent order allowing extension of time till 28th February, 1970, was, therefore, without jurisdiction, and if Respondent No. 2 deposited the amount within the extended period on the basis of the order, which was passed without jurisdiction, he could not get any rights in the property. 15. It is common ground that proceedings under Section 33 of the Act are of a quasi-judicial nature,-vide Dewan Jhangi Ram v. Union of India and Ors . 1961 P.L.R. 610, and Beli Ram Malhotra v. Union of India and Ors. A.I.R. 1962 P H 164, and the Officers exercising powers under that section cannot review their orders unless power to do so was given to them by the statute itself. There is no inherent power of review and this power has to be given specifically by the statute under they are functioning. (Vide Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and Ors . A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 641, and Deep Chand and Anr. v. Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, Jullundur, and Anr . 1964 P.L.R. 318 (F.B.). In the Act, Section 25 deals with review and amendment of orders , it reads: (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Settlement Officer under Section 5, from which no appeal is allowed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... edure, 1908 (Act v. of 1908) when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of any document; (c) requisitioning any public record from any Court or office: (d) issuing commission for examination of witnesses; (e) appointing guardians or next friends of persons, who are minors or of unsound mind; (f) any other matter which may be prescribed ; and any proceeding before any such officer shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) and every such officer shall be deemed to be a civil Court within the meaning of Sections 480 and 481 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act v. of 1898). (I-A) Every Officer appointed under this Act may for the purpose of making an inquiry under this Act and generally for the purpose of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge any of the duties imposed on him by or under this Act, require any person to submit to him such accounts, books or other documents or to furnish to him such information ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... il Procedure for extending the time for the deposit of the purchase price. In this decision, the facts were that on 30th March, 1954, an order was passed by the High Court granting the Plaintiff a period of three months to pay the Court-fee for the trial Court and also for the High Court. The time had to be computed from the date the counsel for the Appellant was informed by the High Court office about the amount of the deficit Court-fee, which was payable by his client. The office of the High Court gave this intimation to the counsel on April 8, 1954. Consequently, the time to deposit the deficit Court-fee was to expire on July 8, 1954. The Appellant was not able to find the money for that purpose by that date. His advocate then asked the Deputy Registrar of the High Court to place that case before the vacation Judge on 8th July, 1954, as the High Court was closed at that time, so that a request for the extension of time could be made. This extension it appears, was to be given by a Division Bench and since no such Bench was sitting on that day, the Appellant filed an application on that very date, viz., 8th July, 1954, requesting that he be allowed to pay a part of the amount imm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... its, other considerations might have arisen; but the High Court in the order quoted, went by the letter of the original order which time for payment had been fixed. Section 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired and Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. That the application was filed in the vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have been considered in dealing with it even on July 13, 1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would have operated from July 8, 1954. How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptorily (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have given the said power to the High Court. If that had been the intention, then the learned Judges would not have proceeded further after observing But we are of opinion that in this case the Court could have exercised its powers first on July 13, 1954, when the petition filed within time was before it, and again under the exercise of its inherent powers, when the two petitions under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed. The next sentence that immediately followed, namely if the High Court had felt disposed to take action on any of these occasions, Sections 148 and 149 would have clothed them with ample power to do justice to a litigant for whom it entertained considerable symapthy, but to whose aid it erroneously felt unable to come -clearly shows that according to the Supreme Court, the power was given to the High Court for the extension of time under Sections 148 and 149 and not Section 151 of the Code. 24. The view that I have taken of the above noted Supreme Court decision finds support in the ruling given by the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Lakshmi Balal Chanak v. Brojendru Nath Pain and Ors . A.I.R. 1971 Cal. 243, where it was observed: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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