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TMI Blog1965 (12) TMI 156X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lus Area) for reexamination of the petitioner's case by reference to the revenue records. After remand, the learned Collector reopened the whole case and left with the petitioner only 100 ordinary acres and declared the remaining area as surplus. This view was taken on the authority of the decision of the Financial Commissioner in Mahia others v. Dalip Singh in which section 2(3)(ii)(a) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act was construed to authorise the maximum area of 100 ordinary acres. As this was the view taken by the Financial Commissioner in some other cases as well, the petitioner did not consider the remedy of approaching the learned Financial Commissioner to be equally adequate or efficacious. The petitioner has accordingly approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Indeed, according to the writ petition, another civil writ (No. 196 of 1963) raising the same question is also pending in this Court. 3. The return filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents justifies the order of the Collector in allowing the petitioner only 100 ordinary acres under section 2(3) (ii) (a) of the Security of Land Tenures Act. Paragraph 6 of the ret ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f determining the permissible area of a displaced person, the provisions of the proviso (ii) shall not apply to the heirs and successors of the displaced person to whom land is allotted. The decision of a Bench of this Court which has been referred to in the return is reported as Nathu v. State of Punjab1, head-note (ii) of which reads as follows:- The definition of the expression 'permissible area' as given in section 2(3) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act means that nobody can hold more than 30 standard acres or 60 actual acres, whichever is more. This means that if a person holds land of inferior quality, which on being converted amounts to less than 30 standard acres, then his holding cannot exceed 60 ordinary acres, whereas, if a person holds land of such quality that on being converted into standard acres, it falls below 30 acres, but his actual holding is under 60 acres, then he can hold the whole of his land. No one can be allowed to keep more than 30 standard acres, however inferior the land, which he holds, is also the total holding is, in no case, to exceed 60 ordinary acres, if in terms of standard acres the holding is less than 30 standard acres. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be, and it was only where the area allotted was in excess of this area that the question of determining surplus area arose whether by conversion into ordinary acres or otherwise. Sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) to proviso to section 2(3) really seems to me to bring out the inevitable disharmony if Shri Kaushal's contention is allowed. At the same time, the provision regarding the maximum area fixed in terms of ordinary acres is not easy to ignore. 6. It appears that the Division Bench in the earlier case of Nathu was not concerned with the provision relating to displaced persons in section 2(3) and, therefore, the various aspects placed before us from the bar were not canvassed before it. In the circumstances, therefore, I consider it more appropriate that this writ petition be decided by a larger Bench. I have not considered it necessary to formulate a formal question because the question posed is quite clear from the order and the decision of the Full Bench would completely dispose of the entire case. Papers may accordingly be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for necessary orders. ORDER R.S. Narula, J. 7. (24th March, 1966)-This judgment will dispose of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed Single Judge the case came up before the Division Bench (S. B. Capoor and Dua, JJ.) it was ordered on December 16, 1965 that because of the various divergent views on the subject expressed in some earlier judgments of this Court and various orders of the Financial Commissioners it was considered more appropriate if the writ petition is heard and decided by a still larger Bench. That is how this case has come up before us in Full Bench. 11. Sidhu Ram, petitioner in C. W. No. 196 of 1963, also a displaced person, was allotted 52 standard acres and 62 units of agricultural land in this State which area is equivalent to 174.62 ordinary acres. The petitioner had acquired the ownership of the said entire holding before the coming into force of the Ceiling Act. By order of the Collector Agrarian, Bhiwani dated February 27 1961 (Annexure A) the petitioner's permissible area was determined as 100 ordinary acres which is equivalent to only 30.58 standard acres. The petitioner's appeal to the Commissioner, Ambala Division having been rejected on July 30, 1962 (annexure C) and his revision petition having been dismissed by the Financial Commissioner on November 20. 1962 (annexure ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enure) Act, 22 of 1950 on the 6th of November, 1950. Section 3 of the 1950 Act restricted the holding of any landowner to the permissible limit . ''Permissible limit was defined in section 2(3) of that Act to mean 100 standard acres of land other than the land occupied by an occupancy tenant, and, where such 100 standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres, exceeded 200 acres, such 200 ordinary acres''. An explanation was added to the above-quoted definition of permissible; limit in the ordinance and in the 1950 Act which is, however, not relevant for our purposes. Standard acre was defined in section 2(4) of the 1950 Act and the ordinance as a measure of area convertible, with, reference to quantity of yield and quality of soil, into ordinary acre of any class of land according to the prescribed scale . Subsequently, however, section 2(3) of the 1950, Act was amended by the President's Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Amendment Act, V of 1951 so as to substitute therein 50 and 100 standard and ordinary acres for 100 and 200 standard and ordinary. acres, respectively. The 1950 Act as subsequently amended was then-repealed and replaced by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rmissible limit' for the purposes of this Act means thirty standard acres of land and where such thirty standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed eighty acres, such eighty acres: Provided that in the case of an allottee,- (a) who has been allotted land exceeding forty standard acres, the permissible limit shall be forty standard acres and where such forty standard acres on being converted into ordinary acres exceed one hundred acres, such one hundred acres; and (b) who has been allotted land exceeding thirty standard acres but not exceeding forty standard acres, the permissible limit shall be equal to the area of land allotted to him. Explanation For the purposes of determining the permissible limit, of an allottee, the provisions of the proviso shall not apply to the heirs and successors of the allottee to whom land is allotted. 16. In short what the authorities under the Ceiling Act have held in all these cases is that on a proper interpretation of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub section (3) of section 2 of the Ceiling Act the permissible area of land to be left with a displaced person has to be either 50 standard acres or 100 ordinar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or the voluntary winding up of the company and an order is made or a resolution is passed, as the case may be, for the winding up of the company, the sheriff shall pay the balance to the liquidator, who shall be entitled to retain it as against the execution creditor. In Hooker's case the expression as the case may be as used in Article 3070 of Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes came up for construction. The said article is in the following words:- In any case provided for in the preceding article, the county attorney of the county, or if there is no county attorney, the district attorney of the district, or the mayor of the city, town or village, or the officer who declared the official result of said election, or one of them, as the case may be, shall be made the contestee. and shall be served with notice and statement, and shall file his reply thereto as in the case of a contest for office; etc. 18. It was held that but for the use of the words as the case may be in article 3070 (reproduced above) in any case of a contest anyone of the persons named in the statute could be made the contestee, for they are all used in the alternative with no preference whateve ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the purview of sub-section (3) no one can be allowed to keep more than 30 standard acres, however inferior the land, which he holds and that the total holding is in no case to exceed 60 ordinary acres even if in terms of standard acres the holding falls to be less than 30 standard acres. In other words two outside limits have been held to have been prescribed by the opening part of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Ceiling Act for the permissible area and according to the above-said judgment of the Division Bench the permissible area governed by that part of the section would be 30 standard acres or 60 ordinary acres whichever may be less. The correctness of the decision of the Division Bench in Nathu's case has no more been attacked before us. We are not, however, directly concerned with the meaning, scope and interpretation of the purview of section 2(3) of the Ceiling Act which unequivocally and clearly contains the conversion formula and most unambiguously provides for both the limits referred to by Khosla, C.J. in Nathu's case at least in cases where the holding is not less tan 30 standard acres. 22. In chronological order, the next decision is again of Shri B. S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which was equivalent to 104 acres 2 Kanals and 15 Marias of land. Calculating the holding in ordinary acres the surplus area declared by the Collector in Harcharan Singh's case was found to be 4 acres 2 Kanals and 15 Marias. By a subsequent order the Collector reversed the process, reckoned the standard acres of land owned by Harcharan Singh and on this calculation found that 20 standard acres and 12 units of his land were surplus. Harcharan Singh impugned the correctness of the subsequent decision of the Collector by way of a writ petition to this Court. My learned brother, Shamsher Bahadur, J. dismissed the writ petition on the finding that the Collector had construed the relevant statutory provision correctly on the second occasion. The relevant observations in the judgment were in the following words:- I take sub-clause (a) of clause (ii) of the proviso to mean that if the holding is in terms of standard acres it shall be the land in standard acres which would be taken into account in computing the surplus area and it is only when standard acreage has not been computed that the holding may be reckoned in terms of ordinary acres. It seems that the allotment in favour of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ., one in standard acres and the other in ordinary acres must be applied to the permissible area of a displaced person in the same manner as was applied in the case of a non-displaced person governed by the purview of sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act in Nathu's case. 25. A somewhat similar question then came up for decision before a Bench of two Financial Commissioners (Sarvshri B.S. Grewal and Saroop Krishan) in Basakha Singh v. The Punjab State 1964 L.L.T. 77. The learned Financial Commissioners held that the ceiling of 100 ordinary acres applies in the case of all allottees under section 3(1) (b) of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. In this case Basakha Singh was a displaced person. His holding was 38.92 standard acres which in terms of ordinary acres was a little over 125 acres. He claimed that under the Pepsu Act he was entitled to retain the entire allotment as his permissible area as the same did not exceed 40 standard acres though on conversion it would exceed 100 ordinary acres. This plea of Basakha Singh had been rejected by the Commissioner, Patiala Division on the basis of the decision in Harjit Singh's case8. Relying on the Division Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dinary acres. As against that, in cases falling under clause (b) of the proviso the only relevant consideration is the area of land in terms of standard acres and not the area of on conversion into ordinary acres. It no doubt looks odd that in the case of displaced persons to whom land measuring more than 40 standard acres has been allotted the permissible limit is 100 ordinary acres if the land converted into ordinary acres exceeds 100 such acres, while no such ceiling of ordinary acres is placed in the case of displaced persons to whom an area of less than 40 standard acres has been allotted, the fact all the same remains that it is the language used by the legislature which has resulted in this oddity and it is for the legislature, if it so deems proper, to remove and rectify this oddity. This Court can gather the intention of the legislature only from the language employed by it, and if the language used is clear and unequivocal it is not open to the Court to assume in the language an ambiguity where none exists and to read in it words which find no mention therein, and on that basis to stretch out a construction which otherwise is not warranted by the language of the legislatu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h has been admitted by the Motion Bench (Falshaw, C.J. and Harbans Singh, J.) on 23rd April, 1965. 28. A view directly opposed to that of the other two Financial Commissioners (Sarvshri B.S. Grewal and Saroop Krishan) was adopted by Shri A.L. Fletcher, Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab in his judgment dated May, 4, 1965 in Rup Ram v. Smt. Kako Bai 1965 Punjab Law Journal 65. Shri A.L. Fletcher held that under section 2(3) (ii) (b) of the Ceiling Act the permissible area for a displaced person, who has been allotted land in excess of 30 standard acres but less than 50 standard acres, is equal to the area allotted. The learned Financial Commissioner held that in the relevant provisions there was no question of any limit in terms of ordinary acres. In other words, he held that for a displaced person who has been allotted between 30 and 50 standard acres, the permissible area is the area allotted whatever may be its value in ordinary acres. 29. Then comes the judgment of D.K. Mahajan, J. dated October, 14, 1965 in Rawat v State of Punjab and others 1965 L.L.T. 161. Under section 18 of the Ceiling Act a right has been conferred on certain tenants to purchase the land of thei ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were, therefore, entitled to exclude the orchard area as also to the benefits conferred by the second proviso on displaced landowners. It was specifically held by Shri Fletcher in that case that the measure of ownership is to be fixed in standard acres and that there being no ambiguity in section 2(3)(ii)(b) of the Ceiling Act the provision must be given the meaning which the words clearly state. The Financial Commissioner refused to import the conversion formula from the purview of sub-section (3) into the second proviso to that sub-section. 31. No other decided case relating to this matter has been referred to before us. Three interpretations of clause (a) of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Ceiling Act appear to be possible. First is the one which was all along adopted by Shri A. L. Fletcher, Financial Commissioner and which has also found favour with D. K. Mahajan, J. in Rawat's case13, and with my learned brother, Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Harcharan Singh's case2. This is the interpretation which is canvassed before us on behalf of the petitioners. It is argued that the different phraseology adopted by the Legislature in the relevant proviso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st possible interpretation against the State and to a beneficial interpretation in favour of the displaced person. It has been further submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the judgment of the Division Beach in Nathu's case does not at all stand in the way of this interpretation as that judgment is based on the clear and unambiguous phraseology used in the opening part of section 2(3) of the Ceiling Act. 32. The second possible interpretation, which has been supported by the learned Advocate General is that the spirit and blood of the purview should be allowed to run through the entire section, that considering the scheme and objects of the Act it should be remembered that the maximum permissible area has been prescribed to be 100 ordinary acres for everyone including displaced persons and that all other rules and criteria contained in section 2(3) of the Ceiling Act are only for the purpose of fixing the permissible area within the said outside limit of 100 ordinary acres and that if this interpretation is adopted for all the clauses of the proviso which after all is only a part of the main section every possible disharmony is avoided. Support is sought by the Advocat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing is that it confers a choice on the displaced person to select either of the two limits, i.e., either in standard acres or in ordinary acres, as the case may be. The third interpretation appears to have been canvassed before a Division Bench of this Court (Dulat and Mahajan, JJ.) in C. W. No. 1313 of 1962-Sham Lal Saluja and others v. The State of Punjab and others C.W. No. 1313 of 1962. The Division Bench only made a prima facie observation about there being some force in the contention but did not decide the matter. The relevant observations in the judgment of the Division Bench dated 6th April, 1965 in Sham Lal Saluja's case are to the following effect:- The only other contention advanced before us is that a claim was made to the Collector that he should declare only the area above 100 ordinary acres are surplus, whereas the Collector has declared area above 50 standard acres as surplus. The contention of the learned counsel is that under the definition of permissible area in section 2 (3) the choice rests with the owner. The contention of the learned counsel seems to have some force, but the real difficulty that lies in his way is that this contention was not presse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... w. In Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory's case A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1596 it was held that a proviso is added as a general rule to qualify or create an exception to what is in the main enactment and that ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further held in that case that provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the main enactment but as saving clauses in which cases they will not be construed as controlled by the main section. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Ceiling Act is not controlled by the purview of sub-section (1) of section 2 as it is in the nature of a saving clause. Saving clauses are normally introduced into repealed acts to safeguard rights which, but for the savings, would be lost. It cannot, however, be disputed that there are cases in which a separate provision different from the purview of a section in a statute is added in the shape of a proviso to provide for a particular contingency or a class of persons who would also be normally covered, but for the proviso, by the pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve provision. The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court does not, therefore, appear to help the learned Advocate General to the extent to which he thought. 36. Roughly speaking, provision can be of three types. The effect of a proviso may be merely to except or take out of the purview a certain class or a certain contingency. In the second set of cases the object of the proviso may be only to qualify the purview. The third kind of provisos is the one usually known as a saving clause. In case the purview and the proviso cover the same field and the two are irreconcilable the proviso is given its full effect against the purview as the proviso is said to be the last expressed intention of the Legislature. The first proviso is of a qualifying nature. It acts in both directions. It qualifies the purview as well as the second proviso. The effect of the first proviso is that no area under an orchard at the time of the commencement of the Ceiling Act can be taken into account in computing the permissible area either for displaced persons or for non-displaced persons. Construed in any other manner, the displaced persons would be placed at a disadvantage in this respect. This could no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the second proviso of that sub section. Consequently there is no justification whatever for introducing into that proviso the conversion formula which appears to have been deliberately excluded in the definition of permissible area for displaced allottees. I will now proceed to give briefly my reasons for arriving at the above-said conclusion. 39. One of the basic principles of interpretation of statutes is that it must be presumed that every word used in a section of a legislative enactment has been inserted with a purpose and some meaning must be assigned to it. The intention of having uselessly added surplus words or phrases should never be attributed to the Legislature. It has been authoritatively held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Wit's Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh A.I.R. 196. S.C. 1170, that the Courts always presume, while interpreting statutes, that the Legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. 40. Keeping the above principle in view we must assume that the Legislature has deliberately used the well known expressi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, or by rejecting them altogether, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. 41. It has also been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 830, that where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. 42. Applying the above-said principle of interpretation of statutes to the relevant proviso I would in order to give sense to the clause introduce in it the words underlined by. me and read it as below:- For a displaced person who has been allotted land in excess of 50 st ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... th the smooth working of the system and arrangement which the second proviso purports to regulate. I have not been able to understand the reasoning of the learned counsel for the respondents by which the phrase as the case may be is sought to be equated to the expression whichever is less . This meaning has never been given to the expression as the case may be and so far as I understand the English language, the expression as the case may be is not susceptible of being given that meaning. 43. The second consideration which has weighed with me is this. The purview of the sub-section contains the general provisions relating to definition of 'permissible area'. The second proviso aims at excluding the cases of displaced allottees from the purview. The definition of permissible area relating to displaced allottees is given in the second proviso is no less a complete and comprehensive manner than the one in which it is defined in the purview for other persons. Obviously the two definitions are substantially different from each other. The only thing common between the two is the object of fixing a ceiling on the permissible holding of a landowner. For determining the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uts had already been applied in their case (before making allotments of agricultural land to them) according to the scheme referred to in Tarlok Singh's Land Resettlement Manual and in various notifications. No such cut had been applied to the holdings of landowners who are not displaced allottees. The departure from the purview in the proviso therefore, appears to be based on sound principle. In this respect it is significant that only displaced allottees and not displaced persons are brought into proviso (ii). This could also be a justification for standard acreage alone being kept in view for determining the permissible area of displaced allottees except those in whose case the original allotment itself is in ordinary acres. Having restricted the holding of a displaced allottee to certain standard acreage at two stages it has not been found necessary by the Legislature to impose a further restriction of the conversion formula on them. In these circumstances, the construction of the second proviso adopted by me appears to further the policy of the statute and must, therefore, be preferred to the alternative interpretation which is sought to be placed on it by the responde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a (b) of the proviso makes it further clear. The permissible area of a displaced allottee of 30 to 50 standard acres is the area of his allotment. There is no room for application of conversion formula to this class of allottees. It was not only so held by Shri Fletcher, Financial Commissioner in Rup Ram v. Smt. Kako Bai12, but it has also been so held by H. R. Khanna, J in Basakha Singh v. The State of Punjab and others10, I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by Khanna, J. in the aforesaid case on the construction of clause (b) of the second proviso. That being so, it is impossible to believe that the Legislature wanted to give step-motherly treatment to displaced allottees of more than 50 standard acres by giving them even less ordinary acreage than an allottee of less than 50 or upto 50 standard acres. As stated above effort should be made by the Court to harmonise every part of the section and to avoid a construction which would lead to oddities, absurdities or anomalies. The view adopted by me, therefore, appears to be the only way to reconcile all the three clauses of the second proviso in a harmonious way. Similarly when reference is had to clause (c) of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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