1972 (6) TMI 72 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appellate proceedings under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
2. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963.
3. Whether the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act can be considered a court.
4. The impact of previous Supreme Court decisions on the applicability of the Limitation Act to tribunals.

Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appellate proceedings under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act:
The primary contention raised by the respondent was that the appellate authority is not a court (civil or criminal), and hence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay, does not apply to appeals filed under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The judgment delves deeply into the principles of the Limitation Act, noting that Section 5 provides the court the power to condone delays in filing appeals and applications. The judgment emphasizes that these principles are generally applicable to proceedings in courts, but special or local laws also prescribe their own periods of limitation. The decision hinges on whether the special law explicitly excludes the application of Section 5.

2. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The judgment explains that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, fundamentally changed the application of the Limitation Act to special laws. The new provision states that all sections from 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to special laws unless expressly excluded. This change means that it is not necessary for special laws to explicitly state that Section 5 applies; rather, an express exclusion is required for it not to apply. The judgment cites the omission of Section 31 from the 1965 Rent Control Act as evidence that the legislature intended for Section 5 to apply automatically due to Section 29(2).

3. Whether the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act can be considered a court:
The judgment discusses whether the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act qualifies as a court. It notes that tribunals often have powers similar to courts, such as those under the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment asserts that the provision of Section 5 extends to these tribunals when the special law does not expressly exclude it. The judgment concludes that the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act, while not a court in the ordinary sense, is vested with the power to condone delays as per Section 5 of the Limitation Act due to Section 29(2).

4. The impact of previous Supreme Court decisions on the applicability of the Limitation Act to tribunals:
The judgment references two Supreme Court decisions, Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli, and Nityanand v. L.I.C. of India, which held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies only to applications before courts and not to tribunals. However, the judgment distinguishes these cases from the present one, noting that the Supreme Court decisions dealt with the applicability of Article 137, not the broader principles of the Limitation Act, to special laws. The judgment concludes that these decisions do not apply to the current case because the issue here is about the applicability of Section 5 to periods prescribed by special laws, not about Article 137.

Conclusion:
The judgment ultimately concludes that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeal proceedings before the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act, 1965, by the force of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, the revision petitions are allowed, and the cases are remanded to the appellate authority to consider whether there was sufficient cause to excuse the delay in not filing the appeal within the prescribed time.

Separate Opinion:
One judge disagreed with the majority opinion, asserting that the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act is not a court and that the Limitation Act applies only to courts. This judge emphasized that the Rent Control Act's specific provision for excluding the time taken to obtain a certified copy indicates that it is a self-contained code regarding limitation periods and exemptions. Therefore, the revision petitions should be dismissed.

Final Decision:
In accordance with the majority opinion, the revision petitions are dismissed with costs.