2009 (8) TMI 139 - HC - Income Tax

Whether the High Court can condone the delay when an appeal is preferred beyond the time prescribed under section 260A of the Act in view of the decision rendered by the apex court in Commissioner of Customs and central Excise v.Hongo India P Ltd. - there is no dispute over the fact that the appeals have been preferred beyond the period of limitation - section 260A permits the assessee or the Revenue to prefer an appeal within 120 days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the assessee. The receipt of the order passed by the assessee has its own signification. By no stretch of imagination, its significance can be marginalised. Two aspects, namely, the period and the date from which it is computed, have to be given their due weightage and on conferral of such weightage, the only conclusion which can be arrived at in the backdrop of Hongo India Private Limited is that this court has no power to condone the delay. Accordingly, appeals are dismissed

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the High Court can condone the delay when an appeal is preferred beyond the time prescribed under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Condonation of Delay in Appeals under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961:
The primary issue in these appeals is whether the High Court has the authority to condone the delay in filing appeals under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeals were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, and the court had to determine if it could condone such delays.

Legal Provisions and Precedents:
Section 260A of the Act allows appeals to the High Court from orders passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. Subsection (2) specifies that appeals must be filed within 120 days from the date the order is received. Unlike sections 249 and 253, which explicitly provide for condonation of delay by the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal, section 260A does not contain any provision for condonation of delay.

Arguments Presented:
- For the Revenue: Mr. Sanjay Lal argued that there is no prohibition under section 260A against the High Court exercising its power to condone delays. He contended that in the absence of express exclusion, the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, should apply, allowing the High Court to condone delays.
- For the Amicus Curiae: Mr. Alok Aradhe and Mr. Sumit Nema supported the view that the High Court should have the jurisdiction to condone delays under section 260A, invoking section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which applies the Limitation Act to special laws unless expressly excluded.

Relevant Case Law:
- Hongo India Private Limited [2009] 315 ITR 449 (SC): The Supreme Court held that the High Court does not have the power to condone delays in filing reference applications under section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, beyond the prescribed period, as the Act did not provide for such condonation.
- Chaudharana Steels P. Ltd. v. CCE: The Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court has no power to condone delays under section 35G of the Central Excise Act, which is similar to section 260A of the Income-tax Act.

Court's Analysis:
The court examined the language and scheme of section 260A and found no provision for condonation of delay. It noted that the Income-tax Act is a self-contained code, and the absence of a provision for condonation of delay in section 260A indicates a legislative intent to exclude such power.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that it does not have the power to condone delays in filing appeals under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The appeals were dismissed on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period.

Final Judgment:
The appeals were dismissed as the High Court held that it has no power to condone the delay in filing the appeals under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, beyond the prescribed period.