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TMI Blog1922 (1) TMI 2X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 141 of the Limitation Act,, IX of 1908. As the defendant pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, the date of Chandramma's death became material and the plaintiff alleged that she died on the 3rd of May, 1904, while the case for defendants was that she died in February, 1904, and not in May, 1904, and that the suit was barred as it was filed more than 12 years from February, 1904. On Chandramma's death the father of the second defendant in this suit filed a suit in the Revenue Court against certain tenants for the purpose of acceptance of pattas and muchilikas under the Rent Recovery Act VIII of 1863. The suit was dismissed but in the judgment there is a statement made by the Judge that Chandramma died on the 3rd of May, 1904. The only evidence let in by the plaintiff as to the date of death of Chandramma was the statement in the judgment which is filed as Ex. B. in the case. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that this statement was relevant to prove the issue as to the date of death of Chandramma and, acting upon it, he held that Chandramma died within 12 years before the date of the suit and that therefore it was not barred by limitation. On appeal, the Distric ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... what is known as judgments in rent and states that such judgments, orders or decrees are conclusive proof of the matters specified in the section, and, by virtue of that section of the Act, evidence would not be allowed to disprove those matters. Section 42 refers to judgments relating to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry and states that such judgments, though evidence, are not conclusive proof of what they state, thus allowing evidence to be given to disprove facts found in the judgments. Section 43 states that judgments, orders, or decrees other than those mentioned in Sections 40, +1 and 42 are irrelevant unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree is a fact in issue or is relevant under some other provision of this Act . e.g., Section 13. Section 44 enables a party to show that any judgment, order or decree which is relevant under Section 40, 41, or 42 was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it or was obtained by fraud or collusion. It appears to me that these sections codify the law as to the admissibility of judgments in evidence. It is not suggested that under the provisions of these sections a judgment, unless it be a judgment in rem, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as it was destroyed and the only evidence of the admission was that contained in a decree in the former suit which began by giving a short statement of the pleadings in the suit. The rules of Court required every decree to contain an abstract of the pleadings. Prinsep and O' Kinealy, JJ. held that the statement in the decree was evidence of the admission made under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. The learned Judges begin by stating that the original containing the admission of the defendant's predecessor in-title could not be produced as it was destroyed and that under a circular issued by the Sudder Court, it was the duty of the Court to enter in the decree an abstract of the pleadings, and they relied on Section 35 as authority for the view that the admission sought to be proved can be proved by the abstract prefixed to the decree. At the end of the judgment, however, they go on to state that the admission in the decree would be binding only if the person who is alleged to have made the admission was the predecessor-in-title of the defendants and observe : Whether the defendants are bound by the statements of Rashmoni depends on the question whether Rashmoni was their pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be put in to prove the allegation made by the previous karnavan and it was held on the authority of the IX Calcutta case cited above that it was admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act. As appointed out by the learned referring Judges the reasoning in this case would apply to Section 13 rather than Section 35. Ramaswami Ayyar v. Appavu I.L.R. (1887) Mad 9 which is referred to by the learned Judges related to the relevancy of judgments under Sections 13 and 42 of the Evidence Act and had nothing to do with Section 35 The 15 Mad. case cited above Thama v. Kondan I.L.R. (1892) M. 378 was a suit to redeem a kanom. The kanom document was lost and the judgment in a previous suit brought by a previous jenmi to redeem the same kanoni in which it is stated that defendants admitted their position as kanomdars was sought to be put in evidence. The learned Judges, following Lekraj Kuar v. Mahpal Singh I.L.R.(1879) C. 741 , Parbati Dasi v. Purnachandra Sen I.L.R. (1883) C. 586 and Byathumma v. Avulla I.L.R. (1891) M. 1, cited above, held that the judgment was admissible and that the recital in a judgment of the admission of the relevant fact would be evidence of the jenini's title u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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