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2007 (2) TMI 585 - SC - Indian LawsWhether presumption stood rebutted or not? Held that - The High Court saying is only on the premise that said Ramchandran Pillai and Thankamony had not been examined and the appellant did not exhibit the Deeds of Sale executed in their favour by the wife of the respondent opined that the said finding was perverse. The reasonings of the learned Trial Judge had not been met by the High Court.Nothing has been stated as to why the findings of the learned Trial Judge were not probable. Having considered the entire fact situation obtaining in the present case we are of the opinion that the defence case cannot said to be wholly improbable one. If it was probable the findings of the learned Trial Judge could not have been thrown out without meeting the reasonings therefor. The High Court therefore in our opinion was not correct in interfering with the said Judgment.It is now well settled when two views are possible the High Court while exercising its appellate power against a judgment of acquittal shall not ordinarily interfere therewith. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Appeal allowed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the cheque issued by the appellant was for the discharge of a debt or other liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Act was rebutted by the appellant. 3. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal judgment of the Trial Judge. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the cheque issued by the appellant was for the discharge of a debt or other liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: The appellant was charged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for issuing a cheque that was dishonored due to "funds insufficient." The appellant contended that the cheque was not issued to discharge any debt but was related to a property sale transaction involving the respondent's wife. The Trial Judge found the appellant's defense-that the cheque was issued as security for the property transaction-probable and acquitted her. However, the High Court reversed this finding, holding that the appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof under Sections 138 and 139 of the Act. 2. Whether the presumption under Section 139 of the Act was rebutted by the appellant: Section 139 of the Act presumes that a cheque is issued for discharging a debt or liability unless proven otherwise. The appellant provided evidence that the cheque was issued as security for a property transaction, not for repaying a loan. The Trial Judge accepted this defense, noting that the appellant's testimony was supported by other witnesses and the circumstances of the case. The High Court, however, found that the appellant did not adequately rebut the presumption under Section 139, as key witnesses and documents were not presented. 3. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal judgment of the Trial Judge: The Supreme Court noted that the High Court did not adequately address the reasoning of the Trial Judge, who found the appellant's defense probable. The Supreme Court emphasized that the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption under Section 139 is preponderance of probability, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The Trial Judge's findings were based on the evidence and circumstances presented, which the High Court failed to sufficiently counter. The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have interfered with the acquittal when two views were possible, citing the principle that appellate courts should not overturn acquittals lightly. Conclusion: The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in reversing the Trial Judge's acquittal. The defense presented by the appellant was found to be probable, and the High Court did not provide sufficient reasoning to overturn the Trial Judge's findings. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal, reinstating the acquittal of the appellant.
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