1968 (11) TMI 86 - SC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay? Whether this court will inquire into belated and stale claims or take note of evidence of neglect of one s own rights for a long time? Held that - Petition dismissed. The judgment of the Bombay High Court in 1958 clearly shows that the merits of the petitioners claim were not being examined. I can however find no merit in the contention that because there is an invasion of a fundamental right of a citizen he can be allowed to come to this court, no matter how long after the infraction of his right he applies for relief. The Constitution is silent on this point; nor is there any statute of limitation expressly applicable, but nevertheless, on grounds of public policy I would hold that this court should not lend its aid to a litigant even under article 32 of the Constitution in case of an inordinate delay in asking for relief and the question of delay ought normally to be measured by the periods fixed for the institution of suits under the Limitation Acts.

Issues Involved:
1. Whether any limit of time can be imposed on petitions under Article 32.
2. Whether the court should apply by analogy an article of the Indian Limitation Act to petitions under Article 32.
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay.
4. Whether the petitioner can claim relief under Article 32 after a lapse of several years.
5. Whether the petitioner was under a mistake of law when making the payments.
6. Whether the petition is barred by principles analogous to res judicata.

Analysis of the Judgment:

1. Whether any limit of time can be imposed on petitions under Article 32:
The court discussed whether there is a prescribed period of limitation for petitions under Article 32. It was noted that Article 32 gives the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights, and the State cannot hinder an aggrieved person from approaching the court. However, the extent or manner of interference is for the court to decide. The court emphasized that it does not entertain every case and has settled principles for its actions, including the exhaustion of ordinary remedies and the principle of res judicata.

2. Whether the court should apply by analogy an article of the Indian Limitation Act to petitions under Article 32:
The judgment highlighted that the Limitation Act prescribes different periods for suits, petitions, or applications, but a petition under Article 32 is not covered by these provisions. The court stated that utmost expedition is essential for such claims, and the aggrieved party must move the court at the earliest possible time, explaining any delay satisfactorily. The court emphasized that it would consider each case on its facts and might entertain a petition even after a lapse of time if justified.

3. Whether the petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay:
The court examined whether the petitioner, who had moved the High Court earlier but did not appeal to the Supreme Court, could take advantage of a subsequent decision declaring the statute unconstitutional. The court held that the petitioner should have taken the right ground in the High Court and appealed to the Supreme Court. Not having done so and having abandoned his litigation years ago, the court decided not to grant relief, applying the analogy of the Limitation Act.

4. Whether the petitioner can claim relief under Article 32 after a lapse of several years:
The court discussed the principles of res judicata and the analogy of the statute of limitations. It was noted that while the Limitation Act does not apply directly, the court acts on its analogy to refuse relief in stale claims. The court emphasized that the extraordinary remedies under the Constitution are not meant to enable claimants to recover money if the recovery by suit is barred by limitation. The court concluded that the petition should be dismissed due to the delay.

5. Whether the petitioner was under a mistake of law when making the payments:
The court examined whether the payments were made under a mistake of law. It was found that the petitioner had challenged the validity of the statute in the High Court but did not appeal to the Supreme Court. The court held that the petitioner was not under a mistake of law when making the payments, as he had already questioned the legality of the statute. The payments were made under coercion, not under a mistake of law.

6. Whether the petition is barred by principles analogous to res judicata:
The court discussed the principle of res judicata, noting that a petition under Article 32 is not barred if the earlier petition was dismissed not on the merits but due to laches or availability of an alternative remedy. The court held that the present petition was not barred by res judicata but dismissed it on the ground of delay and the lack of a mistake of law.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the grounds of delay and the absence of a mistake of law. The court emphasized the importance of moving the court at the earliest possible time and the application of the analogy of the statute of limitations to petitions under Article 32. The judgment highlighted that while the Limitation Act does not directly apply, the court acts on its analogy to refuse relief in stale claims. The petition was dismissed with costs.

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