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2024 (3) TMI 1324 - HC - Indian LawsDishonour of Cheque - power of an Appellate Court to order payment pending an appeal against conviction under Section 138 of the Act - Interpretation of the provisions of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - HELD THAT - In Surinder Singh Deswal 2019 (5) TMI 1626 - SUPREME COURT , the Supreme Court had to consider the object and purpose of the amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act in the backdrop of the general power available to the Appellate Court under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence imposed by the trial court. Noticing that the provisions of Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as amended, conferred powers on an Appellate Court that was considering an appeal against a conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, which powers were an exception to the general power available to an Appellate Court under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to unconditionally suspend the sentence pending appeals challenging a conviction and sentence, the Supreme Court found that while it was no doubt true that under the amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act, the word used in the context of exercising the discretion is may , it is generally to be construed as a rule or shall and it was only in exceptional cases, for which special reasons had to be assigned, that an Appellate Court could refrain from issuing a direction to deposit the prescribed percentage of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. The express provisions of Section 148 of the N.I. Act, as amended, and its stated object as discernible from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act No.20 of 2018. Applications disposed off.
Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 regarding the power of an Appellate Court to order payment pending an appeal against conviction under Section 138 of the Act.
Summary: The judgment pertains to the interpretation of Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, specifically addressing the power of the Appellate Court to order payment pending an appeal against conviction under Section 138 of the Act. The cases were referred to the High Court by the Chief Justice based on a learned Single Judge's order. The issue revolved around the nature and extent of the statutory discretion conferred on the Appellate Court in ordering payments pending appeal against conviction under Section 138 of the Act and the requirement of furnishing reasons for such orders. In analyzing the statutory provision and considering the precedents set by the Supreme Court in previous cases, the High Court concluded that the Appellate Court has the discretion to either order the appellant to deposit a portion of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court or to waive such deposit. If the deposit is required, it should not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial court. Additionally, if the Appellate Court directs the appellant to deposit an amount exceeding 20%, further reasons must be provided for such a decision. The interpretation drawn by the High Court was based on a harmonious reading of the Supreme Court judgments in Surinder Singh Deswal and Jamboo Bhandari, aligning with the amended Section 148 of the Act and its objectives as outlined in the Amendment Act No.20 of 2018. While the cases could have been remitted back to the Single Judge for disposal, the High Court decided to set aside the impugned orders of the Appellate Court due to lack of reasons and directed the Appellate Court to pass fresh orders within three months from the date of the judgment. In conclusion, the High Court provided a detailed interpretation of the Appellate Court's discretion under Section 148 of the Act, emphasizing the importance of providing reasons for decisions and ensuring compliance with the statutory provisions and objectives of the Amendment Act.
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