1962 (10) TMI 62 - SC - Indian Laws

Issues Involved:
1. Competence of appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution.
2. Whether an arbitrator appointed under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a Tribunal under Article 136.
3. Distinction between judicial/quasi-judicial acts and administrative/executive acts.
4. Applicability of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to arbitration awards under Section 10A.
5. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation of Section 10A.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Competence of Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution:
The central issue in these appeals is whether an arbitrator appointed under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, qualifies as a Tribunal under Article 136 of the Constitution, thereby making the appeals competent. Article 136(1) grants the Supreme Court the discretion to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence, or order passed by any court or tribunal in India. The respondents argue that the arbitrator is not a Tribunal under Article 136, thus rendering the appeals incompetent.

2. Whether an Arbitrator Appointed under Section 10A is a Tribunal under Article 136:
For an entity to be considered a Tribunal under Article 136, it must be constituted by the State and invested with the State's inherent judicial power. The arbitrators in question were appointed by the parties themselves under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, which allows for voluntary arbitration. The Court noted that while the arbitrator under Section 10A possesses some quasi-judicial powers and procedural rules, he derives his authority from the agreement between the parties, not from the State. Therefore, the arbitrator does not meet the essential criteria of being a Tribunal under Article 136.

3. Distinction between Judicial/Quasi-Judicial Acts and Administrative/Executive Acts:
The judgment elaborates on the distinction between judicial/quasi-judicial acts and administrative/executive acts. Judicial acts involve the application of law to facts and require a decision-making process that adheres to principles of natural justice. In contrast, administrative acts are more discretionary and do not necessarily follow judicial procedures. The Court concluded that the decisions of arbitrators under Section 10A are quasi-judicial but not judicial acts performed by a Tribunal.

4. Applicability of Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226 to Arbitration Awards under Section 10A:
The appellants argued that a writ of certiorari could be issued against the arbitrator's award under Article 226, suggesting that the arbitrator should be considered a Tribunal. However, the Court clarified that Article 226 allows writs to be issued to any person or authority, not limited to courts or tribunals. Thus, even if a writ may lie against an award under Article 226, it does not imply that the arbitrator is a Tribunal under Article 136.

5. Legislative Intent and Statutory Interpretation of Section 10A:
The Court examined the legislative intent behind Section 10A and its statutory framework. Section 10A provides for voluntary arbitration and outlines the procedure for appointing arbitrators and the subsequent steps, including the publication of the arbitration agreement and award by the appropriate government. The Court found that the arbitrator's authority is derived from the parties' agreement and not from any statutory provision conferring judicial power. Therefore, the arbitrator under Section 10A cannot be equated with an Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 10 of the Act.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents, concluding that the appeals are incompetent under Article 136. The arbitrator appointed under Section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a Tribunal under Article 136, as he is not invested with the State's inherent judicial power. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, with costs awarded to the respondents in Civil Appeal No. 204 of 1962, and no order as to costs in Civil Appeals Nos. 182 and 183 of 1962.

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