2003 (12) TMI 657 - SC - Indian Laws

Maintainability of the writ petition in contractual matters - Validity of conveyance deed - Alleged misrepresentation and mistake in the auction notice and conveyance deed - Seeking prior permission from the Government of Rajasthan against payment of charges as the Government may fix thereof - Applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and FAR regulations - HELD THAT - In the present case the entire case centers around roughly 25 undisputed documents. The question of leading oral evidence does not arise and no intricate interpretation of documents or complicated inquiry into facts is warranted. So far as the issue as to assessment of value of the structure standing on the property is concerned the same stands covered by a detailed factual report quantifying the precise valuation. Based on the inferences to be drawn from documents the questions of what relief if any this Court considers fit to grant and how if at all such relief is to be tailored to suit the facts and circumstances of the case are to be answered. Thus it will not be a sound exercise of judicial discretion to relegate the petitioners to recourse to the alternate remedy of civil suit belatedly at the present stage we proceed to examine the dispute on merits . At the present stage of the proceedings the alternative remedy of filing the suit would not be efficacious. This Court in a number of cases even after recording a finding that the writ petition was not maintainable and that the High Court ought not to have entertained it has declined to interfere on the ground of nonmaintainability where it is found that the matter has been pending for long and/or the High Court has already entertained the writ petition albeit wrongly and/or when to send the writ petitioner back would cause grave delay or harassment. In such cases this Court has proceeded to decide the dispute on merits. It is the appellants who delayed the payment of sale consideration on the dates stipulated for payment. For the period of delay they agreed to pay interest to the State Government voluntarily; they voluntarily paid stamp duty and bore registration charges as stated above in the end of December 1996 and got the sale deed executed on 7th January 1997 on which date the possession was delivered to them and thereafter they voluntarily paid the charges for the approval of building plans with FAR 1.75 and proceeded with construction work for establishing Hotel-cum- Commercial Complex by demolition of existing structure of Dr. Hellings Bunglow standing on the land in question levelling the same digging deep foundation constructing basement and thereafter further raising construction of ground floor and other floors. They cannot now be permitted to turn round and claim refund of any amount which they allege to have spent including the claim for the interest. The appellants have voluntarily paid the entire money entered into possession raised construction and incurred expenditure voluntarily and as such they are not entitled to any refund or any claim and declaration as such on the ground of frustration or impossibility of performance of the contract. Every contract including one by auction is subject to provisions of law. Whenever any action is taken in performance of a contract it must conform to the law in force at the time when action is taken. In the instant case when the appellants applied for approval of building plans it is the law that is in force at that time which would be applicable. Doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available when any action is desired to be taken in contravention of the provisions of law. The terms and conditions of the sale as announced when the property was put to sale were in accordance with law and no guarantee was given (nor could have been given) that the law would not change or that the terms and conditions would be enforceable even in violation of law which may be in force. FAR was a matter of law and the FAR was fixed either by the JDA or JMC in exercise of its statutory powers. The contract when entered into the FAR approved by JDA was 2 and its subsequent reduction in 1996 to 1.75 would not invalidate the contract or by treating as a breach of the contract nor can it be treated by the Government. In the present case we have found as a fact that the appellants even after acquiring the knowledge of fact regarding reduction of FAR from 2.00 to 1.75 and that the land was not ceiling free elected to affirm the contract by getting their plans approved with FAR 1.75 and started putting up construction. They started digging the foundations and continued to build even after knowing that the land was not ceiling free. In spite of having acquired knowledge of the true facts assuming that there was any mistake or misrepresentation to begin with and having learnt that the title which was sought to be conferred on them by the respondents was not such full title as they had contemplated it to be they proceeded to have the sale deed executed and registered in their favour seeking extensions of time and paying interest for the period of delay in payment. The contract stood accomplished into a demise and the transaction ended. It is writ large that the appellants had elected to stand by the contract by digging the land sinking the basement and raising about 9 floors above investing crores of rupees. They have by their own conduct rendered the position irreversible and restitution impractical. We have not been shown any law or authority based whereon the appellants may annul and avoid a concluded contract and fix liability on respondents for the cost of their construction which they have voluntarily chosen to raise in spite of being aware of all the relevant facts and circumstances. Section 298 provides that the State Government has the power to cancel or modify bye-laws or rules framed by the board. Again this is of no avail to the appellants. Power under Section 298 is in the nature of power of superintendence. It is a general power given to the Government that in case the Government feels that the bye-laws framed or the orders issued are not reasonable or are detrimental to the public interest or there is any other good ground available then it can repeal the bye-laws wholly or in part or modify any rule or bye-law made by the Board after inviting objections. The power could not have been exercised to suit the needs of an individual case as has been contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants. It may be noted that the learned senior counsel for the respondent pointed out during the course of hearing that the amended bye-laws were more beneficial to the appellants as there was number of exemptions to be taken into account while calculating the FAR namely storage on all floors balcony guard-door lobby terrace garden service floor AC plant room locker dark room PBX room guard room power house lift room and the lift well. Under the amended bye-laws of 1996 the appellants would get more covered area thus causing no prejudice to them. This has been strongly refuted by the counsel for the appellants. We need not go into this disputed question as it is of no consequence to the points already decided. Thus we do not find any merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Maintainability of the writ petition in contractual matters.
2. Alleged misrepresentation and mistake in the auction notice and conveyance deed.
3. Applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and FAR regulations.
4. Reliefs sought by the appellants.

Summary:

1. Maintainability of the Writ Petition:
The appellants contended that there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition in contractual matters, emphasizing that the power to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 is plenary. The respondents argued that contractual disputes should not be raised in proceedings u/s Article 226, as it is a remedy in public law. The Supreme Court, while agreeing with the High Court that the petition involves disputed questions of fact, decided to examine the dispute on merits to avoid miscarriage of justice due to the lapse of time.

2. Alleged Misrepresentation and Mistake:
The appellants claimed that the conveyance deed is liable to be canceled due to misrepresentations regarding the FAR and the property being "free hold and ceiling free." The respondents argued that there was no misrepresentation as the FAR was 2.0 at the time of the auction, and the change in FAR was due to a change in law. The Court found that the appellants, by their conduct, had affirmed the contract despite knowing the true facts, thus extinguishing their power of avoidance.

3. Applicability of Urban Land Ceiling Act and FAR Regulations:
The appellants argued that the property was not ceiling free as represented and that the condition in the exemption letter regarding non-alienation without prior permission made the property not freehold. The respondents contended that the conditions in the exemption order were not enforced and that the Ceiling Act had been repealed. The Court noted that the appellants had voluntarily paid the sale consideration, stamp duty, and registration charges, and proceeded with construction, thus affirming the contract.

4. Reliefs Sought by the Appellants:
The appellants sought various reliefs, including the declaration that the sale deed was void, refund of the sale consideration, and compensation for the construction. The Court found that the appellants, having affirmed the contract and proceeded with construction, could not now seek to avoid the contract or claim refunds. The Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellants were not entitled to any relief based on the doctrines of misrepresentation, mistake, or frustration.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the Division Bench's decision that the sale of land by auction was a completed contract involving disputed questions of fact, which could not be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. The appellants, having affirmed the contract and proceeded with construction, were not entitled to any relief.