1923 (1) TMI 6 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues: Interpretation of Clause "secondly" of Section 16 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913) regarding structures on the pre-empted site.

In this judgment by the Lahore High Court, the main issue was to interpret whether the sheds and structures existing on a site, which were erected by the defendant-vendee before the sale when he held the land on a lease, fell within the purview of Clause "secondly" of Section 16 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act (I of 1913). The defendant had obtained a lease of the site to start a workshop and had constructed sheds, a stone wall, a latrine, and a katcha wall with a door. The lower courts had held that these structures were covered under the said clause.

The Court examined the argument presented by the plaintiff-appellant that temporary structures like the ones in question did not fall under the definition of "structure" in the Act. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was only entitled to the materials of the structures as he had to remove them at the end of the lease. However, the Court disagreed with these contentions, stating that the law considers the owner of a building or structure on a site as a co-owner in the property sold, and their right of pre-emption is inferior only to a co-sharer. The Court clarified that while the Act does not define "building" or "structure," every building is a structure, but not every structure is a building. Therefore, even less substantial erections like walls or sheds can be considered structures for pre-emption purposes. The Court emphasized that the defendant, as the owner of the structures at the time of sale, had the right of pre-emption, even though he was obligated to remove them at the end of the lease.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the interpretation of Clause "secondly" by the lower courts, stating that the structures in question practically covered the entire site, leaving only a courtyard in the center. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal with costs, affirming that the defendant's structures were within the scope of the pre-emption law.