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Showing 201 to 220 of 467 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 267
Classification of imported goods - Telematics Control Unit (TCU) - to be classified under the Customs Tariff Heading 8517 62 90 of the First Schedule of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 or not - eleigibility to avail concessional rate of Basic Customs Duty under Sl. No. 666 of the N/N. 69/2011-Customs, dated 29-7-2011.
Classification of goods - HELD THAT:- Classification of goods covered under the Customs Tariff is done as per the General Rules of Interpretation (‘GRI’). GRI 1 to 5 lay down the principles determining classification of goods under a specific Heading whereas GRI 6 is applicable if the objective is to determine the classification of goods in the Sub-headings of a Heading. The Larger Bench of the Hon’ble Tribunal in the matter of Saurashtra Chemical, Porbandar v. Collector of Customs [1985 (8) TMI 183 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB] had held that the tariffs must be interpreted in the light of relevant Section and Chapter Notes which are statutorily binding like the Headings themselves.
It appears that CTH 8517 covers such apparatus which is used in transmission and reception of data and wherein the data is transmitted by way of electromagnetic waves in a wireless network. As discussed in Annexure 1 of this application, where the subject good provides for transmission and reception of data in the RF form in the wireless network, by application of the GRI Rule 1 and considering the HSN explanatory notes, the subject good appears to merit classification under CTH 8517 at four-digit level.
It is apparent that all the electrical machinery or equipment covered under Chapter 85 are not regarded as “parts or accessories” of motor vehicles classifiable under Chapter 87, as they stand excluded from the purview of Section XVII.
Applicability of the benefit of the notification - HELD THAT:- The benefit provided under the notification is subject to the condition that the goods being imported from Japan should be originating in Japan and the provisions laid down in Customs Tariff (Determination of Origin of Goods under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of India and Japan) Rules, 2011 are complied with. So long as the imported goods are rightly classifiable under CTH 8517 62 90 and are originating in Japan, the Applicant is eligible to avail concessional duty benefit @ 0% BCD.
Conclusion - The subject goods i.e. ‘Telematics Control Unit (TCU)’ is rightly classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH’) 8517and more specifically under 8517 62 90 - The applicant is eligible to avail concessional rate of Basic Customs Duty on import of the subject goods as per SI. No. 666 of Notification No 69/2011 - Customs, dated 29-7-2011.
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2025 (1) TMI 266
Rejection of preliminary objections raised by the Corporate Debtor that application under Section 9 filed by the Operational Creditor is barred by time - HELD THAT:- It is an admitted fact between the parties that invoices were raised from January, 2018 to August 2018. The copy of ledger has also been brought on the record which indicates that payments were made by the Corporate Debtor from time to time. As per ledger, last payment was received by the Operational Creditor on 26.08.2019 through bank receipt. The only question which needs consideration is as to whether the Operational Creditor was entitled for the benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act to enable it to seek extension of time from 26.08.2019 i.e. the last date of receipt of the payment. The Adjudicating Authority has treated the date of default as 26.08.2019 which is a date of the last payment receipt.
In the present case, last payment was admittedly made on 26.08.2019 i.e. within the period of three years and there is also acknowledgment by the Corporate Debtor in writing which is reflected from the reply to demand notice. When there is clear acknowledgment by the corporate debtor of last payment made on 26.08.2019 which payment was within the period of three years, the operational creditor was clearly entitled for the benefit of extension of limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act and both the conditions which are required to be fulfilled under Section 19 were fulfilled. There are no error in the order of the Adjudicating Authority rejecting the objection of the corporate debtor that application under Section 9 was barred by time. Giving the benefit of last date of payment on 26.08.2019, the application was well within limitation.
Conclusion - Section 9 application was not barred by limitation, as the acknowledgment of the last payment extended the limitation period.
Appeal is dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 265
Seeking approval of the resolution plan under Section 30(6) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ('the Code') read with Regulation 39 (4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 - HELD THAT:- It is satisfied that all the requirements of Section 30 (2) of the Code are fulfilled and no provision of the law appears to have been contravened.
Section 30(6) of the Code enjoins the Resolution Professional to submit the Resolution Plan as approved by the CoC to the Adjudicating Authority. Section 31 of the Code deals with the approval of the Resolution Plan by the Authority if it is satisfied that the Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC under section 30(4), meets the requirements provided under section 30(2) of the Code. Thus, it is the duty of the Adjudicating Authority to satisfy itself that the Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC, meets the above requirements.
In K Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank & Others [2019 (2) TMI 1043 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon'ble Apex Court held that if the CoC has approved the Resolution Plan by requisite percent of voting share, then as per section 30(6) of the Code, it is imperative for the Resolution Professional to submit the same to the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT). On receipt of such a proposal, the Adjudicating Authority is required to satisfy itself that the Resolution Plan, as approved by the CoC, meets the requirements specified in Section 30(2). The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the role of the NCLT is 'no more and no less'. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the discretion of the Adjudicating Authority is circumscribed by Section 31 and is limited to scrutiny of the Resolution Plan "as approved" by the requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors. Even in that enquiry, the grounds on which the Adjudicating Authority can reject the Resolution Plan is in reference to matters specified in Section 30(2) when the Resolution Plan does not conform to the stated requirements.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ghanshyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited [2021 (4) TMI 613 - SUPREME COURT] held that on the date of the approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority, all such claims which are not a part of the Resolution Plan, shall stand extinguished and no person will be entitled to initiate or continue any proceedings in respect to a claim which is not a part of the Resolution Plan.
Conclusion - The instant Resolution Plan meets the requirements of Section 30(2) of the Code and Regulations 37, 38, 38(1A), and 39 (4) of the Regulations. The Resolution Plan is also not in contravention of any of the provisions of Section 29A of the Code and is in accordance with law.
Application allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 264
Admissibility of application - initiation of the Insolvency Resolution Process (IRP) against the personal guarantor u/s 95 of IBC - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute that the Appellant stood as a guarantor for the loan availed by the CD. A supplementary deed of guarantee was executed on 05.09.2017. There is also no dispute that the CD has already been admitted into CIRP. The Respondent Bank has proceeded in accordance with law by filing the application under Section 95 through the RP appointed by it. The Respondent served a demand notice dated 25.08.2020 on the Appellant about the unpaid debts of the CD in terms of Rule 7(1) of the Rules and evidence has been led that the said notice was duly delivered to the Appellant on 19.09.2020 to which there is no response to deny its liability. The application under Section 95 was filed after the expiry of 14 days after the date of service of demand notice and was duly served upon the Appellant who did not file any response.
The judgment relied upon by the Appellant in the case of Mr. Ravi Ajit Kulkarni [2021 (9) TMI 60 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI] may be of some help to the Appellant had the RP not given independent finding in its report dated 23.07.2021 which is already reproduced in the earlier part of this order, for a quick reference, in which it has been categorically said that “in the virtual meeting organized on 19.06.2021, the Appellant acknowledged the existence of debt and stated that he has not made any payment in capacity of guarantor towards the debt due by the CD of the Respondent Bank” Section 99(2) provides that the debtor has to prove repayment of the debt claimed as unpaid by the creditor by furnishing evidence of electronic transfer of the unpaid amount from the bank account of the debtor, evidence of encashment of a cheque issued by the debtor or a signed acknowledgment by the creditor accepting receipt of dues whereas in the present case the Appellant categorically denied to have made payment which was sufficient to hold that there is a default.
Conclusion - The procedural compliance with Section 95 and the independent verification by the RP are critical for admitting insolvency applications against personal guarantors.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 263
Interpretation of the RBI’s Master Circular on Rupee/Foreign Currency Export Credit & Customer Service to Exporters (“Master Circular”) - Banking Ombudsman dismissed the Petitioners’ grievance against the very same interpretation that had been taken by HDFC Bank Limited (Respondent No. 4, “HDFC Bank”) - according to HDFC Bank, since the Subvention Scheme provides Government-sponsored discount only to “export credit”, the exporter would not be entitled to any benefit of the Subvention Scheme where the advance ceases to be “export credit” ab initio - exports actually having been effected within 450 days
HELD THAT:- In our opinion, the Master Circular and the Subvention Scheme, are both instruments of law that seek to implement the stated economic policy objectives. When such instruments fall for interpretation, they ought to be read purposively, contextually, and in a manner that has due regard to the text as well as context, without inflicting violence on the policy objective.
Master Circular on Export Credit - The Master Circular is explicit in terms of its purpose and objective. The Master Circular seeks “to make short-term working capital finance available to exporters at internationally comparable interest rates”.
The crux of the Master Circular is that export credit at competitive interest rates must be made available to exporters in the form of short-term working capital. The very same Master Circular requires banks to keep a close watch on the end-use of funds advanced and to ensure that the credit supplied at special rates under the Master Circular are genuinely used for the purposes of exports.
Crux of the Master Circular is that the maximum period of the export credit would be 360 days (extended to 450 days); one of the multiple means of liquidating it may be used; and the exports so financed would need to be performed within 360 days (extended to 450 days). Within such period, if the exports financed have indeed materialised, banks may purchase the export bills or discount the export bills, and thereby adhere to the period, simply converting the pre-shipment credit into a post-shipment credit (which is also another form of “export credit”). So also, if the exports did not materialise at all in 360 days, the credit extended to the exporter would have to be charged interest at the domestic lending rate and not at the special rate applicable to exports, for the entire period of the credit.
First Lot - We hold that the advances that financed the exports forming part of the First Lot clearly constitute “export credit” and are fully eligible for the subvention under the Subvention Scheme. Any subsequent period of the credit before its redemption i.e. the period of delay in submission of the export documents after the expiry of the maximum period of export credit, would be the period for which the Borrower enjoyed subvention despite the expiry of the maximum permissible period under the Master Circular. The Subvention Scheme is very clear that the subvention would be available only until the date on which the export credit becomes overdue. Reversal of any subvention for such period of delay would be a natural requirement, and we hold that HDFC Bank’s first reaction on October 4, 2021 i.e. of reversing the subvention only for such delayed period was the correct approach that would get support under the Master Circular. HDFC Bank must compute the precise period of delay under each of the underlying exports and charge and effect the reversal of the subvention only for such period of delay insofar as export credit that financed the First Lot is concerned.
Second Lot - The application of the domestic lending rate along with penal interest can only come into effect, if exports do not materialise at all within 450 days.
The special rate applicable to export credit, and the benefits flowing from the Subvention Scheme would not be available to the Borrower in relation to the Second Lot. In any case, HDFC Bank had cash collateral in the form of the fixed deposits for the entire amount, and on the instructions of the Borrower, the cash collateral was to be liquidated and the loan was to be closed out. Any effect of the subvention becoming inapplicable would indeed need to be charged to the Borrower. It was the subvention reversal on the First Lot that led to a mismatch of figures between the two parties. Consequently, we are of the opinion that just as the subvention ought to be made available to the Borrower in relation to the First Lot, HDFC Bank was justified in reversing the subvention amount applicable to the exports underlying the Second Lot. We are unable to agree with Mr. Sridharan, who moulded his argument to submit that as and when the export eventually took place, at least the subvention for the first 450 days ought to be available.
Principle for Drawing a Line - The controversy is only about whether the export documents should be submitted within 450 days and whether the exports should materialize within 450 days.
We have articulated above that in our view, considering the objective of the Master Circular, the core requirement is for exports to have materialised within 450 days and the export documents evidencing the same ought to be submitted. If the export documents, even if submitted later, demonstrate that the exports indeed took place within 450 days, the fact that they were filed a few days late would not be fatal. One would be compelled to hold that the First Lot reasonably falls on the right side of the line. However, where not only have the exports not taken place at all within 450 days, but also the exporter himself has foreclosed the export credit within the 450-day period stating that it is unlikely to be completed within the period, we have no hesitation in holding that Second Lot does not reasonably fall on the right side of the line.
Conclusions and Directions -
a) The Master Circular is required to be read purposively, and is to be implemented in letter and spirit, in a manner that does not undermine its very objective and reason for introduction. It must not be read in a narrow, technical and literal sense and that too with one of its many provisions being read in a manner that undermines its objective;
b) The maximum tenure of pre-shipment credit under the Master Circular is 360 days (extended to 450 days during the Covid-19 pandemic) and exports have to materialise within such period;
c) If exports materialise within such period and export documents demonstrate that the exports have materialised, the credit advanced to the exporter would indeed not be disqualified for being treated as “export credit”, merely on the ground that the export documents that prove the timely materialisation of exports were submitted late;
d) The period of delay in submission of export documents would not be fatal to the treatment of the advances as “export credit” – what is vital is that the export documents ought to prove that exports took place within the stipulated period;
e) The credit enjoyed after the maximum permissible period of export credit i.e. during the period of the delay in submitting the export documents, would attract interest at the normal interest rate along with penal interest in terms of the bank’s policy (published pursuant to the Master Circular);
f) If exports did not materialise within the stipulated period (360 days, extended to 450 days), for purposes of the Master Circular, it would be treated as exports not materialising at all. In such event, the very purpose of providing short-term working capital to finance successful exports would be undermined if the credit extended were to be treated as export credit despite exports not having materialised. Therefore, the credit advanced ought not to be treated as “export credit”;
g) Consequently, subvention would be available to the Borrower in respect of the finance provided in relation to the First Lot;
h) Subvention would not be available to the Borrower in respect of the finance provided in relation to the Second Lot;
i) HDFC Bank shall rectify the reversal of the subvention pertaining to the First Lot within a period of four weeks from the date this judgement is uploaded on this Court’s official website;
j) Consequently, the RBI and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry shall reimburse HDFC Bank with the funds that correspond to the subvention reversal in relation to the First Lot having been corrected as above;
k) HDFC Bank shall within a period of four weeks from today, provide to the Borrower, a detailed statement of account and the computation of the manner in which it has worked out the dues owed and owing between them, in accordance with the declaration of the law in this judgement;
l) There shall be no change to the reversal of subvention in relation to the advances made in connection with the Second Lot.
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2025 (1) TMI 262
Civil revision under Section 86 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 challenging the order of Rajasthan Tax Board - exercise of jurisdiction under Section 22 A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act - HELD THAT:- Evidently, explanation II of Section 22 A of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954, makes it abundantly clear that “goods in transport” means goods which have been handed over to a carrier and complete delivery thereof has not taken from such carrier. In the case on hand, none of the five asserted consignee claimed that in fact they had purchased the goods as claimed by the petitioner. The addressee Satyam Enterprises gone to the extent of making complaint against act of the petitioner. Therefore, at the time of seizure, the goods was with the carrier as such was in transit and covered by the explanation of Section 22A.
Conclusion - The goods are considered in transit until delivery is confirmed by the consignee, and proper documentation is essential to avoid penalties.
This Court does not find any merit in this Civil Revision. Accordingly, this Civil Revision stands dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 261
Maintainability of appeal - requirement of 7.5% pre-deposit as a condition for appeal can be waived or interfered with by the court - HELD THAT:- It is clear from Manoranjan Chakraborty [2000 (11) TMI 1079 - SUPREME COURT] that the provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court. So much so, there was no exercise of power under article 142 in the Constitution to do complete justice, to permit the respondent to pay any lesser amount than 50%. Nevertheless, the Court said, it was clear that if gross injustice is done and it can be shown for good reason Court should interfere then notwithstanding alternative remedy, a writ Court can in an appropriate case exercise its jurisdiction to do substantive justice.
Conclusion - Statutory pre-deposit requirements are generally binding unless gross injustice is clearly demonstrated.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 260
Relevant time for filing an application - whether the time for filing a Section 17 application commences when the party seeking to challenge the award receives a formal notice (18.11.2022) of the making of the award, or from the date such party is aware of the existence of the award? - HELD THAT:- The respondents had notice of filing of the award due to the order dated 21.09.2022, wherein the District Court had directed the respondents to hand over the balance fee to the arbitrators, following which the award shall be furnished. The respondents were completely aware of this direction, which sufficiently states that clearing the fees will result in the court notifying the filing of award. The limitation for filing objections to the award is 30 days, and is governed by Article 119(b) of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The trigger for the limitation to start running specified therein is the date of service of notice of the filing of the award. Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act requires that the court of relevant jurisdiction should give notice to the concerned parties when an award is filed.
While Art. 119(b) of the Limitation Act requires that there be a ‘service of notice’ for the limitation to start running, Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act merely states that court ‘give notice’ to the parties. The precise form of what constitutes as a ‘notice’ of filing the award is unspecified. However, interpreted reasonably, what must be required is that the parties come to know about the existence of the award so that any objections to it may be filed. What appears from the usage of the word ‘notice’ is that the parties merely reach a state of awareness about the award and plan their next steps accordingly, and not the imposition of another procedural step.
The District Court and the High Court fell into error that the limitation for filing objections was still running when the appellant filed an application under Section 17 of the Act on 10.11.2022. The formal date of notice of filing of the award on the respondents, that is, 18.11.2022 holds no significance as they were made sufficiently aware of the award ’s filing on 21.09.2022 itself. The court directing the respondents to clear the fees was a clear intimation about its filing. Holding otherwise would not only be departing from precedents of this Court, but also allowing the respondents to take advantage of their own inaction. Hence, the limitation is to be treated as expired on 20.10.2022, and the appellant’s application seeking pronouncement of judgment in terms of the award was valid and well beyond the period for filing objections to the award.
Conclusion - The parties have to take steps to scrutinise the award themselves as soon as it becomes accessible and they are aware of its accessibility. The limitation period was deemed to have started on 21.09.2022, making the appellant's application under Section 17 timely and valid.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 259
Principles of natural justice - whether the High Court has correctly exercised its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in granting the respondent/claimant one more opportunity to crossexamine appellant/respondent’s witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal rejecting such a prayer? - HELD THAT:- Section 11 application was allowed by the High Court on 08.05.2023 leading to the constitution of the Tribunal which held the first hearing on 19.05.2023. It is evident that the cross-examination of the appellant/respondent’s witness RW-1 commenced on 09.12.2023 when the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked 9 questions on that very day and the cross was adjourned for 10.02.2024. On 10.02.2024, the record shows that the crossexamination commenced at 11 am and concluded by 7 pm during which time the respondent/claimant’s counsel asked as many as 104 questions to the said witness. After a long lapse of almost 8 months, during which period the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was exhausted, the cross-examination commenced on 01.10.2024. Even on that day the cross-examination was commenced at 5.35 pm and concluded at 7.40 pm, which is more than two hours.
The Arbitral Tribunal seems to have given full opportunity to all parties, which is amply evident from the record. On the other hand, the unrestrained cross-examination of RW-1 by the respondent/claimant has already exceeded 12 hours, but the respondent/claimant does not seem to be satisfied with it.
Even as per the quote hereinabove interference under Article 226/227 is ‘permissible only if the order is completely perverse i.e. that the perversity must stare in the face.’ Condition (vi) to (x) underscores the reason why High Courts ought not to interfere with orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunals for more than one reason.
Conclusion - There are no justification in the order passed by the High Court in interfering with the directions of the Arbitral Tribunal holding that full and sufficient opportunity to cross-examine RW-1 has already been given and no further extension of time is warranted.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 258
Estimation of income - Bogus purchases - result declared by the assessee in their return of income relied upon - AO Determined the commission from the alleged bogus parties relating to purchases and sales and made the addition - HELD THAT:- AO should have either rejected the books of account and determined the actual profit earned by the assessee. He chose to proceed with the result declared by the assessee in their return of income and also proceeded to make the presumed commission income which assessee must have paid and received.
We are not able to understand that the AO has retained the returned income as per the ROI and also made the commission income on top of the retuned income. Strictly speaking he has to determine the actual income earned by the assessee not on the basis of presumption. In that case, he has to rework the actual income earned by the assessee. As discussed above, the AO may have to reduce the bogus purchases and sales to the extent it is booked in the financial statements and must have added the commission income which is the payment presumed to have been made. The net result would have been lesser than the retuned income
AO has already proved that the purchases and sales as bogus based on the material found during the search and has already chose to treat them as bogus and cannot play hot and cold.
As discussed above, he has to determine the actual income earned by the assessee and can charge to tax only the actual returned income. It is allowed to make penalties as per the law and cannot presume or make additional income as the income of the assessee without their being actually earned by the assessee. It is different if the AO has not come to conclusion that the transactions are not genuine.
Therefore, after considering the factual matrix on this case, we are of the view that the gross taxable income cannot be less than the returned income filed by the assessee u/s 139(1) of the Act. In our view, the addition made by the Assessing Officer of commission and the elimination of bogus purchases and sales will reduce the taxable income. Therefore, we are inclined to delete the additions made by the Assessing Officer - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2025 (1) TMI 257
Revocation of cancellation of their GST registration - final order of cancellation fails to record or assign any reason in support of the allegations which stood leveled in the SCN and which preceded the passing of that order - Violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- As is manifest from a reading of the SCN of 26 December 2023, the respondents had failed to indicate any intent to cancel the registration from a retrospective date.
The final order of cancellation fails to record or assign any reason in support of the allegations which stood leveled in the SCN and which preceded the passing of that order. In view of the aforesaid, the order of 08 January 2024 is rendered wholly unsustainable.
As is manifest from a reading of the SCN of 26 December 2023, the respondents had failed to indicate any intent to cancel the registration from a retrospective date.
Conclusion - The entire procedure as adopted by the respondents appears to be wholly arbitrary.
The impugned order of 08 January 2024 cannot possibly be sustained - Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 256
Suspension of GST registration of petiitoner - non-consideration of reply - Violation of principles of natural jusice - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the petitioner is a registered dealer under the provisions of GST. The respondent has initiated an enquiry into certain alleged irregularities committed by the petitioner. The petitioner has replied to the said show cause notice. Under the said circumstances, it would be appropriate for the respondent to consider the reply of the petitioner and thereafter pass suitable orders in accordance with law and the act of respondent in suspending the GST registration of the petitioner pending enquiry would be too harsh on the petitioner as he would not be in the position to conduct his business and the enquiry may take some time.
The respondent is hereby directed to revoke the suspension of the GST registration of the petitioner which has been done as per show cause notice dated 14.10.2024.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 255
Challenge to order which has come to be passed and in terms of which a SCN dated 30 May 2024 pertaining to the tax period April 2019 to March 2020 has come to be finalized - HELD THAT:- While dealing with an identically worded order passed by the said officer, in XEROX INDIA LIMITED VERSUS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, WARD 208 (ZONE -11) DGST AND ANR [2024 (12) TMI 1283 - DELHI HIGH COURT] it was held that 'The Assistant Commissioner has clearly adopted a template where the only reason assigned is that the reply filed was “not comprehensible, conceivable, not perspicuous and is ambiguous”. This clearly exhibits an abject non-application of mind and the officer repeatedly employing identical phraseology to deal with such matters.' - the final order cannot be sustained.
The order dated 25 August 2024 is quashed - petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 254
Cancellation of registration of the petitioner - non filing of the GST return for a continuous period of six months - petitioner is ready to make the payment towards GST returns for a period of six months - HELD THAT:- In view of the consensus between the parties, the matter is covered by the order passed in Kiran Enterprises GSTIN Versus Commissioner, State Goods & Another [2024 (10) TMI 1306 - UTTARAKHAND HIGH COURT]], the present writ petition is also decided in terms of the said order.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 253
Challenge to order passed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 73 (9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 - HELD THAT:- While there is some contestation with respect to the participation of the petitioner in the hearings that ensued and on the different dates which were fixed by the Assistant Commissioner, for the purposes of the present writ petition, we find it unnecessary to delve into those aspects since, and in our considered opinion, the Assistant Commissioner has clearly taken an extremely narrow and pedantic view while refusing to accede to the prayer for adjournment. The authority has failed to assign any reason in support of its conclusion that the request for adjournment was unmerited.
The impugned order dated 16 August 2024 is quashed - petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 252
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - challenge to adjudication order passed under Section 73 (9) of the M.G.S.T. Act, 2017, the C.G.S.T. Act, 2017 read with Section 20 of the I.G.S.T. Act, 2017 and the allied enactments - HELD THAT:- It is afraiding, in the wake of the fact that an efficacious remedy of statutory appeal is available to the petitioner, accepting for the sake of arguments that his request seeking time to respond to the show cause notice was not considered favourably, there are no reason to make exception and exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The appellate authority would be able even to go into the stand of the petitioner of breach of principles of natural justice while passing the adjudication order - petition dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 251
Blocking the Electronic Credit Ledger (ECL) of the petitioner under Rule 86A of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 (CGST Rules) - absence of a pre-decisional hearing - HELD THAT:- The issue answered in favour of the petitioner- assessee in K-9-Enterprises’s case [2024 (10) TMI 491 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] where it was held that 'in the absence of valid nor sufficient material which constituted ‘reasons to believe’ which was available with respondents, the mandatory requirements/pre- requisites/ingredients/parameters contained in Rule 86A had not been fulfilled/satisfied by the respondents- revenue who were clearly not entitled to place reliance upon borrowed satisfaction of another officer and pass the impugned orders illegally and arbitrarily blocking the ECL of the appellant by invoking Rule 86A which is not only contrary to law but also the material on record and consequently, the impugned orders deserve to be quashed.'
Since no pre-decisional hearing was provided/granted by the respondents before passing the impugned order, coupled with the fact that the impugned order invoking Section 86A of the CGST Rules by blocking of the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner does not contain independent or cogent reasons to believe except by placing reliance upon the reports of Enforcement authority which is impermissible in law, since the same is on borrowed satisfaction as held by the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court, the impugned order deserves to be quashed.
It is also pertinent to note that in the impugned order except stating that “a registered supplier who has been found to be non-existent or not to be conducting business from his place of registration", no other reasons are forthcoming in the impugned order. On this ground also, the impugned order dated 06.06.2024 deserves to the quashed.
Conclusion - The impugned order is quashed, since no pre-decisional hearing was provided/granted by the respondents before passing the impugned order, coupled with the fact that the impugned order invoking Section 86A of the CGST Rules by blocking of the Electronic credit ledger of the petitioner does not contain independent or cogent reasons to believe.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 250
Short payment of Goods and Services Tax - adjudication of challenge to appellate order - HELD THAT:- The first Division Bench in M/S. MAA TARINI TRADERS, M/S. SURA CONSTRUCTION, M/S. SMT. AMULU PATRO, M/S. THE NATIONAL SMALL INDUSTRIES CORPORATION LIMITED, ASHISH MOHANTY, M/S. V.S.T. TILLERS TRACTORS LIMITED, NIRANJAN PRADHAN VERSUS STATE OF ODISHA & OTHERS, JOINT COMMISSIONER OF STATE TAX, & ANOTHER, CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF C.T. & G.S.T., ODISHA, CENTRAL BOARD OF INDIRECT TAXES AND CUSTOMS (CBIC) , DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MINISTRY OF FINANCE & OTHERS, C.T. & G.S.T. OFFICER, CUTTACK-I [2024 (2) TMI 1421 - ORISSA HIGH COURT] directed a quantum of deposit with liberty to parties in as much as, petitioner could avail of its remedy upon constitution of the Tribunal and in event it does not do so within time provided upon reconstitution, the department would be free to proceed.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (1) TMI 249
Jurisdiction to invoke section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 - suppression on the part of the petitioner with regard to invoices raised upon National Highway Authority of India or not - HELD THAT:- It was pointed out from the impugned show-cause notice by the learned advocate for the petitioner that no details are given with regard to alleged suppression of the facts by the petitioner.
The petitioner has made out a very good prima facie case for granting interim relief during the pendency of this petition. Therefore, the respondents may proceed with the hearing of the show-cause notice but no final order shall be passed without permission of this Court during the pendency of this petition.
Stand over to 4th September, 2024. To be listed on top of the Board.
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2025 (1) TMI 248
Declination to grant any interim order and direction has been issued to file the affidavits - cancellation of appellant’s registration under the GST Act on the ground that the appellant was not carrying on business in the place mentioned in the registration certificate - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the appellant did not comply with the procedure as stated in section 28(1) of the WBGST Act, 2017 as well as Rule 19(1) of the WBGST Rules 2017. Considering the fact that the registration of the appellant was granted several years back, this Court is of the view that one more opportunity can be granted to the appellant to go before the original authority viz., the Assistant Commissioner, State Tax, Government of West Bengal, Serampore Charge and file the appropriate application in the appropriate form along with all supportive documents. If the same is filed, the original authority viz., the Assistant Commissioner shall consider the said application and decide the same on merits uninfluenced by any observation made by the appellate authority in the earlier order.
Appeal disposed off.
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