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Showing 221 to 240 of 467 Records
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2025 (1) TMI 247
Reopening of assessment - Period of limitation to issue notice issued u/s 148A(b) - scope of notices issued u/s 148 of the new regime between July and September 2022 - Application of TOLA to the Income Tax Act after 1 April 2021 - As decided by HC [2023 (2) TMI 1378 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] allowed assessee appeal quashing and setting aside the notice issued u/s 148 alongwith the order u/s 148A(d) of the self-same date.
HELD THAT:- The issue involved in these Special Leave Petitions are squarely covered by the Judgment of this Court rendered in “Union of India & Ors. vs. Rajeev Bansal” [2024 (10) TMI 264 - SUPREME COURT (LB)]
The petitions filed by the Revenue are disposed of. The assessee will be governed by reasons discussed in the said Judgment. AO will dispose of the objections in terms of the law laid down by this Court. Thereafter, the assessee who is aggrieved will be at liberty to pursue all the rights and remedies in accordance with law, save and except for the issues which have been concluded in the Judgment.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
Cases, which fall less than the value of Rs.50,00,000/- would have to be dropped - All that the assessee has to do now is to point out to the assessing officer that he is covered by para 7 of the High Court’s judgment [2024 (10) TMI 1623 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT] and the proceedings be dropped as the tax liability is less than Rs.50 lakh subject to verification of this particular fact. Special Leave Petition stands disposed of.
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2025 (1) TMI 246
Excise duty refund and interest subsidy - full credit of challans deposited by the petitioner had not been given by the assessing officer due to wrong PAN number mentioned in the challans by the petitioner - petitioner has mentioned on the challans TAN number instead of PAN number - HELD THAT:- We are inclined to dispose of this petition by directing the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax, Circle-1, Jammu to ensure that the necessary correction in the challan as stated above is carried out with or without the approval of the Chief Commissioner Income Tax, Amritsar within a period of two weeks and the amount payable to the petitioner is released.
We also make it clear that in case no approval is received by the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax Appeals for correction of an inadvertent and clerical error in the challans from the office of the Chief Commissioner Income Tax, Amritsar, the approval, as may be required, shall be deemed to have been granted and the Deputy Commissioner Income Tax, Circle-1, Jammu shall be competent to carry out the necessary correction and release the amount payable to the petitioner.
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2025 (1) TMI 245
Delay in filing the application u/a 119 (2) (b) - respondent no. 1 rejected the application seeking condonation of delay filed u/s 119 (2) (b) as it was beyond the period of six years from the end of the Assessment Year as stipulated in the CBDT Circular No. 09/2015 thereby holding that the same is not maintainable - HELD THAT:- We find the petitioner has been diligent enough in pursuing the claim for a refund. In fact, it is material to note that the payments made to the petitioner by the Government of UP were delayed on account of the dispute which had to be referred to arbitration. Pursuant to the arbitral award payments were made to the petitioner in different tranches. The petitioner had filed a claim for refund with respondent No. 3 within the stipulated period.
However, respondent No. 3 did not have jurisdiction to process the claim as the same was for more than Rs. 10,00,000/-. The claim of the petitioner for the Assessment Year 2015-16 in respect of the very same contract was processed and refund was granted. In the meantime, there was outbreak of COVID pandemic. We are satisfied that a case making out compelling circumstances for filing the return belatedly is made out in the application filed by the petitioner.
In the present facts, the petitioner has made out a case for condoning the delay in filing the application u/s 119 (2) (b) before the CBDT. There are adequate circumstances on record justifying the delay in filing application and hence, looking at the compelling reasons for the delay in filing the application the claim of the applicant ought to have been considered by the respondents on merits.
Petition is accordingly allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 244
Stay and review application rejected - not providing a reasoned and speaking order while rejecting the applications - HELD THAT:- The respondent authorities has passed the assessment order dated 31.03.2024 passed u/s 143 (3) of the Income Tax Act 1961 along with copy of demand notice issued u/s 156 of the Income Tax Act 1961 against the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner has filed an application under Section 220 (6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 filed on 29.04.2024 before respondent No. 3. The respondent- No. 3 has not decided the case on the basis of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss caused to the petitioner, Genuine hardship, CBDT instruction and hi-pitched assessment.
Respondent No. 3 rejected the application without reasoned and speaking order on 14.06.2024. Subsequently, aggrieved of the same, the petitioner has filed review application before the respondent No. 2/PCIT (Central) Bhopal. The respondent No. 2 has also not decided the review application on merits and passed the order to pay 20% of the tax liability by way of installments in 5 months on. 18.10.2024. Thus, the impugned orders dated 14.06.2024 and 18.10.2024 are non-speaking orders.
AO has not adopted the correct procedure in deciding the stay application and review application of the petitioner and has not followed the guidelines as stated in KEC International Ltd. [2001 (3) TMI 32 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and in UTI Mutual Fund [2012 (3) TMI 333 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] and also M/s Aarti Sponge & Power Ltd. [2018 (4) TMI 1284 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT]
Thus matter is remitted to the respondent No. 2 to consider the stay application afresh/review application.
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2025 (1) TMI 243
Penalty u/s 271B - failure of the assessee to get accounts audited in respect of the previous year as required u/s 44AB but before specified due date i.e. due date for filing the return of income - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the audit of Financial Year 2016-17 was completed in March 2019 & obviously the audit of Financial Year 2017-18 cannot be done prior to that. We find force in the arguments of the assessee that under the above peculiar circumstances of the case the assessee was prevented by reasonable & genuine cause for not getting the books of accounts completed & audited in time. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the assessee was prevented by sufficient & reasonable cause for not getting the books of accounts audited in time.
As relying on APL (INDIA) PRIVATE LIMITED VERSUS JCIT (OSD) -8(1), MUMBAI [2014 (4) TMI 206 - ITAT MUMBAI] we hold that the assessee in the instant case was prevented by reasonable cause in not getting the accounts audited in time and accordingly, we direct the Assessing Officer to delete the penalty levied u/s 271B of the IT Act. Thus, the ground of appeal filed by the assessee is allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 242
Revision u/s 263 - AO had added the Fair Market Value (FMV) of the property to the total income of the assessee u/s 56(2)(x) - PCIT observed that the AO should have added u/s 56(2)(x) and actual purchase consideration as unexplained investment u/s 69A - HELD THAT:- Assessee failed to explain the nature and source of investment with necessary supporting evidences. Action of the PCIT is in accordance with clear statutory provisions of the Act. Clause (x) of Section 56(2) expands the scope of income from other sources w.e.f. AY.2017-18 and subsequent year to provide that receipt of the sum of money or property by any person without consideration or for inadequate consideration in excess of Rs. 50,000/- shall be chargeable to tax in the hands of recipient under the head “Income from other sources”.
AO should have taxed Rs. 14,93,393/- and not the entire Stamp Duty Value (SVA) u/s 56(2)(x) of the Act. Moreover, AO should have added Rs. 33,18,000/- u/s 69 because assessee did not offer explanation about the nature and source of the investment which was not recorded in his books of account. As held in case of Malabar Industries Co [2000 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT] an incorrect application of law will satisfy the requirement of the order being erroneous. Hence, the PCIT has rightly involved provisions of section 263 of the Act.
Whether directions of PCIT in the order u/s 263 of the Act are in order? - We find that there is confirmation and ledger account from the builder, M/s N. Rose Developers Pvt. Ltd., who has accepted payments from the appellant and also signed the documents. The said documents are the basis for the re-opening the assessment u/s 147 of the Act as well as revision proceedings u/s 263 of the Act. It is also a fact that in the payment receipts, different flats numbers are mentioned. It is also submitted that payments for purchase of flat were made from 09.11.2011 to 15.02.2020. Hence, all investments were not made in the current assessment year. Therefore, the addition of the total amount cannot be made in the subject assessment year.
We also find that the facts as stated in different stages are contrary to each other, which require further clarification and verification to come to a correct conclusion. Therefore, in the interest of justice and fair play, the matter is set aside to the file of PCIT to make further inquiry with respect to the year of purchase, purchase cost and date-wise payments etc. to determine the amount of investment u/s 69. For statistical purpose, the appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 241
Validity of reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Whether the appellant was rightly assessed u/s 148/147 despite the existence of Section 153C, which pertains to assessments following search and seizure operations?
HELD THAT:- As foremost substantive ground seeking to quash section 148/147 proceedings and find no merit therein. This is for the precise reasons that case law PCIT Vs Naveen Gupta [2024 (11) TMI 1071 - DELHI HIGH COURT] holds that even if section 153C contains a non-obstate clause, the same does not bar a learned assessing authority to invoke re-opening u/s 148/147 of the Act. This is also coupled with the fact that the assessee has not filed the corresponding search records and panchanama so as to satisfy the rigor of Section 153C.
Suffice to say, a perusal of the case file suggests that the learned Assessing Authority herein had recorded the corresponding reasons based on tangible material comprising of the evidence collected in post such enquiries and statements recorded from various persons. We further emphasize here that the department’s allegation against the assessee right from the beginning is that he had indulged in various accommodation entries outside India in collusion with the searched person Shri Manish Jain. CIT-DR vehemently submits that the appellant herein has not even filed his bank statement right from scrutiny till date resulting this factual position. She also quotes Section 124(3) of the Act that even the assessee is precluded from challenging the Assessing Officer’s jurisdiction as per Abishek Jain [2018 (6) TMI 211 - DELHI HIGH COURT].
We find merit in the Revenue’s instant arguments that the learned assessing authority not only went by the relevant tangible materials initiating section 148/147 proceedings but also it’s jurisdiction could not be questioned at this stage in the foregoing terms.
Departmental authorities herein had not served any notice during the course of assessment, and therefore, the same deserves to be quashed - No substance therein as he has neither challenged the AO’s action taking recourse to Section 144 proceedings by filing all the relevant notice, nor his passport details form part of records before us. We further wish to clarify there is no clarity in the case file that the US based authority had ever detained him during his alleged overseas trip.
Imposition of penalty u/s 271(1)(C) for concealment of income - The assessee has admittedly not filed any reasonable explanation; much less a convincing u/s 271(1)(c) Explanation 1(A) (B) so as to get out of the rigor of concealment and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income therein. We thus quote MAK Data (P) Limited [2013 (11) TMI 14 - SUPREME COURT] to conclude that the learned lower authorities have rightly levied the impugned penalty in his case this “lead” penalty appeal which also stands upheld.
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2025 (1) TMI 240
Revision u/s 263 - Validity of assessment framed u/sec.153C - consolidated satisfaction note has been prepared for many assessment years - HELD THAT:- Since in the instant case a consolidated satisfaction note has been prepared for assessment years 2012-2013 to 2018-2019, therefore, the consolidation satisfaction note being not in accordance with law, therefore, the entire assessment proceedings is liable to be quashed. We hold accordingly and quash the assessment.
There is also no dispute to the fact that two searches have taken place and there is only one satisfaction note i.e., a combined satisfaction note in the case of Yuvraj Dhamale Group of cases has been recorded, on the basis of which, notice u/sec.153C was issued to the assessee. However, no separate satisfaction note was recorded in the case of Shri Sachin Nahar that any books of account or documents seized or requisitioned pertains or pertain to or any information contained therein relates to the assessee. Therefore, no addition could have been made in the hands of the assessee without resorting to the provisions of either sec.147/148 or sec.153C of the Act.
Once the assessment framed u/sec.153C r.w.s.143(3) is held to be void being not in accordance with law on account of a combined satisfaction note for assessment years 2012-2013 to 2018-2019 instead of separate satisfaction note, no addition could have been made in the hands of the assessee on the basis of the email dated 19.03.2021 without issuing a separate notice u/sec.153C or resorting to provisions of sec.148. Therefore, we do not find any error in the order of the Assessing Officer.
For invoking the provisions of sec.263 of the Act, the twin conditions i.e., the assessment order must be erroneous and the order is prejudicial to the interest of Revenue must be satisfied as held in the case of Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd [2000 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT] - In the instant case, the order is certainly not erroneous, even though it may be prejudice to the interest of the Revenue. Therefore, the twin conditions are not satisfied and the PCIT, in our opinion, cannot invoke the provisions of sec.263 - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2025 (1) TMI 239
Revision u/s 263 - Taxability of the investments in the hands of the trust u/s 56(2)(x) - assessment of trust - relatives inclusions in the beneficiaries - whether transactions involved in this case are out of the purview of section 56(2)(x) as the trust has been established exclusively for the family members covered in the definition of relative?
HELD THAT:- Assessee has made only submissions with respect to the non-taxability of interest in partnership firm, the assessee has no where mentioned any thing about the receipt of preference shares and equity shares of M/s Silver Needle hospitality. The AO has also not conducted any query nor raise any further question as regard to the applicability of the provisions of section 56(2)(vii) explanation (d) vis-à-vis preference shares and equity shares.AO has also failed to see the applicability of the provisions of section 45(4) of the Income Tax Act as they stood at the relevant times.
It was the abundant duty of the AO to examine the valuation of shares of partnership firms, adopted by the settlor for crediting the capital account of assessee in those firms and the taxability of the same in the hands of the firms and vice versa, which the AO has not done in this case. Therefore, it is a complete case of lack of enquiry. It is settled position of law that tax planning is permissible if it is done within the four corners of law but tax evasion is not permissible.
Whether amount received is not taxable in terms of section 56(x) as the same has been received for the benefit of relative? - We don’t find any infirmity in the view of the PCIT in as much as it is evident from the clauses of the trust deed that the benefits of the trust were not restricted to relatives only. The benefit of the amount received was not restricted to the family members and hence the view of the AO is not plausible view therefore the PCIT is correct in law in holding the order as prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
What was received is not covered by the definition of term “property” as given in explanation(d) of section 56(2)(vii)? - whether interest in partnership firm is covered in the meaning of expression “property”? - There are so many differences between expression share and securities therefore one cannot say that they are synonyms. The additional differences highlight the complexities and nuances of shares and securities, and demonstrate the importance of understanding the specific characteristics of each.
Expression shares and securities as used in explanation(d) of section 56(2)(vii) denotes two different type of properties these properties are distinct and hence the term “and” used between them carries a meaning of “or”. There are so many judicial pronouncements wherein it has been held that “and” can be read as “or” when the interpretation requires so.
In the present case the context in which the term shares and securities has been used it is abundantly clear that “and” should be read as “or”. Further literal interpretation in the present case is also giving an absurd meaning therefor we are of the firm opinion that the expression “and” used here should be read as “or”
Case laws where it has been held that terms 'or' and 'and' can be interchangeably interpreted to fulfil the legislative intent.
We are of the view that term “and” is to be read as “or”. And if that be so then whether interest in partnership firm falls in the category of “shares” as used in explanation (d) of section 56(2)(vii). What is “interest in partnership firm” has been decided by so many judicial pronouncements wherein this expression has been interpreted of expression. We have already noted somewhere else that term shares as used in explanation-2 of section 56(2)(vii) is not restricted to the shares of companies only, rather it is wide enough to mean a part or portion of something. For instance, "sharing" refers to dividing or giving out portions of something among several people..
Merely because some expression is missing we cannot restrict the meaning of a word. It is settled position of law that that words should not be overly restricted; their meaning can be shaped by the context in which they are used. Legal texts, contracts, or laws often define words, but if a specific definition is not provided, courts or authorities may interpret the word according to its common usage or the broader context. Therefore we have to take the common meaning of word “share”.
As interest in partnership firm” falls in the category of “shares” and the same is covered by the provisions of explanation (d) of section 56(2)(vii). Therefore, we reject the contentions of assessee that interest in partnership firm is out of the purview of section 56(2)(X).
Whether amount was not received without consideration? - No merit in this contention in view of the fact that it is not merely a case of receipt of an amount, rather a case where on the same date the assessee has been given rights in the partnership firms and the erstwhile partner has been retired. In fact, assessee has been made owner of the partnership firms without paying any penny. In fact, it is a finding of fact that no actual money has been transferred to the account of the assessee rather shares of M/s Silver Niddle has been transferred and capital account of the assessee has been credited in the partnership firms by reconstituting the partnership firms.
Amount received by the trust is received under fiduciary capacity and hence not taxable and trust via trustee does not have any right to enjoy the receipt as owner - We don’t find any merit in these arguments, there are provisions under the Income Tax Act which are meant exclusively for the purpose of taxation of Private Discretionary trusts. For instance, section 165 specify the tax rates applicable to a trust section 164A provides charge of tax in case of oral trust etc.
Provisions of section 56(2)(X) are not applicable to genuine transactions - In the facts of the present case, two important facts which are missing in other cases are that the assessee in this case has received the amounts without consideration for the benefits of non-relatives, secondly the assessee has been made partner in those firms where the settlor was having substantial interest. In order to circumvent the provisions of section 45, which deals with the chargeability of capital gains under various circumstances, the assessee has adopted a route of transferring the assets of Partnership firm thorough layers of companies and juristic entities. Therefore, we are not convenience with the arguments of the assessee.
Validity of Revision u/s 263 - The position of facts and law as discussed above would prove beyond doubt that the present case the order of the AO is erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interest of revenue. AO has passed the order without making enquiries which should have been made by him. It is equally true that in final stage of assessment, the assessee has not disclosed the transferee of shares of private limited company along with interest in partnership firm in categorical terms.
Here we would like to make a reference to the decision of Every stone [1994 (7) TMI 36 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT] wherein it has been held that non application of mind by the AO to the legal issues would justify action of section 263. Assessee appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 238
Validity of reassessment proceedings initiated as time-barred under the amended provisions u/s 149(1) - HELD THAT:- The notices issued to the assessee in present case are barred by limitation under the new provision of Section 149(1) of the Act is not covered under TOLA. Accordingly, all the notices are quashed being barred by limitation.Appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 237
Denial of Credit for Foreign Tax paid - Form No.67 was filed belatedly, i.e., beyond the due date for filing of the return of income - Directory v/s mandatory provision - HELD THAT:- Form No.67 was not filed within the due date for filing of the return of income under the provisions of section 139(1), but Form No.67 was filed on 22.03.2019. The CPC, Bangalore had processed the return of income as on 23.05.2020, which means that Form No.67 was very much available with the CPC, Bangalore. Therefore, the CPC, Bangalore cannot deny the claim for credit for foreign tax paid merely because Form No.67 was not filed within the due date specified for filing the return of income under the provisions of section 139(1) of the Act, as it is merely a directory. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2025 (1) TMI 236
Penalty u/s 271D - violation of Section 269SS - sale of ancestral agricultural property in cash - HELD THAT:- We find that the assessee along with others has sold an ancestral property (agricultural property). During the course of proceedings, the assessee explained his shares were received in cash. The assessee was under the honest and Bonafide belief that the agricultural property sold to his relatives who are agriculturists is not covered u/s 269SS - assessee was also under the honest and Bonafide belief that as the agricultural land is exempt u/s 2(14) of the Act, the sale proceeds received from the agricultural land is exempt and therefore, sale proceeds received from sale of such agricultural lands is also not covered u/s 269SS.
There was no intention whatsoever to generate unaccounted money/black money as the assessee had recorded the entire receipt of cash in the registered sale deed and duly disclosed the same not only in the return of income but also during the course of assessment proceedings.
AO has also accepted the returned income while passing order u/s 143(3) of the Act. In view of the aforesaid reasoning and judicial pronouncements cited, we hold that the fact of the instant case penalty u/s 271D of the Act is not warranted and accordingly, we delete the same - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2025 (1) TMI 235
Mis-declaration of imported goods - whether the appellant CHA was a party to the entire illegal exercise done by the other three co-noticees? - HELD THAT:- In the absence of any evidence brought on record by the Adjudicating Authority, the Tribunal ought not to have confirmed the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority. The Tribunal has not independently assessed the factual position. As pointed out earlier, even in the show cause notice, there was no substantial allegation against the appellant that he connived with the other three persons to mis-declare the goods. Therefore, the finding rendered by the Tribunal to be perverse qua the facts and circumstances of the case.
The orders passed by the Tribunal as well as the Adjudicating Authority are set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 234
Error in not considering that, in the entire show cause notice John Miranda and Rakesh Magoo or the importer have never given any statement alleging that the petitioner was aware of the alleged mis-declaration of value - Department proceeded on the basis of assumption, presumption and surmise in the matter without any evidence or not - failure to consider that the petitioner after obtaining the authorization from the importer viz. M/s. Surya Trading Co., Delhi in course of ordinary business filed the bill of entry on the basis of the invoice, packing list, bill of lading, import-export code number etc. provided by the importer - HELD THAT:- As could be seen from the order of adjudication, the allegations against the appellant are very specific and has been noted in paragraph of the Order-in-Original, which is the basis on which show cause notice was issued. Thereafter, liberty was granted to the appellant to file their reply and they were personally heard in the matter and the Order-in-Original was passed. The adjudicating authority in paragraphs in 33.2 and 33.3 has clearly brought out the modus adopted by the appellant and how the appellant was a party to the entire under valuation exercise. This factual finding has been affirmed by the Learned Tribunal.
There are no questions of law, much less substantial questions of law, arising for consideration in this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 233
Fulfilment of export obligation under the EPCG License within the time extended by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) - jurisdiction to question the discharge certificate issued by the DGFT - confiscation - penalties - extended period of limitation.
HELD THAT:- The appellant had initially fulfilled the export obligation after including the exports made through Sundram Export and DGFT by a letter dated 10.05.1999 confirmed that the appellant had fulfilled the export obligation. After the appellant came to know that the export of CD-ROMs made by Sundram Exports was being disputed by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the appellant made further exports after the initial time granted by DGFT was extended upto 31.03.2002, and fulfilled the export obligation after excluding the exports made by Sundram Export. In respect of this License, the Commissioner did not accept the plea of the appellant that it had fulfilled export obligation since the appellant had earlier written to DGFT that it had fulfilled its export obligation and DGFT by a letter dated 10.05.1999 had discharged the appellant from the export obligation.
So long as the time period for discharging the obligation under the EPCG License dated 29.12.1994 was extended by DGFT and the appellant fulfilled its obligation under the License before the expiry of the said extended period, it cannot be urged by the custom authorities that the appellant had not fulfilled its export obligation. It does not matter if the appellant had made further exports to fulfill the export obligation after discarding the exports made by Sundram Exports. This step was taken by the appellant as a matter of abundant caution when it came to the knowledge of the appellant that the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence was examining the over-valuation of goods by Sundram Exports. The finding recorded by the Commissioner that this was done in a fraudulent manner by the appellant is without any basis. In fact, DGFT did not question this act of the appellant and in fact issued the discharge certificate.
It clearly transpires from the aforesaid judgment of the Delhi High Court in Designco [2024 (11) TMI 1150 - DELHI HIGH COURT] that custom authorities cannot go behind the benefits availed, in the absence of any adjudication having been undertaken by DGFT. In other words, an action for recovery of benefits claimed and availed would have to necessarily be preceded by an order of the competent authority under the FDTR Act that the certificate or script had been illegally obtained.
Conclusion - The customs authorities cannot question the discharge certificate issued by DGFT in respect of the obligation to be fulfilled by the appellant under EPCG License dated 29.12.1994, unless DGFT itself takes a prior decision that the appellant had not discharged the obligation under the said EPCG License.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 232
Violation of conditions of the exemption Notification No. 146/94-Cus by National Rifle Association of India (appellant) - sale of imported arms and ammunition to State Rifle Associations and District Clubs instead of using them directly for national or international competitions - confiscation - interest - penalty.
Violation of conditions of the exemption Notification No. 146/94-Cus by National Rifle Association of India (appellant) - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of the notification nowhere shows that there is any 'Actual User' condition. All that is stated is that the goods should be used for national or international championships or competitions. The notification does not say that the importer itself must use them for the purpose. Evidently, when a National Sports Federation imports goods, it does not itself conduct all the championships and competitions directly. It will work through its constituent State and District bodies. There is nothing in the notification which even remotely suggests that such use is not acceptable. There is no finding in the impugned order that they have not been used for the purpose, but there is only a finding that they were not used by the appellant itself. It would have been a different case if the appellant had sold the imported goods in the market or to individuals. The use of the arms and ammunition in such a case could have been doubted. To accept the Commissioner's reasoning one would have to read in the notification after the words 'use', the words 'by the importer' which cannot be permitted.
Confiscation - HELD THAT:- There is no violation of the exemption Notification No. 146/94-Cus by the appellant. The finding that the imported goods were liable to confiscation needs to be set aside.
Demand of duty and interest - HELD THAT:- The basis of the demand of duty is also that the appellant had violated the conditions of the Notification No. 146/94-Cus which have been found to be not correct. Consequently, the demand of duty and interest need to be set aside.
Penalty under section 114A - HELD THAT:- Penalty under section 114A of the Customs Act can imposed if duty is not paid or short paid by reason of fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement. Since it has been found that the demand of duty is not sustainable, penalty under section 114A also needs to be set aside.
Conclusion - There is no 'Actual User' condition" in the notification, and the goods were used for the intended purpose, thus no violation occurred.
The impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 231
Redemption fine and penalty - compliance with the Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011 - Applicability of Sections 111(d) and 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 - HELD THAT:- The appellant has not complied with the labelling requirements of the Legal metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011. There was a failure on the part of the appellant in not producing the Registration Certificate from the Legal Metrology Department when the imported goods landed. Thus, appellant contravened the provisions of Foreign Trade Policy 2009--2014. This contravention automatically entails the confiscability of the goods under Section 111 (d) of the Customs Act, 1962 as it is an ‘improper’, hence the appellant is also liable for penal action under Section 112 (a) of the Act. The Ld. Appellate Authority has also observed that it was only a procedural delay on the part of the appellant as the Registration Certificate was able to be obtained and produced later on i.e., after the arrival of the goods.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case as the appellant had applied for registration but could not get the Registration Certificate in time, the ends of justice would meet if redemption fine imposed is further reduced to Rs.30,000/- and also penalty imposed under Section 112 (a) is reduced to Rs.5,000/-.
Conclusion - It was only a procedural delay on the part of the appellant as the Registration Certificate was able to be obtained and produced later on i.e., after the arrival of the goods.
The appeal is partly allowed.
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2025 (1) TMI 230
Jurisdiction of High Court to transfer the Company Petition to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) 2016 - winding-up proceedings makes it appropriate or feasible to transfer the case to the NCLT or not - HELD THAT:- This Court passed the winding up order on 21.09.2015 and the Liquidator was appointed. Since, nothing substantial could be achieved towards liquidation of the available assets of debtor company, this Court on the suggestions of stake holders ordered a meeting of Department of State Excise, official Liquidator and Bank of India (lead bank for consortium of creditors). Eventually, the creditors arrived at consensus and this Court passed an order dated 02.08.2019 authorizing Excise and Taxation Department of the State to conduct sale proceedings on the assets of debtor company.
In ACTION ISPAT AND POWER PVT. LTD. VERSUS SHYAM METALICS AND ENERGY LTD. [2020 (12) TMI 535 - SUPREME COURT], the power of Company Court to transfer the matters before it dealing with winding up of the companies to NCLT under Section 434(1) (c) of Companies Act, 2013.
This Court is having the jurisdiction to transfer Company Petition No.13 of 2014 to NCLT subject, however, to a condition that the winding up proceedings have not reached a stage where it would be irreversible, making it impossible to set the clock back - thus, partial sales of the assets of debtor company have already been made. Noticeably, the third party rights (auction purchaser) have come into being. There are pending issues with respect to confirmation of sales already effected.
Conclusion - An irreversible situation has been created as partial sales of assets have been effected and a substantial amount has already been collected, therefore, it will not be in the interest of justice to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant-SBI.
Application dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 229
Rejection of claim filed by the Appellant - whether the RP had committed any irregularity in rejecting the claim of the Appellant for being belated and for being claim of such nature that it required adjudication which was beyond the jurisdiction of the RP? - HELD THAT:- In the present case, it is noticed that after the Corporate Debtor was admitted into the rigours of CIRP on 13.12.2021. The Interim Resolution Professional had undisputedly made a Public Announcement on 17.12.2021 in compliance with Sections 13 and 15 of the IBC read with Regulation 6 of CIRP Regulations. The Public Announcement had set 27.12.2021 as the deadline for claim submissions. The Appellant never filed their claim within the time stipulated by the Public Announcement or within the extended timeline of 90 days as provided by the Regulation 12 of CIRP Regulations. The Appellant had filed their claim on 12.09.2023 which was much beyond the extended period of 90 days. From material on record, it is therefore abundantly clear that a lot of time elapsed since the date of issue of public announcement inviting claim and the actual filing of claim by the Appellant.
Despite having filed their claim belatedly, the Appellant has put the blame on the RP for having dealt with the claims and rejected the same within 3 days - There is no material to either believe that the RP acted in a manner hurriedly pushing the plans for consideration of the CoC or having deliberately orchestrated to stall the claim of the Appellant.
It is a well settled precept that there is a catena of judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court wherein it has been held that no surprise claims should be flung on the resolution applicant. The logic behind this precept is that all necessary details should find place in the Information Memorandum so that the potential resolution applicants are fully aware of the liabilities that they may have to provide for in their resolution plan towards satisfying whole or part of such liabilities and to also revive the corporate debtor. In the present case too, when the claims have been filed belatedly after 548 days and that too the claims arise from damages and breach of contract which according to the Appellant is admittedly contingent, the RP’s action to reject the claim by way of a reasoned reply to the Appellant cannot be put to fault - there are no justifiable reason to doubt the bonafide of the RP in not admitting the claim of the Appellant. The Adjudicating Authority had not committed any error in the given facts and circumstances in not acceding to the request of the Appellant for admission of their claims.
Conclusion - The RP does not possess adjudicatory powers and must adhere to statutory timelines for claim submission to ensure a timely resolution process.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (1) TMI 228
Direction for fresh valuation of intangible assets after the approval of a Resolution Plan - seeking direction to permit the revised Resolution Plan to be reconsidered which has been rightly rejected by the Adjudicating Authority noticing the submissions of the Resolution Professional that it is open for the Appellant to submit Resolution Plan in pursuance of fresh Form G - HELD THAT:- There is no dispute between the parties that initially Resolution Plan filed by the Appellant was approved on 30.12.2019 and Resolution Professional has also filed IA No.102 of 2020 for approval of the Resolution Plan. Unsecured financial creditor filed an IA No.1434 of 2020 seeking direction for valuation of intangible assets of the corporate debtor. It was also prayed that the Resolution Plan be sent back to the CoC for reconsideration. IA No.1434 of 2020 was allowed by the Adjudicating Authority on 04.08.2023 copy of which has been filed as Annexure A-6. Adjudicating Authority issued direction for valuation of intangible assets.
It is relevant to notice that the order dated 11.03.2024 was not challenged by any stakeholders including the Appellant. The order dated 11.03.2024 dismissing IA No.102 of 2020 for approval of the Resolution Plan as infructuous and the Adjudicating Authority having directed for issuance of Form G and the said order having not been challenged, the order dated 11.03.2024 has become final and it is not open for the Appellant to now claim any right on the basis of its earlier Resolution Plan.
The order impugned noticing the statement of Resolution Professional that Appellant can very well participate in the process has rightly observed that the grievance of the Appellant stands addressed and the IA has become meaningless. As noted above, the orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority dated 04.08.2023 directing for revaluation and placing the plan of the Appellant for voting was never challenged. After the order dated 04.08.2023, Appellant has submitted its revised Resolution Plan which was considered and was not approved by the CoC which is clear from 22nd CoC meeting. Direction to issue fresh Form G was in consequence of non-approval of the Resolution Plan of the Appellant - Appellant was free to participate in the fresh process initiated by issuance of Form G on 11.04.2024.
Conclusion - i) The Intangible Assets of the Corporate Debtor shall be valued and categorized separately. ii) The CoC's commercial wisdom in rejecting the revised offer was upheld as a legitimate exercise of its discretion.
Appeal dismissed.
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