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Issues Involved:
1. Right to maintain the petition. 2. Constitutionality of the U.P. Land Tenures (Regulation of Transfers) Act, 1952 (Transfer Act). 3. Constitutionality of the Indian Forest (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1956 (Forest Amendment Act). Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Right to Maintain the Petition: The petitioner based his right to move the Court on a registered lease deed dated June 14, 1952. The Court acknowledged that the lease, if unaffected by subsequent laws, would confer property rights on the petitioner, making him at least a permanent lessee. The Court found it difficult to accept the argument that the petitioner had no right to maintain the petition, irrespective of the Transfer Act's validity. The petitioner claimed rights as a bhumidhar or sirdar under the Abolition Act, which the State denied. The Court decided not to determine the petitioner's status as bhumidhar or sirdar due to the need for factual determination, suggesting the petitioner could establish his rights through a suit under s. 229-B of the Abolition Act. The Court concluded that the petitioner had the right to maintain the petition as long as the lease stood, without deciding the nature of the right. 2. Constitutionality of the Transfer Act: The Transfer Act declared certain leases and transactions null and void if made after May 21, 1952. The petitioner argued that the Act was unconstitutional as it deprived lessees of property without compensation, violating Art. 31(2) of the Constitution as it stood before the Fourth Amendment. The Court agreed that if the constitutionality were judged based on the Constitution in 1952, the Transfer Act would be unconstitutional per the decision in Subodh Gopal's case. The respondents contended that the constitutionality should be judged based on the Constitution at the time of the writ petition and that the Fourth Amendment revived the Act. The Court rejected this, stating that constitutionality must be judged as of the date the Act was passed unless retrospectively amended. The Court held that the Transfer Act was unconstitutional as it did not comply with Art. 31(2) and struck it down. 3. Constitutionality of the Forest Amendment Act: The Forest Amendment Act, particularly s. 38-B, regulated or prohibited certain acts in forests claimed by individuals. The petitioner argued that it imposed unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f). The respondents contended that Chap. V-A was supplementary to Chap. II of the Forest Act, serving as an interim measure pending proceedings under Chap. II. The Court found merit in this argument, noting that Chap. V-A dealt with claimants making claims under Chap. II, and thus provided interim protection for forests pending resolution of claims. The Court upheld the constitutionality of Chap. V-A as an interim measure. The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that the land in dispute was not subject to Chap. II, stating that the land vested in the State under the Abolition Act, making the petitioner a tenure-holder, not a proprietor. The notification under s. 4 of the Forest Act was found to be still in force, as no valid notification had cancelled it. Conclusion: The petition was allowed in part, striking down the Transfer Act as unconstitutional. The rest of the prayers were rejected, with the petitioner free to establish his rights under the registered lease through appropriate legal steps. The State was allowed to contest the petitioner's claims. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.
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