2024 (2) TMI 1012 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act - case of an appeal against acquittal - whether the period of filing an appeal against acquittal, has been prescribed under Section 378(5) of CrPC itself, where there is no provision for condonation of delay? - HELD THAT - In the present case, there is no such exclusionary provision under Section 378 of CrPC, or at any other place in the Code. The benefit of Section 5 read with Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can therefore be availed in an appeal against acquittal. There is no force in the contentions raised by the appellants as regards the non-application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the present case and the appeal is therefore dismissed. Neither Hukumdev Narain Yadav 1973 (12) TMI 92 - SUPREME COURT or Gopal Sardar 2004 (3) TMI 743 - SUPREME COURT would help the case of the appellant as both these cases deal with special laws which prescribed a period of limitation and the expression of the language contained in the law is very clear that under no circumstances can such a limitation be condoned. The relevant provisions have already been discussed earlier. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC.
2. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 vis-à-vis special laws.
3. Relevance of precedents set by Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh and Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi.

Summary:

1. Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in Appeals Against Acquittal:
The appellant challenged the Delhi High Court's order allowing a belated appeal against acquittal, arguing that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to appeals under Section 378 of CrPC. The appellant relied on the precedent set by Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, where it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to special leave to appeal under the old CrPC.

2. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963:
The Court distinguished the present case from Kaushalya Rani, noting that the latter dealt with the old Limitation Act of 1908, which expressly excluded Section 5. Under the new Limitation Act of 1963, Section 29(2) does not exclude Section 5 unless expressly stated by the special law. The Court cited Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, which clarified that Section 5 applies to special laws under the 1963 Act unless expressly excluded.

3. Relevance of Precedents:
The appellant's reliance on Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra and Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar was found misplaced. These cases dealt with special laws that explicitly barred the application of Section 5, unlike Section 378 of CrPC, which contains no such exclusionary provision. The Court emphasized that the language of the special law is crucial in determining the applicability of Section 5.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, can be availed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC. The interim order dated 20.03.2017 was vacated, and the Registry was directed to inform the Delhi High Court to continue the proceedings.