9911796707
TMI Blog1922 (1) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an appeal was preferred to the High Court, which was heard by Mr. Justice Scott-Smith, who has affirmed the decision of the District Judge and dismissed the appeal. 2. From the decision of the learned Judge the defendant has brought the present appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Mr. Sheo Narain for the respondent raises a preliminary objection that the order complained of does not constitute a 'judgment' within the meaning of the aforesaid clause, and that consequently no appeal lies from it. 3. The expression 'judgment' is not defined in the Letters Patent, and though some attempts have been made by the High Courts at defining the term, it cannot be said that any precise and, at the same time, exhaustive definition has been formulated. The earliest definition, which is often cited and is now regarded as the locus classicus, is contained in the well-known judgment of The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company (1). In that Case Sir Richard Couch, C.J., said : -- We think 'judgment' in Clause 15 means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upon certainly affects the merits of the question between the parties more especially, when it involves, as it does in the present case, the determination of the point whether the defendant has acquired a prescriptive right of ownership to the land in dispute, vide Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act. 6. It is, however, clear that this definition, which has no doubt been adopted by the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay as a useful guide in determining the question whether a decision is or is not a judgment, has never been regarded as absolutely exhaustive, vide Budhu Lal v. Chattu Gope (1916) 44 Cal. 804 = 25 C.L.J. 193 = 39 I.C. 465 = 21 C.W.N. 269 and Ramendra Nath Roy v. Brajendra Nath Dass (1917) 45 Cal. 111 = 27 C.L.J. 158 = 11 I.C. 944 = 21 C.W.N. 794. 7. The Allahabad High Court has not felt the necessary of defining the term 'judgment,' because it has held that the right of appeal given by the Letters Parent is in respect of an order made under the Civil Procedure Code, controlled by the provisions of Section 104, Civil Procedure Code. Now, Section 588 of the old Code, which has now been replaced by Section 104 and Order 48, Rule 1 of the new Code enacted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3 C.W.N. 347, Sabhapathi Chetti v. Naraiyanasami Chetti (1902) 25 Mad. 555 = 11 M.L.J. 346 and The Secretary of State for India v. Jehangir Moneckji Curestji (1902) 4 Bom. L.R. 342. 10. Coming now to the definition of the expression 'judgment' given by the Madras High Court we find that the earliest Madras Case which deals With this matter is of DeSouza v. Colez (1868) 3 M.H.C.R. 384. In that cage Mr. Justice Bittleston said:-- The Word 'judgment' cannot be limited to the final judgment in the suit, but must be held to have the more general meaning of any decision or determination affecting the rights or the interest of any suitor of applicant. When the language giving the appeal is so general in its terms as that contained in the 15th clause of the Charter, it is, we think, impossible to prescribe any limits to the right of appeal founded upon the nature of the order or decree appealed from. 11. It is difficult to endorse the view contained in the second sentence of the passage quoted above. There can be no doubt that this definition is much too wide, and it has now been superseded by another definition which appears to be the best definition attempted so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... directing a party to produce and give inspection of document framing an issue, are clearly those on which an adjudication cannot be regarded as a judgment. 15. On the other hand, applications for the appointment of a receiver, issue of an interim injunction, etc., belong to the second class, in which the order disposing of the application would be a judgment appealable under the Letters Patent. Indeed, to this class may be assigned all the applications, the orders on which are appealable under Section 104 or Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There are however, several applications in respect of which the distinction drawn in the Madras case cannot be of much practical assistance in deciding whether the order thereupon should be a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. Applications for a mandamus, leave to defend a summary suit on a negotiable instrument, etc., may be cited as examples of this type of applications. 16. There is no sure guide for deciding whether an order terminating an application of this character is or is not a judgment, and it is for this reason that the High Courts have in respect of orders passed thereon taken divergent views. F ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the above article. Now, it appears that one Basawa Singh was the nearest reversioner of Baghela but that he assented to the alienation and attested the deed of gift executed by Baghela. Basawa Singh, however, survived Baghela and is said to have died only four or five years before the institution of the suit, and it is, therefore, contended that on the date of Baghela's death Basawa Singh was his heir, and that Sanwal Singh was only a remote reversioner who became entitled to possession after the death of Baghela's heir. 21. We have considered this argument, but we do not think that it takes the case out of the purview of the aforesaid article. The whole scheme of the Act makes it clear that the object of the Legislature was to remove uncertainty about titles to land by compelling the relatives of the male proprietors to impeach their alienations within a specified period, namely, twelve years from one of the dates mentioned therein. It was intended that the title of the alienee should be immune from attack, if the alienation in his favour was not contested within twelve years from the date mentioned in the third column of the schedule, Article 2, which deals with a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xpress terms that if no declaratory decree has been obtained in respect of an alienation, the period of twelve years for a suit for possession is to be counted from the date of the mutation in respect of the alienation, or in the absence of mutation, from the date of the alienee obtaining possession etc., as the case may be and it is by no means a rare thing that a suit for possession is barred by limitation though the right to sue for possession has not yet accrued. 26. The argument that the contention urged by the defendant would lead to an anomalous position does not appeal to us, because it is beyond doubt that the provisions of the Act are not free from such anomalies. The reason, however, is not far to seek. The object of the Legislature was to ensure without leaving any loophole that the title of the alienee should not remain in doubt for more than twelve years, and that object has been achieved regardless of any anomalies or absurdities which may arise in special cases. 27. We must, however, point out that it would also be absurd that each successive reversioner should have twelve years for a suit for possession from the date of the death of the preceding reversioner. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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