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1956 (4) TMI 55 - SC - Indian LawsWhether the State of U. P. had no power to enact the impugned Act as the Act is with respect to the subject of industries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of Entry 52 of List I and is, therefore, within the exclusive province of Parliament. The impugned Act is, therefore, ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and is a colourable exercise of legislative power by the State? Whether the impugned Act is repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 and in the event of the Court holding that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, it is void by reason of such repugnancy? Whether the impugned Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by section 16 of Act X of 1955 and by clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act X of 1955? Whether the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 inasmuch as very wide powers are given to the Cane Commissioner which can be used in a discriminatory manner? Whether the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954, violate the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1) (e) in that the Co-operative Societies are not voluntary organisations but a cane grower is compelled to become a member of the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a factory? Whether the impugned Act and the notifications infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution? Whether the impugned Act is void in that it confers very wide powers on executive officials and is a piece of delegated legislation? Whether the impugned Act is destructive of the freedom of trade and commerce and thus is violative of article 301 of the Constitution? Held that - The only provision which was retained by the State Government in the impugned Act for the protection of the sugarcane growers was that contained in section 17 which provided for the payment of price of sugarcane by the occupier of a factory to the sugarcane growers. It could be recovered from such occupier as if it were an arrear of land revenue. This comparison goes to show that the impugned Act merely confined itself to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and did not concern itself at all with the controlling or licensing of the sugar factories, with the production or manufacture. of sugar or with the trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, sugar. If that was so, there was no question whatever of its trenching upon the jurisdiction of the Centre in regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry within Entry 52 of List I and the U.P. Legislature had jurisdiction to enact the law with regard to sugarcane and had legislative competence to enact the impugned Act. There is no repugnancy whatever between these provisions and the impugned Act and the Rules framed thereunder as also the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 do not trench upon the field covered by Act X of 1955. There being no - repugnancy at all, therefore., no question arises of the operation of article 254(2) of the Constitution and no provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made thereunder is invalidated by any provision contained in Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 issued thereunder. There was no repeal of the impugned Act or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 by section 16 of Act X of 1955 or by clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 as contended by the petitioners. Any cane grower or a Canegrowers Cooperative Society or the occupier of a factory can, if aggrieved, take an appeal to the State Government against any order passed by the Cane Commissioner and such provision is a sufficient safeguard provided in the Act and the Rules against any arbitrary exercise of those powers by the Cane Commissioner and takes them out of the ban of article 14. Just as Cane Commissioner is not bound to become a member of a Canegrowers Co-operative Society he is equally not bound to offer his sugarcane for sale to the occupier of a factory even if he happens to be a canegrower within the area reserved for that factory. His freedom in that behalf is absolutely unrestricted and we do not see how it can be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954 are violative of his fundamental right under article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. The restriction which is imposed upon the cane growers in regard to sales of their sugarcane to the occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Canegrowers Co-operative Society is not less than 75 per cent. of the total cane growers within the area is a reasonable restriction in the public interest designed for safeguarding the interests of the large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good of the greatest number. That being so, it comes well within the protection of article 19(6) and the impugned notification cannot be challenged as violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g). If these impugned notifications are, therefore, intravires the State Legislature, they cannot be challenged also under article 31 as none of the petitioners is being deprived of his property, if any, save by authority of law. The only provisions alleged to contain such delegation of legislative power are those contained in section 15 and section 16(1)(b) read with section 16 (2) (b) of the impugned Act which we have dealt with above. They are certainly no piece of delegated legislation and the vires of the impugned Act is not affected thereby. As already stated in the earlier part of this judgment that the restrictions imposed by the alleged notifications are reasonable restrictions imposed on the petitioners in the public interest. We are, therefore, of opinion that this contention also is of no avail to the petitioners.The result, therefore, is that the impugned Act and the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th November, 1955 issued thereunder were intravires the State Legislature and are binding on the petitioners. Appeal dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Legislative competence of the U.P. State Legislature to enact the impugned Act. 2. Repugnancy between the impugned Act and Acts enacted by Parliament. 3. Repeal of the impugned Act by subsequent Central legislation. 4. Violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14. 5. Violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c). 6. Violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31. 7. Delegation of legislative power. 8. Violation of Article 301 regarding freedom of trade and commerce. Detailed Analysis: Re. (1): Legislative Competence of the U.P. State Legislature The contention was that the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, though purported to legislate in regard to sugarcane, was in pith and substance legislation in regard to the sugar industry, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament as per Entry 52 of List I. The State argued that the concurrent legislative powers allowed both the Central and State legislatures to legislate on sugarcane. The Court held that the U.P. State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act as it was confined to the regulation of sugarcane and did not encroach upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre regarding the sugar industry. Re. (2): Repugnancy Between the Impugned Act and Central Legislation Repugnancy arises when both Central and State laws occupy the same field. The Court examined if the impugned Act was repugnant to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, and the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Court concluded that there was no repugnancy as the impugned Act and the Central Acts operated in different fields. The impugned Act focused on sugarcane, while the Central Acts regulated sugar production and distribution. Re. (3): Repeal of the Impugned Act by Subsequent Central Legislation The petitioners argued that the impugned Act was repealed by Section 16 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and Clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. The Court held that the power to repeal a State law is vested in Parliament and cannot be delegated to the executive. Therefore, the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, was not validly repealed by the Central Government. Re. (4): Violation of Article 14 The petitioners contended that the powers conferred on the Cane Commissioner were so wide that they could be exercised in a discriminatory manner, violating Article 14. The Court found that the powers given to the Cane Commissioner were well-defined and subject to appeal to the State Government, thus providing sufficient safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power. Re. (5): Violation of Article 19(1)(c) The petitioners argued that the impugned Act violated their right to form associations or unions by compelling them to become members of Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies. The Court held that there was no compulsion on any cane grower to become a member of such societies, and the Act did not infringe upon the right to form associations. Re. (6): Violation of Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31 The petitioners claimed that the Act and notifications infringed their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31. The Court found that the restrictions imposed were reasonable and in the public interest, thus falling within the protection of Article 19(6). The Act did not deprive the petitioners of their property without authority of law. Re. (7): Delegation of Legislative Power The petitioners contended that the Act conferred wide powers on executive officials, amounting to delegated legislation. The Court found no provisions in the Act that amounted to delegation of legislative power, and thus, the Act was not void on this ground. Re. (8): Violation of Article 301 The petitioners argued that the Act was destructive of the freedom of trade and commerce, violating Article 301. The Court held that the restrictions imposed were reasonable and in the public interest, as permitted by Article 304(b), and thus did not violate Article 301. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, and the notifications issued thereunder were intra vires the State Legislature and did not violate any fundamental rights or constitutional provisions. The petitions were dismissed with costs, except for a few where parties were to bear their own costs.
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