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Showing 441 to 460 of 467 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 27
Accrual of income in India or not? - royalty income - whether interconnect service charges paid by Vodafone and Bharti Airtel are chargeable to tax in India as per the Income-tax Act or DTAA? - HELD THAT:- As held so in series of judgements such as M/S Belgacom International Carrier Services SA Belgium [2024 (9) TMI 1675 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], M/s. M.I. Limited [2024 (9) TMI 1677 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT], M/s. Maxis International Sdn Bhd.[2024 (9) TMI 1676 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] and Emirates Telecommunications group company, etc.[2024 (9) TMI 1678 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] that Interconnect charges are not royalty. In case of assessee, on identical facts and circumstances, Coordinate Benches have also held so. Therefore respectfully following all those decisions, we do not find any infirmity in the order of ld. CIT(A) in holding that interconnect charges cannot be taxed as royalty. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2025 (1) TMI 26
Revision u/s 263 - as per CIT AO has erred in under assessing the income by allowing excess deduction u/s 57 - HELD THAT:- As is evident from the record that the assessee has made elaborate submissions on this issue and the AO has satisfied himself that assessee is eligible to claim deduction u/s. 57 of the Act. Therefore, we are of the considered view that on the very same issue ld. PCIT cannot form another view of that of the ld. Assessing Officer wherein he has after making a detailed enquiry also disallowed the claim of the assessee.
As in the case of Narayan Tatu Rane Vs. ITO [2016 (5) TMI 1162 - ITAT MUMBAI] it was held that newly inserted Explanation 2(a) to Sec. 263 does not authorize or give unfettered powers to Commissioner to revise each and every order, if in his (subjective) opinion, same has been passed without making enquiries or verification which should have been made. Thus, it is not at all a case where the subjected assessment order dt. 13.04.2021 should be alleged to be erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. There is neither error of law nor of facts. There is no erroneous assumption by the AO of either the facts or of law, as alleged by the ld. PCIT. Assessee appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 25
Addition u/s. 69C - unexplained expenditure - Addition based on seized material corroborated by the statement of Director of the assessee - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- CIT(A) has discussed this issue at length and gave clear finding of fact that seized material is devoid of any evidence regarding alleged payment of trade payables due of Shri Paranthaman concerns outside books of accounts. We noted that although there is statement of Shri A.N.Boopathy, but this is a rebuttable statement and the assessee has led evidence in the shape of books of account which clearly reflects the trade payables as outstanding and moreover, seized materials confirms that.
The contention of the Revenue that it is natural that name of Shri Paranthaman concerns did not figure in loose sheets since it is the list of actual sundry creditors as on 31.03.2018 and they did not figure in loose sheet no.11, 12 and 13, since they contain names of fictitious creditors as stated by Shri A.N.Boopathy is not at all relevant.
We noted that there are contradictions and logical flaws in his statement as brought out by the CIT(A) and as noted by the CIT(A).
The fact that Shri A.N.Boopathy considered loose sheet No.12 as the list of actual creditors as on 31.03.2017 which is supposed to include in trade payables of Paranthaman concerns also, is discussed and analyzed by the CIT(A).
It is fact that once quantum of actual sundry creditors as on 31.03.2017 was disposed off by the CIT(A) based on loose sheet, particularly loose sheet no.12, the claim of the AO in the same breath that loose sheet no.11,12 & 13 contained the name of fictitious creditors introduced in place of Paranthaman concerns fails.
We noted that seized loose sheet contained print out of group summary of sundry creditors which do not contain the complete list of sundry creditors as per the books of account and they contained partial list taken for the purpose of reconciliation in the process of finalization of accounts.
Thus, difference in the amount of sundry creditors as on 31.03.2018 was explained by Shri A.N.Bhoopathy as mentioned in the seized loose sheets in his statement as payment made to Shri Paranthaman concerns outside the books of accounts. Hence, as per books of account, the assessee has clearly established by evidences that trade creditors payable of Rs. 4.00 crores to Shri Paranthaman concerns was outstanding and clearly allowable and not outside the books of accounts or cash. Hence, we confirm the order of the CIT(A) deleting the addition. Appeal of the Revenue is dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 24
Refusal to extend certain benefits claimed by it under the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) on goods exported - car seat covers manufactured by the petitioner fall under the Harmonized System (HS) Code 87089900 or not - HELD THAT:- In Mehra Brothers V. Joint Commercial Officer [1990 (11) TMI 144 - SUPREME COURT], the Apex Court considered the question as to whether car seat covers are accessories to motor vehicles. After referring to the dictionary meaning of the term “accessory”, the Apex Court found that car seat covers or upholstery is “accessories as an addition; an adjunct; an accompaniment for comfortable use of the motor vehicles or for elegance to the seat”. The Court also noticed that the items concerned were being sold as “automobile parts”.
Thus, with reference to the Sales Tax and Central Excise levies, the question was addressed, holding that even if the seat covers are being made up of textile fabric, in so far as they are used as an addition/accompaniment for the motor vehicle, they are accessories of the Motor vehicle/car seat. It is also noticed that the afore findings of the CEGAT were accepted by the Central Exercise Department, which is produced as Ext. P17. Similarly, the Director General of Foreign Trade has also accepted the afore classification as seen from Ext. P20. Likewise, Ext. P25 communication is issued by the 6th respondent, accepting the classification as seat covers as covered under 87089900 irrespective of whether made up of textile or not.
Conclusion - The petitioner's products, which are exported are to be classified under serial No. 4558 having HS 8708990. The impugned orders/proceedings by which the benefit under the Scheme stood denied to the petitioner, would stand set aside.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 23
Refusal to the release of five consignments - consignments allegedly constituted ‘firearms’ - HELD THAT:- In the opinion of the Court, the Petitioner is entitled to relief sought in the present writ petition.
The relief sought in prayer, regarding the release of consignments stands granted through order dated 30th September, 2024, with certain conditions. However, since the Petitioner is entitled to succeed, the superdarinama is cancelled and the conditions imposed by the Court stand revoked. The Petitioner shall be entitled to deal with the said goods under the consignments, in accordance with law - The claim for compensation for demurrage is rejected.
The present writ petition is disposed of along with pending applications.
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2025 (1) TMI 22
Seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Respondent- Commissioner of Customs to re-export gold seized from the Petitioner’s mother - Petitioner, as the legal heir of the deceased passenger, is entitled to redeem the confiscated goods, or not - applicability of limitation period for redeeming the goods under Section 125 of the Customs Act when the order was not duly communicated to the deceased passenger.
Petitioner, as the legal heir of the deceased passenger, is entitled to redeem the confiscated goods under the Customs Act, 1962 or not - HELD THAT:- The passenger was a senior citizen of more than 70 years of age. The death certificate has been placed on record, which shows that she passed away on 11th December, 2023 in Uzbekistan itself. The Petitioner/daughter - Ms. Umida Karimova has placed a copy of her passport on record. The identity of the Petitioner and her relationship with late Ms. Sharipova is not being doubted by the Respondent. Considering that the goods in question are of substantial value and the passenger having expired, her heir/s i.e., her daughter cannot be deprived of the goods so long as the Order in Original dated 26th July, 2023 is complied with by the Petitioner.
Applicability of limitation period for redeeming the goods under Section 125 of the Customs Act - HELD THAT:- The limitation period under Section 125 would apply only when the option to redeem, given to the passenger, is duly communicated to the passenger. In the present case, admittedly, there is no evidence on record to show that the said order was duly communicated. Under such circumstances, the limitation period is not triggered and thus would not bar release of the goods in terms of the said order.
Admittedly, the Customs Department did not verify the address that was available in the detention receipt or in the copy of the passport. In this regard, the Court is of the opinion that whenever such detentions of goods are made or seizures are effected, the department ought to consider taking the proper contact details including the postal address, email address and mobile number of the passenger concerned and add the same on the detention receipt. This would facilitate communication with the passenger in respect of further proceedings and the order passed, if any.
Also, in view of the fact that the passenger has expired and there is no proof of service of the order passed by the Customs department, the demurrage charges shall stand waived. The present order shall not act as a precedent.
Conclusion - The Petitioner is entitled to redeem the goods upon compliance with the original order. The limitation period under Section 125 did not commence due to lack of communication.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 21
Non-compliance of provisions of mandatory pre-deposit Section 129(E) of Customs Act - Imposition of penalty on the petitioner under various provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- The petitioner has exhausted its remedies against it grievance of its appeals not being entertained on the ground of not making the pre-deposit. The petitioner has also agitated his grievance in this regard before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court, albeit unsuccessfully.
The petitioner is seeking to reagitate the issues before this Court. This is clearly a case of forum shopping and cannot be countenanced.
Petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 20
Abatement of appeals due to approval of Resolution Plan under IBC - request for adjournment due to the absence of counsel - HELD THAT:- On going through the Order of the Coordinate Bench M/S. TATA STEEL LIMITED ( [FORMERLY M/S. TATA STEEL BSL LTD) VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CUSTOMS AND SERVICE TAX, BHUBANESWAR [2024 (4) TMI 1211 - CESTAT KOLKATA], it is found that the Bench had recorded that the appellant company underwent CIRP in terms of IBC, which culminated into approval of Resolution Plan of Bhushan Steel Ltd by the Adjudicating Authority at NCLT, Principal Bench at New Delhi. They have also considered the relevant clauses of the Resolution Plan and the fact that both sides viz., the appellant as well as the Revenue have no qualms over the impugned appeals being abated and having been rendered infructuous, in view of the above said developments. The Order of the Coordinate Bench in respect of the same appellant for other appeals pending before the said bench has held that in the facts of the case, all those appeals abate. In addition, they have also gone through plethora of case laws, etc., keeping in view some of the other arguments concerning refund of pre-deposits, etc., and came to the conclusion that any order passed by the Tribunal beyond the vested power would ipso facto be non-est in law.
Therefore, in view of the settled legal position, as clearly brought out in the Order of the Coordinate Bench dt.16.04.2024 and in view of Rule 22 and Rule 41 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rule, 1982, these appeals would abate and after abatement of these appeals, the Tribunal would be rendered functus officio in the matters relating to these appeals and thus would not be able to decide any other issues connected with the said appeals.
These appeals abate with effect from the date of approval of Resolution Plan by the NCLT vide its Order dt.15.05.2018 and are disposed of accordingly.
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2025 (1) TMI 19
Professional misconduct under Section 132(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 - Penalties and sanctions - HELD THAT:- There exists reasons to believe that the Auditors did not exercise due diligence in ensuring the audit quality expected in an audit of a public interest entity and were grossly negligent in the conduct of the professional duties by not adhering to the requirements as laid down by the relevant statutes. The Auditors' conclusion that they do not have reasons to believe that fraud is committed by the officers of the Company is not supported by sufficient appropriate audit evidence. The Auditors also failed to identify the persons comprising TCWG. The Auditors' failures in the audit, as mentioned in Paragraphs 16 to 70 above, amount to professional misconduct as per Section 132 (4) of the Companies Act, 2013.
The charges of professional misconduct in the SCN are established based on the evidence in the Audit File, the audit reports on the financial statements for the FY 2018-19 and 2019-20, the submissions made by the Auditors, and the Annual Report of ZEEL for FY 2018-19 and 2019-20.
Penalties and sanctions - HELD THAT:- Section 132 (4) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for penalties in a case where professional misconduct is proved. The seriousness with which proved cases of professional misconduct are viewed is evident from the fact that a minimum punishment is laid down by the law.
Because professional misconduct has been proved and considering the nature of violations and principles of proportionality and in view of the directions issued to the Audit Firm, in the exercise of powers under Section 132 (4) (c) of the Companies Act, 2013, it is ordered as under:
a. Imposition of a monetary penalty of Rupees Two Crore upon M/s Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP.
b. Imposition of a monetary penalty of Rupees Ten Lakhs upon CA A.B. Jani and in addition CA A.B. Jani is debarred for 5 years from being appointed as an auditor or internal auditor or from undertaking any audit in respect of financial statements or internal audit of the functions and activities of any company or body corporate.
c. Imposition of a monetary penalty of Rupees Five Lakhs upon CA Rakesh Sharma and in addition, CA Rakesh Sharma is debarred for 3 years from being appointed as an auditor or internal auditor or from undertaking any audit in respect of financial statements or internal audit of the functions and activities of any company or body corporate.
Conclusion - Auditors must exercise due diligence, maintain professional skepticism, and obtain sufficient audit evidence to support their opinions. Failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct.
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2025 (1) TMI 18
Professional misconduct - Engagement Partner (EP) and Engagement Quality Control Reviewer (EQCR) failed to meet the requirements of the Standards on Auditing (SA) and provisions of the Companies Act 2013 during the audit of DB Realty Limited for the Financial Year 2015-16 - Section 132(4) of the Companies Act 2013 - Penalties and sanctions.
HELD THAT:- The EP and the EQCR have made a series of serious departures from the Standards and the Law, in conduct of the audit of DBRL for FY 2015-16. Based on the above discussion, it is proved that they had failed to exercise due diligence in performance of this audit. Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is concluded that the EP and the EQCR have committed Professional Misconduct as defined under Section 132 (4) of the Companies Act 2013 in terms of section 22 of the Chartered Accountants Act 1949 (CA Act) as amended from time to time, and as detailed below:
a) The EP and the EQCR committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 7 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that a chartered accountant in practice is guilty of professional misconduct when he "does not exercise due diligence or is grossly negligent in the conduct of his professional duties" - This charge is proved as the EP and the EQCR failed to conduct the audit in accordance with the SAs and applicable regulations, failed to evaluate valuation reports and failed to perform engagement quality control review.
b) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 8 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that a chartered accountant in practice is guilty of professional misconduct when he "fails to obtain sufficient information which is necessary for expression of an opinion or its exceptions are sufficiently material to negate the expression of an opinion" -This charge is proved as the EP failed to conduct the audit in accordance with the SAs.
c) The EP committed professional misconduct as defined by clause 9 of Part I of the Second Schedule of the CA Act, which states that a chartered accountant in practice is guilty of professional misconduct when he "fails to invite attention to any material departure from the generally accepted procedure of audit applicable to the circumstances" - This charge is proved since the EP failed to conduct the audit in accordance with the SAs.
Penalties and sanctions - HELD THAT:- Section 132(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides for penalties in a case where professional misconduct is proved. The seriousness with which proved cases of professional misconduct are viewed is evident from the fact that a minimum punishment is laid down by the law - Considering the proved professional misconduct and keeping in mind the nature of violations, principles of proportionality and deterrence against future professional misconduct, in exercise of powers under Section 132(4)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, it is hereby ordered that imposition of a monetary penalty of Rs five lakhs. upon CA Chetan Desai; and Rs three lakhs upon CA Rakesh Rathi. In addition, they are debarred for a period of five years, and three years respectively from being appointed as an auditor or internal auditor or from undertaking any audit in respect of financial statements or internal audit of the functions and activities of any company or body corporate.
Conclusion - The EP and the EQCR failed to conduct the audit in accordance with the SAs and applicable regulations, failed to evaluate valuation reports and failed to perform engagement quality control review. Auditors must exercise due diligence, professional skepticism, and obtain sufficient audit evidence to support their audit opinions.
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2025 (1) TMI 17
Persons/entities traded in the scrip of IAL while in possession of Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (‘UPSI’) - higher price rise seen - contravention of provisions of Section 12A of the SEBI Act and PIT Regulations, 2015 - information of a stock split considered as Unpublished Price Sensitive Information (UPSI) or not? - - HELD THAT:- Splitting of stock per se is a Price sensitive information, since splitting of stock is an important decision for a company, (requiring approval of general body of shareholders under Section 61 of the companies Act, 2013), which is intended to improve the liquidity of stock and its affordability, which is likely to make an impact on price. In our considered view, splitting of shares results in shares of smaller face value, which makes the shares affordable, and thereby allows new sets of shareholders to come into picture with the resulting impact on demand and liquidity, that is likely to influence the price trends. Instances of three cases of stock split brought out by the respondent show that it resulted in price rise on the day of split, compared to the previous day.
In our view the appellant’s argument that there was insignificant price rise of 1.46% on BSE and of 1.25% on NSE on June 27, 2016 upon disclosure of the information compared to the previous trading day, is not relevant as it is the likelihood of materially affecting the price of the securities, which is the main factor to determine price sensitivity of information and not actual price rise.
Lastly, in appellant’s own admission, the information regarding stock split was UPSI, which in their view, came into existence on June 26, 2017 and was hence disclosed on the same date. If it were not a price sensitive information, there was no need to close the trading window.
On which day UPSI commenced ? - It is evident that in the meeting held on November 22, 2016, the discussion was in the nature of a general briefing on the concept of stock split, without any specific reference to securities of IAL. Hence it cannot be held that the UPSI period started from November 22, 2016. Nevertheless, in subsequent ‘one to one’ meeting between the MD and CFO held March 20, 2017, the discussion specifically included ‘analysis of budget for next fiscal, along with sensitivity analysis to many scenarios including but not limited to impact of demonetization, GST, share split, dividends, etc.’. Since this discussion was specifically with regard to the stock split for company IAL, it may be construed that the UPSI period started from March 20, 2017.
Whether the appellants can be held as ‘insiders’ within the meaning of PIT regulations? - None of the reasonings, directly or indirectly, suggest that appellants were in possession of or had access to the aforesaid UPSI at the time of trading in IAL scrip. With regard to the first reasoning relating to the pre-IPO allocation of preferential shares of IAL in 2014 for Rs. 49.99 crores, the Ld. Senior advocate for the appellants furnished a list of all such allottees, which was filed in compliance of the Companies (Share capital and debenture) Rules, 2014. The list shows that apart from the Appellant No. 2 and her husband, there were more than 80 such allottees, who had subscribed to the preferential allotment. The last column of the prescribed form makes disclosure of such allottees as ‘Unrelated party’ or ‘promoter / promoter group’. Majority of such preferential allottees including appellant No. 2 and her husband were shown as ‘unrelated party’. Therefore, in our view, in contrast with the ‘promoters’, such unrelated parties cannot be held as ‘connected persons’, unless otherwise provided in the regulation.
It is generally seen that prior to listing, subscription to its capital comes through reaching out to potential investors, directly or indirectly, since till the company remains unlisted, the benefit of the faceless digital platform of Stock exchange is not available to it. The assumption that in that process relationship is built among the investors, which may make them insiders is only an assumption and lacks credence.
We have already held that there is no evidence suggesting that the appellants had access to or mere in possession of UPSI. Therefore, it cannot be held that trades made by the appellants during the alleged UPSI period were motivated by knowledge of UPSI.
Thus, there is no evidence or inkling of communication of UPSI by insiders of IAL to the appellants. In view of this, there is no merit in the allegations that appellants traded in IAL based on knowledge of UPSI in their possession. Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 16
Applicability of corporate governance provisions - applicability of Regulation 23 of SEBI (LODR) Regulations Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 to appellant Company - Appellant’s solitary contention is that the paid-up share capital is less than Rs.10 crores, thus entitled for exemption from compliance with the corporate governance provisions - HELD THAT:- It is settled that words of a statute are understood in their natural and ordinary sense; and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. It is also settled that if the enacting portion of a Section is not clear, a proviso appended to it may give an indication as to its true meaning.
Contention of the appellant is that in order to get the exemption from compliance with corporate governance provisions, the entity has to satisfy both conditions, namely, that the equity share capital should not exceed Rs.10 crores and net worth not exceed Rs.25 crores. We see force in this argument because a plain reading of the proviso makes it clear that the exemption shall continue to remain applicable till the equity share capital or the net worth of the entity reduces below the specified threshold.
Therefore, we are of the considered view that since the paid-up equity share capital is less than Rs.10 crores, the corporate governance provisions do not apply to the appellant entity.
Appeal allowed holding that the corporate governance provisions are not applicable to the appellant as the paid-up equity capital is less than Rs.10 Crores - As the penalty is unsustainable with a further direction to refund the same with interest at 8% p.a. within a period of 8 weeks from the date of this order.
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2025 (1) TMI 15
Validity of SEBI's interim directions - lack of an opportunity for the appellant to be heard provided as alleged - appellant has executed Related Party Transactions without obtaining prior approval from the shareholders in terms of Regulation 23(4) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 - As argued there have been series of correspondence between the appellant and the SEBI but the impugned order interim ex-parte order has been passed without any tenable reasons - HELD THAT:- We are of the opinion that prima facie, is indubitable that appellant and SEBI were in exchange of correspondence since 2020, although it was vehemently contended by Shri. Kapadia that the relevant date to be reckoned is September 2023. In any event, it cannot be gainsaid that appellants have been called upon to file their reply within 21 days from the date of the impugned order. As recorded hereinabove, Shri Kapadia has submitted that SEBI shall pass orders within 30 days from the date of conclusion of hearing. The Learned Senior Advocate for the appellant is also in agreement with the proposed course of action.
Thus, it would not be just and appropriate to continue the impugned interim ex-parte order any further keeping in view that:-
The appellant has been directed to file reply within 21 days; and
SEBI has made a statement before us to pass orders within 30 days from the date of conclusion of hearing and in the event of any adverse order, SEBI is enjoined with all powers to pass appropriate directions including an order of disgorgement.
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2025 (1) TMI 14
Initiating proceedings against the petitioner on the basis of provision which stood omitted by the Finance Act, 2015 - proceedings were initiated as against the petitioner alleging violation of Section 6 (3) (b) of "FEMA" Act in the year 2021 - As submitted the said provision stood omitted by the Finance Act, 2015, which was notified on 15.10.2019 - HELD THAT:- The provisions of the Finance Act, 2015 are quite specific. It provides for amendments to the FEMA Act and by Section 139 of Finance Act, 2015, Section 6 (3) of the FEMA Act stood omitted. The said omission was effective from the date of notification i.e., 15.10.2019.
Thus, we notice that the complaint as well as the show cause notice issued to the petitioner were specifically referable to Section 6 (3) (b) of the FEMA Act. It is clear that the complaint itself was made on 25.10.2019 and the show cause notice was issued on 25.02.2020. It is also clear that Section 6 (3) (b) stood omitted by the Finance Act, 2015 as notified on 15.10.2019.
In view of the clear language of the omission, the contentions raised by the learned panel counsel that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would come to the aid of the respondents cannot be accepted.
As in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. [2000 (2) TMI 823 - SUPREME COURT] has clearly held that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions and since the present case is specifically one of omission, we are of the opinion that Section 6 would not have any application in the instant case. In view of the fact that what has been specifically referred in the complaint and the show cause notice is Section 6 (3) (b), which stood omitted even as on the date, when the complaint was filed, the entire action as against the petitioner on the basis of infraction of Section 6 (3) (b) was without jurisdiction. WP allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 13
Money Laundering - whether the High Court is justified in quashing the summons on the premise that the respondent has been discharged in the predicate offence? - HELD THAT:- What has been issued to the respondent is merely a summons. Simply because he has been discharged in the predicate offence, a Court cannot quash the summons. The questions as to whether the respondent would be arrayed as an accused or not, is a matter which has to be decided at a later stage. In that eventuality, it is well open to the respondent to raise all relevant contentions for the aforesaid purpose including the submissions that since the predicate offence has been quashed, the subsequent action of the appellant arraying him as an accused in the PMLA proceedings would not be sustained in the eyes of law.
The impugned order stands set aside and the appellant is at liberty to proceed in pursuance to the summons that had been issued. However, we make it clear that all issues are left open to the respondent, in the event of him being arrayed as an accused. - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 12
Money Laundering - Seeking grant of Anticipatory Bail - commission of a serious economic offence of money laundering - offence punishable under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - it was held by High Court that 'The anticipatory bail application filed by the petitioner is dismissed.'
HELD THAT:- In view of the averments made in the present application, the order dated 21.11.2024 is partly modified and it is clarified that the appellant, Rajkumar Daitapati, has deposited ₹80,00,000/- in the account of the respondent, Directorate of Enforcement, in the Union Bank of India (erstwhile, Corporation Bank). ₹20,00,000/- will also be deposited in the same account.
Application disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 11
Money Laundering - Seeking grant of bail - Money Laundering - proceeds of crime - diversion of funds - disproportionate assets more than 14 crores - it was held by High Court that 'It is deemed appropriate to allow this application and the applicant herein enlarged on bail subject to the conditions imposed' - HELD THAT:- It is not inclined to interfere with the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the High Court, taking into consideration the length of time, coupled with the fact that a complaint has already been filed.
SLP dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 10
Seeking grant of bail - Money Laundering - collecting illegal bribes and controlling the high level management of important State Departments and State Public Sector undertakings - HELD THAT:- In the case in hand, the factors enumerating in the case which should be taken in consideration while granting or refusing bail in a non-bailable case are that there are three charge sheets filed against the applicant in relation to the same allegations, 457 witnesses have been cited and more than 13,000 pages have been filed before the Special Court (PC) Raipur.
It is trite that the court while considering an application seeking bail, is not required to weigh the evidence collected by the investigating agency meticulously, nonetheless, the court should keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence collected in support thereof, the severity of the punishment prescribed for the alleged offences, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witness being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State etc. Though, the findings recorded by the Court while granting or refusing bail would be tentative in nature, nonetheless the Court is expected to express prima facie opinion for granting or refusing to grant bail which would demonstrate an application of mind, particularly dealing with the economic offences - In the present case, the applicant was involved in the criminal acts of the syndicate and that he received commission from the liquor suppliers. However, no recovery of unaccounted money has been made in this regard and as per the investigating agency, the investigation is pending, hence, a conclusive determination of their role is yet to be made.
As has been held in catena of decisions, the economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country. Undoubtedly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole.
There is no denial to the fact that the economic offences constitute a separate class of their own, but trite it is that presumption of innocence is one of the bedrocks on which the criminal jurisprudence rests. Time and again, Apex Court has reiterated the need to integrate the right of investigating agencies to have effective interrogation of the accused with the right of liberty of the accused.
In the instant case, the offence as alleged against the accused persons is very serious involving deep-rooted planning in which, huge financial loss is caused to the State exchequer. The gravity for the said purpose will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances arising in each case. Keeping in view the consequences that would befall on the society in cases of financial irregularities, it has been held that even economic offences would fall under the category of "grave offence" and in such circumstance while considering the application for bail in such matters, the Court will have to deal with the same, being sensitive to the nature of allegation made against the accused - In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case but the consideration will have to be on case-to-case basis on the facts involved therein.
Conclusion - The applicant's bail application was denied due to the gravity of the charges and the potential risks associated with his release. The court found sufficient grounds to believe that the applicant was involved in a criminal syndicate, justifying further judicial proceedings.
The prayer for grant of bail to the applicant is liable to be rejected and it is hereby rejected.
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2025 (1) TMI 9
Seeking grant of bail - Money Laundering - proceeds of the crime - unexplained source of income - prolonged incarceration of the petitioners without the commencement of trial - applicability of twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA, 2002 - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, the petitioners have been in judicial custody for the last 14 months; the investigation of the crime, so far as the petitioners are concerned, is complete, and the complaint has been filed. But the investigation into the predicate offence is not complete and the charge sheet has not been filed. Therefore, there is not even the remotest possibility of the trial in the crime commencing in the near future. So, keeping the petitioners in indefinite incarceration till the culmination of the trial will infringe on their right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners have strong roots in the State. The apprehension of the prosecution that the petitioners may flee from justice, can be adequately safeguarded by imposing stringent conditions. The petitioners have volunteered to abide by any condition that may be imposed by this Court and they will cooperate with the investigation.
On considering the prosecution allegations and the explanations put forward by the petitioners, which have been narrated above, this Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to hold that the petitioners have not committed the above offences. As the petitioners have no criminal antecedents, going by the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Dheeraj Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2023 (1) TMI 1374 - SC ORDER], this Court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioners are not likely to commit an offence if they are enlarged on bail. This Court is convinced that the petitioners have satisfactorily diluted the twin conditions under Section 45 of the Act. Hence, the petitioners are entitled to be enlarged on bail.
Conclusion - The prolonged incarceration before being pronounced guilty of an offence should not be permitted to become punishment without trial.
The applications are allowed, by directing the petitioners to be released on bail on them executing a bond for Rs. 2,00,000/- each, with two solvent sureties for the like sum, to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional court, which shall be subject to fulfilment of conditions imposed.
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2025 (1) TMI 8
Condonaton of gross delay of 160 days in filing these appeals and 35 days in refiling which has not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant - Exemption from service tax - it was held by CESTAT that the services are eligible for exemption - HELD THAT:- There are no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 23-02-2024 passed by the Custom Excise Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Zonal Bench at Ahmedabad.
The Civil Appeals are, accordingly, dismissed on the ground of delay as well as merits.
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