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Issues Involved:
1. Question of Limitation 2. Definition of 'Judgment' under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent 3. Applicability of Punjab Limitation Act I of 1900 4. Interpretation of 'Heir' in the context of the Limitation Act Detailed Analysis: 1. Question of Limitation The core issue in this appeal is whether the suit for possession of property brought by the plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations. The initial trial court dismissed the suit as time-barred, but the District Judge reversed this decision, concluding that the suit was within the limitation period prescribed by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act. The High Court upheld the District Judge's decision, leading to the current appeal. 2. Definition of 'Judgment' under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent The defendant raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the order in question does not constitute a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, thus making it non-appealable. The term 'judgment' is not explicitly defined in the Letters Patent. However, the court referred to the definition given by Sir Richard Couch in The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company, which states that a 'judgment' is a decision affecting the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. The court ruled that the determination of whether the plaintiff could bring his suit after twelve years from the date of mutation is indeed a determination of a right, thus constituting a 'judgment' under Clause 10. 3. Applicability of Punjab Limitation Act I of 1900 The court examined whether the suit is governed by the provisions of the Punjab Limitation Act I of 1900. It was established that the alienor died in 1901, after the enforcement of the Act. The court cited Mahna Singh v. Ladha Singh, noting that an action to recover possession of ancestral land alienated by a male proprietor subject to the Customary Law of Punjab is governed by this Act if the alienor's death occurs after the Act's enforcement. 4. Interpretation of 'Heir' in the context of the Limitation Act The plaintiff argued that he was not the 'heir' of the alienor within the meaning of Article 2 of the schedule to the Punjab Limitation Act. The court clarified that the term 'heir' in Article 2 should be read in conjunction with Article 1, which prescribes the limitation period for a declaratory decree. The term 'heir' denotes a person who succeeds by descent to an estate of inheritance. The court concluded that the plaintiff, when seeking to recover possession of the property, claims to be the heir of the alienor and thus falls within the scope of Article 2. The court also addressed the argument that the plaintiff's right to possession accrued only upon the death of the nearest reversioner, Basawa Singh. The court emphasized that the Legislature has drawn a clear distinction between the date on which the right to sue accrues and the date from which the limitation period begins to run. The Act specifies that if no declaratory decree has been obtained, the twelve-year period for a suit for possession is counted from the date of mutation or the alienee obtaining possession, regardless of when the right to sue for possession actually accrues. The court acknowledged potential anomalies in the Act but emphasized that the legislative intent was to ensure that the title of the alienee remains undisputed after twelve years. The court rejected the notion that each successive reversioner should have twelve years to sue for possession from the death of the preceding reversioner, as this would lead to absurd results. Conclusion: The court held that the plaintiff's suit is barred by the statute of limitations as it was brought after the expiry of twelve years from the date mentioned in the schedule to the Punjab Limitation Act I of 1900. Consequently, the appeal was accepted, the judgment of the Single Bench was reversed, and the suit was dismissed with costs throughout.
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