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1957 (2) TMI 54 - SC - Indian LawsWhether the filing of an appeal is governed by the law obtaining at the date of the institution of a suit or by the law that may prevail at the date of the decision of it, or at the date of the filing of the appeal ? Held that - The present petition falls within Art. 133, and the. appeal must be held to be incompetent for failure to satisfy the requirements of Art. 133 (1) (a)
Issues Involved:
1. Vested Right of Appeal 2. Application of Article 133 of the Constitution 3. Application of Article 135 of the Constitution 4. Interpretation of Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Detailed Analysis: 1. Vested Right of Appeal: The petitioner argued that he had a vested right to appeal to the Federal Court, which should be preserved under the Constitution. This claim was based on the principle established in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving [1905] A.C. 369, which held that a right of appeal is a substantive right that vests when the action is commenced. The Court examined various precedents, including Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income Tax Commissioner, Delhi [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 421, and concluded that the right of appeal vested at the date of the institution of the suit and is governed by the law prevailing at that time. 2. Application of Article 133 of the Constitution: Article 133(1) of the Constitution provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree, or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court if the value of the subject matter is not less than Rs. 20,000 or if the case is certified as fit for appeal. The majority held that Art. 133 should not be construed to retrospectively affect vested rights. The Court emphasized that the vested right of appeal, which existed before the Constitution, could not be taken away by Art. 133 unless it expressly or by necessary intendment provided for such a retrospective effect. 3. Application of Article 135 of the Constitution: Article 135 provides that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over matters to which Articles 133 and 134 do not apply, if the jurisdiction was exercisable by the Federal Court immediately before the Constitution. The majority opinion held that Art. 135 preserved the vested right of appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the judgment, decree, or final order was passed after the Constitution but the suit was instituted before it. The Court found that the vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which existed before the Constitution, was preserved under Art. 135. 4. Interpretation of Statutes and Constitutional Provisions: The Court reiterated the principle that statutes should not be construed to have retrospective operation unless explicitly stated. The Court also emphasized the importance of interpreting constitutional provisions to avoid absurd results, such as depriving litigants of their vested rights without clear legislative intent. The Court referred to Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin [1929] I.L.R. 56 Cal. 512 and Vasudeva Samiar In re [1928] I.L.R. 52 Mad. 361, which supported the principle that the right of appeal is preserved throughout the career of the suit unless expressly taken away. Conclusion: The majority of the Court concluded that the petitioner had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court (now the Supreme Court) under the law prevailing at the time of the institution of the suit. This right was preserved under Art. 135 of the Constitution, and the High Court erred in refusing leave to appeal. Special leave to appeal was granted to the petitioner. Separate Judgment: Justice Venkatarama Ayyar dissented, arguing that Art. 133 applies to all judgments passed after the Constitution, irrespective of when the suit was instituted. He contended that the vested right of appeal to the Federal Court ceased with its abolition and that Art. 135 did not apply to judgments passed after the Constitution. He emphasized that the language of Art. 133 is clear and should not be restricted by reading in additional words.
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