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Showing 401 to 420 of 467 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 67
Seeking a declaration that the adjudication proceedings which have remained pending for almost 12 years be held to be vitiated in law - challenge to SCN - challenge to final order of adjudication - HELD THAT:- The respondents allude to the matter having been placed in the call book for many years and thereafter proceedings being delayed on account of repeated adjournments being sought by the petitioner.
As was noticed in M/s Vos Technologies [2024 (12) TMI 624 - DELHI HIGH COURT], nothing constrained or detracted from the right of the respondents to proceed ex parte in case the adjudication proceedings were being unjustifiably delayed and frequent requests for adjournments being made. In fact, although the blame is sought to be deflected towards the petitioner, the principal ground for a failure to conclude with due expedition appears to be the matter having remained in the call book for many years and which fact is admitted to by the respondents themselves.
The final order dated 31 January 2023 as well as the SCN proceedings emanating from the impugned SCN dated 21 April 2011 is quashed - petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 66
CENVAT Credit - inputs/capital goods - duty paid on tower materials, puff channels, shade & parts thereof and pre-fabricated buildings materials - immovable property or not - tower would qualify as “part” or “component” or “accessory” of the capital goods i.e. antenna or not - towers, shelter are capital goods or inputs in terms of Rule 2(a) or 2(k) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 or not - invocation of extended period of limitation.
HELD THAT:- Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, considering the said issue involved in M/S BHARTI AIRTEL LTD. VERSUS THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PUNE [2024 (11) TMI 1042 - SUPREME COURT] have held that 'Having held that the tower and pre-fabricated buildings (PFBs) are “goods” and not immovable property and since these goods are used for providing mobile telecommunication services, the inescapable conclusion is that they would also qualify as “inputs” under Rule 2(k) for the purpose of credit benefits under the CENVAT Rules.'
Conclusion - Thus, tower materials and PFBs are not immovable property and qualify as inputs under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 65
Availment of CENVAT credit - revision in rate of service (escalation of price) - violation of Rule 4A (1) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 read with Rule 9(1)(f) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 - denial of Cenvat credit on the ground that the additional invoices were issued by the service providers much after the period of 14 days of completion of service - HELD THAT:- The CENVAT Credit availed by the appellant on the basis of supplementary invoices were rejected by the Ld. adjudicating authority on the ground that the said invoices were not issued within 14 days from from the date of completion of service or receipt of payment, whichever is earlier. It is observed that the issue is no more res integra as this Tribunal in M/S. USHA MARTIN LIMITED VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE & SERVICE TAX, JAMSHEDPUR [2023 (5) TMI 719 - CESTAT KOLKATA] by relying on Hon’ble Madras High Court’s ruling in THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE VERSUS M/S. JSW STEELS LTD., THE CUSTOMS, EXCISE AND SERVICE TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, [2017 (8) TMI 592 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] held that CENVAT credit cannot be denied to the service recipient on the ground that invoice was not issued by the service provider.
In Usha Martin Limited by relying on M/S DELPHI AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS (P) LIMITED VERSUS CCE, NOIDA [2013 (12) TMI 156 - CESTAT NEW DELHI] this tribunal has held that for the period prior to 01.04.2011, as Rule 9(1) did not make any distinction between invoice or supplementary invoice in respect of services, therefore, the term “invoice” in Rule 9(1)(f) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 has to be treated including “supplementary invoice”.
Conclusion - There is no dispute regarding the payment duty on the supplementary invoices. Also, there is also no dispute regarding the receipt of input services and using the same towards manufacture of dutiable goods. Thus, CENVAT credit cannot be denied to the Appellant on the basis of procedural irregularities, if any.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 64
Mis-declaration of MRP and/or alteration of MRP post removal of the goods prior to 01.03.2008 - Clandestine removal.
Mis-declaration of MRP and/or alteration of MRP post removal of the goods prior to 01.03.2008 - statements of various persons were recorded, cross examination not afforded - demand of differential Central Excise duty under the provisions of Section4A of Central Excise Act, 1944 - HELD THAT:- The issue has been decided by larger Bench of this Tribunal in the case of Ocean Ceramics Ltd. [2024 (1) TMI 1280 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD - LB] and subsequently on the answer given by the larger bench the division bench in the case of Ocean Ceramics& others [2024 (9) TMI 1490 - CESTAT AHMEDABAD] finally decided the issue of MRP in the favour of the assessees.
Clandestine removal - manufacture and clearance of 96646 boxes of ceramics tiles of various size and grades - demand based on statements of various persons - admissible evidence or not - HELD THAT:- The said demand is on the basis of the details available in the estimates/debit memos recovered from Appellant’s Mumbai and Delhi office and statements recorded by the investigating officers. It is noticed that in the said matter appellant requested for cross-examination of witnesses which was rejected by the Ld. Adjudicating authority. Further the director of Appellant’s company has also retracted his statement by filing affidavits. It was on records that Appellant have raised the dispute on statements of witness recorded during the course of investigation by investigating officers. Therefore the said statement cannot be relied upon as admissible evidence in terms of the provisions of Section 9D of the Act.
Reliance is placed on the ruling of the Hon’ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Jindal Drugs (Infra) [2016 (6) TMI 956 - PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT] wherein the Hon’ble High Court laid down the detailed procedure, inter alia, providing for cross-examination of the witness of the Revenue by the Adjudicating Authority and thereafter, if the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the statement of the witness is admissible in evidence than the Adjudicating Authority is obligated to offer such witnesses for cross-examination by the other side/assessee.
Statements recorded during investigation in the present matter, whose makers are not examination-in-chief before the adjudicating authority, would have to be eschewed from evidence, and it will not be permissible for Ld. Adjudicating Authority to rely on the said evidences. Therefore, none of the said statements were admissible evidence in the present case.
Also, there is nothing to indicate compliance with the strict stipulations contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 36B of the Act in the present case. Therefore no demand is sustainable on this ground also.
Conclusion - The reliance on statements without cross-examination and demands based on inadmissible computer-generated evidence were rejected.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 63
Recovery of Central Excise duty on the clearances of scrap and waste during the period from April 2008 to March 2013 - demand confirmed solely relying upon the verification report submitted by the range superintendent, against which the Cenvat credit has been taken by the appellant and an observation was made that they are normal entries - HELD THAT:- The report itself does not provide the details of all entries against which Cenvat credit has been taken. The impugned order also in these proceedings presumed that there is a dispute that the scrap which has been cleared would have arisen out of cenvated as well as non-cenvated items of iron and steel. It does not identify and make categorical statement to the effect that the scrap has arisen out of cenvated capital goods. It is based on a presumption which arises in view of the said verification report. Such presumption cannot take place of proof and cannot be basis for confirmation of demand. Appellant has taken a categorical stand before the Adjudicating Authority that these scraps have arisen out of non-cenvated capital goods, some of them even prior to the insertion of Modvat/Cenvat credit scheme in respect of capital goods, this stand of the appellant was to be rebutted by the Adjudicating Authority in the impugned order by relying upon the suitable and concrete evidences. Presumption made against the appellant cannot be the ground for confirming the demand.
These scrap would have arisen not on account of any manufacture but on account of uses of capital goods. Over period of time such waste and scrap arising on account of reasons other than the activity of manufacture could not have been subjected to demand of central excise duty but should have been subjected to reversal of credit in the manner specified as per Rule 3 (5) of Cenvat Credit Rules, if the said capital goods were cenvated. In absence of any conclusion in respect of the facts that these capital goods were cenvated, it is found that impugned order proceeds only on the basis of presumption and assumption to confirm this demand.
Interest and penalties - HELD THAT:- As the demand itself is being set aside, penalties and interest imposed under Section 11AC and Rule 27 is also set aside.
Concusion - The burden of proof lies with the department to establish that the waste and scrap were generated from cenvated capital goods. Presumptions cannot replace concrete evidence in confirming duty demands.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 62
Recovery of Tax dues - Effect of CIRP Proceedings under IBC - Challenge to action of respondents, directing the respondent No. 2 to recover the outstanding amount from its Bank account - non-payment of the entry tax for the goods purchased by the petitioner from outside the State of Rajasthan - HELD THAT:- As per Sections 31 and 238 of the IBC, the approved Resolution Plan has been made binding on the Corporate Debtors - McNally Bharat Engineering Company Ltd., its employees, members, creditors, guarantors including the Central Government, any State Government or any local authority and other stakeholders involved in the Resolution Plan, to whom a debt in respect of payment of dues arising under any law for the time being in force, is owed. Section 238 of the IBC provides that the Code will prevail in case of inconsistency between two laws.
This court also examined similar controversy in the case of Ultra Tech Nathdwara Cement Ltd. [2020 (4) TMI 269 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] and held that any demands made by the Statutory Creditor, i.e. Commercial Taxes Department, for the period prior to the effective date stand extinguished with the approval of the Resolution Plan by the NCLT - Law is well-settled that with the finalization of insolvency resolution plan and the approval thereof by the NCLT, all dues of creditors, Corporate, Statutory and others stand extinguished and no demand can be raised for the period prior to the specified date.
Conclusion - Law is well-settled that with the finalization of insolvency resolution plan and the approval thereof by the NCLT, all dues of creditors, Corporate, Statutory and others stand extinguished and no demand can be raised for the period prior to the specified date.
The impugned communication/notice dated 17.07.2019 is invalid - Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 61
Jurisdiction of Additional Commissioner to pass an order u/s 64 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 after the expiry of more than 4 years since the passing of the original order - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the order sought to be revised was passed on 31.07.2017. The records were called for under letter dated 13.07.2021 which was dispatched on 14.07.2021 and records were received by the Additional Commissioner on 22.07.2021 and notice under Section 64 (1) of KVAT Act was issued to the appellant on 28.07.2021. If the proceedings is initiated within 4 years from the date of order sought to be revised, the date of serving notice on the assessee would have no consequence. Initiation of proceedings and issuance of notice under Section 64 (1) of KVAT Act is relevant for computing limitation of 4 years and not service of notice or passing of order under Section 64 (1) of KVAT Act.
The Full Bench of this Court in M/S.KHIMIJIBHAI MILLS [2000 (12) TMI 883 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] held that 'Emphasis in the earlier provision was in affirmative terms to exercise the power only within 4 years, whereas now the emphasis is in the negative terms by saying that the authority shall not exercise the power beyond the period of 4 years. There is no material difference either to the exercise of the power to revise or to the period of limitation prescribed.'
It is clear from the above that four years limitation prescribed under Section -64 of KVAT Act is to call for records and to initiate proceedings and not to pass final order.
Conclusion - The limitation period under Section 64 of the KVAT Act pertains to the initiation of revisional proceedings, not the conclusion of such proceedings.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 60
Condonation of delay of 5 years, 10 months, and 16 days in filing the appeal by the appellant/State - The court dismissed the application for condonation of delay, finding that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the extensive delay.
HELD THAT:- This Special Leave Petition is dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- to be deposited by the State within a period of two weeks from today with the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and file proof thereof, in terms of the signed Reportable Order.
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2025 (1) TMI 59
Suit for Recovery - Direction to deposit 75% of the decretal amount during the pendency of the present Appeals - separate pre-institution mediation was not initiated for the Counter-Claim - HELD THAT:- The Commercial Courts (Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement) Rules, 2018 [hereinafter referred to as “Pre-Institution Mediation Rules”] provides that a party to a commercial dispute is required to initiate mediation prior to the filing of a suit. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 3 of Pre-Institution Mediation Rules provides that the mediation process should be completed within a period of three months - A commercial dispute is defined as a dispute referred to in Section 2 (1) (c) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Section 2 (1) (xviii) of the CC Act includes “agreements for sale of goods or provision of services”. Concededly, the dispute between the parties is commercial in nature and is subject to the Pre-Institution Mediation Rules.
The Supreme Court in the judgment of Yamini Manohar vs. T.K.D Keerthi [2023 (10) TMI 1375 - SC ORDER], relying on the M/s. Patil Automation case, has held that pre-litigation mediation is mandatory unless the suit contemplates urgent relief. It was further held that a plaintiff should not be permitted to file an application for interim relief as a subterfuge to wriggle out of the requirement of mandatory pre-institution mediation. The Court held that in order that the provision is not bypassed, the learned Commercial Court has a role, although a limited one, to examine whether the suit contemplates an urgent relief so as to keep a check that legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 12A of the CC Act is not defeated.
In the present case, pre-litigation mediation was initiated by Molmek prior to instituting the suit. Molmek has relied upon the copy of the Non-Starter Report of the authority appointed for pre-institution mediation, South-West, DLSA, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi, dated 15.03.2022 to submit NAPL did not attend the Mediation proceedings as these were closed as a "non-starter". NAPL filed its combined Written Statement and Counter-Claim on 31.08.2022 raising a Counter-Claim of Rs. 7,62,930/- against Molmek before the learned Commercial Court.
The object of the CC Act is to ensure speedy resolution of commercial disputes to accelerate economic growth and improve the international image of the Indian Justice System and to restore the faith of the investors. Once a party has taken steps to exhaust the remedy of pre-institution mediation to then ask the opposite party in a case where the subject matter of dispute is entirely the same, to once again undertake pre-institution mediation, prior to filing its counter-claim would defeat the very purpose of the CC Act and delay adjudication of the commercial dispute between the parties.
The Supreme Court in AMBALAL SARABHAI ENTERPRISES LTD. VERSUS K.S. INFRASPACE LLP & ANR. [2019 (10) TMI 1601 - SUPREME COURT] case has held that the statement of object and reasons for the enactment of the CC Act was the early and speed resolution of the commercial disputes and thus, there was an amendment made and fast track procedure set in place by the CC Act - The Supreme Court analysed the provisions of the CC Act and based on such analysis held that statutory provisions of the CC Act and the language therein should be interpreted purposefully to facilitate the swift resolution of commercial disputes, thereby benefiting litigants involved in trade and commerce and contributing to the country's economic growth.
NAPL has placed evidence before the learned Trial Court which remains uncontroverted with respect to the supplies of goods by it to Molmek to show a total number of 46 deliveries between the period 26.10.2018 and 08.01.2021. NAPL has given invoice numbers, “e-way bill” numbers and all filed requisite evidence. The 5 disputed invoices also form part of its GST returns that were filed. The learned Trial Court has conducted a detailed examination and found that NAPL has proved its delivery.
Conclusion - Molmek failed to prove its claim for recovery due to insufficient evidence. The separate pre-institution mediation for the counter-claim was not necessary, as it would undermine the objective of the Commercial Courts Act.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 58
Dishonour of cheque - Company has not been impleaded, as accused, in this case - whether the proceedings cannot be initiated and allowed to be continued against the company?
HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the said Company has neither been impleaded, as, accused in the complaint, under Section 138 of the NI Act, nor in the legal notice issued against the Company, before filing the complaint.
Even otherwise, the Company cannot now be impleaded as accused, in this case, as before filing the complaint under Section 138 NI Act, certain legal formalities have to be completed by the complainant, i.e., issuance of legal notice, demanding the money, within the stipulated period.
The nonprosecution of the company, from whose account the cheque was issued and dishonored, is fatal, noncurable illegality and shall lead to the dismissal of the complaint, being legally defective and not properly constituted.
Conclusion - The prosecution for cheque dishonor under Section 138 of the NI Act requires the company to be named as an accused. Directors and officers can only be held vicariously liable if the company is prosecuted.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 57
Dishonour of cheque - competence of power of attorney holder to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, without any averment in the complaint about the power of attorney holder's knowledge of the facts of the case - HELD THAT:- It needs to be borne in mind that a power of attorney holder is a competent person to file a complaint under section 138 of the NI Act. The aforesaid proposition has already been settled by various judgments. A Magistrate is entitled to issue process to the accused on the basis of the contents of the complaint, documents in support thereof and the affidavit submitted in support of the complaint. If an affidavit is filed in support of the complaint, before issuance of the process under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C, the Magistrate has a discretion and is not bound to call upon the complainant to be examined to decide whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Magistrate can rely upon the affidavit filed in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.
In the instant case, the petition to quash the complaint was filed immediately after the summons was served on the accused. Neither the complainant nor the power of attorney holder has been examined. Summons have been issued based on the complaint, the documents, and the affidavit filed in support of the same.
The circumstances of the instant case has to be appreciated, bearing in mind the above decisions. The stage of giving evidence on oath has not yet been reached. Summons was issued to the accused after verifying the affidavit of the power of attorney holder, which contains a specific averment that the power of attorney holder is conversant with the facts of the case. In view of the decision in MITA INDIA PVT. LTD. VERSUS MAHENDRA JAIN [2023 (2) TMI 824 - SUPREME COURT], the said statement in the affidavit is sufficient. Thus, a power of attorney holder, who is aware of the facts of the case and has made such an averment in the affidavit, is certainly competent to lodge a private complaint, even if such an averment is absent in the complaint.
Conclusion - A power of attorney holder, who is aware of the facts of the case and has made such an averment in the affidavit, is certainly competent to lodge a private complaint, even if such an averment is absent in the complaint.
This petition to quash the complaint is dismissed, leaving open the question regarding the maintainability of a second petition under section 482 Cr.P.C.
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2025 (1) TMI 56
Maintainability of complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, filed against the petitioner - High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the complaint and subsequent proceedings or not - HELD THAT:- It is no longer res integra, that this Court, while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot assume the role of trial Court and the defence, if any, of the accused cannot be taken into consideration, at this stage, as it is for the accused to prove his defence by leading the cogent evidence before the trial Court.
Scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the year 1992, in the lead case reported as 1992 CrLJ, 527, titled as State of Haryana Vs. Chaudhary Bhajan Lal & Others [1990 (11) TMI 386 - SUPREME COURT], in which, the Hon’ble Apex Court has formulated the guidelines for exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., where it was held that 'In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.'
Now, if the facts and circumstances of this case are seen in the light of the the above decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that all the grounds, which have been taken in the petition, are based upon the defence of the accused, which will only to be considered by the learned trial Court - The petition is totally silent as to how the complaint filed by the complainant before the learned trial Court lacks ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act.
Conclusion - This Court, while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot assume the role of trial Court and the defense, if any, of the accused cannot be taken into consideration, at this stage, as it is for the accused to prove his defense by leading the cogent evidence before the trial Court.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 55
Seeking grant of bail - illegal claim of refund of accumulated ITC on account of trade/supply of goods - obtained GST Registration on fictitious documents and has never conducted any business activity from the registered premises - it was held by High Court that 'The detention of the applicant in jail is not required. The applicant is not involved in a heinous crime like murder or terrorism. The basic rule is, ‘bail is rule and jail is exception’. The allegations of serious financial impropriety are levelled against the applicant.'
HELD THAT:- It is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment granting bail and, hence, the present special leave petition is dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 54
Challenge to order u/s 73 of the Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 - valid communication of notice or not - petitioner being unaware of issuance of the notices as well as passing of the orders, could neither appear before the authority nor question the validity of the impugned orders within the period of limitation - HELD THAT:- In the case of OLA FLEET TECHNOLOGIES PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS STATE OF UP AND 2 OTHERS [2024 (7) TMI 1543 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] a coordinate Bench of this Court inter alia observed 'it does appear that the petitioner is entitled to a benefit of doubt. No material exist to reject the contention being advanced that the impugned order was not reflecting under the tab "view notices and orders". On merits, as noted in the earlier orders an other dispute exists whether all replies and annexures to the replies as filed by the assessee were displayed to the assessing officer and whether those have been considered.'
Conclusion - Proper communication of notices is essential for the validity of tax demands. Incorrect placement of notices on the GST portal does not constitute valid communication.
The order impugned dated 23.07.2024 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, State Tax, Division-7, Prayagraj (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) is quashed and set aside - petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 53
Cancellation of the petitioner's registration with retrospective effect from 28 December 2018 - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is permitted to approach the competent authority of the respondents for the grant of registration afresh. Any such application that may be made, shall be disposed of in accordance with law and bearing in mind the provisions of the Circular dated 28 March 2019 issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 52
Rejection of refund claim - Failure of respondents to file a reply despite granted extensions - HELD THAT:- The petitioner is stated to have applied for refund for the period April 2018 to March 2019 in terms of two applications dated 04 July 2019 and 09 July 2019. Two deficiency memos came to be issued by the respondents while considering the aforesaid applications. It is the case of the writ petitioner that the aforesaid deficiency memos were duly attended to and all material duly supplied. Since the refund was not released even thereafter, the petitioner is stated to have approached the respondents by way of representations dated 13 February 2020 and 27 February 2020.
In light of the continued inaction of the respondents, the petitioner had approached this Court in G.S. INDUSTRIES VERSUS PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL GOODS & SERVICES TAX & ORS. [2020 (11) TMI 1126 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and which came to be disposed of on 24 November 2020, with the direction that the claim of the petitioner be duly processed and a decision taken thereon within a period of three weeks.
Whether it would have been permissible at all for the Commissioner to question the validity of the order dated 09 June 2023 in purported exercise of powers conferred under Section 107 (2) of the Act? - HELD THAT:- The Commissioner, while seeking to review an order passed under the Act and in purported exercise of powers vested by Section 107 (2), cannot possibly sit over and above an order passed by the appellate authority - It clearly does not contemplate the Commissioner seeking to even attempt to review an order passed by the appellate authority. The power so wielded by the Commissioner with reference to Section 107 (2) is rendered further unsustainable when viewed in light of the observations which appear in our earlier order of 28 March 2024 - the impugned order cannot possibly sustain.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 51
Cancellation of the alleged demand of GST - de-freezing of bank accounts - It appears to have been alleged that the transactions which formed the basis for the creation of the demand under that enactment are not concerning the writ petitioner at all - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, a final order referable to Section 74 of the CGST Act had come to be passed against the writ petitioner in 2019. The petitioner has not adopted any steps to assail that order in accordance with law. In fact, the original order under Section 74 does not even form subject matter of challenge in the instant proceedings. The freeze, as the Court correctly noticed in the earlier order, was thus referable to Section 79(1)(c) as opposed to Section 83, with the latter being confined to a provisional attachment.
There are no justification to grant the reliefs as are prayed for in the instant writ petition, it is deemed appropriate to accord liberty to the writ petitioner to adopt such appropriate remedies as may be permissible in law. It shall further be open for the writ petitioner to raise all grounds including that of identity theft in any proceedings that may be instituted.
Petiotion disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 50
Rejection of refund claim of the petitioner on the ground of limitation - mismatch between the figures of ITC relatable to integrated tax paid on imports, which was auto populated in Form of GSTR-2A and monthly returns filed in Form GSTR-3B returns - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the petitioner deposited amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- by mistake on 20.11.2020 voluntarily which was neither towards any tax, interest or penalty. The similar issue came up for consideration before this Court in case of M/s. Joshi Technologies International [2016 (6) TMI 773 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] as well as in case of M/S. GUJARAT STATE POLICE HOUSING CORPORATION LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [2024 (1) TMI 1409 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT], wherein it is held by this Court that 'the amount of GST paid by the petitioner is admittedly paid as a self assessment, which the petitioner was not required to pay as per the Notification No. 32/2017. Accordingly, in the facts of the case, the amount paid by the petitioner from electronic cash ledger is required to be refunded by the respondent authority and could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation under Section 54 (1) of the CGST Act.'
In view of above analysis made in the aforesaid judgment which is squarely applicable to the facts of the case, more particularly when the petitioner has deposited voluntarily the amount of Rs. 40,00,000/-, the same would not be covered by the provisions of Section 54 of the GST Act and the same is required to be refunded by the respondent authorities as the same could not have been rejected on the ground of limitation under Section 54 (1) of the GST Act. However, the petitioner will not be entitled to any interest on such amount as the same was deposited voluntarily by mistake and therefore, the respondents to refund the amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- deposited by the petitioner.
The impugned order dated 14. 6. 2024 passed by the respondent No. 2 rejecting the refund application of the petitioner is hereby quashed and set aside - petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 49
Refund under the provisions of the SGST/CGST Act - interest on the refund amount from the date immediately after the expiry of sixty days from the date of receipt of the application in FORM RFD-01 - HELD THAT:- The writ petition is disposed off by providing the competent authority of the respondents to examine the pending refund application and dispose of the same in accordance with law. The respondents shall also take into consideration the additional documentation that has been provided by the writ petitioner and has been filed in these proceedings.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 48
Cancellation of registration of the writ petitioner with retrospective effect from 08 October 2022 - HELD THAT:- In the absence of any material having been relied upon which may have even remotely tended to indicate that the registration had been obtained by fraud, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts, the order impugned cannot be sustained.
The impugned order dated 09 July 2024 as well as the impugned Show Cause Notice dated 20 June 2024 quashed - petition allowed.
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