Doctrine of bias - Indian Laws - General

Doctrine of bias In G. Sarana the learned Judges referred to the Principles of Administrative Law by J.A.G Griffith and H. Street (4th Edn.), and observed that the position with regard to bias has been aptly and succinctly stated thus: (SCC pp. 590-91, para 12)- 12. The prohibition or bias strikes against factors which may improperly influence a Judge in deciding in favour of one party. The first of the three disabling types of bias is bias on the subject-matter. Only rarely will this bias invalidate proceedings. A mere general interest in the general object to be pursued would not disqualify, said Field, J., holding that a Magistrate who subscribed to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was not thereby disabled from trying a charge brought by that body of cruelty to a horse. There must be some direct connection with the litigation. If there is such prejudice on the subject-matter that the court has reached fixed and unalterable conclusions not founded on reason or understanding, so that there is not a fair hearing, that is bias of which the courts will take account, as where a justice announced his intention of convicting anyone coming before him on a charge of supplying liquor after the permitted hours Secondly, a pecuniary interest, however, slight will disqualify, even though it is not proved that the decision is in any way affected. The third type of bias is personal bias. A Judge may be a relative, friend or business associate of a party, or he may be personally hostile as a result of events happening either before or during the course of a trial. The courts have not been consistent in laying down when bias of this type will invalidate a hearing. The House of Lords in Frome United Breweries Co. Ltd. v. Bath JJ 1926 AC 586 approved an earlier test of whether there is a real likelihood of bias. The House of Lords has since approved a dictum of Lord Hewart that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done although it did not mention another test suggested by him in the same judgment: Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. Eventually in the said decision in G. Surana it has been ruled that what has to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias in respect of a member of an administrative board or body is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In other words, whether there is substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to Halsbury s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 2, para 551, where it has been observed: 551. Want of impartiality or bias; fraud.- The test for bias is whether a reasonable intelligent man, fully appraised of all the circumstances, would feel a serious apprehension of bias. In Transport Deptt. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar- 1988 (8) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT, while dealing with the concept of bias as a part of natural justice, the Court observed that: (SCC p. 654, para 12) 12. A predisposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. There must be reasonable apprehension of that predisposition. The reasonable apprehension must be based on cogent materials. Needless to say, personal bias is one of the limbs of bias, namely, pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant,- 2000 (10) TMI 955 - SUPREME COURT, the Court referred to a passage from the view expressed by Mathew, J. in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P- 1973 (9) TMI 101 - SUPREME COURT: (Girja Shankar Pant case, SCC pp. 198-99, para 28) 28. 16. The tests of real likelihood and reasonable suspicion are really inconsistent with each other. We think that the reviewing authority must make a determination on the basis of the whole evidence before it, whether a reasonable man would in the circumstances infer that there is real likelihood of bias. The court must look at the impression which other people have. This follows from the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done. If right-minded persons would think that there is real likelihood of bias on the part of an inquiring officer, he must not conduct the inquiry; nevertheless, there must be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture would not be enough. There must exist circumstances from which reasonable men would think it probable or likely that the inquiring officer will be prejudiced against the delinquent. The court will not inquire whether he was really prejudiced. If a reasonable man would think on the basis of the existing circumstances that he is likely to be prejudiced, that is sufficient to quash the decision [see per Lord Denning, M.R in Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C) Ltd. v. Lannon 1969 1 QB 577 (WLR at p. 707]. (SCC p. 465, para 16) Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench in Girja Shankar Pant case referred to the decision in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning 1948 AC 87 and the sounding of a different note and the dilution of the principle by English Courts in R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2) 2000 1 AC 119 and the view expressed by Lord Hutton in the said case and thereafter proceeded to analyse the doctrine propounded in Locabail (U.K) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. Locabail U.K Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., 2000 QB 451 where the Court of Appeal had upon detailed analysis of the decision in R. v. Gough 1993 AC 646 together with Dimes case Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors, 1852 3 HL Cas 759, Pinochet case as also Ebner, In re23 and the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in President of the Republic of South Africa v. South African Rugby Football Union 1999 ZACC 9 opined that it would be rather dangerous and futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or may not give rise to a real danger of bias. The learned Judges took note of the fact that the Court of Appeal continued to give effect that everything will depend upon facts which may include the nature of the issue to be decided. Eventually, this Court ruled thus: (Girja Shankar Pant case, SCC p. 201, para 35) 35. The test, therefore, is as to whether a mere apprehension of bias or there being a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom-in the event however the conclusion is otherwise inescapable that there is existing a real danger of bias, the administrative action cannot be sustained: If on the other hand, the allegations pertaining to bias is rather fanciful and otherwise to avoid a particular court, Tribunal or authority, question of declaring them to be unsustainable would not arise. The requirement is availability of positive and cogent evidence and it is in this context that we do record our concurrence with the view expressed by the court of appeal in Locabail case. (emphasis supplied) In G.N Nayak v. Goa University- 2002 (1) TMI 1290 - SUPREME COURT it has been laid down that: (SCC p. 723, para 34) 34. It is not every kind of bias which in law is taken to vitiate an act. It must be a prejudice which is not founded on reason, and actuated by self-interest-whether pecuniary or personal. Because of this element of personal interest, bias is also seen as an extension of the principles of natural justice that no man should be a judge in his own cause. Being a state of mind, a bias is sometimes impossible to determine. Therefore, the courts have evolved the principle that it is sufficient for a litigant to successfully impugn an action by establishing a reasonable possibility of bias or proving circumstances from which the operation of influences affecting a fair assessment of the merits of the case can be inferred. In State of Gujarat v. R.A Mehta - 2013 (1) TMI 748 - SUPREME COURT, a two-Judge Bench dealing with bias has observed thus: (SCC p. 37, para 58) 58. Bias is one of the limbs of natural justice. The doctrine of bias emerges from the legal maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria causa. It applies only when the interest attributed to an individual is such so as to tempt him to make a decision in favour of, or to further his own cause. There may not be a case of actual bias, or an apprehension to the effect that the matter most certainly will not be decided or dealt with impartially but where the circumstances are such so as to create a reasonable apprehension in the minds of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision, the same is sufficient to invoke the doctrine of bias. [UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VERSUS SANJAY JETHI AND ANOTHER- 2013 (10) TMI 1521 - SUPREME COURT]